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ABSTRACT 
Military technology change is a subject of enormous diversity and profound complexity. 
To reduce the topic to some ordered form the thesis discusses military technological 
changes in one period; the American Civil War from 1861 to 1865. 
The thesis also contends that military technology cannot be studied in purely physical 
terms. Only in conjunction with environmental elements can we fully comprehend 
technical change. This will enable us to make sense of technology as both a technical 
entity constructed from existing scientific knowledge, and as a human activity 
interacting with the surrounding environment. 
The thesis argues that during the war it was possible to establish how non—technical 
factors concentrated development on traditional weapons technology. Subsequently, 
technical growth was mainly low risk, cumulative, and based on established technology. 
Over five years, however, wartime innovations still produced significant advances in 
technical knowledge. The ultimate success of changes to wartime military technology 
can therefore be understood by using innovation as a guide. From such a basis one can 
progress beyond the examination of an individual entity, to also assess the overall 
innovation process within which technological development occurred. 
The inquiry leads to an open questioning of existing approaches' ability to fully gauge 
Civil War military technological change. Popular theories, explaining scientific 
discovery, fail to provide an appropriate methodological approach by which this thesis 
may be pursued. Equally, the question of the growth to 'modern war' is addressed early 
in the thesis. This is done to illustrate the need for a more accurate yardstick that can 
provide a basis of comparison with 'modern war'. 
The thesis concludes that study of Civil War innovations can provide the tool with 
which to identify and assess military technological change. 
vi 
The thesis will be able to highlight that, despite military technological growth being 
predominantly made by small incremental changes, it nevertheless altered the technical 
knowledge available to innovators. By identifying the cumulative advances in technical 
hardware it is possible to illustrate how significant the changes to some military 
technologies were, when compared to the advances attained prior to the Civil War. 
It is the identification of non—technical elements, affecting the development of Civil War 
innovations, that permits the thesis ultimately to make sense of the direction, and the 
incremental advance of Civil War technical change. 
vii 
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INTRODUCTION 
The study of military technological change is entangled with contemporary concerns; (1) 
it is embodied in any study of the growth to modern war as we recognize it today. To 
understand questions arising from measuring military technological change is 
enormously complex and must require some form of ordering before it may be properly 
conducted. In the first instance this will be done by concentrating upon the American 
Civil War because it can be seen to lie at the chronological centre of the historical 
debate over the change from traditional warfare to modern conflict. Secondly, 
technology will not be examined as just a physical entity, but more completely as a 
function within a wider environment. 
The claim that military technological change is central to the study of the evolution of 
modern warfare would surprise few. In tying this thesis to an examination of 
technological change to the Civil War a secondary debate will be initiated on the war's 
role in the evolution to warfare as we know it in the twentieth century. 
Throughout history there has been a direct relationship between the way wars are 
waged and the the rapidity of changes to existing military technology. The knights' 
supremacy on the battlefield was firstly challenged by the long bow at the battle of 
Crecy, and later by early fourteenth century advances in firearms. During the 
nineteenth century the history of warfare may be divided into distinct phases of growth 
in technology. The dominance of the flintlock, and wood and sail continued from 1800 
until around 1840. The factory age from 1840 till 1870 saw percussion caps, naval shells 
and breech-loading rifled (BLR) cannons, ironclad warships, steam propulsion, and 
better communication systems. Then finally, up to the end of the century, a period of 
faster development occurred. This centred on machine guns and rapid fire small arms, 
smokeless powder, better BLR cannon designs, the super-heavy gun, motor vehicles, 
the submarine, and sea-going ironclads.(2) 
The American Civil War from 1861 to 1865 stands at the mid-point of military 
technological evolution in the nineteenth century. The war occurred at a point in time 
that lay between the initial period where industrialization increased the available means 
to produce new technical entities, and the early twentieth century landmark of modern 
war and mass destruction; the First World War. 
The examination of key technological changes to the Civil War has promoted a 
surprising polarisation of belief on the war's modern dimensions. Study has mainly 
1. H.S. Commager, The Blue & the Grey (Vol.I) (Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1950:xv) 
2. see M. Glover, Warfare from Waterloo to Mons (London, Cassell, 1980:7) 
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concentrated on the important steam innovations - the railroads and ironclad warships 
- and noted the importance of telegraphic and balloon innovations. 
It would, however, be an oversimplification to assume that the progress of warfare may 
be mapped by solely concentrating on the series of breakthrough technologies that 
provided the tools for the twentieth century wars of mass destruction. Technologies 
that are widely held to be significant technical advances, like the ironclad Monitor, the 
Gatling Gun, or the Henry repeating rifle, do not seem to provide clear milestones in the 
evolution of military technology. None of these innovations can be divorced from 
technical knowledge existing prior to the Civil War. 
New technological entities are mostly the result of cumulative advances in technical 
knowledge. Identification of all the pre-existing sources from which inventors drew to 
produce these novel designs is almost impossible. Thus, it is necessary to realize that the 
study of a few technological entities, cannot show a clear progression in all military 
technical knowledge, from the beginning to the end of the nineteenth century. 
To fully comprehend military technological change it is necessary to avoid the narrow 
emphasis on just a physical innovation. Consideration also needs to be given to the 
individual actor who: 
...as a human being who has emotions, conflicts, inconsistencies, and who 
does not live in a social vacuum but rather mediates between the wider 
socio-political and cultural context and the kind of science which results 
from it.(3) 
A study that includes the human element of technical development becomes more than 
an internal focus on the end product as a part of the wider body of scientific knowledge. 
Rather, it accepts that technology occurs as a function within a wider environmenta. As 
such, there is a need for an external assessment of the environmental influences on 
technical change.(4) Only by uniting these two dimensions together may we 
comprehend what body of knowledge the identified technology built upon, its 
contribution to technical development, and once introduced, its impact on a given social 
environment.(5) 
The examination of human factors necessitates the consideration of variables, other 
than just technical concerns, that may affect military technological change. For 
example, understanding the technical history of the Martini-Henry rifle could not hope 
3. I. Spiegel-Rosing, "The Study of Science, Technology & Society" in I. Spiegel-Rosing 
& D. De SoIla Price (ed), Science. Technology & Society (London, Sage, 1977:20) 
4. T.S. Kuhn, "The History of Science", International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences  
(No.14, 1968:80-81) 
5. J.J. Salomon, "Science Policy Studies & The Development of Science Policy" in Spiegel-
Rosing & De SoIla Price, Science, Technology & Society (1977:49) 
3 
to explain adequately how Zulus armed with assegai, overcame the British at 
Isandhlawana in 1879;(6) or how poor tactical choice, by having Confederate forces 
charging across open ground at the "Hornets Nest" in the Battle of Shiloh, contributed 
more to the massive casualties than any improvement in Federal firepower.(7) Unlike a 
study of purely technical matters a human approach to explaining technological change 
invites consideration of wider elements. These include battlefield terrain, 
organizational efficiency, strategy, and other non-technical factors that give a more 
complete picture of influences on the advancement in military design. 
Using a humanistic analysis of military technological change enables the re-evaluation 
of some characteristics of modern warfare. Writing in the early part of the nineteenth 
century Carl Von Clausewitz established a doctrine of 'nation-in-arms' in which he 
advocated that the maximum fighting power of any nation had to be mobilized to win 
future wars.(8) This 'absolute war' or 'total war' required that political, socio-
economic, and military force, be combined to provide a potent means to carry out 
strategic policy. 
With the development of rail and telegraph, and improved organization of military 
supply, mass armies of the mid- to late nineteenth century were able to be moved in 
great numbers, and swiftly concentrated on areas of the battlefield. This was a type of 
war unlike previous wars. It required a new dimension: industrial might, and the 
commitment of society, and especially its government, to sustain military effort. This 
commitment to supply advanced technology to the military, surpassed traditional 
experiences of 'limited' wars.(9) 
The limited war concept has been used to help identify the difference from the total 
wars of later years. Here limited interests, limited objectives, and the restricted time 
and geographic space of conflict, involved less sustained strategic operations.(10) In 
contrast, modern military technology is developed to satisfy specific strategic 
requirements. The First World War provided the consolidation point for the industrial 
6. R. Holmes, The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of 
History (London, Guild Publishing, 1988:7) 
7. J. MacDonald, Great Battles of the American Civil War (London, Guild Publishing, 
1988:26-27) 
8. R.A. Leonard, A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1967:25); & C. Von Clausewitz, On War (London, Penguin, 1984:401-410) 
9. See G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation & the Rise of the West  
1500-1800 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988:esp.1-7) 
10. D.G. Chandler, Atlas of Military Strategy: The Art. Theory & Practice of War. 1618-  
1878 (London, Arms & Armour, 1980:128-129), K. Macksey, Technology in War: The  
Impact of Science on Weapon Development & Modern Battle (London, Arms & Armour 
Press, 1986:12-13); & A. Jones, "Jomini & the Strategy of the America Civil War, A Re-
interpretation", Military Affairs (Vol.34[4], December 1970:127-128) 
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age's knowledge and power.(11) Here it was shown that under the sponsorship of the 
State the process of military technological change could be harnessed to achieve set 
ends. 
It is important to note that despite varying definitions of limited and total war, the Civil 
War• has not conclusively been designated as belonging to either category. At one 
extreme, scholars examining military technological innovation have come to the 
conclusion that the Civil War was not the scene for any significant changes. So not only 
was the war based on pre-existing technology and related strategy, but also, was still a 
war fought in the "traditional" vein of nineteenth century wars.(12) 
Others take the opposite view, arguing that the Civil War can in no way be considered 
"traditional". They point to changes to military technology as the greatest indication in 
favour of their argument that the war was unlike all before it, and more akin to those 
that were to follow in the next century.(13) 
Some analysts of the Civil War have been satisfied to call it the "first modern war" 
purely because of the volume of technical innovation which occurred. These writers 
examined weapons in isolation, and labelled the Civil War as the first 'modern' conflict 
purely because some weapons were to be used in wars of the twentieth century.(14) 
This thesis does not accept that just because there occurred novel or new military 
weapons, ideas, or designs, that the Civil War is automatically distinctly unlike previous 
"traditional wars". Nor, if the war can be shown as possessing some features of 
'modern wars', does it suggest that all wars from 1865 were modern in proportion. 
Nevertheless, there are significant features of the Civil War that indicate it had aspects 
of total commitment. These include commitment of industrial capacity, exploitation of 
natural resources, utilisation of the fruits of the industrial and scientific revolution, 
utilization of innovations in steam technology, electric telegraph, breech-loading 
weapons, repeating small arms, and torpedoes and related torpedo delivery systems. 
11. M. Howard, "War & Technology", RUM (Vol. 132[4], December 1987:20) 
12. A. Hunter-Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies &  
Activities to 1940 (Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1957:125); J.M. McPherson, 
Ordeal By Fire (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982:180); Glover, Warfare from Waterloo to  
Mol_Ei (1980:103); & P. Griffith, Rally Once Again (Wiltshire, Crosswood Press, 1987:189) 
13. E. Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare  
(Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988:xvii); I.B. Cohen, "Science & the Civil War", 
Technology Review (Vol.48,1946:193); W. Millis, Armies & Men: A Study in American  
Military History (London, Jonathan Cape, 1958:121-122); F.A. Shannon, The Organization 
& Administration of the Union Army  (Vold) (Massachusetts, Peter Smith, 1965:142-143); 
W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force & Society Since AD 1000  
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983:242); & C.L. Davis, Arming The Union (Port Washington, 
Kennikat Press, 1973:165 & 178) 
14. Macksey, Technology in War (1986:31) 
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Finally there was also experimentation on innumerable novel weapons and production 
techniques. 
These factors when studied together seem to contrast with the common features of what 
has been labelled limited warfare. Yet behind these technical developments was the 
maintenance of limited government intervention: a lack of societal support, particularly 
in the Union from 1863, for the objectives of the war; and the wide deployment of 
traditional technology such as smooth—bore cannon and muskets. Compounding these 
decidedly traditional factors, military demand was so uncertain it promoted a lack of 
focus from industry on the production of new military technology. 
It is the debate over the Civil War's status as the first 'modern war' that highlights the 
need to establish how military technological change in the 1861 to 1865 period, as 
distinct from other periods, may be measured. Thus while this thesis is not about 
deciding whether the Civil War was the first modern war, it will be necessary, at the 
most fundamental level for the study to produce a theoretical framework capable of 
explaining military technological change, and focussing research onto the complex 
question of its modernity. 
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CHAPTER 1: 	MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE 
CIVIL WAR 
Before formulating an approach to establish military technological growth in the Civil 
War there has to be some justification for the approach to be used in this thesis. There 
firstly will have to be an examination of the material available for study of the Civil 
War. Then an understanding of military technological change will need to be conceived. 
Only then will it be possible for the methodology, appropriate for this thesis, to be 
outlined. 
It needs to be acknowledged that certain difficulties arise for a thesis that is written 
outside the United States, and away from the heart of current academic debate on the 
Civil War. These difficulties are compounded by the academic attention the topic has 
elicited.(1) However, an outside study can bring closer understanding of the war's 
international legacy and perhaps add a new angle to the more traditional studies of the 
Civil War. 
Undoubtedly the existing labyrinthine proportions of the resource material make it 
difficult to consult all relevant sources. Therefore, the most obvious restriction placed 
on this work has been the necessity to fully establish the limits to the discussion that will 
be carried out. Within the first chapter a deliberate attempt has been made to place this 
thesis into context with those relevant academic studies already in existence. 
1.1 	Historiography of the Civil War 
Since the American Civil War has enjoyed 125 years of intense research it is impossible 
for this section to do more than cover the essential works affecting a study of military 
technological change.(2) 
The assessment of the Civil War has held a pervading interest for those who have 
sought to understand the basis for the modern American nation. However, this thesis is 
not directly assessing the Civil War. Rather, it is seeking to understand military 
technological change to the Civil War setting. As such the study will of necessity 
recover material already written on the Civil War. This makes an historiographical 
1. 520 titles that have been published on the topic since 1986, Australia Review Section 
(13-14 October 1990:6) 
2. A recent assessment by the Bulletin magazine in Australia estimated that some 50,000 
major works have been written on the Civil War; Abraham Lincoln alone allegedly having 
more works written in English on him than anyone except Shakespeare and Christ. (October 
2, 1990:76); This problem was also noted by T.J. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil  
War (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954:xi); & C.W. Ramsdell, "The Changing 
Interpretation of the Civil War", Journal of Southern History (Vol.3, February 1937:3) 
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summary important because it can provide both a synopsis of the arguments bearing on 
this study, and establish any existing historical matter that this thesis may build upon. 
General historical studies have provided a myriad of secondary information, 
interpreting original sources from the Civil War: personal diaries, specific studies of 
battles (large and small), regimental histories, and so on. To ease the analysis of 
material written on the war, three broad categories of writings may be identified. 
The first period encompasses the first fifty years from 1861 to 1911. Writings in this 
period included works of primary importance. Contemporary writers drew upon their 
immediate experiences to examine the war. The period also is marked by the 
publication of works by foreign writers examining the international legacy of the war. 
The next phase of analysis, stretches for another fifty years from 1911 to 1961. Niarked 
by two world wars and an increase in international military conflict, writers in this 
period interpreted the Civil War in the reflected light of these new experiences. 
The third period stretches from 1961 until the present day. In effect this period started 
with the spur Civil War centenary celebrations engendered in the American academic 
world. It is marked by a growing maturity, with the period from 1986 till 1990 (the 
period over which this thesis was written) producing academic works that consolidated 
many historiographical lessons learnt over the preceding years. This period continues 
to record the significance of the Civil War to historians in different academic fields. 
The first period was marked by extensive autobiographical material that provided 
valuable insights into the leadership of both the North and South's military forces and 
governments. These works were additionally to provide the basis for subsequent debate 
and analysis on the wartime military strategies and tactics. Such studies were 
augmented by the writings of those participants in the war who held strongly partisan 
viewpoints on military operations and technology. 
Remembering the massive impact a war of such proportions, length, and loss caused for 
this generation of Americans, the journals and general publications of the period mirror 
popular debate on the war. Periodicals such as .Harpers, Century Magazine, Scientific 
American, United Service Magazine, North American Review and others (3) cover 
3. Some others of note would be the Southern Historical Socicty_Papers, Blackwood's  
Edinburgh Magazine, and the Journal of Royal United Service Institution. This is by no 
means an exhaustive list. 
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wartime events., In the 1880s, after a quarter century of reflection, these journals were 
responsible for re—evaluating the lessons of the war for the American public.(4) 
In Britain the study of the Civil War was well served by both study from wartime 
observers, and later by historians drawing on Civil War lessons. Some of the most 
important observations 'Were to be made in texts written by English officers; including 
Lieutenant Colonel J.A.L. Fremantle,(5) Lord Sir Garnet 'VVolseley,(6) Fitzgerald 
Ross,(7) Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher,(8) and the aging Duke of Cambridge.(9) This is 
not to discount many of the informative works written by European military observers 
of the war.(10) 
In Britain the observations of military writers on the Civil War were to engender an 
outlook that was to survive the concentration of most European military writers on 
study of the Prussian military machine. To G.F.R. Henderson has been ascribed the 
accolade of confirming the war's importance as a study piece for British officers. His 
works also served to mark an important external assessment of the Civil War. His 
works offered both an impartial, clinical evaluation of the Civil War (based on primary 
sources), and propelled study on the international legacy of the war into the next 
century. 
Henderson first wrote a treatise on The Campaigns of Fredericksburg  (1891) which was 
intended for British officers to be 'instructed' on Civil War tactical lessons. His later 
works also included a biography on Stonewall Jackson (1898). However, his work on 
Stonewall Jackson, not only built on the earlier works 'instructional' emphasis but: 
described each military situation as Jackson himself would have viewed it, 
and focussing his attention upon the methods and psychological reactions of 
his subject. (11) 
4. Typical of these would be articles written by American generals like Meigs, Sherman, 
Rosecrans and others in Century Magazine in 1888. See the Battles & Leaders of the Civil  
War, (Reprint of Century Magazine War Series, 1888) (4 Vol.) (New Jersey, Castle, 1980) 
5. Three Months in the Southern States April—June 1863 (London, Blackwoods, 1863) 
6. Wolseley wrote extensively in the late 1880s and 1890s in RUST, the United Service  
Magazine and North American Review & see Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (4 Vol.) 
(1888) 
7. A Visit to the Cities and Camps of the Confederate States  (London, Blackwoods, 1865) 
8. History of the American War  (London, 1865) 
9. Duke of Cambridge, R1.151 (Vol.9, 1866) 
10. These would include the Russian Baron de Stoekl, The Comte Dc Paris, DeChanal, 
Prince de Joinville, the Prussian Major Von Borcke, and Major Justus Scheibert. See B.B. 
Sideman (ed), Europe Looks at the Civil War (New York, Onion Press, 1960:193, 237-239, 
& 285-288); & J. 
Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War: The European Inheritance  (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1959) 
11. J. Luvaas, "G.F.R. Henderson & The American Civil War", Military Affairs (Vol.20[31, 
Fall 1956:144) 
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Writing in such a manner enabled the serious student of the war to evaluate not only 
tactics but the actions of Civil War battlefield leaders.(12) This approach engendered a 
strong tradition of similar biographies from American authors.(13) 
From the turn of the century until the First World War there seems to be an increasing 
specialization of historical writings on the Civil War.(14) The completion of the Official 
Records on both land and naval warfare provided invaluable primary sources on the 
Northern and Southern military forces.(15) Writings on casualties, impact of certain 
technologies on warfare, and specific debates over tactics employed by generals began to 
stimulate concentrated analysis of the war.(16) Writers began to fully explore the 
economic, administrative, and social dimensions of the Civil War.(17) 
Between the two great twentieth century wars the tradition of building on specific Civil 
War areas continued. The impact of the First World War influenced historians to look 
back on the nineteenth century to re—evaluate where and how such a destructive war 
had evolved. The American Civil War was examined for the indicators to future wars 
that the historians were then living through in the 1914 to 1946 period. This 
'revisionist' school not only re—interpreted the war, but also promoted strong anti—war 
themes.(18) Many of these texts still produced novel insights into Civil War science and 
technology. New areas of specific research into science and technology were promoted 
by such works as Baxter's examination of ironclads,(19) Haydon's comprehensive study 
of aeronautics in the war,(20) Fuller and Steuart's identification of Southern small 
12. Luvaas, The Military Legacy (1959:303-4) 
13. Such as in the excellent text by P.A. Hutton, Phil Sheridan & His Army (Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985) 
14. Ramsdell, "Changing Interpretation" (1937:3-27) 
15. Official Records, "The War of the Rebellion, A Compilation of the Official Records of 
the Union & Confederate Armies" (70 Vol.-127 Books) (Washington D.C., Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901); & Official Naval Records, "The Union & Confederate Navies 
in the War of the Rebellion" (31 Vol.— Including Index) (Washington D.C., Government 
Printing Office, 1894-1927) 
16. T.L. Livermore, Numbers & Losses in the Civil War in America  (Boston, 1901); W.P. 
Kremer, 100 Great Battles of the Rebellion (New Jersey, Hoboken, 1906); A.H. Burne, Lee, 
Grant & Sherman (London, Scribner, 1938); J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S.  
Grant (New York, Dodd—Murray, 1929); & D.S. Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in  
Field Command (New York, 1944) 
17. E.D. Fite's work on, Social & Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War 
(New York, Frederick Ungar, 1963, first published in 1909); Shannon, The Organization &  
Administration (first published in 1928), V.S. Clark, History of Manufactures in the United  
States (Vol.II) (Washington D.C., Carnegie, 1928), Lewis C Grey, History of Agriculture in 
Southern United States to 1860 (Washington, Carnegie, 1933) 
18. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil War  (1954:295) 
19. J.P. Baxter III, The Introduction of the Ironclad Warship (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1933) 
20. F.S. Haydon, Aeronautics in the Union & Confederate Armies (Vol.1 & II) (Baltimore, 
Doctoral Dissertation, 1941) 
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arms,(21) and the questioning of some traditional assumptions about Civil War science 
and technology.(22) 
After the Second World War the studies began to reflect on the significance of the Civil 
War in the evolution to modern war. Once again writers, in common with their fellows 
80 years before, were trying to comprehend the historical dimensions of a military 
conflict.(23) As themes such as economic factors, anti—slavery beliefs, nationalism, and 
human factors were introduced, different perspectives on the Civil War were 
promoted.(24) 
As the individual approaches to the study of the Civil War began to narrow, texts began 
to address specific concerns. There were still general works solely intended for public 
digestion, but from 1961 to 1985 more scholarly attempts were also being made to 
amalgamate the broad approaches established at the turn of the century. Five core 
themes of historical interest seem to have been derived. 
The study of strategy and tactics seems to have been the most popular area of debate on 
the Civil War. Writers have analysed battles at all levels of engagement and tried to 
improve understanding of why battles (and as such the war) progressed in the manner 
they did. Other authors have examined contemporary wartime writers on Civil War 
tactics (25) to construct an historical progression to modern times on how warfare has 
been conducted. Ancillary concerns encompassed armies manoeuvrability, improved 
communications (rail, telegraph, aerial signals, visual signals, etc.), better logistical 
support, rifled arms technology, trench warfare, and such like. 
Autobiographical—leadership studies would form the next major approach consolidated 
since 1900. While closely aligned with studies of strategy, this approach has followed in 
the vein of writings begun by the original biographies of key Civil War leaders. 
Twentieth century writers have continued to pursue the link between understanding the 
people in the war, and the outcome of the war itself. Studies on political figures in 
21. C.E. Fuller & R.D. Steuart, Firearms of the Confederacy (West Virginia, Standard, 1944) 
22. Cohen, "Science & the Civil War" (1946); & P.D. Olejar, "Rockets in Early American 
Wars", Military Affairs (Vol.10,1946:16-34) 
23. See Luvaas, The Military Legacy (1959) 
24. Pressly, Americans Interpret Their Civil War (1954:305-307); and excluding A. Nevins, 
The War for the Union (Vol.I & II) (New York, Charles Scribners, 1959) which introduced a 
more comprehensive analysis based on a number of themes. 
25. Original works by Civil War contemporaries such as B.E. Upton, Infantry Tactics Double 
and Single Rank (New York, Greenwood Press, 1968 — Reprint of 1874); D.H. Mahan, A 
Summary of the Course of Permanent Fortifications & the Attach & Defence of Permanent  
Fortifications (Richmond, West & Johnston, 1863); & later modern analysis typified by E. 
Hagerman, "From Jomini to Denis Hart Mahan: The Evolution to Trench Warfare and the 
American Civil War", Civil War History (Vol.13, September 1967:197-220); & Jones, 
"Jomini & the Strategy of the America Civil War" (1970) 
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particular have been responsible for ascribing blame and promoting merit. As such 
works generated more research, definitive answers have become harder to agree upon. 
The third approach that can be listed has caused even more controversial debate. 
Economic development is an heuristic approach that has evoked much contrary debate. 
Was the war a break with economic development and growth existing prior to 1861? 
Could the war actually have spurred industry and promoted economic growth? Or was 
the war to produce no significant contribution either one way or another? 
Debate still continues over the interpretation of the often scant economic indicators of 
economic growth in the war. The methodologies used to interpret the data have 
actually become as important a point for debate as the final aim of assessing the war's 
impact on industrialization.(26) 
Following closely upon the above approaches political issues have bridged many areas 
of controversy. Such approaches have considered issues from the consolidation of 
political parties, constitutional change, the reasons for Southern secession, the growth of 
federal government through wartime Acts,(27) the role of both warring states' 
Presidents and their administrations,(28) social issues,(29) and States Rights issues.(30) 
The final approach that may be examined is the study of science and technology in the 
Civil War. In trying to understand the war through this approach writers have evolved 
a broad and indistinct field of study. Scholars have studied numerous military tools of 
the Civil War in great depth. Drawing on other records, militaria collections, relics, 
and contemporary studies, there exists a broad picture of wartime technical endeavour. 
Popular texts often follow the general approach developed by such comprehensive 
works as Coggins, Arms and Equipment of the Civil War  (1960). Although around 
26. Texts encompassing the arguments include R. Andreano (ed), The Economic Impact of 
the American Civil War (Cambridge, Schenkman, 1967); D.T. Gilchrist & W.D. Lewis, 
Economic Changes in the Civil War Era (Delaware, Eleutherian, 1965); 0. Mayr & R.C. Post 
(eds), Yankee Enterprise: The Rise of the American System of Manufactures (Washington 
D.C., Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981); & H. Scheiber, "Economic Change in the Civil 
War Era: An Analysis of Recent Studies" Civil War History (Part II, 1965:396-411) 
27. P. O'Brien, The Economic Effects of the American Civil War (London, MacMillan 
Education, 1988:58-62) 
28. This area has excited great debate since 1865, see R.E. Beringer, H. Hattaway, A. Jones, 
& W.N. Still, Why the South Lost the Civil War (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 
1986:426-429); D.D. Potter, "Jefferson Davis & the Political Factors in Confederate Defeat", 
in D. Donald (ed), Why the North Won the Civil War (Louisiana, Louisiana State University 
Press, 1960:91-112); & A. Nevins, Statesmanship of the Civil War (New York, Charles 
Scribners, 1953) 
29. Emphasis on social factors often has fallen into political or economic texts, D.C. North, 
T.L. Anderson, & P.J. Hill, Growth & Welfare in the American Past: A New Economic  
History (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1983); & Fite, Social & Industrial Conditions (1963) 
30. F.L. Owsley, States Rights in the Confederacy (Chicargo, Chicargo University Press, 
1925) 
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1960 there were a spate of informative works that added to our understanding of 
specific military tools. These included studies by L Naisawald Grape and Canister: The 
d 	I e 	 to ac 	61— 65 (1960), F W Ilackley, 
Re_ oip_t_m_CiAgiv rE2criws (1960), G B Abdill, Civil War Railroads  
(1961), B R Lewis, Notes on Ammunition of the American Civil War  (1959), and R 
McBride, Civil War Ironclads (1962). 
Studies of Civil War scientific effort have tended to produce more general approaches. 
This is typified in works that include R V Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War  (1973), A 
Hunter—Dupree, Science in the Federal Government: A History of Policies and  
Activities to 1940 (1957), N Rosenberg, The Economics of Technological Change  (1971), 
C L Davis, Arming the Union: Small Arms in the Civil War (1973), and G H Daniels 
(ed), Nineteenth—Century American Science: A Reappraisal  (1972). 
Overall the most disappointing aspect of all the main themes studied has been the 
American sources inclination to 'internalize' the debate. One area of study has usually 
been emphasised above another, or the analysis has been directed to a 'popular', 
American based, readership. There is a significant lack of works with a predictive or 
universal framework that enable lessons from study of the Civil War to be applied in 
the study of subsequent wars. 
The 'internalizing' of the Civil War debate is generally a reflection of international 
writers' failure to fully appreciate the importance of the Civil War. The separation 
between American and international military historians' approaches on the war can be 
traced back to the 1870s. While writers such as J F C Fuller,(31) Jay Luvaas,(32) 
Michael Howard,(33) and W McNeil (34) challenged others' disregard for Civil War 
studies, American authors failed to extend writings on the war into the contemporary 
world—wide academic debate. Intent on their own central themes writers all too often 
made few substantial efforts to bridge the gap between the American and the 
international perspective on the Civil War. 
To the non—American student of military technology it is frustrating to have to study 
numerous works on the Civil War to gather relevant information and then, relate the 
American works to an international perspective on the war's importance to modern 
warfare. While some international texts now are beginning to carry out such studies, 
31. J.F.C. Fuller, "The Place of the American Civil War in the Evolution of Warfare", Army 
Ouarterly (Vol.26, 1933:316-325) 
32. Luvaas, The Military Legacy (1959:303-4); & The Education of an Army: British  
Military Thought. 1815-1940 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970) 
33. M. Howard, The Franco—Prussian War (London, Rupert—Davis, 1962); & The Theory  
and Practice of War (London, Cassell, 1965) 
34. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (1983) 
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for the most part general texts on modern warfare are loose historical studies or a 
number of conflicts; not all of which do justice to the importance of the Civil War.(35) 
For those studying technology there is also an absence of studies placing military 
technical development into a wider context. Given the topic of this thesis, it is 
particularly dissatisfying to find so many works failing to emphasis technology as 
anything more than an identifiable physical entity. Perhaps it is difficult to study 
military technology whilst consideration is being given to other important themes, but 
such omissions have limited the context within which military technological change has 
been examined. 
The single most important factor limiting the study of topics that cross a number of 
dominant approaches to a study of the Civil War (such as military technological 
change), has been the use of mono—causal explanations of the war. Unfortunately 
authors have tended in the past to stress one of the five major thematic approaches to 
the Civil War. Novel approaches to the study of the war are rare. Rather, attempts to 
broaden analysis to incorporate other themes, such as technology change, have been 
achieved through the reliance on secondary sources that have already promoted a 
parallel approach. An example of such a practice has been the approach to the study of 
Civil War generalship. 
Debate on the relative merits of some Civil War generalship has encompassed 
biographical, autobiographical, original papers and despatches, strategic, and tactical 
studies. Despite so many works assembling authoritative sources and arguments, the 
field of study is still marked by the degree of dissent, rather than agreement. As the 
written work multiplies so do the different opinions and attitudes. 
Attempts have been made to standardize the framework for analysing Civil War 
generals.(36) There was clearly a need for a predictive framework that could both 
assess the strategic and personal qualities of generalship, whilst still permitting 
comparisons with generals not in the Civil War. Subsequent studies have shown that 
the search for a more universal approach to the study of wartime military operations, 
and a means to assess the different qualities of the generals still continues.(37) 
35. Some of the better examples of international writers re—evaluating the importance of the 
Civil War in a general history of warfare include E.M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy  
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973); Glover, Warfare from Waterloo to Mons  
(1980); Chandler, The Atlas of Military Strategy (1980); & Parker, The Military Revolution  
(1988) 
36. E.J. Stackpole, "Generalship in the Civil War", Military Affairs (Vol.24[2], Summer, 
1960:57) 
37. S.E. East, "Montgomery C. Meigs & the Quartermaster Department", Military Affairs 
(Vol.25[4], Winter 1961-62:183-196); T.H. Williams, "The Military Leadership of the North 
& South", in Donald, Why the North Won the Civil War (1960:33-54); Hagerman, The  
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The particular emphasis on General W T Sherman has been an indication of the 
attempts to make the study of leadership include elements such as military technology 
change. Studies on General Sherman have in particular examined the 'modern' nature 
of his leadership in the 1863-65 campaigns.(38) Some writers have also been keen to 
draw parallels between Sherman's approach to war that directly challenged the will and 
resources of the Southern people, and the 'total war' approach that has become evident 
in the twentieth century.(39) These studies on leadership have in such cases been used 
as an explanation for why the North won or the South lost the Civil War.(40) 
Attempts to produce a common, more holistic approach to the study of the Civil War 
have extended beyond the study of generalship. This has particularly been evident in 
recent works such as R E Beringer, H Hattaway, A Jones, & W N Still, Why the South  
Lost the Civil War (1986), P O'Brien's, The Economic Effects of the American Civil 
War (1988), and E Hagerman's, The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern  
Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command  (1988). From a historiographical 
point of view these titles represent important attempts to escape mono—causal 
explanations of the war. 
Beringer (et al) have written with the deliberate intention of re—invigorating the 
approaches to analysis of the Civil War. They base their work on why the South lost 
the war and in so doing build upon earlier works in the area.(41) 
Amongst their thought provoking conclusions were the findings that "overwhelming 
numbers and resources" (42) did not play a significant role in the outcome of the Civil 
War. They stress that explanation of the war in military terms could not satisfactorily 
resolve the debate over why the North won the war.(43) Beringer (et al) contends that 
studies of strategies and tactics are only important if it is recognized that the Union 
prevailed by conducting a strategy of attrition against a Confederacy that had an 
inability to mobilize political support for their cause. 
American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare  (1988:xiii, 207-209); & Beringer (et 
al), Why the South Lost (1986:18-20) 
38. E. Hagerman, "Field Transportation & Strategic Mobility in the Union Armies", Civil  
War History (Vol.34[2], June 1988:171); R. Wheeler, We Knew William Tecumesh Sherman  
(New York, Thomas Y Cromwell, 1977); B. Davis, Sherman's March (New York, Random 
House, 1980); & J.T. Glatthaar, The March to the Sea & Beyond (New York, New York 
University Press, 1985) 
39. Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost (1986) 
40. H. Hattaway & A. Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War 
(Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1983:ix); & Williams, "The Military Leadership of the 
North & South" (1960:45 & 53) 
41. Williams, "The Military Leadership of the North & South" (1972:33-54); & Hattaway & 
Jones, How the North Won (1983) 
42. Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost (1986:107) 
43. E.M. Thomas, Book review of Why the South Lost, in The Journal of Southern History  
(Vol. 53[2], May 1987:336) 
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The authors also recognize the need for their study to address the issue of mono—causal 
explanations. They emphasise that: 
Historians have assigned many causes for the South's defeat, some stressing 
a single cause, others many. But most assigned first place to one, even as 
they acknowledge the importance of others.(44) 
However, Beringer and his fellow authors continue on to: 
...single out the weakness of southern nationalism as what lawyers would call 
the proximate cause of confederate defeat.(45) 
Mono—causal explanations are addressed, but more significantly they recognize that the 
broad context of any approach needs to be identified. Such recognition does not 
necessarily go onto incorporate all aspects affecting the central theme. Certainly 
technological change is not a major theme. 
The essential lack of political will in the South is emphasised as the core theme 
explaining the Confederate states defeat. Despite efforts to do otherwise, the work 
becomes mono—causal in emphasis. In a review of the book E M Thomas also saw that 
the authors had narrowed their approach by the rejection of other arguments on 
economics, logistics, the make—up of southern society, and their resistance to the 
'states—rights' thesis.(46) 
In an attempt to place their study in the context of strategic analysis the authors use the 
pre—Civil War writings of Jomini and Clausewitz. This is intended to explain military 
operations through a set of "impartial judgements".(47) The precedent for using 
Jomini and Clausewitz in such a manner is not a unique development.(48) The authors 
believe, however, that the use of writers in tandem, rather than in conflict is able to 
provide a new insight into both the offensive and defensive operations of the North or 
the South.(49) 
The need to explain outcomes and measure the modernity of the wartime strategy stems 
from the need to narrow the central theme to defensible grounds. By using Clausevvitz 
the link between war and political considerations becomes nebulous. Clausevvitz's 
concept of 'total' or 'absolute' war (involving the "breaking of the will of the people"), 
enabled the authors to confirm the nature the Northern war effort after 1863. 
44. Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost (1986:3) 
45. IBID 
46. Thomas, Book review (1987:337) 
47. Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost (1986:16) 
48. Dates back to the wartime generals' writings, for a revival of the debate see E. Hagerman, 
"From Jomini to Denis Hart Mahan" (1967:197-220); & Hattaway & Jones, How the North  
Wan (1983) 
49. Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost (1986:17-18) 
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The reliance on the pre—war strategists writings to interpret Civil War generalship has 
limitations. It is useful to refer to General Grant who stated: 
If the Vicksburg campaign meant anything, in a military point of view, it 
was that there are no fixed laws of war which are not subject to the 
conditions of the country, the climate, and the habits of people. The laws of 
successful war in one generation would insure defeat in another.(50) 
This should serve as a warning to any study of Civil War generalship. As Henderson's 
writings advocated, Civil War lessons offered instruction from history to guide his 
contemporary military peers. He advised that lessons had to reflect real life so as to 
avoid one of the greatest errors of war the "attempt to fight battles according to a scaled 
pattern." (51) To Henderson the study of Civil War generalship and any 'great captain' 
was necessary to stimulate thought rather than to yield set, scientific parameters for 
determining officer's actions.(52) 
The question of why the North won is also only understood through coverage of why the 
South lost. In an earlier work Why the North Won in 1983, Hattaway and Jones had 
covered an eclectic range of issues from management of the war effort, support 
facilities, and general questions on the organization of military operations.(53) While 
the 1986 text is a more consolidated attempt to identify a single causal factor in the 
defeat of the South, there is great contrast in approaches. 
Given the analysis in the 1983 work, there is no reason to suggest that the causes 
identified in the 1986 text can both account for the South's defeat, and explain why the 
North won. The 1983 text identified Northern advances in the organization of military 
operations, especially from 1863, as being significant reasons for the North's victory. 
However, the central thesis of the 1986 text states the Confederate States lost because 
they: 
...succumbed to internal rather than external causes. An insufficient 
nationalism failed to survive the strains imposed by the lengthy 
hostilities.(54) 
The emphasis denies not only other causal explanations but does not address the wider 
context of the study. 
50. Quoted by U.S. Grant III in Donald, Why the North Won the Civil War (1960:5) 
51. N. Malcolm (ed), The Science of War: A Collection of Essays & Lectures, 1891-1903: 
By the late Colonel G.F.R. Henderson (London, Longmans, 1910:71) 
52. Luvaas, "G.F.R. Henderson", Military Affairs (Vol.20[3], Fall 1956:153); & J. Luvaas 
(ed), The Civil War: A Soldier's View  (A Collection of Civil War Writings by Col. G.F.R. 
Henderson) (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958:6) 
53. Hattaway & Jones, How the North Won (1983:ix) 
54. Beringer (ct al), Why the South Lost (1986:439) 
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Earlier in their work Beringer and his fellow authors had attributed the demise of the 
Confederate armies to their morale collapse: 
Victory...became the impossible dream because not enough confederates 
willed independence hard enough or long enough to win.(55) 
Such a statement, taken with the main theme of the South's loss of the war, invites 
wider discussion. Patrick O'Brien in 1988 wrote that the South had not expected to 
wage a 'total war' and it was the loss of property (land, slaves, assets etc.) that proved a 
decisive cost blow to Southern attempts to wage war.(56) 
Whether it was the South's desire to stop the war to preserve the remaining assets is 
debatable. O'Brien stresses the "grave" cost of the Southern attempt at secession.(57) 
To Beringer and his fellow authors such economic arguments confirm their central 
hypothesis. The southern will to wage war was implicitly being challenged. 
Nevertheless, the study of the decline in the will of the South to wage war does not 
permit the direct role played by the North to be studied with equal emphasis. Why not 
state that the North won the war because after 1863 it was increasingly able to develop 
the military means to attack the property of the secessionists? 
Beringer (et al) have provided a book that indicates how different themes may be 
synthesized through a single approach to explain why the South lost the Civil War. 
Obviously if interpretation of Civil War events is to be based around one theme, the 
approach may receive criticism. This criticism will most likely come from those who 
feel their areas of specific study are being made to fit a hypothesis, rather than being 
incorporated as part of a hypothesis which has a broad context capable of embracing 
important themes. 
At the beginning of his work O'Brien identified three general hypotheses on the 
connections between the Civil War and the long-run progress of the American 
economy.(58) These explanations belied the extensive arguments and writings 
incorporated under the three simple headings. Yet they included: the belief that the 
Civil War hostilities interrupted rates of growth; the war produced no significant long-
term impact on United States development; and, thirdly, the war removed barriers to 
development in some areas, so promoting more sustained rates of growth than could 
have been expected. 
55. IBID:298; & the point was again made in Thomas, Book Review (1987:338) 




The very difficulties of identifying the impact of the war on economic or industrial 
growth has promoted uninformed debate and false assumptions. O'Brien believed 
problems arose because: 
Imputation and measurement seem so intrinsically difficult to handle 
empirically that some historians prefer to make the reasonable assumption 
that in the absence of war economies would continue to grow at some 
specified pre—bellum rate of advance.(59) 
O'Brien avoids false assumptions by examining previous approaches prior to making 
his findings. His economic approach builds judiciously on previous works and examines 
the political, industrial, and agricultural issues as part of his wider study of the 
economic effects of the war. The data on each issue is examined in part, then placed 
together to form a conclusion. 
Nevertheless, O'Brien's work still presents an insight into other aspects of Civil War 
study. He for instance, presses into one small statement: 
Furthermore, there seem to be few organizational or technical changes in 
industry which might be associated directly with the Civil War...In general, 
though, the war generated few innovations, even in weaponry, and served 
basically to distract scientists and technologists from the pursuit of more 
utilitarian objectives.(60) 
While O'Brien is trying to concisely cover his central theme, a statement such as this 
represents an unsubstantiated broadening of his study. As such it invites criticism on 
grounds other than economics. While considering one approach O'Brien has at least 
recognized the need to strengthen his argument by considering other approaches and 
acknowledging their weaknesses. 
One recent work that has attempted to break even further with the mono—causal 
approach to the explanation of Civil War military operations is Edward Hagerman's, 
The American Civil War and The Origins of Modern Warfare.(61) 
Throughout extensive use of the Official Records, despatches and other primary 
resources Hagerman has produced a work that endeavours to provide an 
"organizational perspective ".(62) 
59. IBID:18 
60. IBID:53 
61. The American Civil War & The Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organizations. & 
Field Command (1988) 
62. Hagerman, The American Civil War (1988:xvii) 
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The study conducted by Hagerman has fundamentally resisted mono—causal 
explanation. In his study he establishes two central approaches: 
[1]...an attempt to break new ground in the analysis of theory, doctrine, and 
practice of field fortification in the tactical evolution of trench warfare. 
[2]...a new analysis of the development of field transportation and supply to 
move and maneuver Civil War armies in the field.(63) 
These central themes on land warfare are felt by Hagerman to best bring into synthesis 
developments in tactics and strategy around the dominant problems of mid-
nineteenth—century field command.(64) Whilst synthesizing his study around field 
command he also draws together other issues such as strategic ideas and organization, 
and intellectual and institutional formation in the new mass industrial society. 
Hagerman's canvass on the Civil War is very wide indeed. Yet his central theme is 
intended to pull together many areas of supporting study. His analysis of field logistics, 
and the use of wartime documents to establish the ratio of men to supply wagons and 
capacity of Civil War armies to support themselves by forage, built on works by earlier 
authors .(65) 
Hagerman re—established (if such is possible) the importance of the war in the evolution 
of trench warfare when he linked the strategies of Jomini and the American strategist 
Denis Hart Mahan to the emergence of Civil War entrenchment.(66) 
The study was conducted across a number of salient issues. As such the work relies 
upon the reader's specialized knowledge to provide the requisite knowledge linkages. 
Only then may the work be pulled together to form an integrated whole. Hagerman 
does not seem to provide one central theme that would direct all readers towards one 
specific conclusion. Without a conclusion to pull Hagerman's multiple factors together, 
his study does not synthesize the excellent detail into any framework whereby the Civil 
War's status as a modern war may be measured. The work certainly progresses 
logically through the study of Lee's Army of North Virginia, manoeuvre and tactics, the 
emergence of trench warfare, the evolution of the war of attrition, and the strategy, 
organization and manoeuvre associated with a war of exhaustion. Like Beringer, 
Hattaway, Jones and Still's earlier work, Hagerman is intent on illustrating the 
63. IBID 
64. IBID 
65. C.W. Ramsdell, "General Robert E Lee's Horse Supply, 1862-1865", American  
Historical Review (Vol.35[4], July 1930:758-777); J.G. Moore, "Mobility & Strategy in the 
Civil War", Military Affairs (Vol. 24,1960:71-72, & 69-74); & also see R. Goff, 
Confederate Supply (Durham, Duke University Press, 1969:240) 
66. Hagerman, "From Jomini to Denis Hart Mahan" (1967) 
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importance of Civil War strategy to the evolution of trench warfare and 'modern' 
elements of warfare. 
Without a strong central hypothesis the close scrutiny of areas in his work can reveal 
argumentative weaknesses. Hagerman stresses the growing use of field fortifications 
from 1861 to 1862. He attributes this to the increased use of rifled muskets during the 
first half of the war.(67) Yet such an explanation must be tempered by acknowledging 
that smooth-bore musket still dominated the Civil War battlefields in this period.(68) 
The use of an order from General Sherman is used by Hagerman as an example of how 
the evolution of trench warfare progressed in the war. 
...the skirmishers along our whole front will, during the night, advance 
within 100 yards of the enemy's works, and will, with spade or ax, prepare 
pits or fallen trees, so as to give them cover from which to kill artillerists who 
attempt to load the guns, also to keep down the fire of the enemy's infantry 
in the rifle-pits during the assault.(69) 
Despite the attack failing and there being no indication of the success of the manoeuvre, 
Hagerman concluded that it, "was the most impressive appreciation of offensive 
entrenchment displayed to date..." (70) There is an extension in logic beyond evidence to 
suggest that because Sherman used offensive trenches once (without victory), that he 
would always adopt such tactics. As many studies are now indicating military leaders in 
the industrial era have not always consistently employed new battle tactics, even when 
new technology has irrevocably altered, or consolidated, certain tactics.(71) 
So what do such isolated criticisms suggest for Hagerman's study? Most importantly, 
the attempts by Hagerman to undertake a study across a number of different themes 
has opened his conclusions to re-interpretation by those addressing specific issues. Yet 
his study is informative and able to shed new light on a number of related areas of 
military operations. The introduction of such a text into the Civil War library indicates 
the potential reward for those seeking to examine the relationship between strategic, 
organizational, logistics, and generalship in the war. 
67. Although in fairness to Hagerman an earlier article was clearer in its linking of 
entrenchments and field fortifications to a tactical fall-back after initial battlefield 
manoeuvres and mass attacks were modified by local commanders during the first years of 
the war. See "From Jomini to Denis Hart Mahan" (1967:98-99) 
68. Hess, Book Review (1990:358) 
69. Quote in Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare  
(1988:203) from Official Records (Series I, Vol.XVI) (Part I, 1888:1090) 
70. Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare (1988:203) 
71. The Australian academic R. Pryor is about to publish an extremely interesting study on 
this very subject. He is co-authoring a study on General Rawlinson which examines his 
failure to consistently utilize advanced artillery techniques when attacking trenches in the 
First World War. 
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The reliance on mono—causal explanations of the Civil War is also challenged. For the 
historiography of the war Hagerman's text represents an attempt to utilize original 
source material upon the war, build on existing academic debates, and still produce 
original perspectives on the war's legacy to the modern era of warfare. Hagerman's 
approach reinforces the need for a strong central theme. If the study is to avoid 
criticism from those who specialize in the areas his broad approach trespasses across, 
then the hypothesis needs to offer a testable conclusion. 
Hagerman offers both an inspiration and a warning to any study of military 
technological change in the Civil War. It indicates the need for a strong methodology 
that can bring together the different issues under examination. For instance, to produce 
a study of isolated technical entities that were developed in the war could not permit 
anything more than a mono—causal explanation of Civil War technological growth. It 
certainly could not address wider non—technical issues affecting innovation and 
invention. The exposition of the Civil War as a stepping stone to future modern wars 
ignores technical knowledge and overall innovative activity, for an emphasis on a 
supposed linear progression from the Gatling Gun or the ironclad to the machine—gun 
and dreadnought of the First World War. 
Earl J Hess wrote an article "The Northern Response to the Ironclad: A Prospect for 
the Study of Military Technology" (72) in which he opened by stating: 
The study of military technology is sizable and growing. The hardware of 
war machinery has fascinated scholars and generalists, but studies of 
responses to those new tools are relatively scarce.(73) 
He continues on to outline a proposal for how Civil War technology may be studied in a 
wider context. Hess believed technology (in the case of the article the Northern 
ironclad), could be approached as a "response to military machinery that considered it 
as tools of prosecuting war"; and secondly as a "response that considered it as symbolic 
of technology".(74) These approaches accept technology as both a physical entity and 
as a representation of a wider process of technical growth in a social system. 
These approaches represent an important attempt to escape the traditional study of 
Civil War technology as just physical entities. Ultimately Hess hoped a more 
comprehensive study could produce informative material that would be "no less 
important in the study of twentieth—century military technology." (75) 
72. Civil War History (Vol.31[2], June 1985:126-143) 




Building on the works of Hess and Beringer (et al), O'Brien and Hagerman indicate the 
need for any study of military technological change to have a strong central hypothesis. 
This counters the problems with over reliance on a narrow, mono—causal study. Such 
an approach can also provide a framework by which to structure our insight into wars 
after the Civil War. 
It is impossible to examine the whole process of technological change and then study one 
novel weapon in the hope it will reflect all technical changes. As unrealistic would be to 
thoroughly examine an isolated military technology whilst denying the influences wider 
technical innovations may have had on that design's evolution. 
It is possible to extend Hess' own argument. Of what use it is to know what Northern 
ironclads were built in the war? We must also know if there was a substantial 
development in wartime shipbuilding knowledge, improved understanding of the design 
and evaluation of the final weapons, how the technology was utilized, the administration 
of the technology, and finally the legacy all these factors left for future ironclad 
development. (76) 
A study of military technological change crosses geographic boundaries, political 
divisions, economic forces, strategic and tactical considerations, administrative and 
organizational factors, and ignores the distinctions made between naval and land 
warfare activities in the Civil War. 
Ultimately, the evolution of technology is acontinuous process. It has no one starting 
point or point of origin. Each design draws from different sources and has an 
incalculable impact on future technical development. Therefore, when technological 
development is studied as what Hess calls "a societal function" — or this thesis prefers to 
entitle as 'environmental function' — it is not just technical knowledge that must be 
studied but human action in the context of the Civil War. 
1.2 	Identification of Military Technological Change 
To examine technology it is possible to follow two distinct approaches. These are 
analogous with an examination of scientific change where research is either conducted 
from an "internal approach" with the emphasis being on the substance of science as 
knowledge; or alternatively, an "externalist approach" where the analyst is concerned 
76. For a contrast in naval technological development examine, for a pre—war situation, L.M. 
Pearson, "The Princeton & the Peacemaker", Technology & Culture  (V01.7, 1.966;163-183); 
on the decay of the US Navy after 1865, S. Sandler, "A Navy in Decay", Military Affairs  
(Vol.35, 1971:138-141); & on the revival of the US steam navy in the 1880s, K.L. Moll, 
"A.T. Mahan, American Historian", Military Affairs (Vol.27, 1963:131-140) 
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with the activity of scientists as a social group within a larger culture.(77) Despite 
recent attempts to place the study of technological change to the broader context of its 
social environment,(78) there has remained difficulty in uniting the social scientists' 
approach with the natural scientists' concentration on technological change as an event 
derived from, and finally adding to, scientific knowledge. 
A successful innovation reflects a whole range of development factors that have 
occurred in a wide social setting. These factors have largely been overlooked by natural 
scientists, with their concern more likely focussed on the end advancement made.(79) 
To concentrate on the final successful invention as an addition to scientific knowledge, 
fails to recognize that technological change can occur with imperfect technical 
knowledge.(80) There exist lags between a new idea, its development, and its final 
adoption. As such it has often been the readiness of military leaders and bureaucrats to 
recognize technical potential, and quickly adopt a radical technology, that has played a 
very significant role in the successful development of new tools for war. 
A study of non—technical factors may be the best indicator of how an innovation was 
able to affect military technological change. 
Were we to look at the Civil War and solely examine technical factors we would ignore 
the important fact that technological innovation has no—one single, identifiable point of 
origin. This ultimately makes it foolish to draw final conclusions about the technical 
merit of any one technological entity, or make conclusions as to its contribution to 
scientific knowledge. For example the advantages of the Rodman type large calibre 
naval MLR cannon may be identified and its significant technical ideas examined. Yet, 
the design built upon preceding knowledge and work carried out by a number of 
innovators. Contemporary wartime belief still held that technical development of large 
calibre naval cannon had, with the Rodman, reached its ultimate point in scientific 
development. But this design was by no means to be the acme of cannon technology. 
77. Kuhn, "The History of Science" (1968:76) 
78. see L. White, Medieval Technology & Social Change (London, Oxford University Press, 
1980); R.K. Merton, Science, Technology & Society in Seventeenth Century England (New 
Jersey, Humanities Press, 1978); Mayr & Post , Yankee Enterprise (1981); •Fite, Social &  
Industrial Conditions (1963); H.J. Habakkuk, American & British Technology in the 
Nineteenth Century: A Search for Labour—saving Inventions (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1962); & economic factors such as covered by Clark, History of 
Manufactures in the United States (Vol.II) (1928); & Andreano, The Economic Impact of the  
American Civil War (1967) 
79. T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (International Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science Vol.2, No.2) (Chicargo, Chicargo University Press, Second edition, 1975:3) 
80. Eg. the development of both the shell gun in the 1840s and later the BLR cannon were 
actually adopted prior to the US Navy overcoming production problems 
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The externalist approach also has developed some shortcomings in explaining 
technological change. The primary problem arises because from an extreme point the 
approach seeks to identify external forces that affect the intellect of the person carrying 
out 'scientific work'.(81) Such an approach may be conducted on a general cultural 
level correlating scientific endeavour with cultural and intellectual histories.(82) From 
the perspective of technological change this general stance may overload the intrinsic 
factors impacting on how a technologist will conceive or interpret scientific knowledge 
that affects their technical work.(83) 
To explain the degree of Civil War military technological change the specific 
examination of some technical changes will counter-balance any study of the general 
environmental factors and barriers to technical growth. An invention must be 
judiciously examined as both an internal process with its own dynamic characteristics, 
and as a component of a wider process of discovery that impacts on a wider 
environment. Technology will, therefore, be studied as a function implicitly affected by 
its distinct environment. 
1.3 	Formulating a Methodology 
Recognizing the limitations experienced by other studies on the Civil War, the foremost 
endeavour of this thesis will be to establish a framework within which military 
technological change may be identified and assessed. Given the complexity of the topic 
under analysis and the wide debate on methodologies of scientific explanation, it is not 
intended to simply produce a rational choice of a theory and reject all other theories 
preceding it.(84) Any number of theoretical constructs could give meaning to the data 
derived from the study of identified fields of innovative effort. But with regard to 
evaluating the process of scientific development this study is not about adding relative 
weight to the epistemological argument between Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, or any of 
the many philosophers on science. 
Nor is this thesis advocating complete chaos in its approach to analysing military 
technological change in the Civil War. As has been seen with the examination of 
Hagerman's 1988 text on the Civil War, a framework is needed to order research, best 
explore the topic, reach some form of observation, and provide a guide-line for future 
81. R. McLeod, "Changing Perspectives in the Social History of Science", in Spiegel-Rosing 
& De SoIla Price, Science. Technology & Society (1977:151) 
82. E. Lurie, "The History of Science in America: Development & New Directions" in G.H. 
Daniels (ed), Nineteenth-Century American Science: A Reappraisal (Evanston, Northwestern 
University Press, 1972:25) 
• 83. P. Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledee  
(London, Verso, Seventh Impression 1987:211) 
84. A.F. Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? (St. Lucia, Queensland University 
Press, 1982:135); & also Feyerabend, Against Method (1987:196) 
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students of the subject. Chalmers warns of the need for some methodological 
framework because: 
Unless the descriptive account of science is shaped by some theory, no guide-
line is offered as to what activities and products of activities are to 
described.(85) 
While Feyerabend (86) encourages the production of new theories to make sense of the 
aspect of science they are examining, and so rid the academic world of hypothesis that 
seek to create uniformity, it may well be that no theory can avail this thesis better than 
one tailored to suit its purpose. As such this thesis is devoid of conscious alignment with 
any one of the methodological approaches espoused by modern theorists on scientific 
development. 
Stretton is one scholar who has encouraged the social scientist: 
...who emphasize the unlikeness, who design methods to take advantage of 
their subjects' unique capabilities to talk, intend, invent and introspect. 
These days there is plenty of support for this policy. But even its supporters 
desperately resist, still, one of its implications. For knowing causes, most 
social scientists whether they like it or not, rightly use the logic and methods 
which historians use. Both scientists and historians need to improve these 
methods, not replace them.(87) 
As the basis of this work is to undertake a humanistic examination of the American 
Civil War's military technological change the study must now build upon the 
historiological perspective and seek objectively to identify military technological change. 
It can then measure its evolution beyond pre-existing science and technical knowledge, 
and finally, assess its growth to modern dimensions. 
Reflecting back to the internalist and externalist debate and the above basis for this 
thesis, it is clearly necessary for any approach adopted to establish a means by which 
technological activity may be both identified and examined in the established historical 
context. The approach needs to be not only dynamic, but predictive. 
(A) Technological Change During the Civil War 
The first step in outlining an approach to this thesis is to define how the concept of 
technological change differs from scientific development. The debate between scholars 
over the relationship between science and technology has for many years now centred 
around the definition of science and technology, and the contribution of technical 
85.Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? (1982:98) 
86. Feyerabend, Against Method (1987:35 & 46) 
87.H. Strctton, The Political Sciences: General Principles of Selection in Social Sciences & 
History (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972:197) 
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improvement to scientific development.(88) It is interesting to note that Gernot Bohme 
has identified four common approaches used to establish the relationship between 
technology and science: 
(a) science and technology develop autonomously and independently of one 
another; 
(b) science develops by orientating itself to existing technology and instruments 
(Eg. the emergence of thermodynamics on the basis of the technical 
development of the steam engine); 
(c) scientific as an instrument whereby, unlike the above approach, it is a 
decisive connector between science and technology, with the technology of 
science (measurement and experiment) at all times outrunning technology of 
everyday life; and 
(d) during the late nineteenth century there occurred a possibility of converting 
scientific knowledge into technology by grafting the craft technique of the 
previous centuries onto scientific development.(89) 
Because the subject matter of this study falls most comfortably into category (d) of the 
common approaches, does not mean the other approaches will be ignored. Most of the 
distinction in establishing the different approaches revolve around the definitions of the 
key components. Between different exponents these vary greatly, therefore promoting 
great semantic confusion over what constitute science or technology activities.(90) As, 
for example, amongst the historian, philosopher, or natural scientist, the definitions of 
pure and applied science will differentiate their views on whether applied science 
actually is analogous to technology.(91) Activities specifically designated as innovation, 
invention, discovery, or development will vary to reflect the nature of the writers 
analysis. 
Before proceeding any further with this study's approach to identifying technology 
change, definitions of the key terms are necessary to provide at least a guide-line to 
their future use. 
88.G. Bohme, "Models for the Development of Science" in Spiegel-Rosing & Dc SoIla 
Price, Science, Technology & Society (1977:337) 
89.Bohme, "Models for the Development of Science" (1977:337-338) 
90.N. Reingold, "American Indifference to Basic Research: A Reappraisal" in Daniel, 
Nineteenth-Century American Science (1972:45) 
91.J. Agassi, "The Confusion Between Science & Technology, in the Standard Philosophies 
of Science", Technology & Culture (Vol.7 [3],Summer 1966:364) 
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Technology 
Technology has long been narrowly defined as just "...tools, techniques, procedures, 
things; the artifacts fashioned by modern industrial man to increase his powers of mind 
and body." (92) Such a definition recognizes that physical objects are derived from a 
combination of practical experience and existing empirical laws.(93) 
As it ignores other human, non—physical characteristics of technology, such a definition 
is very narrow. Harvey Brooks has argued that: 
... technology must be socio—technical rather than just technical, and a 
technology must include the managerial and social supporting systems 
necessary to apply it on a significant scale.(94) 
During this study the broader humanistic definition of technology will be used to permit 
the additional consideration of the environment within which the technical objects are 
created, produced and exploited. 
Science 
The importance of technology as a distinct body of knowledge producing practical 
products and procedures can be explained only by understanding technology's 
relationship with science. 
Science should be distinguished from technology as it evolves from theoretical laws 
derived from knowledge acquired in new or unknown areas of study. Science can also 
be considered as a distinct method that permits a body of knowledge to be formed, so 
providing a basis by which society may expand its beliefs and knowledge.(95) 
Fundamentally, technology's relationship with science arises because technical 
endeavour is responsible for manipulating and controlling the physical world after 
science's comprehension of its primary characteristics. 
The relationship between technology and science became a symmetrical one after the 
Industrial and subsequent Scientific Revolutions of the nineteenth century permitted 
information and new knowledge to be transferred in either direction.(96) The 
92. H.G. Rickover (Vice—Admiral), "A Humanist Technology", Nature (Vol.208 [5012], 
November 20, 1965:721) 
93. C. Boyle, P. Wheale & B. Surgess, People, Science & Technology : A Guide to Advanced 
Industrial Society (London, Wheatsheaf Books, 1984:3; & J.K. Feibleman, "Pure Science, 
Applied Science, Technology: An Attempt at Definitions", Technology & Culture (Vol.2[4], 
Fall 1961:40) 
94. H. Brooks, "Technology, Evolution & Purpose", Daedalus (Vol.109[1], Winter 1980:65) 
95. C. Boyle, et al, People, Science & Technology (1984:2) 
96. G.I. Rochlin (ed), Readings from Scientific American: Scientific Technology & Social  
Change (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 1974:2); & E. Layton "Mirror Image Twins: The 
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importance of science lay in its ability to act as a precursor to new technical activity 
indicating new uses for existing technical products.(97) Though science does not 
apparently set the limits of technological development, it is more likely to indicate 
possible solutions to those problems restricting technical endeavour.(98) 
Pure And Applied Research 
Since the nineteenth century scientific work has been divided into two schools: pure 
science and applied science. Pure science has to do with the 'need to know'. Applied 
research has been used predominantly by applied scientists to apply the lessons learnt in 
pure research to a practical human purpose.(99) 
Applied research then becomes the transitional or linking point between science and a 
technological reality. Despite the often blurred links between applied research and 
technology change, during the Scientific Revolution pure research became an important 
means of producing insights and new knowledge about broader theoretical fields. This 
in turn produced the means for ushering in practical advances in technology. 
Applied research from this period, however, increasingly became concentrated upon 
conducting practical experiments, or innovations based on 'known' technology. Thus 
applied research extended the uses and knowledge of established ideas or products. 
Innovation 
Technology innovation in this thesis will be defined as the "process that begins with an 
inventor's insight and ends with a new product or technique" being created.(100) 
Innovation is not just the practical improvement of hardware. It is also the reshaping of 
concepta or ideas. The innovation process forms the basis for individuals to inject pure 
research, applied research, scientific knowledge and technical "know-how". 
Innovation is not held within this thesis to be the same as discovery or invention where a 
new technical entity unlike any known previous technology, is produced. Discovery is 
the production of new technical or scientific knowledge. This is distinct from invention 
which is usually the result of pure research discovery, or the unique combination of 
Communities of Science & Technology" in Daniels, Nineteenth-Century American Science  
(1972:228) 
97.J. Ellul, The Technological Society (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1976:9-10) 
98.A. Zvorikine, "The History of Technology as a Science & As a Branch of Learning: A 
Soviet View", Technology & Culture (Vol.2[1], Winter 1961:1) 
99.Feibleman, "Pure Science, Applied Science, Technology" (1961:305) 
100.S.B. Lundstedt & E.W. Colglazier (eds), Managing Innovation: The Social Dimension of 
Creativity. Invention & Technology (New York, Pergamon Press, 1982:xiii) 
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established knowledge, to produce a novel technical entity. 	Innovation is the 
improvement to identified technology, ideas or techniques. 
Technology Change. Growth, or Development 
The completed innovation produces a complex source of change that does not stop with 
the alteration of an existing technical entity. It may also a conceptual basis for 
addressing problems that have afflicted society. Thus the wider technological 
environment — social, political, economic or organisational factors — may be influenced 
by technology change and in turn produce secondary effects that are far from apparent 
immediately after the original innovation's introduction.(101) 
The impact of technology change may therefore be spread over an extended period of 
time with only minor incremental improvements to existing technology.(102) The 
impact and course of technology change may also be complicated by technical drift of 
the introduction of innovations from other countries.(103) 
The incremental change to technology can be overtaken on occasions by radical or 
dynamic 'breakthroughs' in technology that quickly alter existing products or processes 
and may swiftly alter existing environmental conditions within which future 
technological innovation occurs.(104) The more radical a 'breakthrough', the wider is 
the base for new or novel innovative effort to accelerate technology change.(105) 
Because significant discoveries and technological change cannot be ordered or pre-
ordained, the innovation that changes technology may be derived only long after the 
original 'breakthrough'.(106) Hence great periods of innovation can then be followed 
by stagnation. Basically, if conceptual breakthroughs do not occur or cross—fertilisation 
of practical development areas is not encouraged, the full potential of technology change 
may not be realised and its actual impact limited. The impact of a final innovation is 
also affected by the fact that in the mid— to late—nineteenth century the development in 
fields of technical endeavour progressed at varying speeds. This meant that 
technologies were often exploited depending on how they contributed to existing areas 
of technical growth rather than where they originally were intended to be applied. 
101. M. Kranzberg, "Technology & History: 'Kranzberg's Laws", Technology & Culture  
(Vol.27[3], July 1986:545) 
102. Lundstedt & Colglazier, Managing Innovation (1982:xxiii fn) 
103. H.G. Gelber, "Technical Innovation & Arms Control", World Politics (Vo1.2614], July 
1974:510) 
104. T.P. Hughes, "Conservative & Radical Technologies", in Lundstedt & Colglazier, 
Managing Innovation (1982:32); 8z. R. Landau, "The Innovation Milieu", in IBID:54 
105. Landau, "The Innovation Milieu" (1982:54) 
106. S. Zuckerman, Scientists & War: The Impact of Science on Military & Civil Affairs  
(London, Scientific Book Club, 1966:128-129) 
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In the military arena technological change has focussed on the provision of those 
technical tools and the techniques by which warfare may be waged. But military 
technology was significantly affected by the technical developments occurring outside 
just its own field of endeavour. It may be argued that from the Industrial Revolution 
until the Second World War military technology satisfied its scientific and technical 
knowledge demands from the same source as commercial manufacturing demands.(107) 
This meant that military technology was also being changed by innovations occurring 
within the general environment. 
(B) Means to Measure Technological Change in the Civil War 
The study of military technological change needs to move beyond a concentration on 
individual weapon innovations and the resulting changes to military doctrine. This 
broadening of the study does, however, raise problems over how one may measure the 
wider concept of technological change. Edwin Layton in "Conditions of Technological 
Development" (108) lists the six most common means by which the measurement of the 
growth in technology and technique occur.(109) Although mainly based around 
contemporary analysis, (acknowledging that the best data are probably the statistical 
compilations by advanced governments and international agencies on the deployment of 
personnel and money in science and technology) Layton's categories may still be useful 
if they can explain technological development in a historical context. 
Layton's six approaches include: 
(i) production functions 
(ii) patent statistics 
(iii) indirect social costs and benefits 
of technological change 
(iv) the study of innovations 
(v) the flow of information 
(vi) embodiment of science in technology 
The examination conducted by Layton was not conducted with specific reference to an 
historical examination of technological change. However, from on historical perspective 
his approaches may increasing our understanding of Civil War military technological 
changes. 
The search for statistics and material on production functions, and the social cost or 
benefits of technological change, could be rejected because it would require much work 
for uncertain gains. General data on the rate and direction of economic change may be 
107. IBID:28 
108.E. Layton, "Conditions of Technological Development", Chapter 6 in Spicgel—Rosing & 
De Solla Price, Science, Technology & Society (1977:197-221) 
109.IBID:199-204 
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detailed,(110) but precise contemporary figures on social costs such as labour 
unemployment, pollution, social dislocation, and such forth, would be difficult to 
identify. To identify all growth not directly attributed to capital and labour inputs, will 
ultimately only produce an aggregate production function that is "a rather crude index 
of technical growth".(111) Neither the first or the third approaches identified by 
Layton could establish the extent to which technical changes affected individuals or 
impacted on specific scientific knowledge. 
Patent statistics do offer a more useful tool to indicate technical activity on individual 
innovation types,(112) and illustrate design fluctuations.(113) Patent statistics, 
however, do not indicate the level of innovation; only claims to property. In nineteenth 
century America, patent figures are exposed to uncertainty due to institutional and 
political changes. They, therefore, could be usefully employed to provide an indication 
of short-term indexes to work on single types of innovation.(114) 
The flow of information and the embodiment of science in technology both rely on 
extensive analysis of technological knowledge through the study of contemporary 
journals and scientific literature. Changes to the scientific community and the core 
discoveries that promote further research, may be mapped through establishing 
"explicit linkages between papers that have particular points in common." (115) These 
links become apparent through the tracing of footnotes acknowledging preceding work. 
As an historical research tool into the growth of science and technology, Derek de Solla 
Price has produced a number of works that statistically link the amount of published 
scientific material with increased technological activity.(116) 
Both approaches are interested in simplifying the chronological collation of available 
material on specific science and technology subject matter.(117) They are not 
specifically interested in providing a method that can delineate individual technological 
110. North (et al), Growth & Welfare in the American Past (1983); & S.L. Engerman,"The 
Economic Impact of the Civil War", Explorations in Entrepreneurial History (Vol.3[3], 
Spring 1966:176-199) 
111. Layton "Mirror Image Twins" (1977:200) 
112. R. Rothwell & W. Zegveld, Industrial Innovation & Public Policy: Preparing for the  
1980s & the 1990s (London, Francis Pinter, 1982:118) 
113. J Schmookler, Invention & Economic Growth (Massachusetts, Harvard University 
Press, 1966) in Layton, "Mirror Image Twins" (1977:200) 
114. see V.D. Stockbridge, Digest of Patents Relating to Breech-loading & Magazine Small 
Arms (Except Revolvers). Granted in the United States from 1836-1873. Inclusive  
(Washington DC, U.S. Patents Office, 1874) 
115. E Garfield, Citation Indexing - Its Theory & Application in Science. Technologv. &  
Humanities (New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1979:90) 
116. D.D. Price, "Is Technology Historically Independent of Science? A Study in Statistical 
Historiography" Technology & Culture (Vol.1, 1966:553-568) 
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changes. The method is heavily reliant on scientific and technical journals and papers 
providing coverage of important advances in scientific knowledge when they occurred. 
It is the study of innovations that may prove Layton's most useful category for 
analysing Civil War technological change. 
The study of innovations can give an insight not only into individual innovative effort, 
or innovation events, but give wider implications as to why innovators failed.(118) The 
level of study identified also may be cross—national or specific to time, region or field of 
endeavour. Using his approach Layton presents innovations as nebulous items without 
uniformity of purpose, atomistic unity, or clear sets of stages.(119) Innovations may 
even be sets of different innovations that when aggregated produce a single end 
technical advancement.(120) He, therefore, proposes that there exists the need for a 
model to make sense of the separate innovative efforts. 
It is evident that a study of innovation can provide the best means by which this thesis 
can assess the separate additions to technical knowledge. Such an approach will 
additionally permit an examination of technological entities from a human perspective. 
Ultimately, it will be possible to gain an insight into whether technical knowledge 
progressed beyond the pre-1861 era of warfare. 
The study of innovations may be usefully broadened by the inclusion of material 
relating to patent records, and social factors that impacted on Civil War military 
technical development. 
Through the study of each innovation this thesis would in no way become dependent on 
general observations of military technological change. Innovations can be analysed 
separately, with each observation not acting as a guide to the choice of future 
innovations studied, or necessarily determining what course of evolution all following 
innovations would take.(121) Simply, innovations are not isolated events. They may be 
the result of other technology changes, or themselves generate technology change. 
There does not necessarily exist clearly identifiable links between the studied 
technology, the modifications, or the cumulative alterations that altered the preceding 
technical knowledge. 
118. Layton "Mirror Image Twins" (1977:202); & On the Shelf: A Survey of Industrial R &  
D Projects Abandoned For Non—Technical Reasons  (London, London Centre for the Study of 
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The analysis of certain innovations permit a flexible means for assessing changes to 
specific fields of military technical endeavour, at given points in time. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to have some form of general model. This should enable this thesis to 
construct general conclusions that can make sense of insights gained from the study of 
separate innovations. 
(C) The Innovation Process and Sources of Technical 
Development 
After his analysis of the means to measure technological growth Layton goes on to 
examine the Linear—Sequential Model as a means to diagrammatically explain technical 
development through a study of its sources. The model when applied assumes: 
...that the events leading to innovation can be arranged in a linear sequence 
of cause and effect and that the first events cause or account for the 
remainder. These models fall into two broad categories: 'discovery—push' 
and 'demand—pull'. Linear sequential models of the inventive and 
innovative process in effect define the structure and functioning of a 
technological system. In this connection, it should be noted that these 
models are all based on a priori assumptions, rather than on investigation of 
how knowledge, in fact, really does work.(122) 
The Linear Model holds additional value when used to assist in the historical 
examination of technological growth. The Linear Model encourages the examination of 
gaps between different sequential stages such as discovery, development and actual 
application. This emphasis also produces some of the major faults identified with the 
model. The phases concentrate on interpreting the sequential progress of a given 
innovation's development. They do not identify how scientific knowledge may influence 
different stages of the innovation process.(123) The 'need—pull' and 'discovery—push' 
emphasis of the model attempts only to provide some social and scientific reasons for 
the spur to innovate. 
The Linear Model may, however, still be utilized to study the innovation process within 
a given time—frame and produce a simplified means by which to order the data on 
overall innovative activity. 
To avoid the specific time—frame and sequential nature of the Linear—Sequential study 
of innovation, a Cyclic—Continuum Model may be used as an alternative means to 
explain innovation. Unlike the Linear Model, the Cyclic Model groups the general tasks 
of innovation into distinct phases. These phases have a sequential relationship but no 
logical beginning or finishing point. 
122. Layton "Mirror Image Twins" (1977:204-205) 
123. IBID:205; & J. Ronayne, Science in Government (Victoria: Australia, Edward Arnold, 
1984:65) 
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Figure 1 Linear Model (124) 
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Figure 2 Cyclic Model (125) 
The Cyclic Model depicted emphasises the interrelated nature of the innovation process, 
but denies the existence of any sequential phase of progression. It does establish that 
need or demand will provide the dominant motivation for undertaking changes to 
existing technology.(126) The acceptance that demand stimulation may initiate an 
innovative activity does not necessarily mean that the innovation process will always 
commence from that point. Within a cyclic process the innovation process may start 
from any point, without necessarily progressing sequential through all phases. 
By way of contrast the Linear Model does emphasise that need and pure research 
discoveries will jointly form the most likely starting point for a sequential process that 
will end with an innovation. This appreciates that market demands may initiate a new 
dimension to investigations, while new market demands may be created by 
breakthroughs in pure research. 
Pure research is only acknowledged by the Cyclic Model in its research and 
development (R & D) phase. Here it is coupled with the investigation of specific issues, 
knowledge, data or products that will satisfy applied research goals. This phase is 
124. Ronayne, Science in Government (1984:44) 
125. G.H. Daniels, "The Big Questions in the History in American Technology", Symposium: 
The Historiograph of American Technology, Technology & Culture (Vol.11r1], January 
1970:8) 
126. Schmookler, Invention & Economic Growth quoted in Daniels, "The Big Questions in 
the History in American Technology" (1970:7) 
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further broadened with the development of research that will encompass a field of 
technical knowledge. Through pure and applied research and development, technology 
is developed to ultimately produce a novel innovation. 
The Linear Model refers to the second phase of the innovation process as strategic 
research. This is carried out with the expectation that it will provide a broad base of 
knowledge that can form the background for delineating the parameters of study 
necessary to devise a specific innovation.(127) The Linear Model follows the strategic 
research phase with separate phases of applied or practical research aimed at specific 
investigation of the problem at hand. It is in the fourth phase of experimental 
development that efforts are made to systematically draw upon research work that can 
produce a distinct new product or process.(128) Only then is the innovation made and 
utilised. 
Unlike the Linear Model, the Cyclic Model regards innovation as a stage occurring after 
research and development. The innovation stage also does not mark the end of the 
innovation process, but paves the way for continued development effort. For the Cyclic 
innovation process a testing phase follows on from the creation of an innovation. This 
recognizes not only the refinement innovations undergo before or during initial use, but 
also that the experimental phase may instigate new courses of innovation away from 
that originally intended. This in turn may start the innovation process all over again. 
Overall, the Linear Model is more intent on explaining the development of an individual 
innovation. This development is studied through separate and sequential phases of 
progression. In contrast, the Cyclic Model prefers to depict innovative endeavour as 
evolving through broad phases, without an actual beginning or end. As Peter Drucker 
stated, the impact of technology tends to be: 
...synergic and the result of several developments, each independent in its 
origins and the outgrowth of a separate discipline with its own 
"experts"...Further, the impact of technology are often quite indirect, and 
by—products rather than main products.(129) 
Despite these differences in emphasis, both models may be placed in a surrounding 
environment which influences the progression of an innovation. 
127. Ronayne, Science in Government (1984:35) 
128. IBID 
129. P.F. Drucker, "Comments: Is Technology Predictable?", Symposium: The Role of 
Technology in Society, Technology & Culture (Vol.10, No.4, October 1.969:524) 
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The Linear Model's specific intention is to be a diagrammatical representation of the 
complex innovation process, that in delimiting its phases, must incorporate the variable 
influences of science and government into the development of a final innovation.(130) 
The Cyclic Model is more general. Whilst establishing the general phases of an 
innovation process, it does not see the interaction between these phases - or the overall 
cyclic process - as being a separate function of any greater social system. Rather, all 
environmental influences, whether positive or negative, are inherently important in 
shaping the progress of innovative activity. 
Both models basically recognize that the innovation process is made up of a number of 
phases that collectively end with the production of a new technological entity or idea. 
Additionally, while the process in reality rarely progresses through a logical continuum, 
both models are intent on identifying the distinct phases that may map the progress of 
innovative activity.(131) 
Ultimately, then, insight into the general conduct of innovative effort in the Civil War 
can be achieved by contrasting either the Linear or Cyclic model's insight into the 
nature of the innovation process. Of especial interest will be if the models of the 
innovation process can cast light onto the highly pertinent question as to whether Civil 
War military technological change can be understood by examining whether pure 
research changes to established technical and scientific laws ('discovery-push') pre-
empted technological changes, or combat needs promoted demands ('demand-pull') for 
the establishment of improved military technology or techniques. 
1.4 	Propositions 
It is proposed that the non-technical barriers affecting the development of certain 
innovations may yield further information than a concentration just on an examination 
of technical changes. The approach adopted by this thesis to the study of innovation 
may, therefore, be guided by some important propositions. 
(1) From a study of key military innovations we may better understand the 
evolution in technical knowledge in the Civil War, over that which preceded 
it. 
130.Ronayne, Science in Government  (1984: 44) 
131.Gelber, "Technical Innovation & Arms Control" (1974:510) 
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(2) Derived from an examination of the general innovative environment it is 
possible to identify non-technical factors important to the development of 
new technologies. Further, it may be possible to establish the role non-
technical factors played in influencing the nature and development of those 
key innovations identified. 
(3) If the previous propositions can be established then, ultimately, an 
assessment may be made of the Civil War innovative effort, and the war's 
impact on future developments in military strategy and technology. 
This thesis will aim to determine not only how innovation confirmed, developed, or 
amended established technical knowledge; but also how environmental factors affected 
wartime technological change. 
1.5 	Structure and Content 
Given the propositions, this thesis is subsequently divided into three major sections. 
The first part deals with technical change, the second with environmental factors, while 
the final part covers the impact of Civil War technological change. 
The whole structure is designed to build upon Part I where there occurs an 
identification and examination of the key military technological changes of the Civil 
War. Having carried out this study it is then possible in Part II to examine the role 
surrounding environmental factors played in promoting these innovations to their full 
military potential. This study may then finally lead to Part III, where an assessment is 
made of the overall impact of Civil War innovations. 
The three chapters of Part I deal entirely with the innovative activity present from 1861 
to 1865. The theme of these chapters is to test the first proposition through an 
examination of specific technological changes. Of additional assistance will be the 
ability to highlight if technical innovations provided a co-operative impact on the 
incremental development of other innovations. Essentially this will permit an 
examination of how these innovation's consolidated previous technical knowledge. Thus 
the nature of key innovations on land, at sea, and in related areas will reveal the 
character of technological endeavours in the war. 
Part II will deal with environmental factors. This will challenge the second proposition 
that it is possible to identify non-technical factors that were important to the 
development of new technical entities. 
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o answer the extent to which innovations were rationally promoted, chapter 5 will 
examine the role of government, industry, and society. It will examine their impact on 
efforts to produce, co—ordinate, test, and utilize the innovations identified in Part I. 
Chapter 6 will examine how at the end of the war the pool of "acceptable" military 
technology and knowledge derived from practical research, had been administered by 
the relevant, formal, Northern military organizations. This examination will show how, 
despite reforming to nurture new military technical entities, the organization's capacity 
to accept new technology lagged behind the pace of innovation, and affected the 
development of certain technologies. 
In concluding Part II, chapter 7 will apply the lessons derived in the two previous 
chapters to see how specific non—technical factors impacted on key technological 
changes. 
The third part of this thesis addresses the final proposition. It should provide a 
balanced assessment of the often complicated course of Civil War military technological 
change based on the preceding chapters' discussions. It will endeavour to measure the 
impact of the identified technological changes, and assess how much these non-
technical limits actually affected the ultimate technological legacy of the war. 
Drawing from previous parts, chapter 8 can go some way to test the overall impact 
technical military innovation made during the Civil War. This study will then be 
extended in Chapter 9 to examine the impact changes to Civil War arms and strategy 
made on the international arena. Together, these two chapters will be able to highlight 
how the changes to military technology produced arms and strategic developments that 
were to alter the way wars were conducted. 
Faced with the difficulty of carrying out a consolidated study of the overall process of 
Civil War innovative effort, chapter 10 intends to provide a theoretical construct. It 
will establish how far the war can be said to conform and act in relation to models of the 
modern innovation process. This will permit each stage of the Civil War innovation 
process to be assessed, while also making it possible to gain an impression of the 
contemporary innovation processes' modernity. This final stage in Part III's study on 
the impact of technological change will round off the study by referring to the modern 
dimensions of the war's innovation process. 
It needs to be re—emphasised that all models of the innovation process are 
simplifications of the complex process of innovative change. Based on assumptions that 
order complex interactions, they add understanding through the use of diagrammatic 
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symbols.(132) The model of the Civil War innovation process will only be derived from 
study conducted in the thesis, it is not a summary of the work's findings, nor will it be a 
scientific theory derived inductively from the observations made here. 







	 TECHNICAL CHANGE 
INTRODUCTION 
The importance of the specific technical changes in the Civil War must be established 
before military technological change and the volume of overall innovative effort may be 
assessed. 
Extensive technical innovation produced many novel land warfare arms. 	In 
transportation, the railroads were elevated to a pre-eminent position in logistics and so 
re-shaped military strategy. New dimensions to warfare were also consolidated by the 
deployment of electric telegraph systems and the use of balloons. 
At sea the advances in naval technology were embodied in combat between steam-
driven ironclad warships, and by the deployment of torpedoes in defended waters and 
their use as offensive weapons on torpedo boats and submarines. In addition to the 
plethora of innovations dealing specifically with naval or land warfare, there existed a 
large but less specific body of endeavour, in areas such as ordnance and artillery. 
Developments in these areas made broad contributions to technological change. 
The importance of wartime military innovations to the promotion of technical 
knowledge has been much debated. For example I B Cohen wrote in an article in 1946 
that the first: 
large scale organisation of technical and scientific resources of man power 
during the Civil War marks that conflict as the transition point in the 
technology of warfare.(1) 
However he, like writers who followed, failed to stress the complications arising from 
using a study of key innovations, to show how the Civil War was more technically 
advanced than previous periods in history. 
As isolated acts, changes to military technology are very difficult to examine. 
Technology change is more of a cumulative process, where development results from 
shifts in how science and technology unite to advance society's existing technical 
knowledge.(2) Technology is, under such circumstances, not just a practical tool or 
technique, but can be responsible for improving manufacturing ability, or as an 
endeavour undertaken to fill specific needs. This contribution may be radical and 
1. I.B. Cohen, "Science & the Civil War", Technology Review (Vol.48, 1946:167) 
2. Brooks in S.B. Lundstedt & E.W. Colglazier (eds), Managing Innovation (New York, 
Pergamon Press, 1982:12-13) 
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produce immediate, dynamic change.(3) However, most technological development 
tends to be conservative and involves long—term improvement to existing technology.(4) 
It is clear that there exists what some authors call an incubation period (5) or a period 
of technology lag.(6) These terms portray technological change as a process that is not 
embodied in a technical design occurring at any one moment in history. It may occur 
"so slowly that decades pass before the historical record reveals much change." (7) 
Society may experience a lag between the time technology changes and the time when 
institutions, attitudes, or other active forces in society realise the full benefit of that 
technology.(8) 
Having established that the act of technological change may not have an immediate 
impact on a society, one should not then expect all innovations to immediately generate 
technical change. It is axiomatic, that technological knowledge utilized in the Civil War 
may have originated before 1861 and continued to influenced future technological 
change after 186549) 
Thus, while Part I will deal with an examination of Civil War technological change 
through an identification of specific innovations, the detail derived from this analysis 
will make possible a later assessment of the influence of other non—technical factors that 
impacted on the introduction of key technical entities. 
3. T.P. Hughes, "Conservative & Radical Technologies", in Lundstedt & Colglazier, 
Managing Innovation (1982:32) 
4. IBID:32; & R. Landau, "The Innovative Milieu", in Lundstedt & Co!glazier, Managing 
Innovation (1982:54) 
5. R.K. Merton, Science. Technology & Society in Seventeenth Century England (New 
Jersey, Humanities Press, 1978:42); & J.K. Feibleman, "Pure Science, Applied Science, 
Technology: An Attempt at Definitions", Technology & Culture (Vol.2141, Fall 1961:313) 
6. Lundstedt & Co'glazier, Managing Innovation (1982:Footnote, xxi); & N. Rosenberg, 
Technoloe.y and American Economic Growth (New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1972:17) 
7. S. Zuckerman, Scientists & War (London, Scientific Book Club, 1966:127-128) 
8. G.H. Daniels, "The Big Questions in the History in American Technology", Technology & 
Culture (Vol.11[11, January 1970:2-3) 
9. H. Rose & S. Rose, Science & Society (London, Pelican Books, 1970:240 & 245) 
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CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL CHANGE TO MILITARY WEAPONS 
In a war dominated by the importance of infantry engagements, technical developments 
of infantry weapons played a significant role.(10) By surveying technical innovations in 
land warfare, it will be possible to evaluate the progress of different weapons 
technology. This assessment will centre on the study of innovations in breech-loading 
and magazine-fed small arms, breech-loading cartridge ammunition, railroads, balloon 
warfare, and the field telegraph. Together these areas have stood as major advances in 
technical knowledge and represent a new level in the industrialisation of warfare.(11) 
Reviewing these technical innovations, individually and collectively, will make it 
possible later to assess their impact on overall changes to military technology. 
2.1 	 Breech-loading and Repeating Small Arms 
Prior to the Civil War, the United States had a history of experimentation in small arms 
design. Many American inventors had in particular become interested in producing an 
effective breech-loading shoulder-fired weapon. Most famous of these early breech-
loaders was John H Hall's, which was granted a patent as early as 21 May 1811, for its 
breech-loading action.(12) The ubiquitous rifle was the American breech-loading 
carbine, which, from 1819 until the Civil War, went through many design modifications 
and itself became the basis of so many other weapon prototypes. 
Immediately prior to the Civil War and during its early months, the foundations for 
further wartime development in breech-loading weapons were made by important 
weapon designs, such as the Burnside, Starr, Gibbs, Gallager, Maynard and Sharp's 
percussion breech-loading carbines.(13) 
Although based on earlier designs, wartime carbines incorporated many important 
innovations. Technically, the most important advancement in breech-loaders was the 
greater operational efficiency of those weapons manufactured towards the end of the 
war. Improvements sought to rectify poor breech assemblies that separated and 
released gas when the expelled gases from fired bullets pressured imprecisely 
manufactured breech-blocks and chambers,(14) poor trigger mechanisms, under 
10. F.A. Shannon, The Organization & Administration of the Union Army (Vol.1) 
(Massachusetts, Peter Smith, 1965:107) 
11.C. Boyle, P. Wheale & B. Surgess, People. Science & Technology (London, Wheatsheaf 
Books, 1984:154) 
12.D.F. Butler, United States Firearms: The First Century. 1776-1875 (New York, 
Winchester Press, 1971:132) 
13.Butler, United States Firearms (1971: Chapter 5 & 6); & National Rifle Association of 
Afnerica, Civil War Small Arms, An American Rifleman Reprint (Washington, NRAA, 
1960:16-21) 
14.C.L. Davis, Arming The Union (Port Washington, Kcnnikat Press, 1.973:1.20-121) 
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powered hammer spring catches that failed to ignite percussion caps, inefficient means 
of extracting rounds, and overly complex manufacturing that hindered the design. 
By the later stages of the Civil War it was possible to see a marked advance in the arms 
and equipment issued to the Union armies.(15) By 1865 design refinements had 
produced such weapons as the improved 1863 Sharps wartime model and the 
Remington split-breech, Ballard, Sharps and Hawkins, Joslyn, Warner and Palmer 
single-shot cartridge carbines. 
However, this is not meant to suggest that each was an ideal design. Rather, each design 
represented a progression towards a more complete breech-loading small arms system. 
The Ballard for instance, was a competent design, with an excellent sliding cartridge 
extraction stud under the forestock.(16) Most designs used improved ammunition with 
some form of fulminate incorporated in the cartridges, in particular the Remington 
split-breech design had an advanced hammer-firing pin design to ensure reliable 
strikes on cartridges. The Palmer Carbine, although adopted too late to be used widely 
in the war, was the first bolt-action, metallic cartridge shoulder arm used by the United 
States armed forces.(17) 
Despite the concentration of inventors on breech-loaders and the exciting experiments 
with many ingenious designs, very poor weapons were possibly more prevalent than 
good ones. This is manifest in the wasted effort and revenue spent on bad designs, 
whilst it seems superior weapon designs had no advantage in the competition for official 
endorsement. 
On balance, despite the abundance of many inferior production weapons, the success of 
the Sharps lever-action single-shot carbine and the venture into hybrid repeating 
breech-loading weapons, stand as testament of the efforts to improve existing weapons 
technology. 
These improvements may be followed through a variety of related technical designs. 
The most important breech-loading repeating rifles of the Civil War (besides the less 
ingeniously designed five-shot, revolving cylinder Colt percussion carbine) were the 
Spencer, Henry and Ball weapons.(18) Unlike the incremental growth in technical 
knowledge associated with single-shot breech-loaders, repeating rifles underwent rapid 
technical development into effective weapons systems. Design work progressed from 
15.D.A. Armstrong, Bullets & Bureaucrats (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1982:26) 
16.NRAA, Civil War Small Arms (1960:18); & J. Dunn, "The Marlin Ballard Rifle", 
Australian Shooters Journal (April 1987:36-39) 
17.NRAA, Civil War Small Arms (1960:21) 
18.IBID:15 
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the Jennings Repeating Rifle design patented in August 1848 by Walter Hunt and Lewis 
Jennings,(19)(See Appendix 20, Patent No. 6973) to the early Volcanic Rifle patented in 
1854. In turn, these early designs were taken by the Winchester Company and in 1861 
they had, with their research and development, produced the Henry rifle. 
The Henry repeating rifle had some design features that were to prove invaluable to 
later weapons.(See Appendix 21 & 22 on the Winchester design evolution) It used a 
lever action to continually feed into the chamber, rounds that were housed in a 
magazine tube mounted under the barrel. Although somewhat delicate in design, the 
weapon was extremely popular with those who used it. The technical success of the 
Henry repeating rifle is held by some to be the peak of Civil War small arms design. It 
built on the preceding design and combat success enjoyed by the Spencer seven-shot 
repeating rifle. Both designs utilized the lever action and self-contained ammunition. 
The Model 1861 Spencer was, however, by far the most important repeating small arms 
design of the Civil War. Some 106,667 of these "most notable shoulder weapons" (20) 
were purchased by the end of the war. Feared by the Confederates as the rifle that 
could be "loaded on Sunday and fired all week",(21) the weapon had a reliable lever 
action that fed rounds from a seven-round magazine located in the butt. The design 
represented the best small arms technology mass-produced in the North. 
Although the North produced the most successful breech-loading weapon innovations, 
the South was not without innovative genius, even if it did lack the subsequent 
production capacity and resources to convert ideas into physical realities. One 
interesting and ingenious concept was for a repeating rifle design called the Sibert 
magazine repeating rifle. 
The Sibert was given a patent one month after the Civil War began. It would appear 
that early in the war all the costing on preliminary production and development of the 
weapon had been done.(22) The available documents indicate that the design was based 
on fairly conventional technical knowledge. Using a number of breech-loaded single 
barrels that rotated into alignment with the bore, the rifle could fire rounds in quick 
succession.(23) Because the weapon was such a departure from existing designs and 
required special manufacturing machinery, the Sibert seems never to have advanced 
19. Butler, United States Firearms (1971:213-214) 
20.The Gun Digest (12th Edition) (New York, American Publishing House, 1958:192); & 
Butler, United States Firearms  (1971:226) 
21. Butler, United States Firearms (1971:111) 




beyond the design phase. The design certainly does not depart from established design 
principles in existence prior to the Civil War.(24) 
Only with one magazine-fed small arm innovation can it be said that the Confederate 
Army's technical endeavour parallelled the North's. This was the development of the 
rapid fire gun. 
The concept of a rapid-fire "shrapnel cannon" was not new. In 1859 the French had 
adopted the multi-barrelled Mitrailleuse (or 'grape-shot shooter') as a mobile rapid-
fire, light artillery piece.(25) The design of an American single-barrel machine-gun 
was also not novel. The Agar ('Coffee Mill' or 'Union Repeating Gun') design pre-
dated the war. This weapon was a rapid-fire gun with a hand-crank mechanical 
operation and a top feed ammunition hopper.(26) 
During 1862, Captain R S Williams, CSA, and Dr Richard Gatling had production 
models of their weapons field tested. The CSA Williams Rapid-Fire Gun and the 
Northern Gatling Gun saw service on a limited basis at the Battle of Seven Pines 
(Virginia), and Petersburg respectively.(27) Both designs represent a distinct 
divergence from usual military technology. 
The innovative environment of the Civil War saw inventors in the North gradually 
evolve other repeating guns such as the horizontally mounted, twenty-four barrel 
Billinghurst-Requa Battery Gun, the eighty-five barrel 'Pepper Pot' Vandenburg 
Volley Gun, and other less effective designs that used light steel or brass cartridges to 
facilitate new mechanical actions.(28) 
In the South the Chief of the Ordnance, Major-General Josiah Gorgas, produced a 
smooth-bore, rapid-fire gun that fired large metal case canister shot or solid shot from 
an eighteen-chamber rotating magazine.(29) As with the early Gatling Gun Model 
1862 design and the Williams rapid-fire gun, all these weapons, although novel in their 
design features, failed to gain , wide acceptance, due either to their mechanical 
deficiencies or because they failed to produce convincing weapon systems that could fit 
traditional military tactics. 
24.See C. Blair (ed), Pollard's History of Firearms (New York, MacMillan, 1983:205-206 & 
213) 
25.[.Hogg & J. Batchelor, The Machine-Gun, (London, Phoebus, 1976:6-7) 
26.IBID:4-5; & J. Coggins, Arms & Equipment of the Civil War  (New York, Double Day, 
1962:43) 
27.Coggins, Arms & Equipment (1962:45); & C.B. Colby, Civil War Weapons (New York, 
Coward-McCann, 1962: 18) 
28.Armstrong, Bullets & Bureaucrats (1982:24-25) 
29.Colby, Civil War Weapons (1962 192) 
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Although the Gaffing Model 1862 was prone to breakdowns, twelve of the design were 
purchased at $1000 apiece and used by General Butler.(30) The weapon showed that it 
had great potential against massed close-range targets. Therefore, when the perfected 
Model 1865 was introduced with four or six barrels, a more efficient feed system, using 
metallic cartridges and working efficiently with 1 inch or 0.50 calibre rounds, the War 
Department and the Navy immediately adopted the weapon.(31) (See Appendix 24) 
It is perhaps indicative of arms development during the war that it was the North that 
could best develop and update weapons technology that was to remain in service until 
the first decade of the twentieth century. The Williams Gun stands as an example of the 
CS Army's basic failure to modify a sound design. The most serious design problem of 
breech expansion, that occurred with continuous firing, could have been alleviated by 
the use of better metallic ammunition and an improved extraction systems. 
The North with its superior industrial capacity was clearly better able build on existing 
technical knowledge and produce a commercial product. Even failure to sell the 
product could further spur innovators and industry to improve upon other technology. 
In the South, the ingenuity of innovators was not matched by such a capacity to convert 
technical knowledge into better weapons systems. Testimony to this is the fact that the 
only weapon purposely designed and mass-produced in the South during the war, was a 
0.58 calibre muzzle-loading carbine produced between 1864 and 1865.(32) 
The industrial capacity of the North did not however necessarily guarantee it an 
absolute advantage in developing new or better weapons. Both sides, for example, 
depended upon percussion revolvers throughout the war; (See Appendix 6) this was 
despite exposure to some foreign designs with novel features, the patenting of repeating 
revolvers (See Appendix 20), and the American development of a rimfire 0.22 calibre 
revolver by Smith and Wesson based on the April 1855 patent of Rollin White.(33) 
It would seem that in the technical advancement over previous knowledge, breech-
loading and repeating rifles represent the greatest development in wartime small arms 
technology. For while the machine-gun and revolver held real potential, it was the 
evolution in breech-loaders and repeating rifles that achieved the most significant 
success in replacing older small arms technology. During the course of the war, 
technical attitudes changed from an almost religious reliance on muzzle-loading 
30. Hogg & Batchelor, The Machine-Gun (1976:7); & The Gun Digest (1958:21) 
31. Hogg & Batchelor, The Machine-Gun (1976:7) 
32. W.S. Hoole, "The Confederate Armory at Tallassce, Alabama, 1864-1865, The Alabama 
Review (Vol.25[1], January 1972:4) 
33. Patent No. 12648 bored through cylinder to use rim-fired rounds see E. Ezell, Handguns 
of the World (London, Arms & Armour, 1981:35); & Blair, Pollard's I-1 is tory of Firearms  
(1983:318-325) 
48 
muskets to a stage where, at the end of the war, breech-loading rifles N'ere the 
preferred standard small arm desired by field commanders and soldiers. 
Muskets used at the end of the war were far more advanced than their flintlock 
predecessors, which had been mostly cast-off during the war. However, the Spencer, 
Sharps and Henry breech-loading rifles were a quantum leap again over rifled muzzle-
loading musket technology. By the end of the Civil War it was these technological 
advancements incorporated in small arms, that were being consolidated into a new 
standard for the military . (34) 
2.2 	 Breech-loading Cartridge Ammunition 
The development and actual use of the centre-fire cartridge in the American Civil War 
was a major step towards modern ammunition and modern warfare.(35) The chief 
reason for this interest in perfecting cartridge ammunition in American small arms 
manufacturers, can be traced back to the Hall's breech-loading flintlock. This weapon 
instilled the desire to create ammunition for the new generations of percussion breech-
loader designs, that were to evolve in the two decades prior to the Civil War. 
The impetus for breech-loading cartridge ammunition was the muzzle-loading 
cartridges made for muskets or rifle muskets of the 1850s. In particular, the 
combination of the rifle-musket and the minie ball proved the advantages of uniting the 
ball and black powder into one unit. (See Appendix 1) Developments in muzzle-loaded 
cartridges also led to the development of rounds that were adapted for use in breech-
loaders. These included unorthodox designs such as the Williams Bullet, the Shaler 
Sectional Bullet, the Gardiner Explosive Shell, and the 0.44 Colt (paper) Bullet.(36) (See 
Appendix 2) 
To the development in muzzle-loading cartridge ammunition during the war, can be 
added technical development in cartridge ammunition prior to the war. These advances 
include, in 1848, the "rocket ball" metallic cartridge designed by Walter Hunt. This 
was followed by the 0.54 Hunt breech-loading repeating rifle. In turn, development 
became centred around the joint development of breech-loaders and their particular 
cartridges. Prior to the war this development produced the Model 1840 Hall carbine 
and 0.64 paper cartridge; the 1856 Gibbs 0.52 calibre carbine and the 1854 Greene 0.54 
calibre carbine, which both fired early paper cartridges; the Sharps carbine and 0.56 
paper cartridge and later linen cartridge; the Maynard 1859 Model and its distinctive 
34.Armstrong, Bullets & Bureaucrats (1982:27) 
35. The Gun Digest (1.958:9) 
36.B.R. Lewis, Notes on Ammunition of the American Civil War 1861-1865  (Washington, 
American Ordnance Association, 1959:4-10) 
49 
0.50 calibre brass cartridge with a broad—rimmed base and fitted percussion cap; and 
the 1860 Burnside carbine with its tapered—cone brass cartridge with a fitted percussion 
cap. (See Appendix 3) 
Technical developments in breech—loading cartridges produced cartridges composed of 
different materials, from nitre—soaked paper to ordinary paper, cardboard, linen, skin, 
rubber, copper, and brass. As with ordinary muzzle—loading cartridges, which had 
innumerable variants in calibre (from 0.31 to 0.79) and performance, the breech—
loading ammunition also had different characteristics. (See Appendix 4 & 5) To make 
matters more confusing the development of the machine—gun, repeating breech—loader 
rifles, and revolvers also produced novel cartridge ammunition. The Requa 0.54 calibre 
brass cartridge, the Spencer 0.52 calibre rimfire copper case and the Henry 0.44 rim—
fire copper case; and the Smith and Wesson 0.22 or 0.32 calibre rim fire revolver round, 
broadened the successful use of metallic cartridges to all types of small arms. 
The development of ammunition was linked to new small arms development. This 
resulted from the attempt to find a combination of an arm and round that would 
overcome gas leakages from the breech mechanisms.(37) The successful evolution of 
technical knowledge on breech—loading ammunition can best be traced through the 
types of breech—loaders and their cartridges used during the Civil War. This also 
illustrates the role technical evolution in ammunition played in making new rifle designs 
more effective and efficient. There existed five basic phases: 
(i) Primitive: separately primed cartridge with percussion cap or patent 
primers and a separate combustible envelope — Colt, Gibbs, Greene, Gwyn 
& Campbell, Jenks and Merrill, Joslyn (percussion model), Lindner, Merrill, 
North—Hall, Perry, Sharps (early model), and Starr. 
(ii) First Transitional Type: a percussion breech—loading with an auxiliary 
Maynard type primer magazine as well as nipples — Burnside (early model), 
Greene, Jenks (Remington), Maynard (early model), Merrill (early design by 
Merrill, Latrobe and Thomas), and Sharps (models 1851 and 1855). 
(iii) Later Transitional Type: primed by percussion caps or patent primers but 
with perforated metallic or rubber cartridge case — Burnside, Gallager, 
Maynard and Smith. 
(iv) Wartime Developments: rim—fired types completely self—contained in 
metallic cartridge — Henry, Ball, Ballard, Joslyn, Palmer, Remington, 
Sharps (Model 1863), Sharps and Hawkins, Spencer, and Warner.(38) 
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(v) Wartime Design Variants: the centre-fire cartridge types with fulminate 
either in the rim and centre or centrally located primer self-contained in the 
cartridge - Smith Carbine (Crispin patent), La Faucheaux (revolver), La 
Mat (revolver), Raphael and Perrin (hand guns).(39) 
The fifth phase illustrated the limited use of centre-fire cartridges. However, in the 
centre-fire design of Colonel Hiram Berdan (of Berdan's Sharpshooters fame), with a 
separate primer assembly pressed into a pocket formed in the centre of the cartridge 
head, ammunition attained a configuration that has changed little today.(40) This 
round was refined and developed by Colonel S V Benet, Commander of the Frankford 
Arsenal in 1864 and 1865. The development and manufacture of such complex 
cartridges was difficult and caused serious restriction on experimentation and research. 
Conversely the success of the Spencer breech-loader and its ammunition can be 
attributed to the fact that they were the most easily manufactured of the designs in the 
family of new small arms and cartridges. 
An example of the failure to develop ammunition because of its "parental" breech-
loading design's failure to gain acceptance, is the 0.44 Henry rimfire. Described as the 
most important "final breakthrough in rifle ammunition during the Civil War",(41) the 
ammunition - along with its repeating rifle - failed to gain Federal contracts when 
introduced in 1862. 
The rifle did have some design weaknesses, yet when tested by a United States Naval 
lieutenant attached to the Ordnance Bureau it fired 120 rounds of ammunition in 340 
seconds without a stoppage or misfire.(42) Although a remarkable feat for the day, the 
rifle and ammunition did not impress General James Ripley, the then Head of the 
Ordnance Bureau. Thus it was left to individual soldiers and State militias to purchase 
the majority of the 10,000 Henry rifles produced during the war. Despite official 
reluctance, the eventual success of the design is evidenced by Federal records which 
show 4,610,400 Henry 0.44 calibre rimfire cartridges had to be supplied to Northern 
forces.(43) 
It is a testament to the technical development of the breech-loading cartridge, that 
despite restricted introduction of breech-loading carbines, some 55 million rounds were 
still officially purchased.(44) The existence of these rounds enabled ancillary 
developments such as greater concentration on designing better repeating rifles. These 
new rounds also enabled innovators to adapt earlier, less successful designs, such as the 
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Gatling Gun, to overcome design weaknesses. This promoted the concentration of 
designs around standard calibres of ammunition. 
Whilst such advances were made in the North, little was achieved in the South. Some 
advantages did lie in standardisation of arms and the ammunition used by issued arms. 
This was due to the fact that the South was forced to maintain small arms that were 
almost exclusively of pre-war design, again reflecting the degree of technical 
underdevelopment of the CSA compared to that of the US Army. This point is further 
highlighted by the Confederates' inability to utilise captured Sharps, Spencer, Henry 
and Ball rifles because their post-1863 ammunition designs were beyond their 
manufacturing techniques. Shortages of resources aside, the South's pre-war 
production facilities were too primitive even to be converted to produce this 
ammunition, had they the time and resources available to do so. 
Despite the South's lack of contribution to cartridge ammunition development, and in 
spite of the difficulty faced by Northern ammunition innovations trying to get adopted, 
Civil War ammunition development was remarkably successful. The shape of 
ammunition (rimflre and centre-fire rounds in particular), the moulding of bullets, and 
the use of brass and copper cases, all reflect developments consolidated for the first time 
in the Civil War and still in use. It was only in the inferior black powder and nitre 
loading of cartridges, that post-Civil War arms innovators were able to make 
significant advances prior to the twentieth century. 
The technical change to Civil War breech-loading ammunition, therefore, saw its 
design integrity consolidated over paper and ball ammunition whilst also attaining 
design features that are still recognisable in ammunition produced a century later. 
2.3 	 Civil War Railroads 
Any discussion of Civil War technical innovations inevitably leads to an examination of 
railroads and ironclad warships and how they came to be martial representations of the 
industrial age. On land, the railroads were seen as living symbols of the new steam 
powered era and a representation of the changes wrought in contemporary technology. 
Yet, more than any other innovation in land warfare, technical advancement in railroad 
technology remains difficult to measure. Mostly restricted to improvements or 
adaptations that satisfied local military needs, railroad technical development has even 
been perceived to have produced no technical innovations. But is this a fair assessment? 
It is important to note that most Civil War railroad innovation drew heavily on existing 
technical knowledge. Nonetheless, it is important to establish if the innovations were 
more than just random and unimportant adjustments to existing technology. 
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The foremost role of rail in the Civil War was in its logistical capacity to re-supply 
armies. Rail expedited the delivery of men, munitions, clothes, medicine, food and 
forage whilst facilitating the removal of the wounded, prisoners, refugees, and captured 
material.(45) This role had been experimented with in Europe in the 1859 Franco-
Austrian War at Solferino, yet the Civil War was the first time the tactical benefits of 
moving troops rapidly were fully realised.(46) Rail's ability to rapidly relocate men and 
material introduced a whole new dimension into military strategy.(47) 
The incentives for both Federal and Confederate Governments and military 
commanders to create a unified rail system were enormous. To the owners of the rail 
lines and manufacturers of rolling stock, the war also produced commercial rewards 
that spurred the advancement of co-ordinated rail links.(48) 
A number of significant technical , innovations can be traced back to this desire to 
facilitate an efficient rail supply system. The Union standardisation of rail gauge at 
four foot eight-and-a-half inches (49) was accompanied by improvements to the road 
beds and more flexible and better designed rolling-stock bogies. Better rail lines 
(including steel lines) were introduced late in the war, and steam engines became 
functionally more efficient, whilst their manufacture became correspondingly 
easier.(50) These technical innovations were complemented by engineering 
developments such as the building of prefabricated trusses and standardised rail 
construction and destruction techniques.(51) Together they enabled the Northern 
wartime railroads to fill the military demands constantly placed upon them. 
Aside from the desire to create a functional network of rail lines, both the North and the 
South also produced the innovations in railroad rolling stock necessary to satisfy 
specific needs. In particular there were significant special designs, including trains 
specifically used to remove wounded, armoured trains, and telegraph trains. 
The First Bull Run battle marked a major phase in the use of rail by the Confederate 
Army to bring up men and artillery from its reserves and directly deploy them into 
battle against the Union forces - an early attempt to exploit rail's tactical value in 
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outmanoeuvring an enemy. As well, this battle also represented the first large-scale use 
of trains to remove wounded from the battlefield. Although it was carried out in an 
unorganised manner on standard rolling-stock, the advantages were apparent. What 
was to emerge was a more deliberate use of designated trains to remove Northern 
casualties systematically. These experiences inspired special innovations. Hospital 
rolling-stock was specially manufactured with good ventilation, lighting, and heating. 
Experiments were carried out with standard stretchers being slung upon shock-
absorbing heavy rubber bands and also with the inclusion of small operating theatres 
capable of performing minor surgery.(52) 
Although normal trains were often used, when hospital trains were available to 
Northern forces they greatly enhanced the survival chances of casualties. Later 
improvements with passenger cars instead of box cars and better equipped surgical 
cars, also increased the care available to the wounded. At Chattanooga, Dr Barnium 
(US Army) supervised the rail transportation of 20,472 patients on hospital trains and 
lost only one man en route.(53) After Gettysburg from 1 July till 1 August 1863, 15,580 
wounded were moved by rail to Baltimore, New York, Harrisburg, or Philadelphia.(54) 
In total, Northern hospital trains from 1862 to 1865 removed some 225,000 wounded or 
sick of both sides directly from the battlefield.(55) 
Although few records exist with which to construct a picture of the South's use of rail to 
remove wounded, it is known that it had no organised system of specialised hospital 
trains.(56) As the war progressed its rail system degenerated under the ravages of war. 
The South's inability to replace-rolling stock or rail lines made systematic attempts to 
remove wounded by rail almost impossible. 
In the area of technical development associated with armoured trains, the South at least 
kept pace with Northern initiatives. Armoured trains included those made shot-proof 
to protect locomotive firemen and drivers from ambushes and sniper fire, those adapted 
to carry troops and even cannon to deter guerilla attack, and trains armed with heavy 
artillery to provide mobile artillery support for friendly forces.(57) 
Bullet-proof trains seem to have been manufactured by both sides. Using available 
materials such as wood, sandbags, old rail girders, building materials, or parts from 
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destroyed rolling stock, trains were given added protection. Although many trains 
could well have had specially machined extra protective armour added, there 
apparently existed no co-ordinated efforts in the North or the South to construct 
armoured trains. It was more likely that, as was the case with the provision of special 
rolling-stock for men or horses to protect trains, adaptation of available rolling-stock 
occurred. 
Unlike other types of armoured trains, rolling-stock with mounted guns did receive at 
least a degree of concerted innovative, as opposed to adaptive, technical change. 
Derived from the principle of using large calibre ordnance on rail to give mobile coastal 
defence, 'rail guns' were used in numerous forms throughout both armies and in all 
theatres of the war. Although mostly designed around exiting rolling-stock, the 
marriage between coastal or naval guns and their mounts, produced various design 
differences. 
Specific effort was made to engineer carriages and guns into a weapons system with 
some combat utility for land forces. Records exist of the Confederates successfully 
deploying a Brooke, Seacoast or Naval 10-Inch smooth-bore on a flat tray in the 
Peninsular Campaign of 1862.(58)(See Appendix 7) It was the use of a Confederate rail 
gun at Jacksonville in March 1863 that precipitated the first recorded rail gun duel. 
The Brooke 10-Inch Confederate rail gun was opposed and forced off the battlefield by 
counter fire from a Northern 4-Inch rifled breech-loader specially mounted on a flat 
tray to chase the Confederate piece.(59) 
However, the best representative example of Civil War rail guns occurred at 
Petersburg. It was there that the North deployed the "Dictator" or "Petersburg 
Express", a huge 13-Inch Seacoast Mortar Model 1861, which weighed 17,000 pounds 
and fired a 200-pound shell.(60) Its mobility and firepower enabled the Northern 
forces to engage Southern targets with some initial success.(61) 
An important method of aiming rail guns has been traced back to this battle. The 
practice of placing a rail gun on a curved track to give an arc of fire (5.5 inch traverse 
for every 88 feet moved down a track with a 500 foot radius) was utilised by the 
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"Dictator" and utilised by rail guns up until they became outmoded in the mid—
twentieth century.(62) 
Figure 3 
The technical adaptation of the train to accept military telegraph equipment is the final 
important innovation made to rolling stock. These innovations involved the use of 
trains to carry a Beardslee magneto—electric telegraph machine.(63) By 1863 thirty of 
these trains were in use by the Union forces as relay points for short—range field 
telegraphs. They acted as central points where command centres could be established, 
with telegraph wires laid out to link forces spread up to eight miles away.(64) Brigadier 
General D C McCallum, who was in charge of Northern railroads, and Major A J 
Myers, Controller of the military telegraph system, both promoted the employment of 
the telegraph train and ensured it received specially converted new or undamaged 
rolling stock. (65) 
Technical changes torailroads accompanied most adaptations -Of trains to meet military 
needs. As the needs were never expressed.in-a systematic _manner or rarely attained in a 
controlled and co—ordinated way, most technical innovations were merely minor or 
incremental improvements. Yet, these changes, although often sporadic and un-
orchestrated, did enable railways to: supply mass armies dispersed across wide 
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areas,(66) successfully remove casualties, and give mobile artillery and telegraph 
support to military forces. 
Admittedly, the growth in technical knowledge was secured through innovations that 
involved minor changes to the basic technology of rail travel. Rather, the war provided 
the inspirational spur that amended the use of rail and its technical components so it 
could more efficiently fill growing military demand. (67) 
Technical innovation during the Civil War cannot be said to have stagnated but rather 
to have been restricted to a number of small changes that did not produce radical 
technological shifts. These innovations were in turn based on the great amount of pre-
war technical development associated with the great expansion of American railroads 
during the 1840-to-1850 period. (68) 
The Civil War concentrated innovative development on making pre-war rail 
technology more able to meet military demands placed upon it. 
2.4 	 Balloons 
The development of aeronautics as a legitimate tool in warfare owes much to the use of' 
balloons in the Civil War. This development of aerial warfare has been advanced as an 
indication that the Civil War was unlike preceding wars, establishing the war's link 
with the era of modern warfare.(69) 
Balloon technology was well-advanced prior to the Civil War. Parallel to this pre-
existing technological development was the evolution of the military use of balloons in 
war. The question as to how Civil War use of balloons affected military technological 
change can only be fully answered after an examination of how balloons were used in 
the war and how technical changes facilitated their greater utilisation. 
It cannot be said that the Civil War marked a radical beginning to the technical 
knowledge derived from the use of balloons in war. Only four months after the 
invention of the balloon by the Montgolfier brothers in France on 5 June 1783, Jean 
Francois Pilatre de Rozier ascended in a balloon (on 15 October 1783) and immediately 
advocated its introduction as a tool of war.(70) Prior to 1861, balloon technology was 
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developed hand-in-hand with its military utility. It had been used by the French for 
aerial observation at the Battle of Fleurus and was used in an organised Regular 
Balloon Company formed on 2 April 1794. 
Since the inception of the balloon a number of suggestions had been made on how to use 
aeronautics in offensive operations. Ingenious ideas were formulated for using the 
balloon to bomb impregnable forts and numerically superior land and naval forces. In 
the Crimean War these ideas were pursued by both sides when the British and the 
French attempted to bomb the Russians at Cronstadt and were later subjected to 
Russian attack from captured balloons.(71) These early military roles were transferred 
across the Atlantic in July 1846 when, during the Mexican War, ballooning was used in 
conjunction with other military endeavours. One proposal, contrived by the American 
forces, was to use John Wise's balloon to bomb the fortress of Vera Cruz.(72) 
Technical development of the balloon in America reached a pre-war climax with T S C 
Lowe's historic attempt to cross the Atlantic in a 700,000 cubic foot balloon, "The City 
of New York." This feat occurred in a period of highly publicised aeronautic efforts 
that created not only a spur to greater technical achievements, but wide acclaim for 
pioneers of ballooning such as James Allen, John Wise, John La Mountain, and 
Thadeus Lowe.(73) 
When the war commenced these pioneers were responsible for trying to introduce 
aeronautical technology into Northern military service. The War Department 
undertook to evaluate their offers. Unsure of the practical military uses of balloon 
technology, the War Department engaged the eminent scientist Joseph Henry as a 
technical consultant.(74) His recommendation not only endorsed the use of balloons in 
war but also gave full endorsement of T S C Lowe's efforts. 
From very early in the war it was evident that balloons could be used as an adjunct to 
land forces. Throughout the war, however, its role in both the Northern and Southern 
forces was mostly limited to non-aggressive actions. Its use was mainly restricted to 
reconnaissance, topographical survey, vital cartography information, spotting enemy 
troop movements before and during battle, signalling, and artillery observation.(75) 
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The North's early attempts to deploy balloons met with little success. On 8 am! 14 July 
1861, James Allen failed to make ascents because a lack of hydrogen prevented him 
from inflating the balloon. John Wise's balloon was inflated and deployed at the first 
Battle of Bull Run. Because free flight was not considered possible, attempts were made 
to redeploy the inflated balloon by towing it with a cart. The decision to tow the balloon 
across wooded countryside was made by the aeronautically naive Major Myer (who 
later went on to command the Signal Corps). Inevitably, the balloon struck trees and 
had a hole torn in envelope.(76) 
On 31 July 1861, however, John La Mountain successfully put to air for General Butler 
at Hampton. Once aloft he spotted a concealed water battery (river minefield) at 
Sewall's Point and observed significant enemy force build-ups in the area.(77) In this 
case continued observation was shortened, by the lack of available hydrogen and 
supporting equipment. 
The development of Confederate aeronautics seems to have occurred mostly in response 
to the North's successful use of balloons. Unlike the North, which progressed between 
late 1861 and mid-1863 to purposely built up-to-date balloons, the South was 
restricted to crude manufacturing techniques. Most Southern balloons were made from 
silk or fine linen salvaged from old frocks, and crude rope and baskets had to be 
constructed in the field. Nevertheless, these dubiously constructed designs Ns, e re 
deployed successfully in the front lines and were even used on naval vessels in key 
strategic river positions.(78) 
Balloons provided invaluable assistance to artillery batteries that had an over-the-
horizon range and therefore needed more accurate fire control.(79) In the North, 
although artillery observation was also a major use for balloons, there occurred 
technical developments in ancillary areas that overcame early design problems. 
Balloons could provide vital battlefield intelligence. To enhance this role an accurate 
and swift form of delivering information from the balloon observer to the ground had to 
be devised. Early use of written messages or sketch maps, weighted with heavy objects 
and dropped to the ground, proved inefficient, while the use of signal flags or flares 
lacked the precision necessary to convey complex messages. At this point the technical 
knowledge on the balloon and existing telegraph systems were linked together, to give a 
highly accurate means of communicating orders and observations.(80) 
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Advances in research into providing accurate battlefield observation, were not, 
however, all successful. Dr John W Draper, a member of the fledgling American 
Photographical Society, together with colleagues of the American National Academy of 
Science, tried to get the War Department to conduct experiments with balloon—mounted 
cameras.(81) This attempt to experiment with the marriage of these two technologies, 
however, never gained official endorsement. 
Major technical problems were also associated with the inflation and deployment of 
balloons. These problems were compounded by the difficulty of transporting balloons 
and their equipment across the wooded countryside, over which the Civil War usually 
raged. The breakthrough came with the introduction of a mobile gas generator. 
It has been claimed that La Mountain was the first to produce a forerunner of later 
generators that could inflate balloons quickly without all the previously required 
cumbersome equipment.(82) However, it was T S C Lowe who designed the first 
portable gas generator that was to produce a lasting change in aeronautics. 
His design was based upon the knowledge that hydrogen could be produced from the 
interaction of sulphuric acid and iron. By 1863 this design was further developed, 
permitting balloons to be filled by mobile gas generators in three hours, instead of the 
normal twelve or more hours.(83) Although the innovation built upon La Mountain's 
generator and pre—existing knowledge of producing hydrogen from iron and sulphuric 
acid, it did so in a manner that, Lowe argued, produced a wholly new piece of 
technological innovation.(84) It was this development that in turn gave balloons new 
mobility and enabled more rapid deployment. 
As the abundance of woodlands restricted the use of balloons on land, Civil War 
aeronauts took their balloons into the sphere of the navy. Rivers were used to convey 
balloons to front—line military operations. Drawing from their experiences with 
mounting balloons on sea craft during Atlantic crossings, the difficulty in marrying 
balloon technology with existing naval technology was confronted. 
Craft were converted specifically to carry balloons for reconnaissance; these included 
the G W Parke Custis by the North and the CSS Teaser by the South. This was negated 
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to some extent as these vessels often lacked personnel with sufficient expertise, or had to 
deal with naval commanders who had unrealistic expectations for the balloon's use.(85) 
Listing the expense of balloon operations and the belief that they made no significant 
contribution to the war, in the military hierarchy ensured no attempt was made to 
organise observation flights or issue specific mission statements.(86) A number of 
technological shortcomings that limited military acceptance of balloons could have been 
overcome with more technical development. 
Despite the fact that severe winds often made balloons unusable, there was no attempt 
to encourage scientific work in wind movements or actually restrict ascents. A further 
complaint by military commanders of both the North and the South was that balloons 
attracted enemy fire, thus giving away defensive positions. This objection was voiced 
despite the fact that balloons could be used in free flight or, through improved liaison 
within the army, could be located in safe areas. The controlled and more limited use of 
balloons could also have been coupled with visual aids such as the telescope to safely 
improve observations from the air.(87) 
Despite support from such prominent Northern generals as McClellan, Fitz John 
Porter, and Butler, and political leaders including President Lincoln, the Balloon Corps 
did not survive the army re-organization of mid-1863. Coincidentally, the use of 
balloons in the North as in the South, became increasingly unco-ordinated. 
The use of the balloon in the Civil War was, then, facilitated by technical innovations 
that improved it as a technological entity and helped it attain greater military utility. 
Even with technical improvements, which occurred throughout the war, the balloon's 
position could not be consolidated in the armies of the day. Existing as an outrider body 
attached to separate army groups but responsible to Head Quarters administration, the 
Balloon Corps was caught in a malaise of organizational uncertainty. Civil War balloon 
use was characterized by its failure to establish itself as an indispensable part of land 
forces. Thus it may be said only to have established itself as a practical example and 
applied demonstration, of the potential for aeronautical innovation. 
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2.5 	 The Telegraph 
The American Civil War was the first war in which the field telegraph was extensively 
employed. Due mainly to the size of the participating armies, the vast distances over 
which the war was spread, and the fluidity of the fronts, the military telegraph quickly 
received wide recognition in both major armies. 
As with other technologies so far examined, the foundation for the telegraph's use in the 
Civil War was laid prior to 1861. Between 1837 and the 1850s the Morse telegraph was 
perfected and electric telegraphy became commercially viable.(88) The telegraph line 
also spread alongside rail lines, as they expanded with America's growth. 
During the Crimean War these developments enabled the British to use the telegraph as 
an inter-communications device. In the Mexican War the US Army's use of the 
telegraph was pursued by A.J. Myer who tried to circumvent the problems of 
conventional visual signalling (by flag, flare, rocket and fire). 
These pre-war efforts produced an awareness in America of the telegraph's military 
function, that later stimulated interest when the Civil War began. Acceptance of the 
technology and resistance to its introduction were certainly reduced because practical 
use had "resolved most, if not all, of the elementary facts" that became the technical 
basis for the Civil War military telegraph.(89) 
The introduction of and heavy reliance upon the telegraph, were however brought 
about by expediency, rather than design efficiency. The use of pre-existing civilian 
lines their civilian operators promoted military control of the service. Finally, in 
October 1861, President Lincoln formally recognized the incorporation of railway 
telegraph operators into military service. On 26 February 1862 he gave the military 
priority in line usage and line construction,(90) but it took until August 1864 for a 
distinct U.S. Military Telegraph Corps to be made separate from the Signal Corps, 
which itself had been officially instituted only in March 1863491) 
Organizational consolidation was possible as the degree of technical specialization in the 
telegraph continued. The development of a truly mobile field telegraph, the 'mule pack' 
telegraph, became possible with the introduction of smaller batteries, that was only half 
the weight of the old 100-pound types.(92) 
88.Plum, The Military Telegraph (Vol. I) (1974 :24) 
89.1BID 
90.Schcips IBID:ii 
91.Coggins, Arms & Equipment (1962:106) 
92. Official Records (Series III, Vol. III 1899:979-980) 
62 
A further technical development was an improvement in the quality of insulated wire. 
This enhanced not only transmission quality, but also the range of communications. 
Another important innovative advance was the mounting of the Beardslee telegraph 
system on specially converted trains. These devices gave swift mobile 'command and 
communication centres' from which telegraph operations could be conducted.(93) 
Linking the new Beardslee telegraph machine to trains, and then to telegraph lines, 
enabled operators to act as the central communications connection between field 
telegraph operators and the pre-war telegraph lines. The mule packs with their 15- 
mile or so portable insulated cables, could be linked to the trains and in effect to 
anywhere in the United States that was connected to the main telegraph lines. 
In the North telegraphic communications were quickly enhanced. Between 1861 and 
1865 some 15,386 miles of telegraph line were laid.(94) 
In the South the military value of the telegraph was hindered by the lack of material to 
extensively introduce field telegraphs. Additionally, the lack of insulated wire seriously 
inhibited the installation of telegraph lines, further hindering military exploitation of 
any potential the lines may have held. 
An interesting innovation brought about by both the North and the South's reliance on 
extensive telegraphic links, was the production of codes and ciphers. The encoding of 
messages and efforts to intercept and decode them, added a new dimension to military 
espionage practices.(95) 
When discussing the telegraph as an instrument of change in military conduct, two 
other areas must be highlighted. Technical development of the field telegraph and 
short-range larger telegraphic equipment enabled defensive positions to respond very 
quickly to communicated orders. Also the rapid deployment of forces on the battlefield 
or by rail often depended on the use of the telegraph. 
The telegraph was also instrumental in improving naval communications and 
operations. With the introduction of the telegraph the relaying of news from official 
reports or private individuals back to the population centres of America, improved. 
Technical innovations in telegraphy were of inestimable value to the Northern forces, 
enabling them to retain communication links where the previously available means 
93. Scheips in Plum, The Military Telegraph (1974:i-v); & Official Records (Series Ill, Vol. 
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would have failed or would have been too slow. Correspondingly, in the South, pre-war 
telegraph lines had to carry the burden of communications as the war continued. As 
they lacked the necessary resources to repair or improve these lines, the system 
inevitably decayed and became inefficient. 
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CHAPTER 3 TECHNICAL CHANGE TO NAVAL WEAPONRY 
Naval conflict is overlooked in favour of land battles when historians look for why the 
South was defeated. Yet it was the Federal Navy's ability to preserve General Winfield 
Scott's Anaconda Policy, blockading the Confederate States, that was to strangle the 
supply of materials necessary for the South to wage war. 
The extension of the blockade through the Civil War resulted in attacks on coastal forts, 
combined operations to gain strategic positions, blockading harbours, controlling inland 
river systems, and finally attacking Confederate commerce raiders and blockade 
runners.(1) These strategic naval operations promoted an innovative environment 
where both sides sought to strengthen their tactical abilities. 
It is in the growth of naval technical knowledge that the Civil War is often cited as 
contributing most to military technological change. The building and use of steam-
propelled ironclad warships, and the development of torpedoes (sea mines) with their 
various delivery vehicles, ' have been seen to elevate the war into the forefront of 
ingenious endeavour.(2) 
Prior to the war, the Naval Department had been exposed to the revolution in sea 
warfare, that by 1859 had seen the 5,600-ton French frigate Gloire launched, with its 
steam engine and four-and-three-quarter-inch thick iron plate covering its hull. By 
1860 this form of naval development was confirmed with the Royal Navy launching 
HMS Warrior, which was a 9,000-ton, iron-hulled vessel with 4.5-inch thick iron 
plates. This class of Royal Navy vessel was followed in the next year by HMS Defence, 
HMS Invincible and HMS Royal Sovereign, all constructed with iron (and later steel) 
hull armour. 
These developments had though, been presaged by advances in technology in America. 
As early as 1842, authorization had been given by the United States government for the 
construction of a 6,000-ton, 420-foot-long floating battery with ten large calibre 
cannons. It was also to have steam propulsion and armour plating.(3) 
1. E.B. Potter & C.W. Nimitz (eds), Sea Power: A Naval History (New Jersey, Prentice-
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Construction of this "Stevens Battery" began but was never completed. However, in 
1842, steam propulsion and the development of a screw propeller had been successfully 
incorporated in the John Ericsson designed USS Princeton.(4) This vessel has been 
called "epoch-making" because so many of her features foreshadowed later design 
practices.(5) 
Also, in ordnance the United States Navy had well-established research efforts. This 
research was enhanced, rather than deterred, by the explosion of the large calibre 
"Peacemaker" cannon on board the Princeton on 28 February 1844. The explosion of 
the cannon and the resulting death of five men of national prominence, actually 
stimulated ordnance innovators of the Civil War era to improve cannon technology.(6) 
From 1845 interest had been expressed in larger guns, better shells, rifling, breech 
loading, and encasement in revolving turrets.(7) These diverse research efforts saw the 
development of perhaps the best smooth-bore cannon of the time, the Dahlgren 
Cannon. Equally, turret development by Theodore Timby in 1843, and Captain 
Cowper Coles in 1859, immediately gained limited recognition from American naval 
officials.(8) 
These developments occurred over the twenty years prior to the Civil War, often in 
isolation. By the beginning of the War, therefore, innovations had contributed very 
little to the standard of the USN, the general assessment being that at the beginning of 
the American Civil War, the navy was "obsolete, decayed and moribund." (9) 
3.1 	 The Monitor 
The Monitor class of vessels has been extolled as the single most important innovation in 
military technology during the Civil War.(10)(See Appendix 8) One must, however, 
express reservations about this view. The USN Monitor should not be considered as a 
successful experiment, but rather as a design crowning the new epoch in naval 
technology.(11) 
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While rich in its use of new ideas, the Monitor design built on existing technical 
knowledge. Although not a revolutionary 'breakthrough', the Monitor did mark the 
end of unsystematic, unplanned attempts to strengthen wooden ships with iron plates. 
Unlike all armoured vessels before it, the Monitor was from bottom up, the first 
purposely designed ironclad ever launched. 
However, the Monitor was preceded into service by Confederate ironclads. The first 
ironclad of the Civil War was the ram CSS Manassas: which was essentially the hull of 
the tug-boat Enoch Train with an armoured superstructure.(12) The practice of 
converting pre-existing wooden ships to ironclads was pursued with the construction of 
the CSS Virginia using the hull of the ex-USS Merrimac, captured at Norfolk Harbour. 
All the features of future ironclads were experimented with in the construction of the 
Virginia. The Merrimac had been burnt down to sea level, so that the upper deck 
structure had to be replaced. Therefore, it was purposely reconstructed with thick 
wood placed at a 50 degree angle. Onto this frame were bolted railway iron runners 
and crude iron plates, that took the armour band to some five inches thick.(13) Within 
this armoured casement, which could deflect all known cannon shot (including that 
fired by the 110-Pound Armstrong or Whitworth guns), were mounted eight seven-
inch guns and two rifled guns in both the bow and stern.(14) 
In the development of ironclad technology, it is clear that the South had an advantage, 
that was only to be matched by the Monitor and finally surpassed in 1863 when the 
North's superior metal-working factories swung into production.(15) 
With the South's development of ironclad technology and its potential to produce a 
radical innovative breakthrough,(16) the North feared that the blockade by wooden 
ships spread over large tracts of coast could be seriously compromised. A Naval Board 
was instituted by Gideon Welles (the Union Secretary of the Navy) on 4 July 1861, to 
study the feasibility of ironclad construction. Not surprisingly, on 3 August 1861 the 
Board recommended the immediate construction of a shallow-draught ironclad capable 
of countering the Confederate designs.(17) 
The first two designs accepted by the North were for the ironclads New Ironsides and 
the smaller Galena. However, the immediate threat posed by Virginia, coupled with the 
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lack of mobilised production resources, forced the late design entry of John Ericsson's 
Monitor to the forefront, as the technical design most capable of meeting naval 
requirements in the shortest period of time.(18) 
The Navy Department had outlined a number of tasks that an ironclad must be able to 
do. They required a vessel that could support existing coastal and harbour defences, 
engage unfortified enemy harbour guns, and have a draught shallow enough to enable it 
to blockade rivers and enemy harbours.(19) 
The actual design of the Monitor was never fully prepared and as its construction 
progressed rapidly, it really emerged directly from John Ericsson.(20) Still, the final 
weapons system to emerge was not only based upon past practical research, but made in 
fulfilment of naval requirements. Yet the Monitor was constructed as a totally new 
design, with only the use of the turret being acknowledged by the ship's builders (if not 
John Ericsson) as coming from a past patent.(21)(See Appendix 9) The first engineer on 
the Monitor stated that there existed at least forty patentable innovations on the 
vess el . (22) 
The end design included many model features: including a low freeboard with a hull 
that had little reserve buoyancy, thus preserving a very low water-line profile to rams 
and shells. It mounted two eleven-inch Dahlgren smooth-bores (although it was 
intended to have larger cannons had they been available), encased side-by-side in a 
360-degree revolving turret armoured with iron-plate and iron railroad tracks. The 
decks were made of oak plated with four-and-a-half-inches of armour that overhung 
both at the stern (to protect the screw and rudder) and at the prow (to protect the 
anchors). Finally, the design incorporated a double trunk steam engine, with thirty-six 
cylinders bored into a single casting, and two return box boilers that united to drive two 
screw propellers.(23) 
The Monitor upon launching, represented the first purposely designed and built 
warship that incorporated iron armour and turret-mounted heavy ordnance, and also 
was steam-propelled and screw driven. 
The Monitor, despite its novel configuration, was constructed in about one hundred 
days from the keel being laid on 25 October 1861 to its launch on 30 January 1862.(24) 
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From its inception, the vessel had been tagged by sceptics as "Ericsson's folly", yet by 
the conclusion of its historic conflict with the Virginia on 9 March 1862, it was 
recognized as the most significant alteration to naval technology since a "cannon fired 
by gun powder had been mounted on ships about four hundred years before." (25) This 
remarkable progression was achieved despite the failure to extensively test and redesign 
the Monitor between its completion on 15 February and its confrontation at Hampton 
Roads on 9 March 1862. 
In fact it was left up to later Monitor class designs to overcome problems with poor 
speed, engine unreliability, waterproofing, shell- and shock-proofing (against splinters 
that ricocheted around the interior after hits in combat), the failure of its cannon to 
inflict damage on similar armoured vessels, and the total lack of stability in open waters 
that almost saw the Monitor sink whilst being towed to Hampton Roads.(26) 
The dramatic test of the Monitor was to be the meeting between her and the Virginia at 
Hampton Roads.(27) The Hampton Roads confrontation confirmed the ironclad 
warship's tactical significance. The Virginia's sinking of the wooden front-line 
Northern ship Congress, the ramming and sinking of the Cumberland, and the 
grounding of the Minnesota all confirmed the superiority of ironclad vessels against 
wooden-hulled, wind-powered vessels. But on the next day, 9 March, the confrontation 
between the newly arrived Monitor and the Virginia, truly sounded the death knell of 
wooden vessels.(28) 
The smaller Monitor withstood superior firepower and ramming, to negate the 
Virginia's victories of the previous day and produced a tactical stalemate that held the 
blockade. The euphoria of the discovery that one little ironclad could achieve so much 
made the possession of more iron-plated naval vessels not just desirable to the North, 
but also to the rest of the world.(29) Suddenly, a new impetus had been added to 
Northern innovation in ironclad technology.(30) 
The Monitor represents the start of a new epoch in the development of armoured naval 
vessels. The vessel gave rise to innumerable design variations that used it as a basis, 
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while its success also provided the catalyst for purpose-built ironclad designs in both 
the North and the South. Rear Admiral L M Goldsborough, in a letter to the Federal 
Naval Secretary, Gideon Welles, believed development based around the Monitor 
design: 
...afforded us the advantage of profiting by wholesome teachings. 
Experience is a great source of wisdom, and to be enabled to recede from 
error is a means of advancing the truth.(31) 
So it was that the Monitor provided the technological model upon which further 
innovation occurred throughout the war. By the end of the war the North had 
manufactured over seventy-one ironclads, and by the end of 1864, five hundred and 
fifty-nine out of 671 front-line naval vessels, were propelled by steam.(32) 
The design of the Monitor was also to influence shallow draught naval vessels and was 
to persist in service until the second decade of the twentieth century.(33) The Monitor 
was, therefore, a harbinger of new naval technology that built upon existing technical 
knowledge and confirmed the superiority of steam-propelled armoured warship 
designs over wooden vessels. She then laid the path for later technical developments to 
consider. 
3.2 	 Torpedoes and Related Weapons Systems 
Development of the torpedo during the Civil War stands as one of the most important 
examples of how wartime innovation took a technical entity, with a limited history of 
practical use, and refined it into a recognized component of warfare. Without doubt the 
advancements in torpedoes and their related weapons were one of the most underrated 
fields of technical change, to occur in the Civil War. 
The torpedo was not a new concept. Inventor David Bushnell (1742-1826) is credited 
with designing a naval torpedo or sea mine at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Bushnell was subsequently responsible for the use of torpedoes to defend American 
ports from the English in the American War of Independence.(34) The use of torpedoes 
in warfare extended to the international arena with another American, Robert Fulton's 
attempts to sell his designs to the French. Further refinement of the torpedo also 
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Other cruder methods were devised for detonating torpedoes, including snag or trip 
wires, stretched across rivers. Once a boat connected with the lines, the torpedoes was 
pulled onto the vessel and detonated on impact. 
The most reliable system for mounting torpedoes became the 'Keg' and 'Singer' 
torpedoes. These were simply moored below the water-line at shallow parts of a 
waterway. Because of the improved reliability of their detonator caps and 
waterproofing, these torpedoes were more successful than earlier designs.(39) (See 
Appendix 10) The design of Keg and Singer torpedoes represented an improvement on 
the designs from the early years of the war. They were able to stay in the water longer 
and had improved means of detonation that surpassed the older percussion caps, which 
were unreliable and volatile. They were also able to hold larger, waterproofed black 
powder bursting charges. Technical innovations in torpedo design were, however, not 
just restricted to its application in the water. 
The Confederates' development of torpedo technology also produced extensions of its 
use in land warfare. Development that had produced torpedoes for a water-based 
environment shifted to apply new torpedo technology to the land. One interesting 
hybrid design was the 'coal torpedo', which was a bomb shaped as a piece of coal and 
placed in a ship's coal bin. This device was responsible for sinking the Union 
Greyhound transporter in 1864440) 
Another innovation was the 'clock torpedo', literally a time bomb. It was extremely 
successful when used at City Point against the staging point for the North's advance 
against the South. Confederate Captain John Maxwell planted a box containing a clock 
torpedo on a Northern munitions tender supplying City Point. When it exploded it 
killed at least 58 people, wounded 126, and caused damage estimated at over four 
million dollars.(41) (see Appendix 13) Torpedoes of a similar design were also used by 
guerrilla raiders to destroy rail links. Placed on bridges or under railroad lines, these 
rudimentary bombs had very destructive capabilities. 
The North's use of land torpedoes was less innovative. In June 1864 the Petersburg 
mine assault ushered in an effective use of the 'mine' in the ancient concept of sapping 
under an enemy's defences. It was here that the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry Regiment, 
in 38 days, built a shaft under a Confederate artillery position and then electrically 
detonated 8,000 pounds of black powder, arranged into a single explosive device.(42) 
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The explosion left a 30—feet—deep crater 170 feet by 80 feet, plus 278 Confederate 
casualties. However, this Northern success was not typical of its exploitation of torpedo 
technology. It was mostly left to the South to use what the North considered 
"ineffectual and unlawful warfare" (43) in armed conflict. 
The Confederacy, with its more innovative and ingenious design outlook, promoted the 
development of the anti—personnel land torpedo. The major development in land mines 
came with General G J Raines' creation of a pressure—activated fuse that could be 
mounted in artillery projectiles and then buried just below the earth's surface. These 
technical innovations resulted in subsequent field conversions of artillery projectiles. 
These were deployed in defensive entanglements to enhanced the defensive positions, 
such as Fort Wagner,(44) or were used as 'booby traps' in vacated positions.(45) These 
torpedoes came in all sizes and, as with their naval counterparts, were detonated by 
impact, lanyard, or trip wire. 
The cumulative effect of these numerous technical changes to the torpedo and its 
modified variants, was to confirm it as a cheap, easy to produce weapon, that with little 
training for its users, could prove an ideal defensive weapon.(46) 
It is apparent that the Confederate forces, whilst achieving some tactical and technical 
advantages in torpedo use, still lacked the resources to develop the technology fully or to 
concentrate these resources on the torpedo with the most technical merit. The failure to 
evolve torpedo technology through the most effective designs and overcome many initial 
design shortcomings, was to reduce the overall effectiveness of both the North's and the 
South's weapons. 
The greatest ironclad of the war, the New Ironsides, twice survived torpedo attacks. On 
the first occasion an electrically fired mine over which she was stationary failed to 
explode because there had been a break in the firing line which severed the link with the 
operator on land.(47) The second occasion was in 1863 when she survived a successful 
David class torpedo boat's assault because its spar torpedo held too small a charge.(48) 
War records exist of numerous other failures to sink vessels because torpedoes either 
failed to detonate, were easily spotted, or suffered mechanical failures. 
Nevertheless the torpedo still scored significant successes, two of which stand out. The 
first ever successful use of any torpedo to sink a warship occurred when the 
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Confederates sank the USS Cairo at the end of 1862. Later the evolution in sea mines 
was highlighted by the sinking of the USS Jones with an electrically fired torpedo that 
was part of a submarine battery that had been in the water for twenty two months.(49) 
To further promote these successes, the Confederate navy encouraged any innovation 
that could better use torpedoes against Federal ships. 
The use of torpedoes on vessels was mostly restricted to the use of windlass-mounted 
spar torpedoes. The first successful "torpedo boat" was the Confederate David class of 
craft. Developed by the South at Charleston, the vessel was a semi-submerged ironclad 
boat, with a steam engine driving a propeller.(50) Lacking the resources and means to 
build conventional motor gun launches, the Confederacy developed the David as a 
means of delivering torpedoes at Northern vessels. It was the South's only hope of 
breaking the Northern blockade. The fifty-foot vessel mounted a one hundred-pound 
torpedo on a forward slung windlass spar and quickly proved its effectiveness against 
an unprepared enemy by torpedoing the ironclad New Ironside . However, the David  
failed to sink the ironclad because the spar torpedo had only a sixty-pound charge 
mounted. 
Described by the head of the Federal Navy, Admiral Dahlgren, at its first trial as the 
best achievement of any invention,(51) the David inspired a whole new class of naval 
torpedo boats. It was followed in mid-1864 by the Confederacy's Squib, which used 
ideas of the designer of the David, F D Lee. The North also achieved success in the field 
by using a steam launch, commanded by Lieutenant W B Cushing, to deliver a spar 
torpedo that sank the CSS Albemarle. However, Northern industrial superiority was 
able to produce the most formidable torpedo boat, when it launched the Spuyten Duyvil  
which operated on the James River from late 1864 to 1865 and mounted not only eight 
torpedoes but also two clock torpedo explosives.(52) (See Appendix 15) 
The success of the David and the desperate situation of Charleston also provided the 
spur that encouraged other unconventional, alternative designs capable of acting as 
torpedo delivery vehicles. The most notable of these vehicles, was the submarine. 
The basis for American submarine technical knowledge was established by the 
endeavours of Robert Fulton. Fulton was a world leader in submarine technology prior 
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to the war (53) and his experiments formed the basis for work on the first submarine to 
be launched in the Civil War, the CSS Pioneer. 
However, this vessel had a limited deployment and was sunk or scuttled in New Orleons 
on 31 March 1862.(54) The Pioneer served to inspire the Union into designing their 
Alligator, and provide the basis for the USS Intelligent Whale submarine. In spite of 
these early designs efforts, none were effectively deployed during the Civil War and the 
North never succeeded in deploying a battle—worthy design.(55) 
After previous problems with wartime submarines, the CSS Hunley became the unlikely 
design to be the first deployed against the enemy. As with the CSS Pioneer, this design 
was also directly based around an earlier design by Fulton.(56) But the Hunley was a 
crude construction built around an old boiler. It suffered innumerable design faults, 
not least of which was the lack of an electric motor, which meant it had to be driven by 
eight men manning a hand—cranked propeller. After sinking three times in accidents 
and submerging trials (killing all the crew), Hunley was still deployed like a David in a 
semi—submerged state. In an engagement on 17 February 1864, Hunley sank the USS 
Housatonic. She then immediately followed her victim and took her brave crew to their 
deaths. 
What torpedo boats and the submarine did stimulate was the consideration of the 
torpedo's offensive rather than just defensive capacities. 
While the North did try to develop a submarine (57) they had more success with other 
delivery vehicles, and the development of innovations to counter the threat posed by 
torpedoes. John Ericsson's obstruction remover, false prows, large wooden river bed 
drag frames, floating nets, and armoured ship bottoms, were all evolved to counter 
mines.(58) Attempts to counter the threat of torpedo boats produced such innovations 
as powerful searchlights with magnifying mirrors, defensive nets and obstructions, 
rapid—firing machine guns mounted on patrol boats, and fast light vessels intended for 
destroying torpedo boats. 
Other naval uses for torpedo technology were also explored. Although research had 
been done on self—propelled locomotive torpedoes by Luppis and Whitehead in 
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Europe,(59) their American contemporaries knew little of their work. The work of 
American innovators Major E B Hunt and John Ericsson, on a submarine self—
propelled torpedo or shell, never resolved the problems of guidance and waterproofing 
that the Whitehead torpedo later managed to overcome.(60) Work on submarine 
bombs, or what today would be called depth charges, was also terminated due to a lack 
of perceived need for such a weapon.(61) 
In essence, the torpedo forced technical innovation that saw mine designs advance and 
promote ancillary developments in torpedo boats, submarines, and counter naval 
vessels such as torpedo boat destroyers and mine—sweepers. 
The importance of the torpedo in the war is clouded by two points. The torpedo did not 
change the outcome of a major battle,(62) nor could it be said to have significantly 
influenced the course of the war. But with four monitors and twenty seven other 
victims sunk, the torpedo did achieve greater success than any other weapon in sinking 
Federal ships. The North was also able to sink or severely damage seven Confederate 
ships with torpedoes.(63) In addition, the fear induced by the "torpedo phantom" (64) 
provided an unquantifiable deterrent to Northern naval commanders' otherwise 
unchallenged passage through coastal and river waters. 
The evidence of torpedo innovation during the Civil War suggests that torpedo 
technology did not reach a single design that may represent an apex in torpedo 
technology. 
In a comment on Civil War torpedoes, the Prussian observer Victor Ernest Rudolph 
von Sheliha made the incisive comment that: 
The great error which a host of inventors fell in was, that they aimed at 
accomplishing, all at once, too much in a field which to all of them ... was still 
an unexplored terra incognito.[sic] Complicatedness of the apparatus was 
the next consequence ... which resulted in its utter failure in being tried.(65) 
The development of torpedo technology, therefore, was far from a complete success. 
Yet application of the technology on the battlefields (land and sea) hastened practical 
research into torpedo technology. Unlike other Confederate naval innovations that had 
been tragically frustrated, the submerged torpedo and torpedo delivery systems 
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underwent extensive technical development (66) and a Torpedo Corps was established 
specifically to promote its effective use. 
Combined with the North's recognition of the torpedo as a means of blocking harbours 
or of arming small, fast, steam launches, the torpedo can be seen to have developed into 
a valuable weapon with a demonstrated capability that was to produce a lasting 
influence on naval tactics. 
66. Anderson, By Sea & By River (1962:298) 
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CHAPTER 4: 	 GENERAL INNOVATIONS 
4.1 	 Artillery 
Technical innovation in artillery was pursued by both the North and the South, and by 
both the armed services and private individuals. These technical endeavours were to 
make the American Civil War the highest point in muzzle loading, smooth-bore 
technology. As well as being the last war in which smooth-bore pieces predominated, it 
was also the first war where rifled ordnance was extensively used.(1) As this suggests, 
artillery became the subject of intensive technical development during the Civil 
War.(2)(See Appendix 17 & 18) 
In the North, innovations in artillery never replaced the standard smooth-bore 
technology. In the South, increased demand coupled with a small industrial base, 
forced heavy reliance on captured weapons and on whatever imported rifled and 
breech-loading modern artillery pieces the Confederates could secure. Despite their 
relying on such weapons, the Confederacy's Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond, from 
1863 to 1865, manufactured 3,000 cannons, the bulk of which were smooth-bores.(3) 
Thus, unlike Northern advances in rifled artillery which were always stilted by the 
voluntary adherence to smooth-bores, the Confederacy, despite making use of breech-
loaders such as the Whitworth, Blakely and Armstrong pieces, remained dependant on 
smooth-bores.(4) Adherence to smooth-bores was further enforced by the 
Confederacy's inability to produce reliable fuses and high explosive shells for breech-
loading artillery.(5) 
The North's industrial capacity enabled Federal forces to develop large-bore artillery 
pieces, and also provided facilities for high-grade iron manufacture that benefited 
railroad line and warship construction.(6) At sea, the continuing development of large 
calibre guns produced notable innovations. The pre-war development of the Rodman 
and Dahlgren smooth-bores and their manufacturing techniques,(7) led the Naval 
1. I.V. Hogg & J. Batchelor, A History of Artillery (London, Hamlyn, 1974:61) 
2. B.R. Lewis, Notes on Ammunition of the American Civil War 1861-1865 (Washington, 
American Ordnance Association, 1959:13) 
3. J.M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War & Reconstruction  (New York, Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1982:192) 
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5. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire (1982:192) 
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Department and prominent technologists to believe that the perfect gun had been 
produced.(8) Two fundamental misjudgements resulted from this belief. 
Firstly, the inability of smooth-bores to destroy armoured ships (despite their 
effectiveness against wooden vessels), led to the extensive use of ironclad rams. 
Contemporary military thought held that ramming was a key naval tactic.(See 
Appendix 25) This in turn led to smooth-bores being developed to shatter armour at 
close ranges. High-velocity rifled artillery that could penetrate armour was virtually 
ignored in America.(9) Secondly, the concentration on smooth-bores discouraged the 
development of superior gunnery skills by improved gun laying and sighting. 
Concentration was placed on close-quarters engagements with the sole aim of ramming 
an opponent. 
At sea and subsequently on land, rifled ordnance and particularly improved breech-
loading systems, were never extensively improved. Lack of official interest in their 
adoption curtailed innovative attempts to overcome problems with jamming of 
mechanisms, gas escape, and lack of design strength in key components.(10) At sea, 
rifled breech-loading systems were not to replace smooth-bore muzzle-loaders until 
the 1880s. 
On land, armies also clung to smooth-bore weapons. Muzzle-loaders, in particular the 
12-, 24- and 32-Pounder howitzers, and the 12-Pounder "Napoleon" field gun, formed 
the core of both sides' field batteries.(See Appendix 16) In the North, Napoleons 
constituted at least two thirds of artillery pieces used in land engagements. It was only 
in the battle at Gettysburg that Napoleons did not constitute at least half the field pieces 
deployed.(11) 
The success of the smooth-bore 12-Pounder was achieved despite the existence of the 
good 12-Pounder James rifled gun. This weapon weighed less than the smooth-bore 
12-Pounders and due to less windage (the difference between the diameter of the shot 
and bore) had greater range and better accuracy.(12) However, the Napoleon was well 
liked for both its reliability and its efficiency when countering close range targets.(13) 
Even in the South, which chose to build the Napoleon from 1861 to 1864, General Lee 
8. A. Hunter-Dupree, Science in the Federal Government (Massachusetts, Harvard 
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felt its simplicity and its performance at short range in wooded country, made it the 
piece around which the Southern artillery should be built.(14) 
Technical innovations in artillery pieces, such as improved weapons like the rifled 3- 
Inch Ordnance, the 3-Inch Parrott, and the 20-Pounder Parrot, never systematically 
replaced smooth-bores in the North. 
Interestingly, the North's reliance on Robert Parrott's 10-, 20- and 30-Pounder rifled 
cannons, may well have been due mainly to their simple design rather than there being 
any technical advancement. The main advantages being that they were quick and cheap 
to produce while still being relatively robust weapons. Parrott himself commented that 
although they were not the most perfect of designs, they were the most practical 
available.(15) 
The South's lack of resources restricted attempts to experiment with rifled or other 
innovative artillery types. Official support for the introduction of new designs was 
muted by fears that technical innovation in ordnance matters could waste scarce 
resources. Thus whilst breech-loaders were imported from England by both sides 
(mainly Armstrong, Blakely, and Whitworth guns), the problem of machining two 
barrel sections and a breech mechanism, the need for constant field cleaning, the cost of 
manufacture, and the lack of breech-loading ammunition, all combined to temper 
indigenous technical development.(16) The necessity for field artillery pieces to be 
horse-drawn also severely restricted the popularity of heavy breech-loading and large 
calibre rifled ordnance. 
Lack of technical development was not the only cause for the dearth in further artillery 
designs. The strain weapons would place on existing manufacturing resource was 
certainly a major consideration. One of the reasons for the Napoleon's popularity was 
that it fired cheap, easy to use, muzzle-loading ammunition. The South's reluctance to 
develop rifled ordnance and its reliance on the 12-Pounder smooth-bore was due in no 
small part to its inability to produce reliable percussion fuses and to manufacture 
technically advanced shells.(17) 
Developments in artillery ammunition mostly meant manufacturing shells that could 
easily be loaded into the muzzle of a rifled cannon but expand (to reduce windage) into 
14.Coggins, Arms & Equipment (1962:64) 
15.W. Ripley, Artillery & Ammunition of the Civil War (New York, Van Nostrand 
Reinhold, 1970:110) 
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17.J. Gorgas, Ordnance Manual 1863 in C.E. Fuller & R.D. Steuart, Firearms of the 
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the grooves on firing. Such innovations gave high priority to the development of new 
and more reliable fuse types.(See Appendix 12) 
Some major factors inhibited innovations in shell technology. The most significant of 
these was the North's failure to develop breech—loaders. Newly developed shells that 
could be muzzle—loaded but which expanded on firing became obsolete as breech-
loaders gained greater international recognition. This was despite numerous 
innovations such as lead casings, expanding rings, discarding sabots, raised studs, and 
grooves or belts, that tried to improve muzzle—loading rifled artillery.(18)(See Appendix 
17) These shells never fully overcame the problems of fouling and wear caused by firing 
shells that expanded into ML cannon's rifling. 
Developments in shrapnel or spherical case shots by the end of the war, removed the 
smooth—bores' remaining advantage: their superiority over rifled pieces in dealing with 
massed targets at close ranges. The Napoleon and its effective canister round were, 
however, still used throughout the war. Despite this, developments in ammunition 
continued as fast as innovators could devise new ways to use fuses, or could marry new 
fuse technology to potentially effective shell designs. 
The development of fairly reliable fuses overcame most limitations on new shell designs. 
Fuses were designed that could be detonated by percussion, concussion, time, or a 
combination of types.(19) The explosive shell or case type of shell, in its myriad of 
designs, was mostly set off by a powder—train fuse that screwed into the face or nose of 
the projectile.(20) This fuse had replaced wooden or paper fuses made to burn and 
ignite the main black powder bursting charge at set times. 
The first American innovation to dramatically alter fuse and shell technology was the 
Bormann (Boarmann or Borman) fuse. Despite working only about 75 per cent of the 
time, the fuse was the most widely used type by the North and South.(21) Whether 
fitted to smooth—bore shot or to rifled shells, the design's innovative features worked 
equally well. The fuse was a timing fuse with a punch type powder train design, that 
permitted the user to manually pierce the fuse at the required time delay; propellant 
gases released by the shell on firing would ignite the fuse.(22) 
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Percussion fuses, like the most common Hotchkiss type, had a plunger that was armed 
when a pin was released on firing.(23) The Schenkl combination fuse, used in the 
widely manufactured Schenkl projectile, had a percussion plunger that was activated 
prior to firing by removing a pin; it also had a timing device that was activated by 
rotating the fuse head.(24) A typical concussion fuse was the Tice concussion fuse; used 
on both smooth—bores and rifled—bore projectiles, it was armed by exposing a glass 
fulminate on its head, that shattered on impact, causing a flash that detonated the 
bursting charge.(25) 
Many other types of fuses were designed. These included the US Water Cap Time, the 
updated Paper Time Fuse used by Confederates in conjunction with copper fuse 
adaptors, Confederate chemically fired pressure land mine fuses, Grenade Plunger 
fuses, and Mortar Wood fuses, as well as various design changes to basic fuses made by 
gunners in the field.(26) All fuses, regardless of type or design, suffered from two major 
failings. First, the manufacture of fuses was often crude, with the South in particular 
producing some very rough and unstable fuses. Second, manufacturing problems were 
compounded by the fact that most shells had to land directly on their noses to guarantee 
detonation. Time and concussion fuses were the only ones likely to detonate without 
direct pressure on the shell's nose, yet these were also the most unreliable type in use. 
Improvements in ammunition did, however, enable rifled muzzle—loaders to end forever 
the strategic role of brick and mortar fortifications (27) and to improve the range, 
accuracy, and penetration of large coastal and siege cannons.(28) 
Aside the design of guns, ammunition and fuses, there was one other important area of 
artillery innovation during the Civil War. In sight and fire control, large calibre 
artillery achieved a few limited advances. Gun mounts also went through some notable 
evolutions. These included mounting guns: 
* on rail flatcars; 
• on fully rotating turrets on naval vessels; 
• in protected barbettes for sea—coastal positions; 
• on boat carriages devised to allow a gun to be used on a boat or ashore; 
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on experimental mounts using recoil buffers - recoil slides that sloped away 
and upwards from the point the barrel fired at; and 
on other carriages that sought to either cut recoil or to give heavy guns all-
round traverse. 
One interesting development was associated with the introduction of the balloon. 
Whilst the balloon assisted artillery fire control, its proximity to the battery often 
attracted counter-fire from the opposing artillery. Thus many artillery pieces, 
particularly rifled pieces that fired time fused shells over long ranges, were used to fire 
at balloons.(29) Where positions were well-established these guns had their trailers 
placed into specially constructed holes that enabled their wheels to be locked in a static 
position whilst the normal elevation of the gun could still be employed for its original 
field artillery role.(30) In effect these ingenious adaptions to the guns' use produced the 
first purpose-designed anti-aircraft guns. 
Technical development of the gun also occurred in areas where it had little impact on 
existing designs. The use of steel in guns and gun carriages, further metallurgical and 
design work on existing guns, experiments with electrically fired guns, steam 
compression weapons, and 'rocket guns', all failed to influence Civil War artillery. 
Artillery development did not, in any technical area, dramatically alter the course of the 
war. Some developments certainly influenced the future of artillery and did alter the 
principal uses and characteristics of guns used in the war, but despite wide technical 
innovation, improvements were made mostly on existing design features. Alternative 
designs to muzzle-loading smooth-bores did not replace all smooth-bore weapons, and 
very little progress towards a single universally accepted, breech-loading, rifled 
weapons system was made. 
4.2 	 Ordnance 
A number of far-reaching military technological innovations do not easily fit into any 
one category and will be included under a general study of ordnance. 
The discussion of Civil War technical ordnance would not be complete without at least 
an acknowledgement of innovations such as gun sights, hand grenades, rockets, 
flamethrowers, stink shells, and explosive rifle shells. These developments are often 
shrouded in mystery, and sometimes their actual use in the war has become a matter of 
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some conjecture. But collective study of them may help to further build a picture of 
technical innovation during the war. 
As the war progressed, a number of developments helped increase the accuracy of 
weapons. As well as innovations to small arms and artillery fire, the contributions of 
binoculars, telescopes, the telegraph and balloons must be credited with important 
roles. Gun sights also underwent certain technical development: graduated posts with 
ranges over 300 yards and up to 1000 yards were fitted to rifles,(31) replacing 
inadequate short range, L-shaped post rear sights, with two alternative settings.(32) 
As weapons became more accurate, there followed a number of other innovations. A 
telescopic sight was fitted to snipers' rifles.(33) Front sights were designed that could be 
adjusted laterally to allow for windage (the space between the shell and the barrel 
rifling). Micrometer sight were also devised to permit adjustments for elevation and 
also for side winds over the chosen range.(34) The adoption and extensive use of better 
sights, and tubular barrel mounted telescopes, such as the highly efficient British 
designed Davidson Telescopic Sight, led not only to an improvement in sniping, but to 
an overall increase in the marksmen-soldiers' usefulness as a battlefield weapon.(35) 
Artillery-sight development was equally interesting. With rifled weapons and weapons 
of large calibre, the use of indirect fire onto targets increased and 'over the horizon fire' 
became more common. In fact, as the war progressed, refinements to sighting made old 
line-of-sight (aiming down the barrel like a rifle) and graduated spirit levels, 
obsolete. (36) 
With more scientific research into trajectory and ballistics, accuracy was worked out by 
range determined from barrel elevation, the point of aim or direction, and the drift all 
rifled cannon gave to shells.(37) Thus a consistent aiming point could be derived by 
selecting a prominent feature in the area. With this point and the gun's position 
established on a map, a few minutes' work would establish the aiming point, so that on 
firing, instead of having to re-lay the gun every time, the sight could just be reset to the 
aiming point already established.(38) For coastal guns, the gun itself was used as the 
fixed point, the sea as the horizontal range, and the gun's elevation as the height and 
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range of the shell. An equation could then produce a crude fix upon the target. Such 
range-finding techniques were also enhanced by pre-established ranges, which were 
mathematically recorded on complex range cards. 
Whilst the evolution of sights relied upon the ingenuity of contemporary innovations 
and more scientific methods of use, the development of the hand-grenade could be 
traced back to bark, glass, and clay vessels filled with black powder that were used in 
the fourteenth century.(39) Yet the Civil War directed this development into new areas. 
The most widely used of all types of hand-grenade was the Northern Model 1861 
Ketchum grenade. This weapon had a dart shaped body with a fitted impact detonator 
plunger, with a fitted wood and cardboard, winged tail assembly.(40) (See Appendix 12) 
The other types of grenade used by both sides in the war, were smooth-bore projectiles 
converted for use as grenades. The United States Adams Grenade was one such grenade 
used by the North. It had a pull, friction ignited fuse that was usually fitted to a 6- 
Pounder shot. (41) 
Figure 4 	Grenade Supply Figures US Army 1861-65 




1-Pound Ketchum 	 25,556 	15,576 
3-Pound Ketchum 42,799 34,340 
5-Pound Ketchum 	 24,845 	22,815 
Adams Hand-Grenade 	 5,000 4,750 
Some hand-grenade innovations did not attain the technical level of the Ketchum and 
Adams designs. The US Hanes (otherwise called Haynes or Excelsior) Grenade was 
more dangerous for its users than for the enemy. Built with a spherical case 
surrounding an inner spherical charge that was fitted with detonator caps, the whole 
grenade had no safety mechanism except for extreme care.(42) 
Other grenades were used with varying degrees of success. In particular, work around 
the torpedo design produced some hand thrown time bombs. Confederate forces are 
recorded as having thought highly of the grenade as a defensive weapon. The South is 
39. C. Chant, How Weapons Work (London, Marshall Cavendish, 1980:221-222) 
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known to have issued grenades to some coastal forts thought likely to face mass assaults 
by Northern forces.(43) 
Research and development in explosive 	weapons also produced extensive 
experimentation with rockets. From the time of the attack on Fort Sumter to the very 
end of the Civil War, rocket weapons were used in varying roles and with different 
degrees of success.(44) The oldest of all explosively propelled projectiles, the rocket had 
seen practical use in the late eighteen and early nineteenth centuries. Colonel Sir 
William Congreve's war rocket was used by both the army and navy. However, neither 
he nor the rocket development that followed through the nineteenth century till the end 
of the Civil War ever produced a rocket that had significant tactical impact on military 
engagements.(45) 
In the early stages of the war the rocket appeared to hold as much potential for military 
use as any other technical innovation. With President Lincoln's encouragement, 
experimentation continued - although his own life had almost been lost at a rocket 
testing when the missile exploded on take-off.(46) Experiments with technical 
innovations in rockets were to have similar success. Attempts to devise a rocket-
propelled torpedo for use on Northern naval vessels had a most unfortunate practical 
test. Without any means of steering the missile and little real knowledge of flight 
stabilisation, the inventors of this first sea-to-sea missile managed to miss the large 
target ship completely with the first shot and on the second firing, to sink a vessel. 
Unfortunately, it failed to sink the target vessel and instead sunk another moored 
nearby.(47) 
Rockets were, however, developed to a point where they could be used by both the 
North and the South in a variety of roles. Unlike other innovative weapons like the 
machine-gun and the flamethrower (where faults in the original technical innovation 
inhibited official interest), the rocket was still seen to have some military usefulness. 
Unlike the flamethrower (where little is known about its innovative features or actual 
use)(48) the rocket was known to have been used for signals,(49) as an offensive 
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incendiary naval device and siege weapon (mostly signal rockets turned onto targets), 
and as a 'star' or illumination device to light up night skies and allow the navy to spot 
blockade runners, who mostly ran the gauntlet at night.(50) (See Appendix 19) 
The use of illumination projectiles brings signal pistols into the study. Although crude 
in appearance, these pistols — the Model 1861, Model 1862 and a late war conversion of 
the Model 1862 to take a "star" instead of a flare projectile — were in fact the first 
effective signal pistols used in any war. They were single—shot front—loader designs, 
with hammers firing the projectiles by means of an attached percussion cap. They were 
used both on land and at sea, although it appears from the records that they were only 
produced by the North. 
Two other explosive projectiles that were endowed with unique technical features and 
which are known to have been used in the Civil War, are the 'stink' shell and the 
explosive bullet. 
Stink shells could not only be fired from rifled cannons but also could contain different 
substances, like poisonous gas or phosphorous.(51) These innovations were called 
"carcasses", smoke balls, suffocating balls, and stink or stun shells. The origin of 
wartime designs appears to be Oliver "Pet" Halsted and Alfred Birney's incendiary 
shells and Levi Short's tin canisters filled with Greek fire.(52) 
The shells were used in two forms. The first type was designed by the North to be used 
for removing Confederate soldiers from dug—in defensive positions, where explosive 
shells could not penetrate. They seem to have been a mixture of chemical components 
used to produce gases that suffocated or produced such a stench as to force soldiers 
from defensive positions and make them easy targets for the opposing riflemen.(53) 
The second form of shells had designs based on liquid fire. Records remain of their use 
at Charleston on 22 August 1863. General Beauregard, commander of the Confederate 
defences, noted the effect these shells had on the town. He stated that the shells were 
"the most destructive missiles ever used in war", causing destruction of military and 
civilian personnel alike.(54) General McClellan also saw the impact his shells could 
produce and categorically stated that "such means of destruction are hardly within the 
category of those recognized in civilized warfare." (55) 
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Another device that brought into question the users' adherence to the principles of 
civilized warfare was the explosive bullet. Despite the fact that after the war in 1868 the 
second Geneva Convention on war would ban explosive bullets,(56) both antagonists in 
the Civil war had conducted extensive experiments with them.(57) 
Although neither side admitted using explosive bullets, evidence exists of each side 
accusing the other of using them, and medical records of wounded treated for horrific 
wounds, plus General Grant's condemnation of their use at Vicksburg, tends to confirm 
the wide use of explosive bullets by both the North and the South.(58) 
The explosive bullet experiments seem not to have produced a bullet that could be 
provided in large numbers. However, it is known that 33,350 Gardiner Explosive Shells 
were made from 1863.(59) Made in 0.54, 0.58 and 0.69 calibres, the bullets had a cavity 
in the base where slow-burning powder was ignited on firing and exploded later. If 
already inside a victim, such a bullet would produce horrific injuries. Evidently the 
Gardiner Bullet was the only officially produced explosive shell to reach wide 
production. 
Musket 'shells' exploded by percussion were recorded as having been used by 
Confederate forces,(60) while from the battlefield debris at Vicksburg it is apparent 
that the Confederates either captured Gardiner Bullets or had some other design which 
is yet to be discovered. More likely is that the Confederate forces were using explosive 
musket shells. 
Personal accounts of Civil War soldiers, as well as discarded bullets uncovered on 
battlefields, have shown that the soldiers of both sides were not averse to re-shaping 
bullets on breech-loading cartridges. Either rounding off bullet noses or by notching 
bullets, soldiers produced projectiles that expanded on impact. 
It should be noted, in fairness to the soldiers who reshaped bullets, that the musket ball 
with its low velocity and flattening effect after firing was a much more destructive 
missile than the newly designed breech-loading small arms projectiles of the 1860s. 
Alongside the other changes to general ordnance technology, it is possible to see that 
technical innovations were not exclusively restricted to changes in weapons designs. In 
fact, innovative changes to weapons components or improvements in ancillary 
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60.Peterson in NRAA, Civil War Small Arms (1960:13) 
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technology greatly affected the performance of some prominent military arms (eg. the 
railway, telegraph, or BLR small arms). 
Although not always receiving academic attention, innovation in general ordnance did 
influence military technology. Some important advances made by innovations over 
pre—war technical knowledge, have often be lost in the general clutter of poorer 
technical designs. 
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TECHNICAL CHANGES SUMMARY 
Past technical knowledge and contemporary design work seems to have paved the way 
for most Civil War innovations. Only in cases such as the development of ironclads, 
torpedo delivery vehicles, later repeating breech—loading small arms, and ammunition 
designs, may the intention to produce better weapons be seen to be prompted by a 
perceived military demand. 
Over the length of the Civil War the scope of technical endeavour became consolidated 
around the efforts to develop a few novel weapons. Innovators seem to have strived to 
make technical advances that made their innovations stand apart from other competing 
designs. Yet these design improvement did not guarantee military acceptance. In fact 
many technically sound weapons did not reach a high level of design acceptance. 
Innovations on breech—loading mechanisms, ammunition, more rapid firing weapons, 
naval construction, and torpedoes, produced fundamental advances upon technology 
existing prior to the Civil War. Other developments in telegraphy, balloons, railways, 
and ordnance designs, became more widely used but were built on technical knowledge 
in existence before the war. Even when introduced into service, many of the above 
innovations still failed to be fully adopted and subsequently their technical evolution 
floundered. This confirms the need for further investigation of non—technical reasons 
for a technology's failure to be fully developed. This will be done in the following Part 
II of this thesis. 
Neither studying technological change alone, nor establishing that a great volume of 
innovation did occur, effectively explains how successful technical growth was, nor why 
certain innovations failed. Obviously more dimensions to innovation, other than just a 
comprehensive examination of individual technical advancements, need to be 






PART II 	ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
INTRODUCTION 
A comprehensive survey of technological change involves an examination of not only 
technical developments but also the influences on it from the environment. The 
environment here means the non-technical elements or societal influences that affected 
technology. 
This definition enforces this study's acknowledgement that military technology interacts 
with the existing environmental system and cannot be understood just from an isolated 
survey of technical changes.(1) As no technical innovation can be said to occur divorced 
from environmental factors, the next two chapters will explore the general and specific 
environmental conditions. They will endeavour to identify those non-technical factors 
that were central to military technological change. The final chapter of this Part will 
round-off the examination of environmental factors by identifying how these non-
technical factors affected the development of key innovations. 
In effect, the study will follow G H Daniels' guiding statement that "... the direction in 
which society is going determines the nature of its technological innovations" and, 
therefore, no technological innovation, whether alone or in combination, "ever changed 
the direction in which society was going before the innovation." (2) As such, an 
innovation does not occur in isolation from the wider social context. 
Such statements suggest that while technical entities are the key guides to technological 
change, they only result from a complex interaction between environmental factors, 
existing technology, and technical knowledge. Equally, no honest assessment of 
technological change could predict the direction of innovation, from solely an 
examination of the course in which society is developing.(3) The stimulus of technical 
change affects society and in turn the social structure is a determinant in the ability to 
apply technical knowledge. 
During the course of the next three chapters, it will then be necessary, to establish the 
general environmental factors in the sphere of government, industry, and society, that 
had a primary role in influencing the course of Civil War military innovations. 
1. S.B. Lundstcdt & E.W. Co!glazier (cds), Managing Innovation (New York, Pergamon 
Press, 1.982:xiv) 
2. G.H. Daniels, "The Big Questions in the History in American Technology", Technology 
& Culture (Vol.11111, January 1970:3) 
3. H. Rose & S. Rose, Science & Society (London, Pelican Books, 1970:240-245) 
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CHAPTER 5: 	GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 
When Clausewitz linked war with the extension of a state's (nation's) will, he produced 
a form of thought that was to evolve into the twentieth century concept of "total war" 
or "absolute war" .(4) 
As a feature of twentieth century wars, total war moved from a loosely defined 
construct of Clausewitz, to explain the reality of total mobilization of soldiers, military 
capabilities, industrial capacity, economic might, and political will. This feature has 
become an important measure of modern wars as major twentieth century wars have 
involved the total commitment of all the latest means to ensure military goals were 
attained. 
Thus while some may argue that even wars occurring hundreds of years ago may have 
attained features of total warfare, the linking of political will and industrial capacity to 
produce wars of mass destruction are distinctly modern. Wars prior to the modern era 
have then been labelled as "limited wars". While there is no single, adequate 
description of what a limited war actually entails, it has been used in juxtaposition with 
total warfare to highlight the different levels of commitment by the State. 
An assessment of the general environment affecting Civil War technological change, 
with particular emphasis on the role of government, industry, and society, is intended to 
highlight how total was the commitment made to the war effort in the Northern and 
Southern states of America. In turn this will reveal the influences placed on the 
promotion of military technological change. 
5.1 	Government and Innovation 
The most fundamental dilemma confronting Civil War governments' technological 
innovation policy - North or South; Federal or State - was whether to be 
interventionist or to permit the private sector to innovate at its own pace. It was the 
competition between these two views that produced the struggle between laissez-faire  
and interventionism. The former had seen government not intervene to impel pre-Civil 
War industrialism, whilst the latter interventionist policies circumvented older ideas of 
individualism and an artisan-based innovation system being central in the desperate 
struggle to provide the necessary products for armed conflict.(5) 
Analysing the impact of government intervention on Civil War innovation is not easy. 
As well as diverse structures of government, there were a variety of ideological, and 
4. C. Von Clausewitz, On War (London, Penguin, reprint 1984:62-63) 
5. Elazan Comments in D.T. Gilchrist & W.D. Lewis, Economic Changes in the Civil War 
Era (Delaware, Eleutherian Mills-Hagley Foundation, 1965:97) 
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therefore policy„ directions that could influence military technology. Coupled with 
these problems, one must acknowledge that the patterns of military technical change 
were affected by other complex variables such as economic growth patterns, inflation, 
technical resources, and labour shortages. Within these variables there still remains a 
great deal of work to be done to examine how they actually influenced technology 
change. In turn, it is unclear how government policy was reciprocally influencing a 
broad range of societal conditions. 
An important development in government actions was the Civil War's consolidation of 
central political authority. This was particularly so in the North. An ancillary 
development was the Federal government's trend towards interventionist policies. 
These developments critically influenced military innovation. 
In the South the ability of Jefferson Davis to galvanize unity behind a central 
government was severely restricted. Opposition to central "Federal" jurisdiction 
stemmed from the strong sense of regional ideologies.(6) Any attempts to control arms 
procurement, manufacture and design would have had to rise above both the strong 
regional identities and the fragile industrial union.(7) 
(A) 	Federal Government 
Much of the study conducted on government factors will concentrate on the North. Its 
definable policies, innovation programs, and degree of technical change will be 
emphasised. Focus on the much—discussed point of how the North's political 
organizations assisted it to resist the South can also be assisted by such an emphasis.(8) 
Under the leadership of President Lincoln, a consolidated move to preserve the Union 
produced a far more controlled form of centralised administration. D Brogan believes 
the desire to preserve the Union was a major reason the North resisted the spirit of 
rebellion and the South gained the righteousness necessary to hold the separate 
secession states, in a confederation.(9) In contrast, other analysts of the war point to the 
confederate states lack of will and the lack of nationalism, as the reason for the 
Southern defeat.(10) 
6. P.D. Escott, After the Succession (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1978:47-48) 
7. J.C. Cobb, Industrialization & Southern Society  (Lexington, Kentucky University Press, 
1984:11712); & D. G. Faust, The Ceation of Confederate Nationalism  (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana State University Press, 1988:21) 
8. B.D. Brogan, "The Debate on the American Civil War", Proceedings of the British  
Academy (Vol.49, 1963:222) 
9. IBID:223 
10. R.E. Beringer, H. Hattaway, A. Jones, & W.N. Still, Why the South Lost the Civil War  
(Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1986); Faust, The Ceation of Confederate Nationalism  
(1988); Escott, After the Succession (1978); & F. Owsley, State Rights in the Confederacy  
(Chicargo, Chicargo University Press, 1925) 
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It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, to find that the Civil War period acted as a 
catalyst for constitutional and legislative revolution in the growth of a truly United 
States federal government. Equally, when one studies the government impact on 
innovation, the focus becomes Northern rather than Southern, and Federal rather than 
State. This is not a denial of the role Confederate and State governments' played in 
policy directions. Instead, it is an admission, within the bounds of this thesis, for the 
importance of understanding why the Federal Union government could not promote 
military technology change to achieve victory at an earlier stage in the war. 
(B) 	Intervention or Innovation 
One of the most decisive factors that was to determine government approaches to 
intervention on innovation, was the increased breakdown of laissez—faire policies. This 
breakdown was promoted by the Agricultural Bills of 1862 and the political pragmatism 
that followed, as politicians became involved in State issues or financially involved in 
war industries that were exposed to administrative decisions. The breakdown was given 
added impetus when wartime arms demand at the beginning of the war, far outstripped 
existing production. 
Throughout the war, governments consciously sought to increase the productivity of 
government armouries, to issue contracts to those private sector producers with the 
cheapest productive capacity, and to fill with overseas purchases, the shortfall between 
demand and local arms production.(11) Faced with the need to preserve their systems, 
government patronage of innovation was quickly extended beyond pre—war non-
interventionist levels, to one promoting government influence.(12) 
The legacy of laissez—faire policy was, however, never removed. Innovation policy, per 
se, was unheard of by Civil War politicians. Rather, within this uncharted policy field, 
there existed occasional and unsystematic attempts to speed industrial production. 
Deliberate, co—ordinated, and all—encompassing policy that could directly affect 
military innovation did not exist. Influence was instead expressed through a number of 
policy mechanisms. 
11. F.A. Shannon, The Organization & Administration of the Union Army (Vol.!) 
(Massachusetts, Peter Smith, 1965:113-114) • 
12. A. Hunter—Dupree, Science in the Federal Government (Massachusetts, Belknaps Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1957:3) 
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v. Financial & 
Taxation 
vi. Legal & Regulatory 
vii. Political Process 
viii. Procurement 
ix. Commercial & 
Overseas Agents 
purchases. 
Innovation by publicly owned industries, 
setting up of new industries, pioneering 
new techniques and participation in 
private enterprise. 
Research 	laboratories, 	support 
associations, 	learned 	societies 	and 
research assistance. 
General education, universities, technical 
education and re—education schemes. 
Information networks, libraries, advisory 
and consultancy centres, liaison services 
and data bases. 
Grants, 	loans, 	subsidies, 	financial 
sharing arrangements, equipment, 
building or other provisions, tax 
exemptions, company personnel, pay—roll 
tax and tax allowances. 
Patents, 	regulations 	and 
business laws. 
Planning, regional policies, division of 
power, control and public consultation. 
Purchases and contracts and R&D 
assistance. 
Trade agreements, tariffs, currency, 
regulation, defence sales and foreign 
• 13. A chart derived from R. Rothwell & W. Zegveld, Industrial Innovation & Public Policy 
(London, Francis Pinter, 1982:61) 
96 
(i) Public Enterprise: 
Ever since the Hall breech—loading flintlock carbine, the United States Government had 
been exposed to military arms innovation that had been instigated by public sector 
decisions.(14) Later, with major armouries at Harpers Ferry and Springfield, the 
government not only adopted innovations from independent innovators such as Colt 
(his percussion mechanism for the 1856 Rifle Musket) and Hall (his breech—loading 
design improvements) but also became the vanguard of production techniques. The 
standardisation of parts, the placement of machines in factories to better facilitate mass 
production and the use of precision machine tools, all set standard models for private 
firms to copy.(15) 
The Federal Government remained committed throughout the war to meeting arms 
production from its own arsenals. In August 1864 General George Ramsey (Chief of 
the US Ordnance Bureau) reported to the Secretary of War that whilst private 
contracts were being issued, government factories and foundries were still the cheapest 
and most desirable sources of supply.(16) 
It was the Federal Government alone, with its arsenals and finance, that had established 
the capability to undertake the immediate production demands of 1861-1862.(17) 
However, despite private contractors' expenditure of time and finances to meet 
government contracts, benefits from product development and manufacturing 
techniques, were always a side issue. The Federal Government intended contracts to be 
short—term solutions, until they could meet all production demands themselves. 
Another source of government influence on innovation, through public enterprise, was 
the clothing industry. The government factories in the North were able, not only to 
make up the production shortfall that private firms failed to fill, but as with the small 
arms factories, to provide a model for division of labour, specialised production stages, 
and standardised quality.(18) Wartime demand still necessitated using private 
contractors who often failed to match the product quality of the government factories. 
14. Rothwell & Zegveld, Industrial Innovation (1982:49); & H.J. Habakkuk, American &  
British Technology in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1962:94) 
15. N. Rosenberg (ed), The American System of Manufacturers: The Report of the 
Committee on the Machinery of the United States 1855 & the Special Reports of Georg_ 
Wallis & Joseph Whitworth 1854 (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1969:5) 
16. Official Records, "The War of the Rebellion, A Compilation of the Official Records of 
the Union & Confederate Armies" (70 Vol.-127 Books) (Washington DC, Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901) (Series III, Vol.IV) (1900:590) 
17. M. Smith, "Military Entrepreneurship", in 0. Mayr & R.C. Post (eds), Yankee  
Enterprise: The Rise of the American System of Manufactures  (Washington D.C., 
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1981:94-95) 
18. Rosenberg, System of Manufacturers (1963:156) 
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This effectively limited the government's influence on clothing manufacture and quality. 
Not until corrupt officials or the excess of demand over supply were removed, could 
contracts be issued to the most capable companies. 
Throughout the war it is possible to establish a number of other areas where public, or 
indeed military, endeavours influenced innovation. The North's participation in 
hydrographical and topographical surveys, the efforts of military engineering and 
medical departments, and the role of military railroads and telegraph communications 
links, all enhanced private sector development. 
ii) Science & Technical Support: 
The expansion of technical knowledge in the Civil War, provided the stimulus in 
American history, for science and technology to became inexorably linked. 
By 3 March 1863, after the war had gone on for nearly two years, the Northern 
Government employed the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to advise it upon "any 
subject of science or art".(19) Specifically, the Federal government recognized the 
importance of science in promoting wartime development. This recognition was in turn 
directly linked to its desire to maintain a superiority over the South's technical 
development. Employing this new scientific tool, the Northern government sought to: 
1. negate the South's capacity to gain a military advantage through some new 
invention; 
2. develop the pure application of science, particularly in the areas of chemistry 
and physics; and 
3. assist in the translation of industrial research and effort, into military 
hardware.(20) 
A Permanent Commission and some five special NAS advisory committees were set up 
to carry out scientific studies relating to military innovation.(21) The permanent 
commission became the representative of scientific bodies assisting the Northern war 
effort. The special committees had some success in developing a system of weights and 
measures for coinage; armouring ironclad hulls; and enhancing naval navigation 
through a group of investigations into magnetic deviation on ironclad—mounted 
compasses; a hydrometer; and sailing charts.(22) 
19. N. Reingold, "Science in the Civil War: The Permanent Commission of the Navy 
Department", 1ii (Vol.49[3], No.157, September 1958:307) 
20. Reingold, "Science in the Civil War"(1958:308) 
21. Dupree, Science (1957:118) 
22. IBID:144-145 
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Despite the success in focussing scientific and technological support, the NAS had no 
profound influence upon military technical innovation. This was largely due to the 
Federal Government's inability to harness its scientific adviser into direct support of 
existing innovations. Instead, it was left to the military institutions themselves, to 
produce innovation by technological research, carried out under government 
supervision. 
The Naval Departments of both the North and South had been exposed to a number of 
innovations prior to the Civil War. Therefore, existing Northern establishments such as 
the Washington Naval Yard, the Naval Observatory, and the Naval Academy, spent the 
war expanding the practical development of pre-war research on steam propulsion, 
Rodman and Dahlgren heavy ordnance, navigation, and ironcladding. In the South, 
despite its lack of established development facilities, the need for naval innovations to 
circumvent the North's naval supremacy, produced an awareness of the importance of 
innovation .(23) 
As organised research produced more significant developments on specific knowledge 
bases in the North, the South pursued less systematic promotion of innovations. The 
South still produced such innovations as torpedoes, their related weapon systems, and 
ironclads of varying designs, but they were forever restricted to lending assistance to 
schemes independent of any overall scientific or technological master plan.(24) This 
was unlike the Northern government, which through finances or co-ordination of 
private companies, could establish a development program on such an important field 
of endeavour, as ironclad technology. 
Thus while the Southern Tredegar iron works struggled, because of limited technical 
assistance, the development in the North progressed, and contracts for ironclad armour 
plates over three-inch thick were being issued. 
The 1862 reorganisation of the Northern Naval Department was able to confirm the 
Northern naval administrations direction under the overall guidance of Gideon Wells. 
He in turn promoted John S Dahlgren's Ordnance Bureau experiments and also 
encouraged the vital work of B F Isherwood's Naval Engineering Department, on steam 
engines. Therefore, a broad range of research into naval technology was possible whilst 
scientific understanding of existing technology continued to expand.(25) 
23. G. Elliot, "Her Construction & Service" (Part 1) of "The Career of the Confederate Ram 
Albemarle", The Century Magazine (Vol.36[3], July 1888:421) 
24. V.C. Jones, The Civil War At Sea  (Vo1.111) "July 1863-November 1865 - The Final 
Effort" (New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1962:60) 
25. Dupree, Science (1957:125-126) 
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Although the Federal Government had a degree of success in creating a research base 
for naval scientific and technical efforts, it cannot be said to have met with the same 
level of success in the army. In the South, the failures once again sprung from the lack 
of co-ordinated effort and the failure to set priorities. So although it was endowed with 
talented innovators and engineers, the South never possessed the resources or industrial 
capacity to induce consolidated exploitation of promising innovations. 
The Southern government therefore sought to restrict involvement to the influence of 
specific innovative efforts and to the creation of efficient production centres. What 
resources were available were concentrated on exploiting existing scientific and 
technical knowledge, rather than on broadening it into areas of less certainty.(26) 
Concentration of effort was therefore achieved by avoiding technology of unknown 
military benefits. Instead scarce resources were focussed on combat tested technology. 
Unlike the North, where industries had become well developed in both process and 
techniques, the Confederate Government was faced with a relatively new industrial 
superstructure with a very short gestation period. Thus, while weapons such as the 
torpedo (mine) and torpedo lioat emerged from R & D efforts, these were mostly 
carried out without regard to government development programmes. Rather local 
officials gave tacit support to individual innovators. 
In the North however, there were many innovative directions, all competing to gain 
resource allocation and government financial endorsement. 
Government, through the direct patronage of President Lincoln and the Secretary of the 
War Department, Edwin M Stanton, often cut red tape to promote the innovations with 
the greatest potential.(27) However, bureaucratic obstinacy saw institutions such as the 
Ordnance Bureau under General James Ripley resist the involvement of even the 
President in the adoption of innovations. 
Without systematic promotion of innovations by government, Northern agencies were 
too often left to devise their own means to select weapons for development. It was to be 
the military bureaucracy, that would provide the technical direction in the selection, 
testing and production supervision, of innovations for the land forces. 
26. W.S. Hook, "The Confederate Armory at Tallassec, Alabama, 1864-1865", The  
Alabama Review (Vol.25[1], January 1972:10-12) 
27. R.V. Bruce, Lincoln & the Tools of War (Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1973:N-xi) 
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iii) Education: 
The contribution made by education to military technical innovation is hard to 
determine. In a general sense, the rise of literacy and basic education made more 
soldiers able to adapt to new technology. The American nation's historical pre-
occupation with the practical efforts of inventors, also served to promote government 
concern with giving general grants to universities and utilising innovations from such 
institutions. 
However, education's contribution to Civil War technology was not always peripheral. 
The development of nitre substitutes better black powder, engineering techniques, diet, 
medicine and meteorology, were all enhanced by university research. Government 
recognized these successes, but still produced no policy giving specific encouragement to 
education institutions undertaking projects useful for the military. 
iv) Information: 
There existed no deliberate government policy promoting the flow of scientific and 
technical information. Information was mostly transferred by means of informal 
information networks. Thus, although Civil War government encouraged dialogue on 
technical issues, it never co-ordinated miscellaneous policies dealing with education, 
support for scientific literature, promotion of public science displays, and sponsorship 
of individual research projects. Influences on the transferral of technical knowledge 
between individuals and broad areas of endeavour, were therefore never consciously 
brought within any policy framework. 
v) Finance and Taxation: 
It was in this area that the real impact of government participation in the private sector 
could be measured. The use of finances and taxation also became the key to the growth 
of centralised government in America. Although industrialisation had brought an 
emphasis on central government, during the war President Lincoln asserted not only 
this power shift, but reinforced it by affirming the Federal Government's role in the 
economy .(28) 
As real wages fell, inflation bludgeoned a nation weakened by the need to finance a mass 
army. The North increasingly resorted to government legislation to redress economic 
problems.(29) Federal Government undertook to increase taxation, yet Treasury 
Secretary Chase was faced with problems whose scope had never before confronted an 
28. Elazan Comments in Gilchrist & Lewis, Economic Changes (1965:98) 
29. S.L. Engerman, "The Economic Impact of the Civil War", Explorations in 
Entrepreneurial History (Vol.3[3], Spring 1966:1.87 & 189) 
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industrialised nation. Revenue increased, but the expense of war far exceeded 
government expectations.(30) Agricultural reform was instigated through such Bills as 
the Homestead Act and Morrill Land Grant College in 1862. Yet agricultural 
expansion did not offset the monetary shortage faced by the Federal government.(31) 
In 1863 the Federal Government was forced to modernise its monetary structure,(32) 
resulting in the National Banking (System) Act of 1863 being passed. The plethora of 
state banks, banknotes, and diverse procedures, was replaced by a uniform centralised 
system.(33) Paper money in the form of the ubiquitous 'greenback' was introduced. 
These treasury notes coupled with the issuing of war bonds, not only stimulated the 
economy, but staved off the monetary crisis until the victories at Gettysburg and 
Vicksburg restored confidence in the Northern economy.(34) 
Overall, the banking system, with perhaps the exception of the commercial banks, 
remained depressed throughout the war.(35) However, it is possible to see that the 
North, with its industrialised base and central government, was at least able to confront 
its vast economic problems. Thus, while the Northern government increased the role it 
played in the national economy from an average 2 per cent per annum of Gross 
National Product in the 1850s, to a wartime average involvement of 15 per cent of 
GNP,(36) the Southern government was crushed under economic problems.(37) 
While Jefferson Davis and Secretary of the Confederate Treasury Christopher 
Memminger, did try to raise taxes, gain loans, redistribute invested money out of slaves 
and agriculture, and issue paper money, their lack of financial expertise and a 
supporting industrial base, meant they failed to offset the wartime monetary crisis.(38) 
The repercussion of the North's ability to at least control economic decline with finance 
and taxation—related policies are hard to define. Basically, no general statement 
regarding the impact of prevailing economic conditions on the North and South's war 
effort, may survive specific examination.(39) 
30. P.J. Parish, The American Civil War (London, Eyre Methuen, 1975:354) 
31. IBID:353; P. O'Brien, The Economic Effects of the American Civil War  (London, 
MacMillan, 1988:56) 
32. O'Brien, Economic Effects (1988:54) 
33. J.M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War & Reconstruction (New York, Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1982:204); & The Times August 8,1862 in H. Brogan (ed), The American Civil War:  
Extracts from The Times 1860-1865 (London, Times Books, 1975:72) 
34. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire (1982:203-204) 
35. Engerman, "Economic Impact" (1966:192) 
36. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire (1982:200) 
37. For Southern monetary policy sec O'Brien, Economic Effects (1988:44) 
38. Parish, The American Civil War (1975:307-315) 
39. IBID:353 
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It is possible to see that the provision of finances to John Ericsson and the awarding of 
contracts to certain small arms producers did enable innovations to be put into 
production quickly.(40) Financing, provision of factories, and the exemption of owners 
from the three per cent income tax applying to those who earned over $800.00 per 
annum, acted as inducements to undertake manufacture of new military technology. 
Specific inducement for projects desired by government was possible by direct 
remittance of taxes or levies on new enterprises, land grants, and in railroad 
development, the purchasing of corporate bonds by government, as well as the 
subsidising of company land purchases.(41) 
Government assistance, however, was usually only obtained after the commencement of 
a project, rather than being used to induce additional development assist in the 
expansion of military technology. 
vi) Legal and Regulatory: 
One of the major tools used by American governments to influence the course of 
innovation prior to the twentieth century, was the patent system.(42) The patent system 
served to preserve the financial rewards for individuals, from their innovative efforts. 
Ordered by government legislation and enforced by the courts of law, it permitted 
central governments to monitor technical advances and also provided the 
administrative structure within which disputes could be settled, whilst technical 
advance still continued.(43) In shipbuilding, small arms, manufacturing techniques, 
and other ventures affecting military technology, unique developments were assured 
under this legal recognition.(44) 
The patent system endeavoured to ensure a logical process in technical development was 
maintained, and available to be viewed by the next generation of innovators. It also 
guaranteed the innovator his financial rewards, even if later innovation incorporated 
his ideas in a way that permitted their unrealized potential to be filled. This was the 
case with the patented Timby turret used on the Monitor by Ericsson, the Colt 
40. E.B. Potter & C.W. Nimitz (eds), Sea Power: A Naval History  (New Jersey, Prentice-
Hall, 1961:265); & W.T. Sherman (General, U.S. Army), "The Grand Strategy of the 
Rebellion" The Century Magazine, (Vol.35[4], February 1888:141) 
41. C. Cochran, "Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization?", in R. Andrcano (ecl), The 
Economic Impact of the American Civil War (Cambridge, Schcnkman, 1967:175) 
42. Rothwell & Zegveld, Industrial Innovation (1982:82) 
43. E.D. Fite, Social & Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War  (New York, 
Frederick Ungar, 1963:100) 
44. The Civil War to a certain extent did promote infringements of patents that had 
previously limited design work. This happened with the Colt patent on the revolver pistol, 
see C. Blair, Pollard's History of Firearms  (New York, MacMillan, 1983:232-233) 
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percussion lock on the 1856 Springfield rifle, and Rollin White's bored-through 
revolver cylinder which Smith and Wesson perfected with rimfire rounds. 
The patent system also had one very negative affect. Inventors were often forced to 
develop military technical designs (cartridges and rifle actions in particular) that 
avoided current patents. Thus to avoid infringing patents or paying royalties, they 
eschewed the development of sound technical ideas with real potential. 
The rigid enforcement of patents by government also encouraged individuals and small 
firms to attempt to develop new technology. Knowing the patent system would protect 
their discoveries, technologists could risk financial and important resources, with the 
knowledge that the gains could be enormous. In effect then, large companies were only 
marginally better off than any small firm undertaking technical research and 
development. 
It is perhaps because of the use of the patent system and the lack of rigid anti-trust 
legislation, that the individual technologists and entrepreneurs operating in military 
technological development, consolidated their efforts under the sponsorship of a 
number of large companies. Firms such as Winchester, for instance, found it easier to 
sponsor innovators to work on the lever action Winchester repeating rifle concept, than 
to buy their patented designs after innovation had occurred. Thus a whole new area of 
corporate research conducted by numerous individual technologists became the new 
core concern of the patent system.(45) 
vii) Political Process: 
The most profound policy trend during the Civil War was the increased power of the 
central legislature. From the perspective of how centralization impacted on 
technological changes, it is important to note that while the States continued to exert 
important influences on the political system, it was the Federal Government that gained 
from the centralised shift in legislative power. It was able to bring to bear upon 
innovation, an influence that took the 'nation's welfare' as the central motive and 
circumvented reliance upon decentralised State legislatures to organise the war effort. 
Through public enterprise, research assistance, broad financial and taxation policies, 
and issuing of contracts, the Federal Government's policy machinery consolidated its 
new pre-eminence in shaping the nation's direction in technological endeavour. 
45. V.D. Stockbridge, Digest of Patents Relating to Breech-loading & Magazine Small  
Arms (Except Revolvers). Granted in the United States from 1836-1873 Inclusive  
(Washington DC, U.S. Patents Office, 1.874) 
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The growth of central, federal government has been challenged by those who believe the 
Confederacy was divided by individual states demanding states' rights. These States-
Rights theorists maintain that the Confederate states were devoid of sufficient national 
identity to survive wartime combat.(46) Thus industrial as well as military forces 
suffered from a lack of central political direction. This thesis has in its own turn being 
challenged by more recent schools of thought, that indicate the Southern states still 
achieved a high degree of central political direction.(47) 
One must be careful in accrediting central governments, on either side of the Civil War 
political fence, with unlimited expansion. It should not be assumed that in order to 
shape technological change, the Union government made a conscious movement 
towards greater market intervention. American Governments of the Civil War still did 
not comprehensively understand either the theory of market competition or know how 
to co-ordinate it, during their irregular progress towards industrialisation.(48) Nor did 
they consciously produce a policy package that shaped innovations. Basically, the rate 
of successful military innovation was influenced by a basket of changes to centralise 
government organisation and control, including adaption of government regulations 
affecting industrialisation and the overall stimulation of productive capacity. 
In the marketplace, state governments could and did play a crucial role in stimulating 
industry. Because industries were highly localised, with for instance, small arms and 
boot and shoe industries concentrated in Massachusetts and iron and steel industries in 
Pennsylvania,(49) State Government could directly influence local conditions. In 
particular, it played an important role in infrastructure support. This role ironically, 
was not as important as its role in stimulating innovation when governments competed 
against each other in the open market to secure arms technology. 
Oligopsonistic markets (exclusive markets with a number of government buyers) saw 
states vie against each other, and against the central governments of the North and 
South, to secure the best available weapons to arm their militias.(50) This competition 
not only pushed up market prices, but also induced companies to take up slack 
productive capacity while also exploring new technology as a means of securing new 
commercial products. 
Innovations such as the Spencer and Henry repeating rifles were only originally used in 
combat, because state governments were sympathetic to local manufacturing firms and 
46. Owsley, State Rights in the Confederacy (1925) 
47. Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost (1986:218); & O'Brien, Economic Effects  
(1988:17ff) 
48. B. Collins, The Origins of the American Civil War  (London, Edward Arnold, 1.981:29) 
49. IBID:29-30 
50. Shannon, Organization & Administration  (Vol.') (1965:115) 
105 
because they saw the weapons as valid, cheaper alternatives to weapons that would have 
to be bought in competition with the Federal Government. Thus, those states with 
available capital, secured good weapons, often on contract, so as to avoid paying 
artificially high prices for older-type weapons that the Federal Government and other 
State governments desired. 
The popularity of the Spencer and Henry rifles reinforced these State Governments' 
purchases of technical innovations whilst also confirming the early sponsorship of 
advanced innovative efforts by commercial manufacturers. 
viii) Procurement: 
The Federal Government exerted a profound influence on technical development 
through its use of procurement and contractual arrangements. During the Civil War 
these arrangements provided a stable market demand that reduced the producer's risk, 
by making it unnecessary to compete on the open market for government sales. 
Unfortunately, politicians and bureaucrats, military and civilian alike, were without a 
formalised contract system, whereby the chosen product was tested and assessed before 
the contract was awarded. Thus those who supervised innovation and the introduction 
of new military technology used the contract system to reinforce their narrow view of 
whose interests they perceived themselves to be promoting. Sometimes their lack of 
technical skill saw them fail to promote the best available product. 
Contracts could, however, reduce market uncertainties and shield manufacturers and 
government alike, from the economic changes and price fluctuations, that open market 
competition caused. Contracts, nevertheless, still did not guarantee industry's 
commitment to innovation. Sales and the filling of contracts often resulted in companies 
lacking the capacity to redirect resources into research or development. Equally, while 
the Northern central administration remained reluctant to award contracts on new 
technology such as repeating small arms, few companies took the risk of developing new 
technology that would have to be sold on the open market. 
By 1863 the Northern government had put an end t,o the mass importation of weapons. 
Instead, the North expanded productive capacity in its government foundries and 
factories, and only when there existed a shortfall in military demand, did they issue 
contracts for certain weapons. 
Although the Federal Government became more prepared to issue contracts for 
weapons, they usually procured only weapons (such as repeating and advanced breech- 
loading rifles) that could not be manufactured in their foundries. By 1863 the 
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technology of these arms was more known and the designs were generally considered 
less than radical in their design. 
Contracts did, however, confirm these new technical advances as commercially viable. 
Also the guarantee of prices and the breakdown in government reluctance to issue 
contracts for new technical products, permitted companies with organisational or 
process shortfalls, to secure contracts for refined weapons technology that, once in 
production, could enable them to compete efficiently on the open market.(51) 
Contracts did, however, possess the capacity to stimulate manufacturing. Yet the lack of 
an articulated system for issuing government contracts inhibited the promotion of the 
best available technical innovations. Coupled with the existing political patronage, 
corruption,(52) and companies' capacity to sell known, older types of technology, the 
contract system's capacity to promote technical innovation was more often abused than 
properly used. 
ix) Commercial and Overseas Agents: 
The early stages of the Civil War (until 1863) saw a heavy reliance being placed upon 
overseas agents to secure the weapons necessary to fill the arsenals of both the Northern 
and Southern armies. These men often worked without buying guide-lines or set 
standards, and were not at all impervious to corruption. 
In Europe, the attempts to buy arms resulted in huge leaps in European weapons' resale 
value. Faced with filling buying lists that stated numbers of arms and not their quality, 
American agents payed inflated prices for obsolete weapons cast off by European 
nations.(53) 
The efforts of these purchasing agents affected domestic arms innovation in a twofold 
way. Firstly, the lack of quality imported arms reduced the impact technology transfer 
had on stimulating American development. Thus whilst the French and Prussians 
experimented with bolt-action rifles, the American forces were very slow to develop 
such designs.(See Appendix 20, on bolt action rifle development in the Civil War) 
Some weapons that were introduced with novel technical features, did influence 
domestic American technologists. The development of rimfire revolvers benefited from 
51. Rothwell & Zegveld, Industrial Innovation  (1982:99) 
52. Discussion on the Ordnance & Commissionary Department are in McPherson, Ordeal By 
Fire (1982:198) • 
53. Shannon, Organization & Administration (Vol.I) (1965:119-120); & L.M. Scars, "A 
Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III", American Historical Review  (Vol.26[21 
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designers' exposure to imported French revolvers such as the Le Faucheaux, Le Mat 
(product of an American designer working from France), and Perrin designs, and 
artillery designers were encouraged by the importation of foreign breech-loading rifled 
ordnance and related ammunition. But instead of promoting technological innovation 
with novel designs, both Northern and Southern governments clogged the battlefield 
with expensive, low-quality imported weapons that diverted demand from new local 
small-arms designs. While so many foreign arms abounded, governments were 
reluctant to risk introducing unknown technology with an uncertain lead time between 
ordering and delivery. 
The second major impact of large overseas procurements by agents was an increase in 
the American Government's overseas debt, which not only lowered its purchasing 
power overseas but affected the impact of government financial policies on the local 
economy. Paradoxically, it was this lack of overseas purchasing power that was in 1863 
to stimulate government administration to issue local contracts and even to compete on 
the domestic open market.(54) This in effect freed government capital to re-invest in 
domestic industry and inject new life into the arms manufacturers who were developing 
new technology. 
(C) Government And Technology Change 
Throughout the Civil War, governments failed to adopt a systematic approach to 
innovation policy. Nevertheless, despite policy being disjointed, it did greatly influence 
technical developments. Because of the Federal Government's increasingly central role 
in the affairs of the nation and its policy in public enterprise, patents, finance and 
taxation, and contracts, it was able to directly manipulate the course or military 
technology change, not always with conscious regard to the outcome. 
Administratively, these policies occurred outside the influence of any one institution. 
Thus while the policy process was diverse, the implementation of the total policy could 
not fall under the control of one agency. Such problems were compounded in the North 
as government and military organizations worked separately from one another,. Many 
negative factors inevitably arose. The lag between discovery and exploitation of useful 
military innovations was lengthened because of the failure to issue guide-lines for the 
adoption of new weapons. It was rare for any consideration to be given to the marriage 
between newly introduced weapons and existing weapons technology. Contracts were 
54. J.F. Baenteli, "Civil War Revolvers", in National Riflc Ass°dation of America, Civil 
War Small Arms, (Washington, NRAA, 1960:9) 
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usually just issued to secure the arms that could not be immediately supplied from 
existing (government) sources.(55) 
The closest the North came to having such a policy was when General James Ripley of 
the Ordnance Bureau blocked efforts that were intent on introducing new weapon 
innovations. In effect, then, policies produced haphazard promotion of some innovative 
effort but important agencies such as the War Department and the Treasury were often 
pursuing their own interests, divorced from important technical changes. 
In summary, then, the Northern Civil War public sector illustrated that the early, 
positive promotion of military innovation could be conducted by interventionist policy. 
Yet the failure to develop innovation policy often meant that arms manufacturers were 
never able to attract enough government funds to develop and promote new weapons 
technology. This resulted in a lack of emphasis on high-risk research into inventions 
that could dramatically alter existing military technical developments. This trend was 
reinforced by the Washington administration's inability to use its unique industrial base 
and pure research assets, to promote Civil War military technical change. The North 
could have achieved this by focussing its policies on military innovation or by clearly 
delineating military demand. 
Innovation policy throughout the war was instead, restricted by random and unco-
ordinated policies that were based around a limited understanding of how technical 
change could itself be used as a weapon in war. 
5.2 	Industrial Environment 
A single enigma has dominated discussions of Civil War industry: why did the North 
not use its obvious industrial superiority to destroy the Confederacy before 1865? One 
major school of thought headed by T C Cochran believed that the failure was due to the 
retarding of industrialisation by Civil War factors: 
By modern standards, the Civil War was still unmechanized. It was fought 
with rifles, bayonet, and sabres by men on foot or horseback. Artillery was 
more used than in previous wars but was still a relatively minor consumer of 
iron and steel. The railroad was also brought into use, but the building of 
military lines offset only a small percentage of the overall drop from the 
pre-war level of civilian railroad construction. Had all this not been true, 
the Confederacy with its small industrial development could never have 
fought back through four years of increasingly effective blockade.(56) 
The "Cochran Thesis" poses many questions in itself. This is inevitable, given the lack 
of comprehensive figures on industrial and economic indicators and the inconsistent 
55. C. L. Davis, Arming the Union (Port Washington, Kennikat Press, 1973:vi) 
56. Cochran, "Did the Civil War Retard Industrialization?" (1967:173-174) 
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interpretations so many authors have subsequently lent to these figures.(57) llowever, 
the debate has an important bearing upon our understanding of how the general 
industrial environment affected military technical innovation. Firstly, can we simply 
state that although in 1861 the North possessed the capacity to produce breech—loaders 
for an army of 600,000458) it did not do so because the Civil War produced conditions 
that were retarding manufacturing enterprise? 
Secondly, if we accept the basic tenet of Cochran's thesis and the contributions to the 
argument lent by others such as S L Engerman and even V S Clark's outstanding 
History of Manufacture in the United States,(59) then during the war not only were 
there no radical changes to domestic industry and production methods, but war 
demand basically did not revolutionise industry.(60) 
If this is so, can we therefore finally suggest innovation in military technology was 
inhibited by a lack of enterprise in a manufacturing environment that was pre—occupied 
with converting existing resources to fill production shortfalls with military demand? 
Answers to these first two questions will assist us more fully to establish the industrial 
environment's affect on military technical innovation. Yet because of vagaries in the 
link between innovation and industrial growth, this study will have to establish a 
number of prior factors. Thus it will be important to examine the American System of 
Manufacturers (ASM) and the machine—tool industry to give an indication of the pre-
war techniques of industrial production. From this point, the impact on war industries 
in the North and the South can be assessed. 
Only after this study will it be possible to establish whether innovations were retarded 
within this environment. How, if at all, did specific industries affect military technology 
change? Can a link be established between environmental factors and the ability of 
industry to produce innovations utilizing advanced technical knowledge? 
(A) The American System of Manufactures (ASM) 
Very early in the nineteenth century America produced a system of manufacture that 
was to represent one of the greatest spurs to the nation's quest for industrial might. 
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This so-called ASM was initiated by the efforts of small-arms designers Eli Whitney 
and John Hancock Hall, who sought to produce muskets with standardised, 
interchangeable parts.(61) 
The ASM by 1860, had affected other industries so that manufacturers were irrevocably 
restructured according to its guiding principles.(62) The system involved the 
characteristics of mass manufacture by power-driven machinery and by machinery 
especially designed to make particular parts at each phase of the production process, 
and was were guided by the principle of interchangeable parts.(63) By the 1850s, 
embodied with this new "machine consciousness", industries such as the watch, clock, 
lock, tools, sewing machine, and small-arms industries, were changing the face not only 
of manufacturing enterprise, but also of American society.(64) 
At the start of the Civil War there already existed the precision tools and gauges, as well 
as the necessary principles of mass manufacture, to produce new products.(65) By 
1861, small-arms manufacturers such as Colt, Robbins & Lawrence,(66) Sharps, 
Remington, George S Lincoln, and Providence Tool Company,(67) already possessed 
the knowledge and the principles necessary to reorganise machinery to meet wartime 
demand. While it may be true that the Civil War was never a dynamic force in altering 
production methods, it did confirm the technical trends in human and mechanized 
resources use, management techniques, and industrial needs initiated by the ASM.(68) 
(B) 	Machine Tools 
Machine tools and the machine-tool industry respectively, stand as examples of a 
necessary part of industrialisation and as a representative of the impact 
industrialisation had on industry.(69) Machine tools were, therefore, central to 
61. R.S. Woodbury, "The Legend of Eli Whitney & Interchangeable Parts", Technology & 
Culture (Vol.1[1], Summer 1959-60:235-253); J.E. Sawyer, "The Social Basis of the 
American System of Manufacturing", Journal of Economic History  (Vol.1.4[4], 1.954:361- 
379); & D.F. Butler, United States Firearms: The First Century. 1776-1875  (New York, 
Winchester Press, 1971) 
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64. Smith, "Military Entrepreneurship" (1981:89) 
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providing the industrial capacity to produce new products, and were themselves a 
source of innovation and expansion in manufacturing enterprise.(70) 
N Rosenberg considers that machine tools were: 
...the most important members of the larger classification of power driven 
metal working machinery. The basic distinction is that machine tools shape 
metal through the use of a cutting tool and the progressive cutting away of 
chips, whereas other metal working machinery shapes metal without the use 
of a cutting tool, by pressing (forming, stamping, punching), forging, 
bending, shearing etc.(71) 
Before the Civil War these functions had been increasingly important because of the 
growing influence of the ASM. Primarily, machine tools provided the means to make 
the machinery necessary to sustain the new machine based manufacture-type 
industries.(72) As the ASM instituted specialised production of parts at different phases 
of the production process, so the machine tools and their manufactured machines 
replaced artisans who made each product individually. Thus machine tools produced 
specialised turning, boring, drilling, milling, planing, grinding, polishing and other 
functions.(73) Finally, the machine tool industry expanded with the ASM and 
confirmed the "machine consciousness" that produced a transformation of the technical 
features of American manufacturing.(74) 
The utilisation of the Springfield Armoury's productive capacity to meet wartime 
demand, was not so much just a sudden revolutionary use of machinery, but a 
realisation of the productive capacity established by machine-tool evolution in the 
1840s and 1850s. Equally, the successful application of these production facilities 
showed how other industries could build upon existing technical developments (75) 
without radically altering the production methods the ASM had inculcated into 
industry over two decades.(76) 
70. N. Rosenberg, "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry 1840-1910", The 
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(C) 	War Industries 
It is not possible to surpass V S Clark's summary of the Civil War's impact on 
industry. He states that: 
In a word, the factories and work shops of New England and the Central 
States were already prepared to equip armies and to replace the waste of 
modern war. We did not have to create these establishments when hostilities 
began, but only to transform them to military use.(77) 
Under such description the Civil War did not create an a priori catalyst for industrial 
expansion. Because of the development of new manufacturing techniques and the 
inroads made by the use of machine tools, more specialised areas of mass production 
techniques were being applied to meet the new wartime demands. 
In particular, the scarcity of labour became more critical during the Civil War. Thus 
the drift towards labour-saving machinery that the ASM precipitated was 
accelerated.(78) In turn, this resulted in increased demands on the machine-tool 
industry, increased innovation in the production and use of machinery, reduced cost of 
machinery manufacture, and overall, an increase in employees' productivity.(79) This 
phase of expansion during the war provided the realisation of pre-war changes to 
production methods and spurred changes to production methods resulting in 
improvements to the techniques of production.(80) 
These technical changes are seen by S L Engerman (81) as not being war-related. 
Rather, he believes the changes were less related to war industries than to consumer 
goods industries or industries whose demands were derived from that of consumer 
products.(82) He suggests, therefore, that the: 
techniques of war were pre-modern and that any mechanisation in heavy 
industries due to war demands was of minor importance, in contrast with 
twentieth century wars.(83) 
This suggests that industries classified as war-related were subject to a variety of war-
induced influences. As these would affect military innovation in their industries, it is 
perhaps useful to examine the key war industries of small arms and munitions, iron and 
steel, rail transport, clothing, and the boot and shoe manufacturers. 
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(i) The Small Arms and Munitions Industry.  - It is difficult to assess how much 
impact the war had on this area of manufacturing. Basic factors such as advances in 
precision tools and engineering expertise can be attributed to the war. Certainly, 
technical development was spurred by the war despite it being an incremental process 
rather than a radical leap forward.(84) The necessary machine tools and techniques 
existed in 1861 to fill the same contracts as were issued in 1865, for 78,100 repeating 
rifles and 11,850 single-shot breech-loaders.(85) 
The irony of the Civil War small-arms industry is not the existence of established 
production knowledge but of its non- exploitation during the war. This irony is 
reflected in the study of the British Committee that investigated the United States 
small-arms industry in the early 1850s. The British had found that the Crimean War 
had created massive problems for military technology production.(86) With what they 
learnt in America, the implementation of the ASM techniques, mass-production 
technology, precision machine tools, and the adoption of better small arms designs,(87) 
the British largely resolved their military production problems. 
The Americans, who were the originators of the ASNI and had the system well before 
the Civil War, still had not fully exploited the system. In fact, from 1861 until 1863, 
both the South and, more ironically, the North, were buying the English Enfield 
muzzle-loading percussion rifle at 25 dollars each. Yet it was made at the Birmingham 
Small Arms factory and was directly based on the British Investigating Committee's 
American findings, that had a decade earlier studied production of the US Springfield 
1857 muzzle-loading percussion rifle.(88) Ironically, in 1862 the cost of manufacturing 
the latest US Springfield rifle was still only three-quarters of the purchase price for the 
Enfield rifle. 
The final irony was that in 1856 the British Committee had examined repeating (Colt 
rifle) and breech-loading (Sharps and Perry Carbines) designs and had thought they 
would shape the types of weapons in future army arsenals.(89) This scenario was 
repeated with the Committee's surprise discovery that the United States had vastly 
superior gun-casting techniques to its own.(90) The Committee considered the US 
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ability to mass-produce good quality weapons without enormous amounts of expensive 
labour, as extremely advanced.(91) 
However, while the British were to introduce United States machinery and engineers to 
change their system of arms manufacture, the potential of arms production and the 
ASM was still not fully accepted in America. Production potential was, therefore, never 
realised prior to the Civil War. 
Some advances in munitions occurred during the Civil War. Rimflre and centre-fire 
cartridges were developed from a few pre-war experimental models, and the powder 
and explosives industries expanded their wartime production to meet the new demand. 
Both sides also had to develop nitre works to manufacture substitute saltpetre or to 
rationalise their inefficient production methods.(92) 
The story of Civil War small-arms manufacture is not necessarily one of unlimited 
growth in industrial performance. For instance, the manufacture of breech-loaders 
was often inhibited by an inability to machine precision parts so as to make 
interchangeable barrel and breeches, in ways that assured precise fitting.(93) 
Repeating rifles and metallic self-contained ammunition designs were often too 
delicately made to survive the rigours of the battlefield. Some precision weapons such 
as snipers' rifles still had to be produced by individuals skilled enough to precisely 
manufacture accurate rifles. 
Modifications to weapons designs, the reduction in moving parts and the improvements 
to precision machining did combine over the length of the war to produce high 
production standards.(94) The BLR and repeating rifle in general, and specific designs 
such as the Gatling Gun and Henry repeating rifle, certainly were benifited by the 
improvements to machine tools. These small arms and machine-tool advances were not 
universal. They were not to spread throughout the whole industry until after the 
war.(95) 
Innovation was promoted in specialised techniques and special products. This was 
especially so where efficiency was increased, cost decreased, or a product capable of 
gaining a government contract could be competitively manufactured. 
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(ii) 	The Iron & Steel Industry. - Unlike the small-arms and munitions industries, 
this was marked by its total lack of innovative stimulus resulting from the war.(96) 
The industry had no major product or process innovations that could mark the war era 
as a major period of technical growth. As wartime demand for iron increased, it still 
could not offset the very large decrease in pre-war levels created by railroad 
demand.(97) Small-arms production also demanded increased industrial capacity, but 
although sponsoring the production of more refined, high quality wrought-iron and 
experiments with steel weapons,(98) production levels in the North barely offset the loss 
of the export and Southern markets.(99) Despite increased domestic production of rifle 
barrels, it still only marginally affected the rate at which rifle barrels were imported 
from Great Britain.(100) 
It was only in the production of pig iron that output by 1863 matched 1860 figures and 
continued to rise.(101) Experimentation with the Bessemer steel process and 
improvements in metallurgy were not extensive enough to improve iron production 
figures. Mainly because of patent conflicts, the Bessemer steel process was used only to 
manufacture swords and some railroad tracks.(102) 
Improved metallurgical knowledge did promote an increase in gun size. The 1861 
Rodman gun was a 15-Inch calibre, 25-ton gun firing a 337-pound shot. By 1865 a 
20-Inch calibre version weighing 50 tons and firing a massive 1,000-pound shot was 
being cast in the same foundries as its 1861 forerunner. Yet these and other 
experiments with heavy ordnance were unco-ordinated and more than matched by 
European experiments by Armstrong and Whitworth in England and by Krupp in 
Germany. Although not necessarily officially accepted, European advances created new 
weapon designs, better casting techniques, and even all-steel manufacture. 
In the manufacture of ironclads, required the commitment of production resources to 
make iron plate. Improvements in wrought-iron production provided increased labour 
savings, increased iron width, better machine tools and an increased thickness in iron 
plates from 1.5 inches to the 5-inch plates being produced by the war's end.(103) 
However, in 1862 machines could tool and shear only 1.5-inch-thick plate.(104) At this 
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time Great Britain had the capacity to roll and cut up to 20 tons of 12-inch-thick iron 
plate.(105) 
Although the iron industry enhanced its pig iron and wrought- or plate-iron 
production, the level of these advances was small. Similarly, these advancements in 
technical knowledge did not stimulate advances in steel production.(106) Yet in 1865 
production of some 15,862 tons of steel railroad track illustrated the burgeoning 
capacity of the industry.(107) Government requirements and standards set in 1864 and 
1865 also promoted the greater use of precision machine tools, uniform production 
standards, and a loose confederation in the steel industries.(108) 
It would appear that while technical development in the steel industry was restricted, its 
potential was actually increasing. This is in contrast to the iron industry where 
technical and process innovations did influence production but the average production 
figures during the war still fell below that achieved thirty years earlier during three 
weeks of 1832!(109) 
(iii) Clothing Industry. - The clothing industry reflected the wartime fate of most 
textile-related companies. With the exception of the wool industry, the story was one of 
declining markets and production.(110) 
The production of men's clothing was directly stimulated by the need to provide 
soldiers' uniforms. Wool consumption in the North rose from a pre-war level of 85 
million pounds to a peak of 200 million pounds in 1865.(111) Of this increase, only 75 
million pounds was to fill the military demand whilst the other 138 million pounds was 
sold to civilian consumers.(112) 
Wartime demand had little effect on other textile industries such as cotton. Increases in 
the wool industry could not offset the textile industry's overall 30 per cent decline in 
output between 1860 and 1865.(113) 
In the advances made in clothing during the war, the strongest was the trend towards 
better quality products. The greatest support for the clothing industry was instigated 
by government factories. However, the standardisation of labour activities and 
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efficiency in the whole industry was criminally inadequate during the early phase of the 
war. The word "shoddy" became popularly applied to uniforms made from pulped 
linen and rag, that were sold in the early stages of the war to fill government contracts. 
They were so poorly made that they dissolved in the rain.(114) 
Under the influence of government enterprises, better organisation and management of 
procurement, and the expanded use of the innovative sewing machine, producers of 
wool, cotton, leather and linen at least improved the clothing industry's productive 
efficiency.(115) 
(iv) 	The Shoe and Boot Industry. — Like the clothing industry, it benefited from 
exposure to government enterprise and the invention of the sewing machine and 
developed more efficient wartime production methods.(116) Manpower fell from 77,827 
to 55,160 people in the decade between 1855 and 1865.(117) In the same period, overall 
output also fell, from 45 million pairs to 35 million pairs.(118) 
Unlike the clothing industry, where machinery increased productivity, the shoe and 
boot industry's figures are more ambiguous. They seem to indicate that despite 
improvements in manufacturing technology productivity remained relatively 
stable.(119) The real benefits lay in the development of standardised production to fill 
military contracts, while steam—driven machinery made organisations more efficient. 
These benefits were, however, not necessarily common to the industry as a whole. As 
more than half the nation's boots and shoes were manufactured in Massachusetts (along 
with one—third of the textile output and one—quarter of the wool output), the ability of 
industries to exploit technical advances seems to have been influenced by regional 
locations.(120) 
Thus although the lack of growth in wartime production over pre—war figures indicates 
a sector decline, the industry went through a period of quality, production, and 
efficiency development, that was induced by the commitment of some companies to 
technical advances. 
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(D) 	Confederate Wartime Industries 
Before assessing the overall Civil War industrial environment it is perhaps necessary, 
for the sake of a more complete picture and an aid to comparisons, to study briefly 
Confederate industry. 
The Confederacy was hampered by its lack of a substantial wartime industrial base and 
a decline in all major sectors of industry, exacerbated by a shrinkage of accumulated 
capital.(121) In fact, the story of manufacturing in the South is one of steady wartime 
destruction or decline, and only rare examples of increased industrial activity in new 
technologies.(122) 
However, there did exist some government support and innovative centres of 
production. The Confederate Government was always faced with wartime demand 
outstripping industrial capacity, yet it succeeded in at least facilitating individual 
innovations such as submarines, ironclads, and torpedoes. Unlike the North, these 
industries had to concentrate productive capacity on military needs in preference to 
consumer production. Successful operations included such centres as the Tredegar iron 
works at Richmond, which produced field cannons, two-inch iron plates, and rifle 
barrels. Efficient production was also achieved at the Augusta powder mill and the 
Nashville nitre works.(123) 
Large small-arms industries were also built. Some 25 per cent of annual Confederate 
small-arms production were produced at Richmond.(124) The next largest centre of 
production was Fayetteville, where the captured Harpers Ferry armoury equipment 
was located. The remaining arms production was carried out at the expanded works at 
Augusta, Charleston, Columbus, Macon, Atlanta, Selma, and later in Tallassee when 
the Selma works were moved there.(125) 
These small-arms works and other smaller works produced some 330,000 weapons to 
meet the Confederate Ordnance Bureau's orders and made another 270,000 for state 
militias.(126) However, throughout the war the Confederates relied heavily upon arms 
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from Europe that evaded the blockade. These in turn were supplemented by great 
numbers of captured enemy weapons. 
Many shortages affected production in Southern industries. Aside from labour and 
capital shortages, there also existed a lack of oil lubricants and a demand for sulphur, 
lead, and saltpetre, that the Nitre and Mining Bureau of the Southern War Department 
made valiant efforts to offset. Southern iron works were only ever able to satisfy 
around a half of military demand.(127) 
These factors limited 1864 small—arms production to 20,000 stands (a weapon plus 
attachments and associated equipment for one man) despite a projected capacity of 
55,000 stands.(128) In the production of ironclads, the lack of manpower and iron 
plating also made for severe restrictions.(129) Replacements for worn rail lines or old 
rolling stock were virtually curtailed after 1863 because of the lack of rolled or refined 
metals.(130) 
The Confederate industrial environment was, then, one that encompassed industries 
trying to meet increased military demands but possessing neither an adequate 
production infrastructure built up prior to the war, nor sufficient wartime resources to 
meet these demands. Additionally, the concentration of scarce resources on known 
products and processes, stagnated innovation in the industrial sector.(131) 
It was not until after the war that the South began to shift towards a more unified 
process of industrialization. This process of change was driven from two opposing 
forces. One the one hand the North, with its vigourous new economic order, enforced 
reconstruction and a new industrial era on Southern society.(132) On the other hand 
many crusading Southeners promoted economic modernization and industrialization as 
the only way Southern independence could ever be gained.(133) 
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(E) 	Industry and Military Innovation 
Throughout the Civil War, industry continued to be exposed to and involved in, 
technical innovation. The war directly stimulated many miscellaneous manufacturers 
such as producers of soap, salt, petrol, kerosene, oil lubricants, chemicals, paper and 
sugar.(134) Although the stimulation of industrial activity can be more clearly seen in 
the North than in the South, the relationship between war and its catalytic impact on 
industrial growth cannot be simply established. 
Put into a generalised hypothesis, one gets back to the points made by such analysts as 
V S Clark and T C Cochran that growth, if it did occur, usually took up only productive 
slack in existing industries. Mostly the war had an adverse impact on industrial output 
and did not lift production beyond pre-1857 depression levels. The sustaining 
production methods and the pre-1857 infrastructure of industry also remained 
relatively unchanged through the war years. Consistent with this point is the fact that 
increased technical development in machinery and processes produced more uniform 
progress in innovations that were concentrated in the areas of small-arms, machine 
tools, naval engineering, and in some clothing and footwear industries. 
However, while organizations concentrated their research and development on 
technology with established markets, the eventual effect was to limit the expansion of 
new products. Thus the innovation base itself grew only slowly.(135) 
This belief was held by V S Clark when he stated that: 
...the stress of the Civil War...like a whirlpool in a river neither contributed 
to the volume of our production, nor permanently diverted its direction.(136) 
Pursued to its conclusion, such a belief supports the argument that the war never 
created a level of demand or degree of new products that could induce radical industrial 
growth or development. The war, of itself, could induce firms to transfer resources to 
meet military demand, but this process involved little innovative effort and rarely saw 
innovations responsible for increasing the scale of an organization.(137) 
In short, the V S Clark school of thought believes the evidence indicates that the effects 
of the war were selective and uneven. Subsequently an uncertain environment for 
industrial expansion was created. 
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Did the industrial environment retard military innovation? Indications are that even if 
one could prove that the Civil War stimulated industrial growth, there still appears to 
be no substantial link to the promotion of military technical change. Innovation 
occurred but was never aided as an overall activity by the industrial conditions. 
Separate and individual innovative enterprises were encouraged by industrial factors, 
such as large small-arms factories or nitre works, but these were generally exceptions. 
Industry, when it did undertake military production, preferred known technical entities 
with commercial markets and with the greatest capacity to take up productive slack 
without a large capital outlay. 
How, if at all, did specific industries promote technical change? Influence exerted by 
industries on technical change had no clear pattern. Influence was not related to size, 
resources, or apparent capacity to undertake innovation. The iron and steel industry in 
the North stands as one such example of how an industry could adhere to traditional 
products. Industries such as small-arms, clothing, and naval engineering were more 
able to make innovative contributions, but did not always promote the best-developed 
technical advances. 
Two general rules of influence can be suggested, however. First, commercial advantage 
was the main inducement to promote innovations as well as to adhering to older 
technology. Second, whilst the impact of industries' intrinsic technical and procedural 
developments held an uncertain relationship to industrial growth and therefore profits, 
industries were more prone to adapt new technology to military production which 
offered securer returns.(138) 
The influence exerted by industries on specific technical innovations was mixed. In 
general, had they supported good innovations and had government demand or military 
contracts offered worthwhile commercial returns for industries' promotion of these 
innovations, then more technical changes would have been promoted. 
Did any link between the industrial environment and the general pattern of military 
technology change emerge? Because military technical innovations did not have their 
best designs promoted, the resulting weapons produced give only a shallow picture of all 
the advances actually made in the Civil War. This was not solely the fault of industry. 
The time involved in developing radically different designs, winning official support, 
and re-machining factories, weighed heavily against innovators immediately trying to 
secure commercial contracts.(139) 
138.J.B. Rae, "The 'Know-How' Tradition: Technology in American History", Technoloov 
& Culture (Vol.1[1], Summer 1959-1960:145) 
139.Davis, Arming The Union  (1973:87) 
122 
As there existed no systematic adoption of new military innovations, industry in turn 
concentrated its resources on known commercial technology. To conservative private 
industries there seemed no reason to divert resources from traditional products or to 
expend enormous amounts of capital on developing products that had no guaranteed 
market. This seemed even more logical if the Federal Government continued to expand 
production from its own factories to meet its core military needs. 
With the loss of pre-war markets, an excess of productive capacity over demand in 
major industries, and secure profits from selling existing weaponry, industry had little 
incentive to promote military technical change. When it did occur, change was 
incremental, based on the lowest risk options utilising existing production resources that 
could also be sold to defined military markets. 
5.3 	Social Environment 
Although much has been written on the social dimensions to technological development, 
this section seeks to identify the chief areas where the social environment impacted on 
technical developments. Rather than make unsubstantiated generalizations, the 
significance of these areas will often not be fully apparent until the ensuing two chapters 
examine these areas in the specific context of an innovation. 
A study of the Civil War social environment within which technology change was 
occurring can illuminate how society influenced technical innovations and was itself in 
turn affected by these changes.(140) 
(A) 	Societal Attitudes 
Societal attitudes play an important role, not only in promoting specific innovations but 
in generally producing an environment where technological change may be encouraged. 
Prior to the Civil War, American history had emphasised the practical know-how 
approach to technological change.(141) The emphasis on inventions and inventors had 
usually encouraged social attitudes to applaud entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial 
abilities.(142) By the mid-1800s these attitudes had become in America, a distinct 
quality of "machine consciousness ".(143) 
Entering the Civil War, American society generally had a favourable attitude towards 
innovation, industrial expansion, practical skills, and engineering of ingenious 
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mechanical devices. Although it was not always expressed in terms of demand for new 
products, society did sustain the development and use of new technical products. 
The burgeoning industrial revolution through the 1840s and 1850s produced 
technological change with particular characteristics: either discrete changes to 
technology that produced a novel innovation without apparent antecedents or 
numerous small alterations to existing technology that provided a cumulative basis for 
wider technological change.(144) 
How the economy affected military technological development, has been plagued by 
unresolved debates. It has been suggested that consumer demand was from 1857 until 
1865 one of the major instigators of business development. As well as satisfying 
consumer demand in the North, developments in soap, kerosene, clothing, and mass-
produced products were also utilised by the military. Although no one denies that the 
war stimulated different business opportunities,(145) the role societal factors played in 
sustaining production is far from clear.(146) 
What is ascertainable is that through the war, the North and South evolved industrial 
systems that were diametrically opposed. Denis Brogan has suggested that the Civil 
War was an economic conflict between different economic systems.(147) If this is so, 
then the industrial-based Northern society was victor over the agrarian South., Yet 
while the North attained superiority through often-dubious industrial developments, 
the South never possessed the infrastructure, resources, or capacity, to sustain a Nv a r 
that from 1863 was a war of attrition. 
While consumer demand may have increased Northern industries' profits and sustained 
other product development, it cannot be upheld that different social attitudes markedly 
influenced the course of military technical change or precipitated the level of 
industrialisation necessary to win the war. 
(B) 	The Role of Science 
One of the major factors influencing military technical change spawned by social 
attitudes is science. Society in America had always encouraged applied sciences, which 
not only confirmed the importance of science in society, but encouraged its role in 
everyday technological developments.(148) 
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The Civil War saw the role of science leap ahead. Governments came to realise its 
importance not only in social development but in the war itself.(149) The promotion of 
practical research and the trial-and-error pragmatic way of innovation were further 
expanded by the recognition of the role science could play in sustaining the 
technological developments associated with the new industrial age. 
The incorporation into societal attitudes and actions of scientific development, 
introduced an important phase of history. During this period, which ended with the 
First World War, there arose an awareness of the need for individual efforts to be co-
ordinated and for practical or applied research to be backed with pure research efforts. 
What the Civil War period introduced into American history was a period where "big 
science" (150) could be seen to expand on the research and development previous 
generations had created. This phase of science is noted for feeding off the scientific 
revolution, so broadening the industrial revolution and forever removing innovation 
from being the precinct only of entrepreneurial technologists.(151) 
Science played an important role in the Civil War. It increased technical effort and 
gave an insight into how important discoveries in pure research were in expanding 
applied research work. Through the actions of individuals in the National Academy of 
Sciences, Northern technological development was systematically exposed to new ideas 
in photography, navigation, armour on ironclads, ballistics, explosives, and other areas 
of endeavour. 
The role of science in Civil War technological change was encouraged by social attitudes 
that supported development. Despite understanding of the role of science still being at a 
very embryonic stage, by the war's end, science was positively addressing technical 
problems facing innovations. 
(C) 	Labour 
The development of the "machine consciousness" in nineteenth century America can 
largely be attributed to industry's search for labour-saving devices. Corresponding 
with the drive to save labour was the emergence of a factory system which adopted 
mechanised production as a means of overcoming shortages in labour and pushing 
down high wages.(152) 
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The Civil War caused further tightening of the labour market as labourers became 
soldiers. Industry was forced to try and attract labour away from agriculture and 
competing industrial sectors by offering higher wages.(153) This resulted in price 
increases to offset wage costs and produced an inflexible labour market where labour 
lacked inter-sectorial mobility and had a narrow skill level, and where workers' 
militant bargaining power was conflrmed.(1541) 
Attempts to circumvent these problems greatly promoted industrial innovation. 
Mechanisation increased capital intensity in industry,(155) which in turn made surplus 
capital from profits available, for release into expanding industries. This is often 
considered as the impetus behind what W W Rostow calls the "take-off" point in 
American economic development. 
The capital generated after the mechanisation spurred growth of 1850 to 1857, was 
mostly held in savings during the subsequent 1857 to 1860 recession. When the railways 
and transport industries began to boom, the saved capital was fed into an American 
business resurgence.(156) 
Labour shortages accelerated the introduction of steam-driven machinery such as 
machine tools into the small-arms industry and the Arkwright waterframe and sewing 
machines into the textile industry. Conversely, however, where labour existed in some 
numbers and a diffusion of capital could proceed at a constant wage, there: 
... was no inducement to replace existing equipment unless the new 
equipment yielded a higher rate of profit on the value of the old and new 
machinery together.(157) 
This helps explain why some excellent innovations that were capable of radically 
altering Civil War production, like the Bessemer conversion process, never replaced 
older less technically advanced machinery. 
Another influence upon industry was through management. Both as a part of 
industry's labour force and as a controlling influence over labour, the essential 
inadequacies of Civil War management deeply affected technical advances. 
Management during the war generally failed to comprehend technical innovation. It 
lacked both the ability to assess innovations and to put forward the benefits of 
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technological ideas. Coupled with this failing was a lack of understanding of how 
innovation could assist a company to achieve its goals and objectives. 
Managers lacked the concept of market competition to help determine how they 
introduced structural changes and personnel policies, or utilised machinery to gain 
maximum returns. Yet there were enough corporate exceptions in the Civil War era, to 
indicate that management techniques were changing. Railroad companies began to 
produce skilled, well educated managers, while companies such as Du Pont and 
Winchester were able to use technological development to become leaders in newly 
created markets.(158) 
Lack of innovative spirit in management and the existence of labour constraints meant 
there was little support for industrial innovation during the Civil War, so industrial 
innovation was either limited to a few select, forward-looking companies with 
guaranteed profits or to improvements induced by the expansion of the machine-tool 
industry. The net impact on military technical innovation was mostly felt in the 
production technology used by small-arms companies and in the limitation of extensive 
development and production changes to commercially viable technology. 
(D) 	Individuals and the Civil War 
The conduct of warfare in one's own territory greatly affects all of society and very few 
Americans could escape the impact the American Civil War produced. The South was, 
in particular, to have the scars of the war left on all its citizenry. The blockade of the 
South, the strategic importance of townships, the continuous attempts to produce the 
materials of war, the supply of front-line needs, and the guerilla war conducted by both 
sides, removed the clear line between soldiers and citizens. 
The struggle confirmed the economic and geopolitical divisions between North and 
South. The Confederacy was proud of its agricultural heritage and its martial 
prowess.(159) In the North, the industrial age and the drive for broader personal 
horizons lent a framework to a diversity of cultures and people. Neither side, though, 
could have been prepared for the long martial struggle or the attrition of men, material 
and societies that the destruction of ante-bellum society would bring.(160) 
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The Southern armies mobilized some 1,200,000 white men into service and experienced 
some 350,000 casualties.(161) When one considers that the population of the south was 
only some 5,500,000 whites and 3,500,000 blacks in eleven states, then the impact of the 
war can be appreciated.(162) As fierce as the political passions ran, the North never 
could produce as systematic a level of conscription. 
Thus while the Confederates conscripted their men to fight for a cause that 
paradoxically was to preserve states' and individual's rights from centralised 
government,(163) the North met these forces only with some 2,100,000 men.(164) This 
included men counted separately for each re-enrolment, re-enlisted wounded and 
discrepancies in records and official lists. This was from a Northern population which 
had about 22 million whites and 500,000 blacks.(165) 
The North had the capacity to draw from at least three times the number of 
Confederate men of military age in the 15-40 age group.(166) These resources were 
never fully drawn on as many Northern males felt no compulsion to join the armed 
struggle. This was despite powerful opinions in favour of the war, such as that of 
General W T Sherman who believed that: 
...in 1861-5 we fought a holy war, with absolute right on our side, with pure 
patriotism, with reasonable skill, and that we achieved a result which 
enabled the United States of America to resume her glorious career in the 
interests of all mankind...(167) 
Such opinions seem to differ from those who rioted in the Draft Riots of July 1863.(168) 
There were a swift and violent reactions against the "Act for Enrolling and Calling Out 
the National Forces, and for Other Purposes" and the appointment of an Enrolment 
Board in March 1863. 
Many soldiers were also mercenaries, or men who were paid by draftees to fight in their 
stead. "Patriots" were earning nearly $300 for three-year enlistments.(169) This only 
matched what agricultural and industrial workers could hope to earn in the same 
period of employment. 
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Some of the developments affecting individuals were to have even more profound 
influences. The use of new technology such as railroads and the telegraph brought 
people closer to the war, which had a notable effect. Despite the consolidation of 
statesmens' and generals' roles, Civil War military leaders were plagued by political 
interference. Soldiers were, therefore, in many ways evolving as politicians' chess 
pieces, rather than the generals'.(170) 
As control could be exerted over far—flung battlefields, the distinction between executive 
power and military initiatives became blurred. For soldiers, and later for American 
society as these soldiers returned to their normal lives, there was born a deep mistrust 
of executive control of strategy for political rather than tactical goals. 
As wounded returned home, as the press published the horror and euphoria of warfare 
only hours after it occurred, American society was forced to confront the legacies of this 
destructive war. It was not just soldiers, sailors, negroes and politicians who were 
involved in the war. Any examination of the quantity of literature on the Civil War 
shows that the profound impact of the war reverberated through American history. 
The result of such fundamental changes was important for the way the technological 
environment evolved. In the North, the confused attitude to the war produced a stifling 
environment. Those seeking to direct manpower, financial resources, and technical 
development towards maximum war effort were confronted with a society not totally 
convinced that such reactions were desirable. 
Individual labourers, industrialists, politicians, and other fortunate people were often 
advantaged by the war.(171) Their rewards only served to taint the loss and sacrifice 
made by soldiers at the front. Put simply, Northern society was confused over the merit 
of the armed struggle. 
Unlike the North, Southeners were more likely to perceive themselves as fighting for 
survival. Most soldiers and citizens were faced with hardships, and few could not see 
the necessity for using all available weapons to assist their cause. Thus was born a spirit 
of co—operation and joint support that spawned ingenuity and desperate efforts to 
promote military innovation. Despite the trials and challenges to the spirit of 
confederation, individuals in the south did strive to overcome the perceived aggression 
of the Union. 
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In the South, individual attitudes saw the war as a forlorn struggle against impossible 
odds. In such an environment, military technical innovation offered some hope. In the 
North the war increasingly became a hopeless moral dilemma that technical innovation 
in military technology was often perceived to be reinforcing. 
(E) 	Economic Conditions 
Economic factors affected the social environment and were intrinsically a part of that 
environment. It is because of this confusing duplicity that a study of economic 
conditions in the Civil War is very challenging.(172) Opinions on the topic vary greatly. 
Therefore, this section will simply outline the important points relating to the factors of 
production, structural supports, and techniques that affected the acceptance or 
technology.(173) 
Innovation in products and processes had throughout the course of the war increasingly 
influenced the adaptation and adjustment in capital goods industries as well as helping 
to create new technical requirements. These alterations influenced the factors of 
production available to other industries. For instance, the small-arms industry was: 
...instrumental in the development of the whole array of tools and accessories 
upon which large scale production of precision metal parts is dependent; jigs 
(originally employed for drilling and hand filling), fixtures, taps and gauges, 
and systematic development of die-forging techniques.(174) 
In the agricultural industry and in transport, wartime growth and prosperity resulted 
in a reduction in prices that stimulated improvements in equipment.(175) 
In the flow-on from technical changes, some industries lacked the structural integrity to 
reinforce their activities and expand their prosperity. This structural inflexibility, 
therefore, also created an economic system that only slowly geared up to exploit 
business opportunity. 
The period of economic growth, prior to the realization of opportunity, is also marked 
as a period where technical gestation was occurring. 
After an innovation had been developed, but before it was produced, a business's ability 
to profit from resulting opportunities affected the future course technical development 
172.O'Brien, Economic Effects (1988:9); & C. Goldin & F. Lewis, "The Economic Cost of 
the American Civil War: Estimates & Implications", The Journal of Economic History  
(Vol.35, June 1975:299-326) 
173.Rosenberg, Technology and American Economic Growth (1972:60) 
174.Filch Quoted in Rosenberg, "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry l 840- 
1910" (1963:427-428) 
175.Fite, Social & Industrial Conditions (1963:77) 
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might take.(176) It was in this developmental stage that business realized the economic 
potential, of exploiting an innovation that could often reshape technological change. 
Economic adjustments in the Civil War were occurring in a manner that reflected this 
gestation scenario. In the railroad industry, expansion was inducing adjustments as 
capital expansion stimulated ancillary industry development. Reduced transport costs, 
the development of corporate organisations, and the relocation of economic activities, all 
mark the growth of the economic importance of the railroads. (177) 
Similarly, it is possible to establish that the ASM was laying the groundwork and 
sustaining conditions for industrial growth.(178) In the small-arms industry and in the 
industries that had slack productive capacity or new capacity created by the Civil War, 
these conditions induced economic expansion.(179) 
The effect of economic conditions upon society was to encourage the use of new 
techniques to produce both old and new products. Nevertheless, there existed a lag 
between technical changes and vital economic and institutional supports necessary to 
immediately exploit technical changes. By the war's end, these economic factors had 
been realised and their reciprocal impact on the environment was established. 
5.4 	Military Technological Change as an Environmental Function 
The prevailing general environmental factors surrounding Civil War military 
technological change were not wholly supportive of innovative efforts or their rapid 
adoption. 
Government could neither control. nor understand what was happening, not having 
already understood technological risks and ways of making the new happen, and so it 
took the much greater risk of being surprised by what did happen. It was surprised by 
war demands for weapons and had to satisfy these short-term needs with the available 
low-risk technology. 
However, the environment for military technological change was by no means totally 
unsupportive. The increased influence of central government and the existing industrial 
factors certainly influenced innovative efforts. Likewise, the prevailing social attitudes 
and the effect war produced on individuals generally was not antagonistic to 
technological change. The largest single problem facing expansion of military 
176.Rosenberg, "Technological Change in the Machine Tool Industry 1840-1910" 
(1963:420) 
177.North (et al), Growth & Welfare (1983:101) 
178.Sawyer, "The Social Basis of the American System of Manufacturing' (1954:379) 
179.Engerman, "Economic Impact" (1966:180 & 184) 
131 
innovation was that there existed no formalised general framework within which to 
encourage specific innovations. 
Government did produce cogent general policies that could assist military technical 
innovations. Intervention by way of public enterprises, patents, contractual 
procurement, and limited scientific assistance did provide more co—ordination of 
technical endeavours. Industry also attempted to promote innovations that were 
commercially viable. By 1863, in both the North and South, the general society was 
struggling under the moral and economic burden imposed by a war that seemed to have 
no 'noble' end. 
Environmental factors, with some exceptions, seem to have generally been unable to 
positively influence the creation of institutional and attitudinal supports, necessary to 
nurture military innovation. 
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CHAPTER 6: ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON 
MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
Whilst this thesis has identified key technical changes, and sought to link technical and 
non-technical factors together in the study of technology, the study is still far from 
complete. The study of general environmental conditions has not fully explored the 
particular conditions that influenced the administration of military technological 
change. To cover this omission it is necessary to study those institutional factors that 
constrain innovation. 
As we have seen in the last chapter, industrial effort was isolated by the philosophy of 
laissez faire. There was an absence of a co-ordinated innovation process linked through 
political control to military needs. At the beginning of the war the North was almost 
totally devoid of any existing governmental framework by which to sponsor military 
technological development, let alone identify and promote those innovations that would 
become necessary during a future conflict. The adoption of military technology was, 
therefore, left to those whose interests the innovations were supposed to serve: the 
military organizations. 
Simply to indicate that the environmental constraints added to the malaise of military 
technological development, in no way assists our understanding of the specific factors 
that inhibited military bureaucrats' adoption of new technology. We have not for 
instance addressed why the North was better able to adopt new technology after 1863, 
but did not deploy innovations in times of critical need prior to that date. 
As greater numbers of new weapons were introduced into military arsenals, they not 
only transformed warfare, they also challenged traditional thoughts and practices.(1) 
The USS Monitor, CSS Merrimac, the Henry repeating rifle, the Gatling Gun, and 
torpedo related technology, all clearly demonstrated their potential as military tools. 
Yet there arose problems with administrative delays in the assessment of the role these 
new technologies could have in the war. 
It is the aim of this chapter to more fully comprehend the organizational problems and 
administrative factors that collectively served to hinder the nurturing of wartime 
innovations. The study will concentrate on the Northern administration but will look at 
the South to highlight important differences. 
1. P.J. Parish, The American Civil War (London, Eyre Methuen, 1975:129) 
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6.1 	Indicators of Malaise 
At the outbreak of the American Civil War there were few advances in 'military 
technology despite the significant developments instigated by the on-going industrial 
revolution. Considering that the industrial revolution was well established by 1861, and 
there occurred a myriad of military technological changes during the Civil War period, 
why is there such debate over the inability of Civil War technologists to further extend 
the lessons derived from existing technological advances? 
After their defeat at the first battle of Bull Run early in the war, the North was 
confronted with the fact that the war was not going to be resolved quickly. Far from 
mobilizing its industrial resources to produce future military tools, the Union was 
struggling to provide an adequate administrative framework for co-ordinating the war 
effort. The creation of an effective structure for mobilizing men and arming them 
preoccupied the military and civil bureaucrats of 1861.(2) Even in today's terms an 
attempt to immediately increase a standing army tenfold, would raise enormous 
problems. Within the existing infrastructure and wide administrative expanse of 
America in 1861, the task was indeed formidable. (3) 
The administration of the Civil War progressed through a confused adolescence until 
1863.(4) In both the North and the South many of the components necessary to build an 
effective war administration existed, but these were sketchy and designed for a US 
Army of 16,000, not the mass armies of the Civil War.(5) Growth to any semblance of 
consolidated control was slow and inadequacies in organizational practices soon became 
evident. 
Despite the administrative inefficiencies on both warring sides, the opposing War and 
Naval Departments were headed by strong, skilled individuals. These included 
Secretaries such as Gideon Wells in the US Navy Department, Edward Stanton in the 
US War Department, Salmon Chase in the US Treasury, and their counterparts; 
Stephen Mallory of the CS Navy Department, James Seddon of the CS War 
Department, and Christopher Memminger, Secretary of the CS Treasury. These men 
were responsible for co-ordinating administrative changes that were from 1863 to 
2. J.G. Nicolay & J. Hay, "Abraham Lincoln: A History. The Call to Arms", The Century  
Magazine, (Vol.35[5], March 1888:721); & J.M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War 
& Reconstruction (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1982:181) 
3. A. Nevins "1861: A Primitive Administration" in W.R. Brock (ed), The Civil War (New 




create organisations totally different from the agencies that served their apprenticeships 
in 1861.(6) 
Even with the evolution in administrative practices, the large war organisations became 
unwieldy morasses of bureaucratic practices. The urgency of wartime administration 
compounded the incapacity of organisational designs or management to control the 
operations of these new bodies. In particular, the War Department of the North, while 
concentrating on running land conflict, was not able to properly conduct other 
important operations. 
One of the Northern War Department's fundamental mistakes was its failure to co-
ordinate changes to military technology.(7) Holding the greater industrial base, with a 
capacity to undertake military technical development, the War Department in the 
North failed to create the necessary institutional supports for innovative endeavour. 
In the South the War Department's inability to control military innovative effort 
accentuated problems with managing the allocation of scarce resources.(8) 
Ludweil Johnson summarised the malaise in military administration of new technology 
when he wrote: 
In the welter of conflicting pressure groups and political factions it was 
indeed difficult for the Federal government to bring to bear its enormous 
material and numerical supremacy. Therein lies the key to the great 
mystery of the war, which is not only why the South lost but why the North 
took so long to win.(9) 
6.2 	Exploitation of Innovations by Northern Military 
Organisations 
For the duration of the Civil War it was left to the individual military organisations to 
promote military technical innovation to the best of their ability. Regardless of a new 
weapons' potential, the degree of political patronage, or its synergy with existing arms 
and tactics, its fate more often than not depended more on the organization's 
administrative ability than the weapon's potential.(10) 
It is possible to identify how the different administration of new technology by Northern 
military organizations affected the deployment of technology. The Ordnance Bureau 
6. IBID:146 
7. F.A. Shannon, The Organization & Administration of the Union Army  (Vol.1) 
(Massachusetts, Peter Smith, 1965:108) 
8. IBID:108 
9. Johnson, "Civil War Military History" (1971:130) 
10. D.A. Armstrong identifies bureaucracy as playing a the critical role in introducing new 
weapons into military doctrine, Bullets & Bureaucrats (Westport, Greenwood Press, 
1982:xiv) 
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will be examined to highlight the resistance to innovations from those within the bureau. 
An examination of the Quartermaster Department, in particular, will be used to identify 
the wider implications of why a powerful organization with its established priorities 
could prevent the adoption or administration of new technology. This example will 
extend into an examination of the Military Railroad Department, the Signals Corps, 
Military Telegraph Corps, and Balloon Corps. These agencies were specifically given 
the responsibility to administer new technology. The success of their operations was 
particularly dependant on the support of established military organizations such as the 
Quartermaster's Department. 
An examination of the Medical Department and the Corps of Engineers will also be 
made in order to discover how more established military organizations were able to 
meet wartime operational needs whilst responding to innovations that would improve 
the performance of the Corps' core function. 
A study of the United States Ordnance Bureau (USOB) is perhaps the best starting 
point for a discussion of the administration's ability to exploit innovations. The USOB 
and its Chief from 23 April 1861 until 15 September 1863, Colonel (later Brigadier 
General) James W Ripley, have inspired much academic ridicule for their failure to 
adopt new weapons.(11) 
Much blame has been laid at General Ripley's feet for his failure to understand the 
importance of new technology, and furthermore for his failure to adopt innovations at a 
greater pace. This criticism of Ripley encompass details that illustrate the importance 
of understanding military technological change as a wider environmental function. 
The plethora of small arms designs being produced in limited quantities, and then 
forced on the US Army, confirmed for the Union Generals that the USOB testing and 
introduction program was being circumvented. For field commanders their worst fear 
came not from having to field test weapons of unknown reliability, but without 
standardized calibre or performance bench—marks, unsatisfactory weapons were being 
put into production and issued to troops. This meant that not only were most 
innovations occurring without consideration of the existing technology in service, but 
there was no regard given for their ultimate technical merit as combat weapons.(12) 
11.. W.R. Brock, Conflict & Transformation: The United States 1844-1877 (London, 
Penguin, 1978:285) 
12. W. Ripley, Artillery & Ammunition of the Civil War  (New York, Van Nostrancl 
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Coggins wrote that throughout the war: 
It is hard to understand why the Federal Government never made a 
determined effort to arm the troops with breech-loaders. There was no 
question as to their effectiveness, and the men were so anxious to have them 
that in many cases, companies would save their small pay and purchase the 
arms themselves.(13) 
Such strict analysis of the physical technologies has perpetuated perplexing questions 
about why the BLR technological change was frustrated. However, these questions 
should be understood in the context of the conditions actually confronting the USOB at 
the beginning of the Civil War. 
When on 15 April 1861 President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers, he far surpassed 
the existing pre-war army of 16,000 soldiers or the army of 21,000 raised for the 
Mexican War of 1846 to 1848.(14) As the army grew from 1861 until the war's end, 
problems of organising and equipping these men became more acute.(15) These 
problems dominated attempts to build an Ordnance Bureau that could cope with the 
wartime demands placed on it. 
The expansion in the army was matched by only very minor growth in Ordnance 
Bureau personnel, and a hopelessly inadequate growth in resources. The breech-
loading arms were clearly superior to muzzle-loaders for infantry operations, especially 
the cavalry.(16) Given that General Ripley as Chief of the USOB was personally 
responsible for arming the largest army ever assembled in the industrial age, the 
introduction of a number of different types of BLR represented an uncertain option. 
These weapons were also at least a third more expensive than the Springfield 1855 
Model, had a variety of ammunition types and calibres, unproven capacity for 
machined interchangeable parts (in an age when this was considered a great technical 
achievement), and questionable production schedules run by private entrepreneurs. On 
existing tactical requirements these weapons were considered unsatisfactory to use with 
a bayonet attached, were too heavy, and encouraged too much ammunition wastage.(17) 
The immense small-arms shortfall at the beginning of the war override any other 
pressing arms-problems affecting the Union forces. Despite the availability of local 
manufacturing, the Northern government, through the Ordnance Bureau, sent agents 
overseas to purchase weapons. By 30 June 1862, 738,000 overseas muskets and rifles 
13. J. Coggins, Arms & Equipment of the Civil War (New York, Double Day, 1962:28) 
14. Nicolay & Hay, "Abraham Lincoln" (March 1888:721) 
15. IBID:721 
16. J.M. McPherson, Ordeal By_fi e: The Civil War 8 Reconstruction(New York, Alfred A. 
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had been purchased.(18) Government enterprises and contracts in the same period 
concentrated on the production of Springfield percussion muzzle—loaders. At a cost of 
only 16 dollars from a government factory and 20 dollars from a private firm the 
Springfield was a tried, cheap, and reliable weapon.(19) 
The Union's complete failure to promote breech—loaders despite their obvious potential 
is still difficult to comprehend. It seems certain that General Ripley was deeply 
committed to the Model 1855 Springfield MLR and considered it superior to breech-
loaders. 
As he had sat on the committee responsible for its design and introduction in 1855, 
General Ripley was biased towards the Springfield. Yet his dislike for rifled arms, and 
in particular, his reluctance to adopt breech—loaders, goes much deeper. He was 
already confronted with the problem of having to provide enormous amounts of 
ammunition for the 0.58 calibre Springfield, to which was added the immense confusion 
of calibres as the foreign weapons reached the troops. Breech—loaders and repeating 
rifles exacerbated existing administrative problems.(20) 
General Ripley himself best describes his position: 
A great evil now specially prevalent in regard to arms for the military 
service is the vast variety of the new inventions, each having, of course, its 
advocates, insisting on the superiority of his favourite arm over all others 
and urging its adoption by the Government. The influence these exercised 
has already introduced into the service many kinds and calibres of arms, 
some, in my opinion, unfit for use as military weapons, and none as good as 
the US Musket [1855 Springfield], producing confusion in the manufacture, 
the issue, and the use of ammunition, and very injurious to the efficiency of 
troops. This evil can only be stopped by positively refusing to answer any 
requisitions for or propositions to sell new and untried arms, and steadily 
adhering to the rule of uniformity of arms for all troops of the same kind, 
such as cavalry, artillery,infantry.(21) 
The modern critics who have often labelled him "Ripley Van Winkle", should consider 
this statement from General Ripley. His actions imposed limitations on the introduction 
of arms that would have added to the declining ability of the USOB to standardize not 
only ammunition but also interchangeable parts between arms. 
Wary of poor designs, the USOB felt that the adoption of tough standards would 
restrict the introduction of BLR designs. Opposition to the Henry repeating rifle was 
18. Shannon, Organization & Administration (1965:118) 
19. IBED:120 
20. National Rifle Association of America, Civil War Small Arms, (Washington, NRAA, 
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21. Ripley July 1.1, 1861 quoted in Bruce, Lincoln & the Tools of War  (1973:69), emphasis 
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focussed on the claims that it fired too much ammunition and had too many moving 
parts. The design certainly proved to be unnecessarily prone to stress breakage of 
delicately machined parts, and the ammunition held in a magazine under the barrel was 
exposed to potentially dangerous hard knocks.(22) 
Under General Ripley the Ordnance Bureau felt vindicated in its belief that all weapons 
should be of a robust design, should take a standard bayonet, and conform to the 0.58 
calibre type muzzle-loading ammunition. The Ordnance Bureau was thus able to 
prevent the diversion of its war effort towards innovative designs that were both 
expensive and more difficult for untrained soldiers to use.(23) These attitudes were 
further consolidated by a USOB wartime philosophy that saw the private production of 
all designs other than the Springfield as only 'stop-gap' measures until the government 
armories could meet military demand.(24) 
General Ripley confronted the confusion over arms introduction by belligerently 
refusing to consider any innovative designs. It was not until, by the order of President 
Lincoln, he was replaced by General George D Ramsay that new designs received more 
balanced consideration.(25) The new Ordnance Bureau direction from September 1863 
came to reflect Ramsay's belief that: 
Repeating arms are the greatest favourite in the Army and could they be 
supplied in quantities to meet all requisitions, I am sure no other arm would 
be used. (26) 
Despite Ripley's fervent adherence to his decision to deny small-arms technological 
change, the impact of these new weapons in the war was considerable.(27) Soldiers and 
officers alike, State regiments, and whole troops of cavalry, had by official or unofficial 
means secured breech-loading and repeating rifles.(28) 
The administrative reforms of 1863 reflected an acceptance of the importance small- 
arms innovations had in the conduct of the war. Once reformed, the organisation 
became responsible for introducing the very designs that the earlier Ordnance Bureau 
22. F. Wilkinson, The World's Great Guns (London, Hamlyn, 1973:173) 
23. C.E. Fuller & R.D. Steuart, Firearms of the Confederacy (West Virginia, Standard, 
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had only reluctantly adopted or had rejected.(29) 	By 1863, then, small-arms 
technology changes had been consolidated through the co-ordination of innovative 
effort in areas where wartime experience had suggested greatest promise. 
The year 1864 saw the introduction of 33,657 repeating rifles, mostly of the combat tried 
Spencer design, and 15,051 single shot breech-loaders using copper self-contained 
ammunition. Orders were also placed for 78,100 repeating rifles and 11,850 more 
breech-loading rifles to be supplied by August 1865.(30) Not only was industrial 
production stimulated but innovative endeavour became concentrated upon a few of the 
best designs. 
In retrospect we can see that the significant benefit of these innovations defied the dire 
predictions of General Ripley, yet they did not destroy the system he had sought to 
preserve; in 1866 the US Army stopped issuing repeating rifles. Instead the government 
concentrated on producing a BLR version of the Springfield Model 1855 within their 
armories.(31) 
While the USOB appears to be an inhibitor of technological change because of its 
administrative decisions, not all US Army Corps were able to recognize the potential of 
some innovations. Other Corps had no capacity to promote military technological 
change because important discoveries in scientific and technical knowledge were still 
unknown during the war. The examination of the US Army Medical Corps supports 
this later situation, while the Quartermaster Corps is an interesting contrast in its 
wartime failure to promote technology with military applications. 
Faced with massive numbers of casualties, disease, wounds and the inadequacy of 
medical knowledge, the whole practice of medical care came under review.(32) The 
need for medical reform was accelerated by the war; devastating diseases, the impact 
new weapons had on massed armies, and the need to quickly remove wounded to 
hospitals, all instigated change.(33) 
In the introduction of medical technological change, the USAMC had a clear charter to 
amend the desperately inadequate medical system. Unfortunately, the USAIVIC had 
only limited success in promoting new technology. During the war contemporary 
29. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats (1982:42) 	• 
30. Shannon, Organization & Administration (1965:141) • 
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medicine was given a prime opportunity to apply new techniques, and for amending 
formerly inviolable traditional practices that could not handle wounds inflicted on the 
battlefield. 
The institutions set up during the war to initiate these reforms were the US Medical 
Department and the Sanitary Commission. The US Navy also maintained medical staff 
to treat its wounded.(34) All organizations were successful in introducing gradual 
improvements to pre—war medical practices, but no significant advances were made 
through the military's use of medical technology or scientific knowledge. 
The ability of these organisations to promote medical reform through technical 
development was limited. Improvements in the treatment of battlefield wounded were 
mostly restricted to provision of ambulances, better hospitals, organised treatment, and 
minor improvements to surgical tools. Innovations in hygiene and sanitation were also 
mostly restricted to important improvements in existing tools and techniques. 
Changes to the treatment of battlefield wounded were influenced by a number of 
ancillary factors. As with the USOB, the organization had to firstly adapt in order to 
handle the unprecedented number of wartime casualties that overburdened medical 
facilities. Once they had adapted their services to meet the demands placed on them, 
the North and South were able to function in a competent manner. 
Although no precise figures of the numbers of wounded exist, at least 110,000 to 200,000 
soldiers died of wounds received in the war.(35) However, between 360,000 and 560,000 
soldiers died of other causes.(36) Of those who died of wounds, two trends are 
significant. Firstly, very few wounds were caused by bayonets, swords, or lances; 
secondly, most deaths occurred when massed formations attacked defended 
positions.(37) In some cases, when good defensive positions were attacked by infantry 
or cavalry, the attacking forces as shown in the war records lost up to seventy or even 
eighty per cent of their strength!(38) At this time 5 per cent was an average number of 
casualties and 40 per cent was considered extremely high. 
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The effect of these battlefield losses upon the USAMC was immediate and profound. 
Although in existence prior to the war, the USAMC was confronted with serious 
organisational limitations. The chief defect of the US Army's medical system was its 
early adherence to a strict regimental organisation.(39) This system was inflexible, and 
took no account of wider army needs. Confronted with its inability to control collection 
of a massive number of wounded, who needed prompt treatment, and given the 
rampant spread of disease, the Corps had to reorganise its services dramatically. 
By end of the war the efforts of Surgeon General William A Hammond and the Medical 
Director of the Potomac Army, Dr Jonathan Letterman, had succeeded in strengthening 
field hospital systems and introducing field ambulances to each Corps.(40) Advances in 
carriage design produced ambulances that could more efficiently remove the wounded 
to hospital, and hospitals were reorganised and rebuilt to facilitate the more streamlined 
treatment of patient. Copying the Southern example, the North devised a hierarchical 
system of field hospitals, clearing stations, regimental and later army hospitals, and 
general hospitals.(41) Innovations were built into a system that saw the use of railroad 
hospital trains; the division of hospitals into special functions, with general hospitals 
having wards to care for each class of injury; and increasingly better classification, 
treatment, and nursing care for patients.(42) 
The use of chloroform as an anaesthetic and morphine and opium as pain killers in 
operations became more extensive.(43) Neurological treatment and stomach and chest-
wounds treatment were all significantly improved during the war.(44) Despite these 
advances wartime medical officers were ignorant of germs, sepsis, and the proper use of 
antiseptics.(45) Many wounded were, therefore, tragically lost to post-operative 
infections even though better surgical tools and techniques were in use. Accentuating 
this was the USAMC's continued inability to rapidly transport wounded or perform 
interim surgery in 'field hospitals' because the risk of death from infection had not been 
overcome. Located close to the front these 'field hospitals' usually did not represent 
more than a tent with an overworked 'medical assistant' performing surgery on those 
unable to survive without immediate attention. 
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In the area of hygiene and sanitation, the story of military medicine had a more 
favourable conclusion although diseases such as typhoid, which claimed 35,000 
Northern soldiers; scurvy with 30,000 recorded cases; epidemic jaundice, with 70,000 
cases;(46) and other diseases like influenza, cholera, typhus, smallpox, and measles were 
the bane of contemporary soldiers. 
The remedy for the greatest killer of soldiers, disease, grew out of the British sanitary 
body instituted in the Crimean War and its concept of preventive medicine. The North 
formed a Sanitary Commission, which was able to actively participate in camp hygiene, 
the transportation of wounded, hospital staffing, and the administration of new medical 
ideas. Through their efforts, improved tents, clothing, clearing of camp grounds, 
methods of cooking food, and better diet were instituted in many army corps.(47) These 
duties were carried out despite constant opposition from the formally established 
Medical Department. 
Despite the volume of sick and wounded, and in spite of poor administration, innovation 
in practical areas was used to assist with ancillary reforms to the system of medical 
care. From this basis there evolved a more coherent medical system that improved the 
survival chances of a wounded soldier, and reduced the chances of the soldier falling ill 
to preventable diseases. 
The United States Quartermaster Corps (USQMC), like the USANIC, stands as an 
example of an organisation that had its pre—war administrative function extended 
during the war beyond any preceding level. Unlike the USAMC, the Quartermaster 
organisation was considered a major part of the War Department and a central part of 
military operations. While the administrators of medicine and ordnance matters 
struggled to handle increased workload and to secure the resources necessary to 
perform its function, the USQMC, as an established Corps, was always in a better 
position to secure scarce resources. 
The Chief of the USQMC, General Montgomery C Meigs, from 15 May 1861 until some 
twenty years later, had consolidated the organisation's military role and asserted its 
pre—eminent role in all high level military decisions.(48) 
Alone of all the military service corps, the USQMC was an organisation with a solid 
power base, a strong administrative network, and the autonomy necessary to introduce 
46. Joules, Doctors' View of War (1938:23,34 & 64) 
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military developments.(49) As one of the oldest and best established departments, 
USQMC had control of key functions such as provision of "quarters and transportation 
of the army; storage and transportation of all army supplies; army clothing; camp and 
garrison equipage; cavalry and artillery horses; fuel, forage and straw; material for 
bedding; and stationery." (50) 
Overall, however, the USQMC was more concerned with consolidating its own 
operations and directly exerted very little positive influence over military technological 
change. However, the loss of Meigs' support for innovation could prove decisive. With 
his position of power in the military hierarchy, and the important controlling function 
performed by the USQMC, Meigs could ensure a new technological entity was, or was 
not deployed effectively.(51) 
Unlike other service Corps that influenced technical changes by their adoption or 
rejection of a technological innovation, the USQMC was quite unique in its ability to 
produce far—reaching influences upon military technology. Rail use stands as an 
example of how endorsement by a powerful administrative body could further 
technology change. 
Under Meigs' authority the USQMC extended its influence into many areas that 
impacted on innovative effort. It assumed responsibility for operations of balloons, 
ambulances, rail rolling—stock, fixed telegraph lines, and many of the personnel 
attached to these and other corps. Meigs' capacity to influence the utilization of new 
technology also arose from his organization's capacity to determine relationships 
between rapacious businessmen trying to have their weapons procured, and the 
allocation of Government monies towards procurements.(52) 
Meigs extended his influence by vehemently opposing lengthy campaigns. Generals 
such as McClellan, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade who through indecision, reluctance to 
attack, or other weaknesses, kept armies in the field too long all suffered Meigs' 
wrath.(53) In particular Meigs was concerned that it cost $600,000 per day to supply 
McClellan, rather than the results that McClellan was achieving.(54) 
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As an organization the USQMC failed to encourage newer organizations that were set 
up to manage novel technological entities. With balloons, breech-loaders, the 
telegraph, and repeating rifles, all causing inter-service conflict, the USQMC saw 
innovations as disruptive.(55) Meigs used his authority and position of power to ensure 
that the introduction of these innovations did not undermine the USQMC's operations. 
The administration of new technologies - rail, the telegraph, and balloon technology - 
were all to suffer under the administrative yoke imposed by the powerful USQNIC 
Corps. 
New agencies set up to promote the more effective use of new technology were all too 
often seen by traditional administrative bodies as a challenge to their authority. For 
example, the administrative functions performed in the quartermaster operational area 
were challenged by the advent of new organizations such as the United States Military 
Railroad Department (USMRD). 
Establishment of the USMRD as a part of the War Department dated from 11 February 
1862,(56) resulted from the wartime need to control railroad resources. The idea was to 
organise rail as a military tool to assist field operations. Under the executive control of 
D C McCallum, the Department would secure "a high degree of co-operation between 
the government and the railroad" enterprises.(57) As well, it would be responsible for 
the "restoration, operation or distribution" of rail resources.(58) 
The lack of lines and the necessity to restrict the use of rolling-stock and rail usage 
caused fierce debates between military leaders in the field and those civilians appointed 
to control the running of rail operations.(59) Attempts had been made by the political 
executive in 10 November 1862 to increase the autonomy of the rail Department's 
operations by issuing a Presidential Order. E D Townsend, the Assistant Adjutant 
General, issued on behalf of the Secretary of the War Department, Edward Stanton, a 
general order seeking to prevent field commands from hindering USMRD official 
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duties. It ordered: 
...commanding officers of troops along the United States railroad will give all 
facilities to the officers of the roads, and the quartermasters, for unloading 
cars so as to prevent any delays ...commanding officers will be charged with 
guarding track... No officers, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with 
the running of cars as directed by the superintendent of the road.(60) 
To further facilitate the USMRD's difficult role, McCallum divided it into geographic 
divisions, and in 1863 the Department was consolidated into two parts, a Transport 
Corps and a Construction Corps.(61) This separation was not only a reflection of the 
importance of the USMRD's functions; it also enabled some 10,000 men on the eastern 
and western theatres of war to concentrate on management of rail rolling-stock use and 
the maintenance or repair of railroad lines respectively.(62) 
Major problems began to plague these bodies from 1863. Through the war there 
continued to be opposition between the civilian workers who formed the body of the 
USMRD and the regular army units. Although the leaders of the department were the 
only ones with the technical expertise to run railroads and construct railway lines, the 
authority of their honorary officers' rank was barely recognized by army officers. This 
situation further impaired the problems of co-ordination between the users of rail 
(soldiers) and the organisers of its proper functions (technicians). The conflict between 
Hermann Haupt, the leader of the Construction Corps (and officially a Major in the US 
Army), and General Pope in 1863 over the construction of lines and effective use of rail 
resources typified the problems of using new technology in military operations.(63) 
Despite the Presidential directives confirmation of the USMRD functions, Haupt, first 
with General Sturgis and later with Pope, could not overcome intransigent traditional 
military opinions. Through frustration Haupt was driven to resign on 14 September 
1863.(64) The Construction Corps' authority was continually being undermined by 
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regional military commanders. On 19 January 1864 NIcCallum felt compelled to report 
that: 
... the railroad organisation of this department as decidedly defective, and, as 
far as I have been able to discover, there is a lack of will directed energy and 
seeming want of ability to comprehend the magnitude of the 
undertaking.(65) 
Such comments reflect a number of problems confronting the USMRD. One of the 
most serious problems was that of administrative overlap. There was a serious lack of 
co—ordination between the Transport Corps role as controller of rail lines, the 
USQMD's role as controller of the rolling—stock, the Construction Corps role as 
railroad repairer under the direction of the USQMD, and the army as a user of the 
lines. There also existed opposing opinions as to whether the rail lines should have 
purely logistical functions, or function as troop movers as well.(66) 
From 1863 the progress in the use of rail in warfare was, however, still continuing. D C 
McCallum believed the use of rail as a military tool developed from an experiment with 
severe difficulties in 1861-62, to its peak as a successful reality in 1864 when it 
succeeded in supplying Sherman's army of 100,000 men and 60,000 animals with only a 
360—mile single track and limited rolling stock.(67) 
Confusion over its initial administration and control was to limit military exploitation of 
railroads through 1861 to 1863. There continued to be amazing efforts by the 
Construction Corps to devise new techniques to keep open or lay new lines; innovations 
in the use of rail for wounded; and moves to assist with tactical reinforcements. Yet the 
administrative confusion detracted from these innovative efforts. As the co—ordinated 
administration of the USMRD and the Construction Corps as part of the wider US 
Army organization improved, there occurred greater exploitation of rail as a military 
supply vehicle from 1863. 
One of the advantages of having rail technology administered by a new military 
department was the inclusion of personnel with specific technical knowledge. This 
invariably made organizations set up to administer new technology more ready to 
instigate innovations that would enhance their own functions. 
New technology, despite having a body created to specifically encourage its known 
advantages, was evidently restricted by the wartime institutional environment. This can 
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be confirmed by an analysis of the wartime management of the United States Signal 
Corps (USSC). 
Despite the speed with which the telegraph became a tool of the military in the Civil 
War, its full potential was never realised. So although the military progressed through 
a number of organisational changes, they never facilitated proper use of the telegraph 
as a medium for military communication. 
The USSC was formed as part of the Adjutant General's Department in October 1861. 
It was not until official reorganisation in March 1863 that the Corps received a semi-
autonomous role in the military establishment. Even so, from October to November 
1863 the USSC was loosely consolidated into an organised Signal Corps and a Military 
Telegraph Corps.(68) 
By 3 March 1863 the two bodies had evolved with the Signal Corps having some 300 
officers and 2,500 men under the command of Major A J Myer.(69) IVIyer's command 
dealt solely with visual field communications (flag, rocket flares, torches, and mirrors) 
and mobile field (tactical) telegraph systems. The Military Telegraph Corps under 
(Colonel) Anson Stager and (Major) Thomas J Eckert, with some 1,000-1,500 
operators,(70) was attached to the USQMC and dealt with (strategic) electric telegraph 
material: the Beardslee and fixed lines. A third organisation can be nominally included. 
This was the Secret Service which handled the collection and transmission of cyphers 
and covert information. 
Although military operators were given priority on all electric telegraph lines from 26 
February 1862, the effectiveness with which these lines were used never attained their 
potential. The splitting of the USSC into two separate bodies did not remove the 
problems inherent in the administration of communications technology. Two major 
problems plagued the effective use of the electric telegraph. In the first place, there 
existed rivalry about which organisation should control telegraph resources. Myer 
wanted to control all telegraph operations on the battlefield and bring the 
communication system under the "compulsion and control" of the field 
commanders.(71) The other problem was between the civilian operators and their 
officers. This was the division between those who possessed the technical expertise to 
use the new technology, and opposition from the established military hierarchy which 
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found voice through the USQMC's desire to maintain control over the operation of 
fixed telegraph lines. 
The 1863 splitting of the USSC to create a specific telegraph body not only served to 
accentuate the problems of co-ordination but effectively split the administration over 
signal operation.(72) By including the Signal Corps in the military hierarchy, it became 
subject to the politics of the system. As the personnel were still mostly of civilian origin 
(either enlisted or paid to work for the army) and the commanding officers lacked 
recognized status in the administration, the unit quickly got lost in the convulsions of 
Union military administrative problems. By November 1863 the Secretary of War E. 
Stanton decided to replace Myer because of his resistance to the reorganization. 
The Telegraph Corps, on the other hand, was immediately isolated by the predatory 
USQMC which had already established its jurisdiction over fixed telegraph lines. 
Ultimate strategic control over telegraph operations fell into the hands of an older-style 
military body, that had its functions predetermined by officers with wider concerns. As 
the USQMC offered greater protection from antagonists, some benefits were derived 
from these arrangements. Even greater benefits could have been gained had the 
USQMC a desire to permit the USMTC to operate autonomously. However, it 
maintained the Corps' operations with a minimum of encouragement and left its civilian 
operators to function without complete military support. They permitted this out of the 
benevolent belief that the USMTC served some useful purpose, while believing it had no 
long-term future that would last beyond the end of the war.(73) 
Despite the fact that the efficiency of telegraph communications was totally reliant upon 
the core of trained personnel provided by railroad companies, civilian personnel and 
their civilian commanders held only temporary officer status. This effectively made 
them subordinate to all senior army officers and their delegates. 
The civilian operators were responsible for the improved technical efficiency of the 
telegraph system, and they enabled the potential of the field telegraph system and its 
technical development to be expanded. Nevertheless, the position of civilian operators 
was very unsatisfactory. As Plum recorded: 
More complaint has been uttered by telegraphers on account of their 
anomalous position in the service, and its consequent evils, than all other 
causes united.(74) 
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The operators were subject to the burdens imposed by increased reliance on the 
telegraph system and were often blamed for inadequacies in the communication links. 
Often undertrained and without extensive telegraph experience themselves, they were 
involved in an organisation that offered them inconsistent wages that often fell below a 
foot-soldiers' wage.(75) Since it was never established exactly what status the 
operators and their civilian supervisors held in the military hierarchy, the relationship 
with military personnel was also uncertain. 
The continued support for the Signal Corps and Military Telegraph Corps at Union 
Army Head Quarters command level was absent. Despite support from President 
Lincoln, Generals McClellan, Sherman, and Meigs, and Admirals Farragut and Porter, 
the telegraph never attained an autonomous role in the military hierarchy.(76) 
Paradoxically, while this uncertain status of telegraphic operations occurred, the Union 
Secretary of War Edward Stanton still believed: 
The military telegraph under the general direction of Colonel Stager and 
Major Eckert, has been of inestimable value to the service, and no Corps has 
surpassed it.[sic1(77) 
Technical advances often only served to compound problems associated with using the 
telegraph. Advances in the power of electric batteries, which increased the range of 
field telegraph systems, confused the arbitrary boundaries between the administration 
of fixed lines, telegraph stations, and mobile field telegraph operations. The 
organization and operation of mobile field systems, which were intended to support 
front-line commanders, was left to a USSC that was devoid of any capacity to 
administer the use of fixed lines, or the use of Beardslee rail-mobile telegraph stations. 
To more completely exploit the field telegraph's technical improvements, the technology 
needed one agency to autonomously manage its full range of functions. With the 
existing administrative overlap, and the absence of clear guide-lines on military 
deployment, there existed few commanding officers who were not only empowered to 
manage the new technology, but also able to use it to enhance their battlefield 
tactics.(78) This case may be further confirmed by the Northern deployment of balloon 
technology. 
The Balloon Corps was established to administer a technology that, due to its novelty, 
did not easily fit into any existing military organization's jurisdiction. As innovations 
further refined operations, and added new functions, the problem of who was to 
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administer aeronautic technology became even more uncertain. As with the USSC and 
USMTC, the Balloon Corps' organisational weaknesses were to severely restrict the 
introduction of technology into military use. These weaknesses ultimately led to the 
Balloon Corps demise after the administrative reforms of 1863. 
The potential of the balloon was only gradually realised by military commanders. From 
the very early days of the war, the aviators had to lobby the US Army to get balloons 
deployed. Balloons were then able to gradually put to use for conducting aerial 
observation, field communication, and artillery observation.(79) Yet the US Army had 
no consensus on how balloons could complement battlefield tactics. 
As with the telegraph and railroad, civilian operators had to be employed to deploy the 
balloon technology. As with other corps, it quickly became apparent to T S C Lowe, the 
leading civilian officer in the operation of balloons, that military officers had "...no 
knowledge whatsoever of aeronautics and were often a serious hindrance rather than a 
help." (80) This encouraged greater reliance on civilians to provide the necessary 
technical skills and support personnel. As balloons became more widely used, technical 
changes were introduced to refine their operation. This served to further increase the 
complexity of equipment, and, ironically, raise the level of skills necessary to properly 
deploy balloons. 
The US Balloon Corps in 1862 has been described as a "loosely organised, poorly 
administered, and decentralised mixture of civilians and military personnel..." (81) The 
organisation's internal cohesion was further destroyed by bureaucratic red tape and 
army regulations that governed everything from equipment supplies to personnel 
policies. Compounding these problems, the Corps went from the control of the Bureau 
of Topographical Engineers, the USQMC, the Corps of Engineers, and finally came 
under the Signal Corps from March 1863 until April 1863, when it was disbanded.(82) 
The confused attempts to bring the Balloon Corps into central control severely 
restricted aeronautical operations on the battlefield. Whilst the balloon was used 
throughout the war, poor organisation, unco—ordinated efforts and lack of liaison with 
separate regiments hindered its usefulness. It was too novel a technology to fit easily 
into the existing military organizations that toyed with administering its functions. 
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These organizational deficiencies in the hierarchical army structure served to severely 
retard further extension of technical innovations on the core technology. Refinements 
made by innovators improved the military utility of the balloon. Whilst serving to 
highlight the unlimited potential of the core technology, aerial operations never reached 
their full capacity. 
It is only in the Corps of Engineers organization that the established technical expertise 
was committed towards improving military operations by increasing the use of 
significant innovations. As with the USAMC, the operations of the Corps of Engineers 
were responsible for promoting more efficient usage of available technology. 
Established prior to the war and considered an integral part of the military hierarchy, 
the engineer organisation's greatest benefit was its ability to promote the conditions 
where innovations could enhance military operations. 
The expansion of military engineering during the Civil War represented not only 
increased use of practical knowledge but the collation and use of civilian know-how for 
military use.(83) The importance of existing under-developed pre-war technical 
knowledge can not be underestimated. Perhaps the best example of this is Denis Hart 
Mahan's pre-war writings that were to influence the wartime efforts of the Engineering 
Corps of both sides. The relevance of trench warfare - battlefield fortifications - was 
not immediately apparent at the beginning of the war. These skills had to be 
rediscovered and then enhanced as the war progressed.(84) 
As with the advances in medical treatment, it is difficult to pin-point where the Union 
Corps of Engineers directly promoted technology. The Corps had two main 
responsibilities. It had to improve the performance of transport technology through the 
provision of better rail lines, and the construction of better supply and command 
centres. The Corps was also heavily involved in improving defensive tactics through the 
construction of defensive positions. 
With the extension of transport links and the utilization of civilian rail engineers, the 
Corps of Engineers became essential in the struggle to satisfy demands placed on the 
logistics system. Engineers contributed to the improvements in rail lines, canal systems, 
and road links. They also built supply centres, administered the hardware for 
construction efforts, and rivalled the USQMC's own capacity to distribute these 
construction materials.(85) These efforts also complemented the efforts of specialised 
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engineers working for the USMRD in the Construction Corps. Together they 
reconstructed ruined rail lines and rebuilt sabotaged bridges (with significant 
innovations such as pre-constructed trusses and inter-locking wooden beams) to 
quickly re-establish support facilities.(86) 
Army engineers were well commanded by General Joseph G Totten until 1864 and then 
by General Richard De!afield. Regardless of the wide area over which the war was 
carried out, and the particularly wooded and rugged terrain of the eastern campaign, 
the Corps' leaders managed to maintain a semblance of co-ordinated effort. The more 
their operations complemented existing Corps functions, the better the Engineers were 
able to meet demands placed upon them. This enabled the Corps to survive the 1863 
administrative reform relatively intact. As such, they were administratively prepared to 
accept the burdens placed upon them when the pitched battles of the last three years of 
the war were undertaken. 
The history of the Corps to 1863 reflects only a marginal role in technology change. 
However, one of the greatest contributions to promoting innovations in the Civil War 
was the Engineer Corps' construction of defensive networks. 
Not only did these improvements consolidate past techniques and ideas: they introduced 
new defensive methods. This was to alter the concept of defence and attack. Improved 
engineering also encouraged the defensive deployment of weapons that could increase 
fire-power. The defensive deployment of explosive devices such as land torpedoes 
(mines) and hand-grenades was also encouraged. In effect, the defensive strength of 
soldiers was to be promoted over that of the attacking force.(87) 
It was in the combination of a number of novel technical innovations and improved 
techniques that mark the Civil War as a period of great significance in the quest for the 
origins of trench warfare tactics.(88) 
Engineers used defensive network improvements such as well-dug trenches (at least 
seven feet deep); forward redoubts connected by trenches to the main network; sand-
bagged walls and casements; firing steps for riflemen to engage the enemy over 
casements; bomb-proofed command and storage areas; chevaux-de-frise (3-metre 
logs, 18-centimetres thick, with 90-centimetre sharpened spikes set at right angles 
projecting from the log) sharpened stakes;(89) wire entanglements; and torpedoes 
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attached to trip—wires in wire entanglements, or torpedoes with pressure—sensitive fuses 
laid in front of trenches (See Appendix 11) to stop massed infantry or cavalry 
assaults.(90) 
As the war progressed heavy howitzers, accurate rifled artillery with percussion fuses, 
small trench howitzers, and surprise attacks were employed to break trench networks. 
The sappers of the Corps of Engineers responded with redoubts for pickets and zig—zag 
trenches to reduce shrapnel vulnerability, and also reshaped trench networks that 
supported each other with cross— and flanking—fire. 
Both the North and the South became extremely proficient at constructing these trench 
networks. One informed observer, the Comte de Paris, believed that the expertise of the 
Southern engineers in particular delayed the South's defeat for at least a year.(91) 
Another observer, the Duke of Cambridge, was so impressed by the innovations in 
defensive engineering techniques that he declared the spade to be "a great element in 
campaigns" and a "new element in the features of the war." (92) 
The Corps was responsible for converting existing knowledge into improving practices. 
Railroads, other transport systems, defensive networks, and miscellaneous endeavours 
all benefited by having their supporting role to contemporary armies enhanced. Under 
this guidance new technology was more capable of achieving its potential. It was not the 
Corps' conscious role to directly promote new technology, but as a mature, established 
organization it established an operational climate that was conducive for the 
introduction of military innovations. 
6.3 	The Impact of Northern Executive Leadership on 
the Administration of Military Technical Change 
Enterprising innovators had only two chances to promote their products or ideas: when 
government contracts were issued or when selective field tests could be secured.(93) 
Due to the indiscriminate nature of contract issuing and product testing, many 
entrepreneurs were not able to promote their product. 
The main means by which an entrepreneur to gain acceptance for his or her innovation 
was to secure and maintain the endorsement of a prominent member of the political 
executive. 
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The role President Lincoln played in the promotion of Northern military innovation 
stands testimony to the importance of senior officials. He was responsible for lifting 
select innovations out of the confused system of assessment and encouraging their 
promotion. Lincoln promoted the balloon, rapid—fire guns, and expressed a continued 
willingness to review promising innovations that could not obtain official endorsement. 
That he felt the need to exert such an important influence on the adoption of new 
technology, is a reflection of his lack of confidence in the military bureaucrats.(94) 
Lincoln's influence on the adoption of new technology is not questioned, but was it a 
positive influence that overcame bureaucratic problems?(95) Or was it more an 
example of political interference that handicapped the pursuit of military efforts?(96) 
In many cases a feature of the Northern wartime procurement process was the 
willingness of military bureaucrats to yield authority to the politicians. As the 
framework of military bureaucracy was still stretching to accommodate the new 
demands placed upon it, the imposition of orders (particularly from the Executive 
offices of the President) removed the burden of responsibility from military men. This 
confirmed the authority of politicians to interfere in the process of military 
procurement. 
When the military (in General Order Number 54 of 1861), acknowledged the Act For 
the Better Organization of the Army, they confirmed the President's Executive direction 
over the Army.(97) It was President Lincoln who became vested with the ultimate 
responsibility for encouraging the more efficient organization of the Union Army. 
The absence of an effective Staff Command system inhibited President Lincoln's ability 
to delegate responsibility for military procurement.(98) Whilst General Hitchcock was 
attempting to enforce strategic control over military operations, President Lincoln still 
maintained active oversight of these operations. The General Staff understandably had 
little ability to restrict military decision—making to their own ranks. The War Board or 
Committee, which sat in a formal policy role in the General Staff, lasted only from 1861 
until July 1862. From then until war's end its power resided in its informal capacity to 
exert central control on established projects.(99) 
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Lincoln's involvement in military procurement reflects a critical failure to develop an 
adequate framework for evaluating new designs. There exist numerous examples of 
ranking political and bureaucratic members using their power to sponsor weapons that 
were poorly designed, were totally inappropriate to battlefield needs, or tied up 
manufacturing and financial resources beyond any military justification.(100) Lincoln's 
role in the procurement process may be interpreted in a negative way because his 
actions seem to promote outside interference in the Ordnance Bureau's operations. The 
Army and Navy Ordnance Bureaus were subject to decisions, made independently of 
their jurisdiction, that sought to promote an isolated innovation. In the confused 
environment of 1861, military officials utilized this intervention by political figures to 
further abdicate their own responsibility for the procurement process. 
The good intentions of the President could not be doubted, for he firmly believed that if 
he did not encourage the development and use of better weapons, no-one would.(101) 
The increase of political interference further opened the procurement process to 
another obstruction; popular discussion. As Lord Wolseley wrote in 1888: 
The discussions from Washington and the criticisms from Washington, 
based upon the loose and rampant public opinion of the day, were in every 
instance wrong, and were disastrous to the cause of the Union.(102) 
The prevalence of these public-inspired criticisms made it extremely difficult for any 
organisation to plan without perceived political priorities being imposed. Lincoln acted 
as a filter for the expression of political patronage, rather than as an advocate for the 
use of political power by politicians to influence procurement policy. Often it was only 
the support of the President that allowed certain technologies to be introduced.(103) 
The introduction of ironclads, breech-loaders, balloons, and some novel weapons relied 
on technical innovations that were influenced through priorities imposed by the 
President. 
Popular public and political opinion greatly influenced the adoption and deployment of 
the Monitor.(104) At first societal opinions were unsupportive of innovative effort. The 
popular belief upheld that the Monitor, far from being a great advancement, N'as 
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"Ericsson's Folly".(105) After its success at Hampton Roads the Monitor design 
received adulation and support. This support flowed into the development of other 
ironclad designs.(106) 
Military representation for the Spencer repeating rifle were similarly biased against its 
introduction. The 1856 Springfield Muzzle Loading Rifle was popularly held up by 
senior military bureaucrats as the most effective of American weapon designs. Not until 
soldiers and State governments began to adopt BLR arms, outside established Federal 
procurement procedures, did support for the exclusive endorsement of the Springfield 
begin to wane. As the public perceived the value of new designs - such as the Monitor - 
administrators' development of replacement technologies often similarly followed public 
opinion. 
Lincoln's most dramatic action came when he directly intervened in August 1863, to 
assist with the adoption of Christopher Spencer's repeating rifle. By replacing General 
James Ripley as the Chief of the Northern Ordnance Bureau, Lincoln removed a major 
antagonist of BLR technology and opened the way for a more considered review of new 
technology. As the President's faith in his administrators increased his persistent use of 
executive powers to directly manipulate the procurement process decreased. 
The problem of getting senior military officers to give direction on the technology to be 
tested led President Lincoln to enforce his role as de facto Chief of Staff and 
Commander-in-Chief. He felt the Generals' reluctance to innovate reflected a wider 
failure to maintain focus and control in the war.(107) 
6.4 	Contrast Between Northern Industrialization and 
Southern Improvisation 
Since the beginning of the war the Union grand strategy of blockading the South had 
isolated the Confederate forces from their external arms supplies. Compounded by the 
lack of financial resources to buy foreign arms, the absence of supplies served to place 
greater emphasis on internal technological developments. 
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Throughout the Civil War the North maintained a naval superiority that could not be 
offset by any number of Southern innovations such as torpedoes, torpedo boats, fast 
patrol boats, submarines, and ironclad rams.(108) 
Conversion of the Merrimac, and continuing efforts by the South to copy a winning 
weapon, created a profound fear in the North that the South could perhaps produce an 
effective weapon.(109) While not overcoming the North's confidence in its own arms 
superiority, this fear became the spur for Northern organizations undertaking 
innovation to match Southern ingenuity and to outstrip its enemy's capacity to produce 
ironclad vessels.(110) The Northern Naval Department's actively encouraged research 
and development on steam engines, large calibre rifled muzzle-loader cannon, better 
armour-plate construction, turrets, propeller-drive systems, and overall incorporation 
of these features into a naval weapons system.(111) 
Through improvisation and innovative designs the Confederacy was able to fill the 
shortfall in combat equipment. Early in the war at least, the difficulty caused by the 
blockade was offset by the South's resourcefulness. This in a small way compensated 
for the resource superiority held by the North.(112) The Confederacy also benefited 
from having private innovators who were able to merge their efforts with military 
needs. This was unlike the early wartime situation in the North, where much of the 
innovative effort seemed to be knee-jerk reactions to perceived military demands. 
The immediate threat posed by the North also served to galvanize the Southern 
administrators. Where available resources existed in the South, concentration was 
more likely to be focussed on a few technological developments. This was enhanced by 
the Confederate people being inspired by the success of innovations such as the ironclad 
CSS Virginia, torpedoes, and the individuals who, by their endeavours, made these 
technologies possible. 
The Confederacy did not escape the proliferation of military bureaucracies.(113) 
However, the bureaucracy was severely restricted in its operations by the essential lack 
of industrial and financial resources. The endeavours of a few individuals came to 
shape the focus of technological development in the Confederacy. 
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Theodore Stoney was one of the Confederacy's skilled innovators. At his own expense 
he designed, built, and combat tested the David (MTB), and then present the craft to the 
CS Navy.(114) This illustrates not only the 'know—how' of innovators, but the 
important role such motivated individuals could play in the war. The deployment of the 
David also served as an example to contemporary innovators that a low level of 
organizational capacity need not hinder the deployment of technologies. 
The Confederate shipbuilding programme was by no means unco—ordinated or 
compromised in size to fit available industrial resources. Some 150 ships were laid 
down during the war with only 50 being completed. However, resources were 
concentrated on producing some 22 ironclad vessels.(115) As the war continued, the 
lack of resources and the strategic requirements for defensive shallow draught vessels 
precipitated the construction of 'improvised' ironclad. 
The shortcomings of the South's continued lack of manufacturing strength became all 
too evident by 1863. Whilst the David may have been deployed with relative ease, its 
further success was restricted by the lack of resources necessary to develop and 
manufacture more of these vessels.(116) The strength of commitment from senior 
administrators could not secure scarce resources. No amount of support from the Naval 
Secretary Stephen Mallory or President Jefferson Davis, could promote torpedo 
technology while there existed a fundamental inadequacy of available resources. (117) 
The fact that the ironclad, torpedo, MTB, and the submarine were inspired by a desire 
to give Southern forces the basic tools with which to defend the Confederacy, 
developmental issues were focussed. With little or no capacity to prevent the US Naval 
supremacy, by 1864 it became clear that it was on land that the South needed to commit 
resources to prevent immediate defeat. From 1863 the war of attrition soaked up CS 
Army resources faster than they could be replaced. The innovative efforts suffered two 
main problems. Firstly, available resources and administrative support had to be 
directed towards maintaining the existing military effort, while the innovative effort 
became concentrated on simple technology that could fill the void left by the decreasing 
capacity to wage war. 
With the advent of the war of attrition from 1864 to 1865, the real problems with the 
South's lack of industrial resources became evident. They could neither produce a 
weapon to slow the advance of the North, nor replace rail roads, bridges and basic 
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weapons needed to prolong the war. This situation is reflected as early as April 1863 in 
the comments by the Confederate Secretary of War J A Seddon. He estimated that at 
least 49,500 tones of rail were needed annually, but the estimated combined production 
from the largest rolling mills in Atlanta and Tredegar, could only produce 20,000 
tons.(118) He also admitted that to achieve this production figure substantial diversion 
of manufacturing resources from current arms production would have been required. 
• For the South the fundamental lack of resources could never be overcome by 
improvisation or the creation of ingenious technologies that could better perform 
specific military functions. While the North lacked the organizational capacity early in 
the Civil War, it still possessed substantial industrial and production resources. These 
fundamental differences between the USOB's ability to administer technology after 
1863, and the capacity of its Southern rival, illustrate some important factors affecting 
Civil War administration of technical change. From being a barrier to technology 
change in 1864, the USOB grew to become instrumental in promoting technological 
change. The reverse trend is evident in the South: as the war progressed the 
Confederate Bureau of Ordnance became increasingly less able to promote new 
technology. 
The capacity of the ordnance bureaus to provide new technologies seems to be 
parallelled by their ability to firstly satisfy existing production demands. Excess 
administrative and physical resources had to exist before innovative activity could be 
properly sponsored. In satisfying their Army's arms demands up until 1863, the 
Confederacy was able to use improvisation and available resources to match the mass 
productive capacity of the North. 
The contrast in arms development between the waring sides in the Civil War is best 
reflected by the fact that by 1864 the North had moved away from the conditions of 
1861 in which MLR small arms were first choice acquisitions. In the Confederacy by 
the end of the war the MLR still dominated the arms replacement programme. Whilst 
having the advantage of narrowing its range of shoulder fired arms and calibres used, 
the South was utilizing these weapons by default. 
Weapons technology became increasingly more technically sophisticated and as the war 
progressed it seems demands increased both on the administration of the weapons 
procurement process, and on production resources. Neither the Northern or the 
Southern ordnance bureaus were able to maintain staffing levels that could both handle 
all the wartime demands placed on them, and still assess new technologies. 
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Up to 1862, the USOB had only 59 officers to handle arms contracts, inspection of 
plants and arms, repairs, service and field liaison, and assessment of all new 
technology.(119) Major Thomas Rodman, inventor and member of the USOB, was 
aware that a dilemma existed because "every officer had so much to do that he could 
not spend much time on inventions." (121) 
Towards the end of 1863, General Gorgas, the Southern Chief of the Confederate 
Bureau of Ordnance (CSBO), made a similar complaint when he noted that operations 
had altered to such an extent over twelve months that: 
...the department has been chiefly engaged in the supply of the armies in the 
field. Very little time has been devoted to scientific research or 
experiments(121) 
Throughout the war the CSBO struggled to maintain the army's on-going weapon 
needs. General Gorgas' greatest achievement was the removal of his organization from 
the dependence upon other Bureaus and civilian leaders. (122) By the end of 1864, any 
gains made in increased administrative efficiency had been eroded by the Ordnance 
Bureau having only some 300 men of all ranks serving in the Confederate forces.(123) 
At the same time the Bureau had an accumulated debt of $5.6 million.(124) The 
situation had became so critical that General Gorgas lacked not only money to employ 
labour, but the resources to clothe and feed those men already working in the 
Bureau.(125) 
By the end of 1864 the USOB had attained a much sturdier capacity to meet the 
demands placed on it. Organizational problems were reversed to such an extent that on 
22 October 1864 the Northern Chief of the Ordnance Department, General Alexander 
Dyer, was able to report: 
The increase in the manufacturing capacities of the arsenals and armories 
has already gone far toward supplying the large demand for arms and other 
ordnance stores, and, in conjunction with private manufacturers in this 
country, has rendered us independently of foreign supplies.(126) 
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Under the guidance of Generals Ramsey and Dyer the Northern Ordnance Bureau 
increased its capacity to meet weapons demands. This permitted the administrators to 
concentrate on the better management of other services.(127) 
Access to official institutional support did go some way to help nurture certain technical 
developments. But the promotion of key innovations mostly occurred through the 
restricted efforts of institutions set up to specifically administer new technology. These 
included the Confederate States Submarine Battery Service, the Torpedo Bureau, Naval 
Department and Confederate Bureau of Ordnance. 
Yet without manufacturing resources, the Southern institutions had little capacity to 
contribute to the wider development of successful military technologies. An example of 
this situation is where General Rains (CSA) designed and deployed ingenious land 
mines at Southern defensive positions. He admitted that given more time and resources, 
the quality of the torpedoes, and the defensive capabilities of the mine-fields, could have 
been vastly improved.(128) 
The South may be credited with novel ideas that precipitated the evolution of important 
innovations. Nevertheless, the Confederacy lacked the technical and industrial 
resources to produce advancements that required extensive commitment of resources to 
experimentation and development. From 1864 it was apparent that only in the North 
were there the resources to support technical endeavour on innovations such as, 
telegraphic communications, improved ironclad armour, ammunition advancements, or 
the perfection of specific designs, like the lever-action repeating rifle. 
It was the Northern military re-organization in 1863 that rekindled military technology 
change. As organisations had their chain of command delineated and control 
reasserted, they also became better able to adopt innovations that enhanced their 
operations. 
As they became better able to control their wartime operations, these mature bodies 
became important agencies for identifying areas in need of technical change. The 
process of recognizing weapons innovations that held some potential, and developing 
and testing them further, was hastened. But from the time when the military 
administrations had to respond to the mass armies raised in 1861, the streamlining of 
the system never fully overcame the over-bureaucratization of the military 
administration, nor the lack of clear directives on military demand. 
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Where organizations were established for the administration of new technology, 
innovative activity was more likely to be promoted. Where innovations were able to 
demonstrate that they could improve military operations, their adoption was likely be 
more favourably considered. However, this did not ensure that the technology would be 
successful adopted. The most successful innovations seem to have complemented 
existing military tools and been able to gain the endorsement of military organizations. 
The deployment of new technology was influenced by the capacity of the responsible 
organizations to both acquire the necessary technical expertise, and avoid encroachment 
upon existing military organizations jurisdiction. This marriage between technical 
expertise and military authority was difficult to achieve. It meant that all too often new 
organizations were unable to operate under the predatory gaze of traditional military 
Departments. 
Overall, the introduction of innovations was best conducted when the person 
responsible for the nurturing of new technology understood its operation and was 
capable of promoting the innovations' use as a supplement to existing military activities. 
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CHAPTER 7: REASONS FOR THE STUNTING OF 
MILITARY INNOVATIONS 
In the previous two chapters the general factors and specific environmental 
(administrative) barriers to full exploitation of a new Civil War technology were 
examined. This chapter is intended to synthesize the lessons from the previous chapters 
and focus on the technical reasons why an innovation, in the wartime environment, may 
fail to be fully utilized. 
In this chapter it will often be the less notable or technically unrefined ideas or designs 
that stand as examples for greater technological development in the future. This is to be 
expected. As the focus of this chapter shifts away from the successful technologies that 
went into mass production, the designs advancement over previous technical knowledge 
becomes the most important measure. 
At least five main reasons can be advanced to explain why technological designs failed 
to be satisfactorily introduced. The first, and most obvious, is the designs' fundamental 
lack of technical merit. The next reason is the problem that "fashionable innovations" 
deflected resources away from a technology with merit, to another with "popular" 
support. The lack of testing and development on innovations also provided a third 
major reason why there was a failure to consolidate technical advances. 
Another of the most persistent problems confronting new military technology, was the 
inability of Civil War military organizations to recognize the technical (and tactical) 
significance of some designs. Finally, a lack of technical development often occurred 
because innovators were recasting existing technology and technical know—how. 
Designs rarely improved on the relatively static technical designs already in existence. 
The lack of technical advancement in many designs left them devoid of any 
developmental merit. Such designs did not accomplish their end purpose any better 
than existing technology and, at best, served only as technical lessons for future 
innovators. 
Regardless of their lack of technical merit, many poor designs were still adopted during 
the Civil War. This could be due to the entrepreneurial flair of the innovator, wartime 
confusion that failed to adequately test a proposed design, or patronage from a 
prominent official that enabled a government contract to be issued for a limited 
production run. These innovations were doomed to become short—sighted blights on the 
wartime military innovation process. 
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One Northern official, when reviewing experimental torpedo designs, believed that it 
was impossible for committees to select the most technically effective design as the: 
War Department and the Chief Engineer...were worse than opportuned by 
the..inventors, everyone of whom demanded an examination of his plan or 
model. (1) 
Entrepreneurial skills aside, a number of innovators possessed advanced technical ideas 
that failed to be amalgamated into a coherent design. When the design went into 
production it was still at the unrefined, experimental stage. Many Civil War 
innovations could fit this description. In a more specific context it applies to those 
innovations that did not enter into service because their production models were so far 
from complete that they would require a complete re-working to make them competent 
tools of war. Such designs would include the Gorgas smooth-bore, rapid-fire gun,(2) 
both the Northern and Southern submarine designs, and attempts to make a more 
accurate form of guided rocket. 
Unfortunately for the evolution of military tools, many of the better innovations had to 
compete with very poor designs for official attention. Many poor designs never 
progressed to the point of testing or introduction but constantly served to divert 
attention away from better designs. Consequently, potentially sound designs did not 
make it through an overburdened system of assessment. To alleviate pressure on their 
deliberations, examination committees were more likely to consider innovations that 
were either presented to them in a more complete format, had a simple design concept, 
or had actually proved themselves in service.(3) 
Not all weapons advancements were easily achieved by a re-assessment of existing 
technical knowledge. The construction and, therefore, development of the BLR cannon 
was severely limited by the strength of iron. The concept of breech-loading cannons 
was in advance of American industries capacity to produce wrought iron breech-
loading mechanisms that could withstand the pressures produced on firing. It was not 
until the wrought iron was used in conjunction with an improved quality steel inner 
sleeve in the barrel, that progress in the manufacture of cannons could even begin to 
make headway. Although Northern industry made progress with the Rodman cannon, 
the overall advancement in the manufacture of all steel cannon or breech mechanisms 
were not to be successfully completed until after the war when the technical lessons 
from the successful German manufacturers Krupp, became available. (4) 
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The capacity of existing technology in the arms factories to produce these new arms was 
equally significant. For instance, the fact that the North produced armour plating in 1.5 
inch thickness was due less to demand, than the fact that iron plate over 4 inches thick, 
could not be cut by existing guillotines.(5) Also, if iron plate was more than 1.5 inches 
thick (such as on the Monitor design), it could not be trimmed with existing shears. It 
was not until the end of the war that production technology had advanced enough to 
handle 5 inch plates. This contrasts with England where rolled iron plates 12 inches 
thick were being made.(6) 
Despite the seemingly limited wartime advance in the production of iron plate in the 
North, it still represented an important process of industrialization, whereby production 
capacity sought to satisfy known demand. In this case military requirements were no 
longer able to be met by individual entrepreneurs competing to satisfy unplanned 
government demands. As specifications became embodied in contracts, especially for 
armour and ordnance, military needs were being filled by firms with a proven ability to 
overcome technical limitations and produce the new technology.(7) 
By way of contrast, rocket technology with its small base of truly significant pre-war 
technical advancements, seems to have gained little over the course of the Civil War. 
Used both on land and at sea, innovations seem to have only produced rudimentary 
improvements in guidance, explosive loads, engineering integrity and overall tactical 
application.(8) The lack of fundamental advancements in technical knowledge in no 
small way affected the efforts expended by innovators who were trying to improve the 
rocket as a combat weapon. 
The South's efforts to produce a repeating firearm led them to utilize known technology 
in order to produce the Sibert Magazine Rifle Model of 1861. While a new design, it 
drew exclusively from technical knowledge that was outmoded prior to the war.(9) 
Intended more to fit the manufacturing capabilities of the Confederacy, this design 
never possessed either the technical basis or military utility to see it become the source 
for further development. 
As prominent officials and the public became aware of a technology's battlefield 
performance the development of these designs became more fashionable. The effect of 
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such support was to restrict the introduction of better technology, or to curtail the 
introduction of other more advanced technology that lacked public endorsement. 
The BLR is a good example of this type of situation. BLR technology was increasingly 
being adopted by both the military and the US Ordnance Bureau, but as one design was 
being officially promoted, another would lose endorsement. The resulting staggered 
and diffuse production of breech-loading small arms made it impossible to tool-up 
Northern industry for any production based around the best weapon types. The extra 
competeition of the repeating rifle against the BLR meant that in the long run officials 
tended to support existing BLR technology only because of the cost of adopting 
repeating rifle technology.(10) 
In the case of repeating weapons - Gatling gun, rifles and hand guns - the initial 
competition was dominated by the desire for production contracts. Thus design 
integrity and full development became secondary to the speed with which a design could 
be presented to prominent officials. Research and development on existing designs was 
more likely to be seen as an admission of fault, rather than an acceptable design 
refinement. A design without the support of a prominent official or political patron was 
unlikely to hold the attention of those responsible for weapons procurement.(11) A 
number of similar situations occurred with examples such as the rapid-fire weapon 
designs receiving less attention as the seemingly more reliable Gatling was developed. 
Naval technology was also subject to public endorsement or condemnation.(12) The 
success of the Monitor and fear inspired by Confederate ironclads served to foster 
informed debate on the technological nature of this new form of naval warfare,(13) yet 
did not promote the balanced assessment of ironclad designs.(14) 
The MLR cannon ammunition is another example of how a technology tended to divert 
attention away from a new area of design work; in this case the need to concentrate 
resources on developing a better breech-loading design. The superior penetration 
power of smaller calibre high velocity BLR cannon, over heavy calibre MLSB, was 
ignored as improved manufacturing techniques allowed several design improvements 
on the MLSB. Also of note was the technical improvements to the balloon as a 
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stationary observation platform which limited the development of it as a free floating 
aerial weapon. 
Lacking an overall picture technical innovation, both sides seem to have lapsed into 
supporting the latest, most popular military tool. An even more backward step was 
taken by both sides when new technology was introduced at the expense of existing, 
more viable technology. 
The most obvious examples of such a situation is where the Union Repeating Gun 
(Coffee Mill Gun) yielded any significant design developments it had instituted to later 
rapid—fire weapons, in particular the Gatling gun. The switching of support between 
designs affected each innovation's technical development. Overall, the designs did not 
reach a perfected mechanism, nor permit those employing the weapons to devise 
appropriate tactical uses.(15) 
A prevailing military belief held that the BLR performed a similar function to the 
rocket, but with much greater success. The development of rocket technology suffered 
as a consequence. As artillery men manned most of the rockets and machine—guns 
deployed on land, it was their enthusiasm for other new forms of technology, such as 
advanced rifled ordnance, that dominated from 1863.(16) As C Sleeman noted, the 
failure to introduce rifle calibre machine—guns could in part be also attributed to: 
the powerful opposition of the artillery, due in a great measure to an 
unreasoning and exaggerated fear that these weapons, if introduced, would 
threaten the very existence of artillery.(17) 
As the machine—guns were mounted on gun carriages and weighed about the same as a 
light field or mountain gun, the weapons were logically and logistically perceived by 
contemporaries to be the responsibility of artillery men.(18) 
The development of the BLR ordnance is another example of an advanced innovation 
that had its promotion stunted by new designs. The failure to refine Northern BLR 
ordnance designs, particular the heavy wear and occasional failure of such innovations 
as the Parrott BLR,(19) diverted innovators towards what they considered to be the 
more rewarding possibilities of improving the performance of MLR ordnance. This led 
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to innumerable types of ingeniously studded shells that on firing could expand into the 
grooves of a MLR barrel. (See Appendix 17) Experiments were conducted in an 
attempt to join ordnance fuse technology with ostensibly obsolete muzzle loading 
ammunition. The resulting technical development only served to divert effort away 
from improving the existing BLR designs and their ammunition. 
Officials came to consider that there was little advantage in the BLR over the MLR 
because improvements had still failed to increase the rate-of-fire, overcome problems 
of barrel fouling, or significantly improve range. On a wider scale however, this 
example reflects the official inability either to direct technical effort towards more 
fertile fields, or to look ahead and assess the future potential of some designs. 
The Civil War offered the greatest chances for recently devised technologies to be tested 
in combat. At sea there existed the first opportunity in fifty years for the sustained live 
testing of weapons and the revising of gunnery techniques.(20) The Naval Yards in both 
the North and the South permitted new maritime technology to receive a more thorough 
assessment than could have been expected for land military tools.(21) An example of 
the successful testing of a design occurred with the John Ericsson "Rodman" 15-Inch 
cannon and later 13-Inch cannon.(22). Apparently a sound weapon from a skilled 
innovator using novel manufacturing techniques, the 13-Inch wrought iron cannon 
used advanced forging techniques which gave greater strength. Nonetheless, the 
weapon was rejected after extensive tests by the US Naval Bureau of Ordnance showed 
the forging requirements were too advanced for industry to consistently meet.(23) 
Despite some testing success by the Union Naval Department, inspired by the 
ironcladding of the CSS Virginia, there was still no consistency in US Navy ironclad 
development. Testing of the Monitor and the first prototype ironclads was almost non-
existent. Development was mostly left to trial and error under combat conditions. 
The addition of armoured hulls and water-line armour belts to circumvent the 
Confederate's use of torpedoes became a battlefield development that was later 
incorporated into Union ironclad designs. Deriving from wartime experience, the US 
Navy added extra armour to its ironclads. This was the first evidence of a purposeful 
20. C. Dixon, Ships of the Victorian Navy (Southampton, Ashford Press Publishing, 1987:8) 
At Sinope Roads in the Black Sea, Russian rifled cannon destroyed the wooden Turkish fleet. 
Only one of thirteen in the Turkish fleet survived. 
21. A. Hunter-Dupree, Science in the Federal Government (Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1957:123-124); B. Anderson, By Sea & By River: The Naval History of the 
Civil War (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962:291) for Northern yards; & W. Ripley, 
Artillery & Ammunition of the Civil War (New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970:110) for 
the Southern yards. 
22. Ripley, Artillery & Ammunition (1970:99) 
23. IBID:176 
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attempt to solve Civil War combat problems through improvements to naval design.(24) 
This was certainly an advancement over the first two years of the war where the 
development of ironclads had been a haphazard process that relied on individual 
commanders making their vessels more battle-worthy. 
Development of BLR ordnance was, however, restricted as much by the lack of 
development in industrial machining as by the preference for smooth-bore cannons in 
both the North and South. In the South the lack of manufacturing capacity was 
compounded by a lack of resources which forced the government to import foreign 
BLR. Industrial problems also affected the North as inconsistent machining techniques 
prevented the consistent production of quality breech fittings.(25) Despite innovative 
BLR designs, such as the 7-Inch Brooke Rifle, the Confederacy also had development 
effort restricted by the knowledge that they still had to rely heavily upon inferior 
percussion and paper time fuses for their artillery ammunition.(26) 
Perhaps the best example of Northern development of a BLR ordnance design is the 
conversion of the 3-Inch Rodman (Ordnance Rifle Field, M1861) from a MLR to a 
BLR. After the war this design went on to become the standard field piece.(27) Despite 
this limited success, the Northern industry faced many problems. Many technologies 
issued with contracts for production simply were not supplied in time. This severely 
affected the ability of the US Ordnance Bureau to assess the performance of the more 
advanced designs, and then apply the derived lessons to future technical developments. 
Fuse development during the Civil War is an example of a much more successful field of 
technical development. Development did not just concentrate on different fuse designs. 
A wide variety of novel uses for the technology also evolved. Engineers developed basic 
time and percussion artillery projectile fuses and placed them into hand grenades, land 
mines and booby traps.(28) 
The failure of some fuses to detonate artillery shells, either through poor design or the 
shell not landing on its nose, necessitated improvement to fuse designs. (Appendix 12) 
The gradual development of a better fuse and in particular an improved carcass shell 
design, was marred by the absence of appropriate procurement regulations. With the 
carcass or 'stink shell', the development of the best design was limited in particular by 
the lack of feedback from those actually using the best designs. Combat troops options 
24.Allard, "Naval Technology" (1989:122) 
25.B.R. Lewis, Notes on Ammunition of the American Civil War, 1861-1865 (Washington 
D.C., American Ordnance Association, 1959:13) 
26.IBID:23 
27.Ripley, Artillery & Ammunition (1970:162-3) 
28.IBID:278; & F.W. Hackle)', Report on Civil War Explosive Ordnance (Maryland, U.S. 
Naval Propellant Plant, 1960:32) 
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on the choice of the best designs was rarely exercised. They mostly had their choice 
limited to the design which had actually managed to win the attention of the 
Quartermaster Department at that particular time. While many similar designs went 
into production, most had different features and purposes.(29) The front—line troops 
had no real ability to compare the similar carcass shells to each other or assess how well 
they performed different tasks. Testing and development of the best carcass shell 
designs was impossible while the availability of any shell dictated decisions on 
deployment. 
In some cases the testing and development conducted on Civil War technology helped to 
identify areas for future technical research. Even some very crude designs produced an 
incremental growth in technical knowledge. Early Confederate submerged river mines 
had very poor waterproofing, yet they provided the foundation for experimental work 
that saw later designs address this problem. The benefit of a small change in knowledge 
could often hold greater meaning for later innovators. This was particularly the case 
with the development of submarine technology. 
The development of the submarine in the South reflected a poor design that reached 
actual combat use not because of official malfeasance, but more due to desperate 
military need, hope, and human bravery. At the outset the design for the CSS Hunley  
was very basic. It was developed with regard for the absence of adequate resources and 
the builders' inability to construct a system of locomotion. These factors combined to 
make the submarine one of the crudest military tools to see active service in the Civil 
War. Yet despite its lack of technical advancement, some wartime contemporaries still 
believed the development effort was an important precursor for the future: 
There seems no insurmountable objection in the way of the construction of a 
submarine boat; the principal difficulty has been one that ought to be 
remedied by the application of our increased knowledge of mechanics and 
chemistry, since the period when it was first conceived — that is, to regulate 
or purify the supply of air, so as to enable the operators of the boat to 
remain a considerable time beneath the surface. The general use of 
torpedoes, offensive and defensive, seems to lead to the introduction and use 
of such a boat, and it cannot be long before the inventive genius of man will 
supply the demand made upon it.(30) 
Throughout the war, in both the North and the South, there was a significant technical 
base from which torpedo designs could be devised. However, the lack of 
experimentation and deployment of more radical designs served to promote only 
29.Ripley, Artillery & Ammunition (1970:263-4); J.B. Poole, "A Sword Unclrawn: 
Chemical Warfare & the Victorian Age", (Part I), The Army Ouarterly & Defence Journal  
(Vol.106[4], October 1976:469); & R.V. Bruce, Lincoln & the Tools of War (Westport, 
Greenwood Press, 1973:237 & 243) 
30.J.S. Barnes, Submarine Warfare. Offensive & Defensive  (New York, Van Nostrand, 
1869:151) 
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conservative improvements to existing technology. The system of assessment for 
torpedoes favoured the introduction of those designs which improved on weapons 
already in service, or could be presented by the innovator as a 'working' model. 
Despite wartime developments in torpedo technology the benefits of technological 
change were not always apparent within the years of the Civil War. In the 1880s one 
English commentator wrote: 
...[the] real power of the offensive torpedo in actual warfare remains yet to 
be proved, for the few cases recorded during the Civil War in America have 
by no means settled the point; and many inventions which appear quite 
successful when tested merely in deliberate experiments, where everything is 
previously arranged to insure the most favourable conditions, completely fail 
when applied in actual warfare.(31) 
Another weapon that presaged later design success was the Henry repeating rifle. This 
design was as complex as it was advanced. As such it was both expensive to make with 
existing machinery and prone to some operational problems. To the foot-soldier, the 
Henry's higher rate-of-fire more than compensated for any design drawbacks: 
particularly as the 15 rounds in chamber could be fired in 11 seconds. It was not until 
the 1866 Winchester lever action rifle, that the true technical promise of the Henry 
design was more fully realized.(see appendix 22) 
Some Civil War innovations were never able to progress beyond the most fundamental 
level of technical development. The more these new technological entities departed 
from the weapons already in use, the greater was the difficulty in establishing their 
usefulness for Civil War combatants. Because they made little or no impact on the 
conduct of the war, it is difficult to assess how important these technologies were in 
advancing technical knowledge. 
Many innovations were to appear in the Civil War "before their time". In many cases 
the development that occurred after the war indicated the importance of some 
innovations. Many of these designs failed to become fully developed only because their 
potential was not actualized.(32) In general terms this could include the flamethrower, 
steam-driven land artillery tractors, guided rockets or 'torpedo launchers', and "anti-
submarine" cannon devices. 
Some of the more interesting concepts that can be examined include the use of aerial 
photography on balloons, the Dickensons Steam Gun, and the Lyman accelerating gun. 
31. Routledge, Discsiysi _Inventions (1989:175) 
32. This did not necessarily improve after the war, see Armstrong, Bullets & Bureaucrats 
(1982:Chapter 3) 
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The use of photographic equipment was seen by both aviators and some members of the 
Academy of Sciences as having distinct advantages.(33) Both photography and aviation 
were sciences in their infancy. Joined to form a single military tool of unknown 
technological merit, the concept failed to achieve official support. In retrospect it is 
possible to apprecia\ te the potential technological advantages that Civil War 
contemporaries had not appreciated. 
Another interesting experiment in an area of which little is known, is the Dickensons 
Steam Gun, designed by the Confederate supporter Charles S Dickenson.(34) It was 
also known to the Confederates as the Winans Steam Gun, or Dickensons Revolving 
Steam Gun. This innovation apparently could throw 300, 2 ounce balls a minute, to a 
range of 100 yards.(35) The weapon was, however, captured on April 1861 before its 
development could effectively progress. 
In this design the cannon was mounted on a partially armoured steam powered tractor. 
This design's use of steam traction was not a totally novel military technology. In the 
Crimean War the British had used the Boydell steam tractor to pull artillery across 
poor terrain.(36) A British Committee's later investigation of steam traction usage 
during the Civil War may indicate further Union development on the concept.(37) Did 
the British have knowledge of further use of armoured steam tractors, or of Union 
developments in the field? It seem likely that it was the British, rather than the United 
States, who were more interested in examining the role of steam traction in land 
warfare. The US Engineering Department acknowledged that, prior to the date of 
writing in 1899, there was no "instance of the use of road traction engines by our 
military forces", and nor had they "been seriously considered." (38) 
Despite the Dickenson Steam Gun receiving little attention it produced an interesting 
technical legacy. It can perhaps be considered a legitimate predecessor to the tank, self 
propelled gun, or even the mechanised combat vehicle. Maybe it should be examined 
33. Official Records, (Series 3, Vol.3 ) (1899:293); & F.S. Haydon, Aeronautics in the Union  
& Confederate Armies (Vol.I) (Baltimore, Doctoral Thesis, 1941:332) 
34.Bruce, Lincoln & the Tools of War  (1973:139-141); &RT. White, Tanks & Other 
Armoured Fighting Vehicles 1900 to 1918 (London, Blandford Press, 1970:1) 
35.F.A. Shannon, The Organisation & Administration of the Union Army  
(Vol.1)(Gloucester, Peter Smith, 1965:145) 
36.The steam road tractor by James Boydell was patented in 1846, and used in the Crimean, 
however, in 1855 James Cowen recommended the mounting of a gun and armouring a 
Boyden tractor. See K. Macksey, Technology in War (London, Arms & Armour Press, 
1986:21-22) 
37.Gallway & Alderson Report 1864, in J. Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War 
(Chicargo, Chicargo University Press, 1959:35-36) 
38.0. Layriz, Mechanical Traction in War (London, David Charles Reprint, first published in 
1900 - 1973:95-96) 
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solely as an innovation that indicated more technical promise than could be realistically 
capitalized on by Civil War contemporaries. 
The Lyman cannon is another interesting design that reflects a complete break from 
existing technology. Despite being based around a patent dating back to Azel S 
Lyman's patent 3 February 1857, the whole concept of the Lyman cannon was largely 
devoid of official backing during the Civil War.(39) 
At first the weapon was seen as an ideal short range coastal defence weapon capable of 
delivering torpedoes. The design was based around the use of an exceptionally long 
barrel with air compression to assist with the gentle build up of a shell's launch, and 
then the use of charges to accelerate the velocity of the projectile(4O) The weapon may 
well also have been the first cannon to use an electric firing arrangement. 
Future development was to see this "torpedo gun" advanced by Mr Mefford of Ohio in 
1883,(41) forming the basis in 1885 to 1887 of the New York based designer Lieutenant 
Edward Zalinski's Pneumatic Dynamite Gun. This later gun received support as a 
viable means for both "delivering mines into local waters to supplement the existing 
defensive minefields",(42) and as a torpedo gun mounted on either coastal stations or on 
a specially designed boat.(43) The ingenious concept of using additional chambers on a 
long barrel that could be ignited in succession to increase the velocity of the projectile, 
was not restricted to just the Pneumatic Dynamite Gun. It later contributed directly to 
the design rationale behind Herr Conder's World War Two German Cross Channel 
Accelerating Cannon.(44) 
While some designs incorporated technical knowledge that would not be fully developed 
until many years after the Civil War, it is also possible to identify other innovations that 
simply drew from past designs. Without actually adding to technical knowledge, these 
designs produced few advances. Either because contemporary innovators lacked the 
technical knowledge to improve the design, or because there was no significant addition 
to related technology, no advance and further improvement could be made on past 
designs. 
39. Ripley, Artillery & Ammunition (1970:176) 
40. Added to by Dr. John Brahan Read in a prototype of 1859. This was followed by the 
Mefford patent, and the Lyman and Haskell British patent 2216 in 1867; sec I.V. Hogg & J. 
Batchelor, A History of Artillery (London, Hamlyn, 1974:204) 
41. W.R. Hamilton, "American Machine Cannon & Dynamite Guns", The Century Magazine 
(Vol.36[6], October 1888:891) 
42. Hogg & Batchelor, A History of Artillery (1974:87) 
43. IBID:86 
44. IBID:204; & Ripley, Artillery & Ammunition (1970:176) 
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As the naval forces engaged in the Civil War concentrated on improving steam engines, 
armour plating, stability in deeper water, and fire-power, a direction for world-wide 
changes in naval construction was confirmed. For all the technological changes Civil 
War military innovations could draw on, the naval shipbuilders had a limited number 
of lessons to follow.(45) With the exception of the HMS Warrior and the French Gloire, 
the navies of the world were pre-occupied with sail and the wooden walls of a century 
earlier. Steam and screw propulsion made progress in a remarkably short period of 
time from 1840446) but the union of these technologies still had to accommodate design 
features from the past. 
The New Ironsides ironclad represents an example of a Civil War design that had few 
innovative features itself, but simply drew from the Warrior and Gloire, mistakes and 
all.(47) It represented an unhappy compromise shipbuilders reached between sail and 
engine; breech-loading and muzzle-loading cannon; turret technology and the battery 
configuration; armour and wood or iron plate; and the balance between size against the 
cost of an increased draught. Coupled with these design dilemmas was the designer's 
inability to resolve how to increase an ironclad vessel's speed and seagoing capacity, 
while still retaining a prow ram and large calibre ordnance. 
Very early in the development of naval ironclads, American shipbuilders had 
established from English experiments that a 4.5 inch thick iron plate, backed by teak, 
would resist the impact of the heaviest naval cannon of the time (the 68-Pounder) at 200 
yards.(48) Yet with improved techniques of gun foundry, especially with the use of a 
steel inner barrel and the addition of forged iron and wrought iron sleeves, heavier 
powder loads or increased gun size became possible.(49) 
MLR advances necessitated design improvements that would improve both the 
deployment of these cannons at sea, and protect vessels from their firepower. The value 
of a BLR cannon that could produce higher impact velocities with a smaller calibre was 
almost totally ignored. Yet the Civil War did provide compelling reasons for the 
world's most advanced navies to concentrate on those innovations that would improve 
firepower and armour. 
The inability of either the North or South to produce iron plate more than 1.5 inches 
thick also provided a brake on efforts to design vessels with thicker armour. Despite 
45.Dixon, Ships of the Victorian Navy (1987:1) 
46.Routledge, Discoveries & Inventions (1989:101) 
47.R. McBride, Civil War Ironclads (Philadelphia, Chilton Books, 1962:68); Official Naval  
Records, "The Union & Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion" (Series I, Vol.15) 
(Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1902:99) 
48.Dixon, Ships of the Victorian Navy (1987:3) 
49.IBID:4 
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advances in manufacturing techniques, the problems with producing muzzle—loader 
cannons of over 68 pounds and mounting theni on vessels, effectively limited Civil War 
naval designer's concentration on increasing armour and armament. All that was 
gained from the pre—occupation with the combat between heavier armour and heavier 
solid shot seems to be the diversion of design effort away from resolving problems with 
ironclad's sea—going capacity. This was to ensure that MLR and MLSB cannon were to 
dominate American naval arsenals well into the 1880s. 
By contrast with the lack of progress in sea—going ironclad design, the Monitor and the 
David models were responsible for injecting a new life into naval ship design. The 
Monitor was based around older designs, and highlighted the way subsequent designs 
could consolidate technical advances. Alternatively, the David used a novel design 
concept to create a new dimension in naval warfare. These vessels both formed a 
significant basis for fundamental additions to existing technical knowledge on 
shipbuilding. 
The wartime use of the telegraph and railroad technology also stand as examples of 
pre—war technical knowledge being applied in a novel manner. Concentration on 
completely new technical advances was less evident than attempts to improve the 
military utility of existing technology. In the South this lack of innovative effort may be 
traced back to the continued lack of resources necessary to produce rail and telegraphic 
equipment. However, in the North, technical advancement actually became subservient 
to making the existing technology suit combat requirements. Design development 
lagged behind the need to improve the immediate utility of the technology for field 
operations. This is not a condemnation of innovative effort. The ability to utilize 
"telegraph trains", and the linking of aerial observation with telegraph 
communications, provided an indication of the importance front—line military 
communications could play in future wars.(50) 
Similarly, in the field of medicine, technical advancement seems to have been limited by 
the absence of further breakthroughs in developmental research that could have altered 
wartime practices. Improvements in management and understanding increased the 
utility of medicine as an organised body of technical knowledge. But technology reliant 
on past knowledge needed breakthroughs in pure or applied research to fundamentally 
advance its wartime utility. 
50. Official Records (Series 3, Vol.3) (1899:293) 
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MILITARY TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
FUNCTION 
Fundamentally, an institutional framework for the encouragement of specific 
innovations was never formally devised during the Civil War. Military and government 
administrative bodies responsible for nurturing military technological change became 
centred on controllable technology. This situation was due to environmental factors 
ensuring that the developers of Civil War military technology acted in virtual isolation 
from each other. Because individuals operated on particular technologies, without exact 
knowledge of all design work in the technical field, final technological changes were 
assessed on their individual merit. The process of adoption became very competitive 
and rarely subject to evaluation by officials in possession of the full knowledge of each 
design's relative technical merits. 
There was clearly only a limited capacity for any wartime government to speed wartime 
technological development by intervening in the private sector. Additionally, current 
debate over the effect of the war on industrial production precludes any categoric 
statement that the war provided the catalyst for a massive gearing-up of productive 
capacity. Nor, finally, may we either indicate that society was responsible for removing 
barriers to military technological innovation, or formal institutions were capable of 
deliberately nurturing the most promising new technologies. 
The delays between innovation and formal support, therefore, were determined not by 
the effectiveness of the new technology, but by the capabilities of the supervising 
institution. A study of some specific organizations illustrates that regardless of the 
technology's inherent benefits, institutional inertia obstructed innovative effort. Quite 
simply, organizational practices and subsequent reforms, could not cope with either the 
rapidity, or the diversity, of changes to military technology. 
Even where bodies were established to encourage known, low-risk technological 
change, such as railroads, organizational problems restricted developments. As with 
the Quartermaster Corps, the administrative power of an institution did not mean that 
it would necessarily encourage innovation. Nor did the Engineering Corps' lack of a 
specific charter or direct influence in technical developments prevent it from playing the 
role of catalyst in the encouragement of military innovation. 
In essence the major problem limiting the promotion of innovations by Civil War 
organizations was the failure to give those with technical know-how sufficient 
autonomy. Civilians' technical knowledge was subjugated to military authority. 
Working outside the direct supervision of the military meant that many innovators had 
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to labour without the assistance of any clear statement on current or future military 
needs. Without clear institutional guide—lines, innovators realized that designs had to 
be based on established technology (with benefits known to military commanders) if 
they were to be adopted. Without the endorsement of army Head Quarters or High 
Command figures, the chances of utilizing new technology, or replacing old technology 
with new, were remote. 
The initial restriction on introduction of small arms innovations, the demise of the 
Balloon Corps, the restricted success of the Telegraph Corps, and barriers to the work 
of the Sanitation Corps, all reflect the lack of technology—specific encouragement from 
the Northern administration. Without the co—ordinated endorsement of formal 
institutions, the systematic introduction of innovations was not possible. 
PART III 






For the American Civil War to be accurately labelled the "last of the old wars and the 
first of the new",(1) military technology must be shown to have gone through a tangible 
and sustained change; it must have progressed beyond that of previous eras. 
After surveying many types of technical innovations, as well as examining 
environmental factors, it is possible to perceive a number of important features of 
military technological change in the Civil War. It appears that innovations in military—
related technology occurred in key areas. Subsequently, however, it has also been 
established that institutional support and government encouragement did not actively 
promote the rapid assessment or adoption of the most promising of these innovations. 
Thus while important technical innovations may be identified, restrictions limited the 
impact these designs and ideas could have. 
To establish more fully the impact of Civil War innovation, it is necessary to outline the 
lasting impact technological change had on wartime strategy and subsequent military 
engagements. The fact that the next chapters are outlining, rather than establishing any 
conclusions, is indicative of certain inherent problems. In conducting this study it is 
necessary to realize that the significance of military technological advances were not 
always apparent to those participating in the war. Additionally, while there is obvious 
merit in understanding the future impact of the "Civil War legacy" on subsequent 
wars, the coverage of all post—war influences is a massive undertaking. Certainly 
scholarship on the theme of lessons derived from the war, whether they be strategic or 
technological, has been shown within the earlier historiographic section of this thesis, to 
be enormous. Equally, it is open to revision and interpretation beyond the scope of this 
thesis' immediate technical concerns. 
The final chapter of this section endeavours to place wartime military technological 
change into an overall perspective. As has been postulated in chapter 1, if a 
hypothetical model of the Civil War innovation process may be drawn, then conclusions 
regarding the general growth in technical knowledge may be made. 
1. H.S. Commager, The Blue & the Grey (Vold) (Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1950:xv) 
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CHAPTER 8: THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE ON 
WARFARE DURING THE CIVIL WAR 
Precursors in the change to military hardware had been in evidence prior to the Civil 
War. In particular, the period immediately before the war was marked by 
developments in railroads, the telegraph, construction techniques used to make heavy 
ordnance, new designs of breech—loading rifles, and the evolution of the repeating rifle. 
By the end of the Civil War it was these same technical developments that were to be 
acclaimed as the best innovations. But were these changes so important? Does the 
failure to fully exploit such innovations as the breech—loading and repeating rifles, 
balloons, rockets, stink shells, and other innovations, negate the overall impact 
technological change had? Can the use of railroad and telegraph technology be held as 
the quintessential representatives of successful wartime innovative effort? 
In itself the deployment of a technology is only part of the technological change story. It 
is also very important to understand how key innovations succeeded in re—shaping 
traditional warfare. 
8.1 	 Impact of Innovation on Land Warfare 
General Sherman of the United States Army believed that the changes to "artillery, 
engineers, ordnance and staff" and "the scientific branches of the military service" had 
lifted the art of war to a strategic level where it could be considered no less than a 
science of war.(2) To General Sherman the "science of war" is the underpinning 
capacity of an army to deploy technology effectively. Sherman believed this advance 
changed the capacity of the Union forces to wage war.(3) 
The introduction of new weapons technology changed the simple art of war to such an 
extent that General Phil Sheridan (US Army) believed "nations could not make war, 
such would be the destruction of human life." (4) 
From a strategic perspective, the Civil War had many unique characteristics that were 
to remould military tactics, even before military innovations came to impact on the war. 
There existed a mass conscripted army of a size, configuration, and mobility 
unparalleled in contemporary wars. 
2. W.T. Sherman, "The Grand Strategy of the Rebellion" The Century Magazine, (Vol.35141, 
February 1888:597 & 582) 
3. In this sense the "science of war" is not refering directly to the establishment of a scientific 
body of knowledge relating to weapons development. 
4. Quoted in R.V. Bruce, Lincoln & the Tools of War (Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 
1973:298-299) 
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Although tactical units of war were still based around the 500 to 1000—man units 
common to the Napoleonic Wars,(5) they carried unique features. This included 
regiments made up of regional groups of volunteers, few of which had experienced 
officers (6) and which often had a level of intelligence and physical fitness, below that 
expected of regular soldiers.(7) Yet these loosely organised and poorly commanded 
units were expected to be mobile, to fight over rough, wooded terrain, and to do battle 
in sustained campaigns. 
When listing the important strategic phases of the Civil War, six basic periods can be 
identified: 
(i) Washington to Richmond battles 1861-62. 
(ii) Union consolidation of lines 1862. 
(iii) Confederate counter strokes (Lee & Jackson). 
(iv) Union Offensive, 1863-64. 
(v) The war of attrition by Grant and the defensive war fought by Lee 1864-65. 
(vi) From 1862 until 1865 the presence of guerrilla raids and tactics used by both 
sides.(8) 
Although both sides' strategic phases were not necessarily as systematic, the above 
description serves to illustrate certain trends in tactical operations. One of the most 
profound strategic trends was the shift from offensive tactics, to an increase in the 
importance of defensive tactics. As military technology changed, there continued to be a 
re—examination of the tactics used by fighting units. In the rough terrain and on the 
battlefields that spread over hundreds of miles without front lines, the trend towards 
irregular warfare increased. 
From 1861 to 1863, the war was marked by the inconsistent tactics used by land forces. 
In 1861 the Union army in Virginia went from one disaster to another, yet consolidation 
of command, organisation, and supply, saw Union land forces reach a level where 
military operations could be more offensive. However, from mid-1862 until 1863 the 
impetus of the Union army yielded to the superiority of the South's defensive 
5. J. Coggins, Arms & Equipment of the Civil War (New York, Double Day, 1962:21) 
6. M.C. Meigs, "On the Conduct of the Civil War", American Historical Review (Vol.26[2], 
January 1921:285-303) 
7. F.V.A. De Chanal, The American Army in the War of Secession (Kansas, Spooner, 
1894:43-440); & F.A. Shannon, The Organization & Administration of the Union Army  
(Vold) (Massachusetts, Peter Smith, 1965:156-167) 
8. Wolscley (Viscount), "An English View of the Civil War", North American Review  
((Vol.148[390], January 1889:538); & L.C.F. Turner, "The Grand Strategy of the Civil War", 
Australian Journal of Politics & History  (Vol.26[1] 1980:57-70) 
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positions.(9) Through the deficiencies of Union strategists, the war, by 1863, had 
become a war of attrition. 
A number of technical developments underpin the course of the war's strategies. Most 
importantly, the superiority of rifled small arms in defensive positions limited offensive 
operations. This was coupled with developments by both sides in observation balloons 
supporting over-the-horizon rifled artillery fire, field telegraph systems, and well 
constructed field fortifications. Defence by both sides settled into • immobile and 
unmovable front lines. Trench warfare became symbolic of the 1864-1865 campaigns. 
The siege of Petersburg itself is the epitome of the period and a most familiar precedent 
to the battles of the First World War.(10) 
As weapons reinforced defensive tactics, so they also served to promote tactical changes. 
A new system of infantry tactics was devised to avoid the destruction new small-arms 
wrought on troops attacking with line in-depth formations. Double and single ranks 
were adopted by the Union army to manoeuvre troops through difficult terrain. When 
in frontal attack, swarms and skirmishes replaced columns and ranks.(11) These tactics 
were further enhanced by the use of breech-loading and repeating arms that enabled 
men to fire and load in a prone position or to reload on the run. 
The "epoch in the history of tactics"(12) was to extend to the way generals deployed 
troops. Debate has long raged over the lack of sound strategic development in the Civil 
War and over who, of the few good leaders, was the best general. While the merits of 
Generals Grant, Lee, "Stonewall" Jackson, and Sherman, are widely debated, their 
strengths provide invaluable insights into important tactical developments.(13) 
Strength lay in Lee's defence, in Grant's retaining the initiative in offensive operations 
during 1864-65, and in the fluidity of Jackson's and Sherman's tactics and strategies. 
The characteristics of these generals have been used to illustrate the importance of 
defence in twentieth century warfare. Their actions confirmed the importance of 
attacking an enemy through the commitment of men and resources at his weakest point, 
and the commitment to total warfare that attrition forced into being.(14) 
9. W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983:242) 
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Civil War generals attributed few lessons to their predecessors tactics. General U.S. 
Grant did not underrate the value of military knowledge but he attributed little merit to 
comparing the strategic lessons Civil War generals could gain from pre—war European 
writers.(15) Clausewitz's lessons had not been extrapolated and he remained almost 
unknown; Jomini became less relevant as technical innovations saw the decreasing use 
of cavalry and shock tactics; and Wellington, Napoleon, and Marmont were dated. 
General Sherman believed their lessons applied post facto to events: 
As we won the battle, we are willing to give these authors the benefit of our 
understanding.(16) 
These words reflect the general's certainty that strategic management of the war was 
uniquely indigenous. The truth, however, lay closer to the fact that mid—nineteenth 
century military writers were applied by those post—Civil War analysts who sought to 
interpret the war's strategic lessons. Poorly trained troops and poor terrain negated 
European tactical principles. The advent of rail, telegraph, and breech—loading and 
rifled ordnance technology, altered the validity of new tactics devised in early and mid—
nineteenth century Europe. 
Before rifled cannon, small—arms, and in particular prototype rapid—fire guns, the 
Napoleonic rigid line and column tactics yielded to more open formations.(17) Troops 
also began to dig in as a normal means of protecting themselves from longer range, 
more accurate rifle and artillery fire. The art of field fortifications became a major part 
of armies' static defensive positions. 
Eventually this process of tactical improvisation led to a strategy of exhaustion. The 
strategy of exhaustion was pursued with the Union confident in its ability to use 
industrial strength to crush the Confederacy, and the South countering with the 
defensive tactics of General Lee. The process of attrition seems to evolved from meeting 
of these two antagonistic strategies. The Northern leaders,(18) were obliged to try and 
force defeat upon the South, and draw the South from its defensive positions. From late 
1863, it could be argued, that the South was hoping the Northern society's resolve for 
the maintenance of war would falter. 
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Tactics became shaped to each battle's peculiar situation. When Lee's defensive tactics 
and Grant's battering ram style offensive tactics met in a battle, all available resources 
were used to gain victory. These conflicts foreshadowed the total wars of the twentieth 
century - the types of battles where nations threw their industrial, political, and 
economic force behind military objectives; battles where nations' civilian populations 
could not feel isolated from the impact of war. 
General Sherman's push to the sea reflected the attack on strategic rail lines, economic 
resources of the South, and more importantly a challenge to the Confederate States' will 
to maintain a war against an aggressive enemy.(19) Into these strategic imperatives, 
innovations injected both a means with which to sustain a war of attrition, and a means 
to inflict greater injury on the opponent. Technical developments altered the means by 
which battles could be fought. They also changed tactics as some innovations added 
new dimensions to warfare. 
Rail in particular still stands as an example of an innovation that never had its strategic 
potential realised. Viscount Wolseley pointed out from his witnessing of the operations 
at Manassas Junction during the battle of the First Bull Run that: 
It is clear that, essentially, this railway movement was purely one of general 
reinforcement.(20) 
This observation was to reflect the general use that rail was put to during the war. 
Wolseley attributed this limitation in use to two major factors: the lack of sidings into 
which lower priority reinforcements could go to enable essential rail traffic to get 
through, and the tactical naivety of the generals, who lacked command of the lines and 
an awareness of how rail could bring troops to an enemy's flank.(21) These factors 
were to influence the American Army's use of rail throughout the war and beyond.(22) 
The failure to control the introduction and use of railroad technology severely limited 
how successfully they were deployed. Chapter 6 highlighted how the use of rail 
ostensibly became divided between the US Military Railroad Department - which 
employed civilians with the necessary technical expertise - and military commanders 
who possessed a number of unco-ordinated tactical priorities. Field commanders 
became responsible only for the protection and local operation of railways. While the 
maintenance of rail roads, logistical priorities, and overall control of rail lines remained 
in other hands. 
19.Hagerman, The American Civil War (1988:207); & Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost 
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Field commanders' need to move troops and logistics effectively, became mutually 
exclusive.(23) The use of rail by the field commanders of both sides was compounded 
by the lack of available rolling stock. For strategic reasons, then, the emphasis was 
placed on denying the enemy the use of his rail lines. The full exploitation of railroads 
as a means to move troops to advantageous positions never assumed a dominant role in 
the Civil War field commander's options. The story of the Civil War railroads is thus 
an example of how new technology can be put to use fulfilling vital functions, yet fall 
short of achieving its full military potential in these areas. Inherent organisational 
problems, and commanders' tactical short—sightedness circumvented attempts to foster 
the strategic use of railways. 
The position of the telegraph as a technical innovation that greatly assisted in managing 
field operations is a little more secure. Although used in the Crimean War, it was 
during the Civil War that the electric field telegraph achieved its greatest success as a 
command and control tool. Spread across wide spheres of action and with massed 
armies involved, Civil War leaders quickly utilised the telegraph. It was particularly 
useful in relaying orders and commands between commanders and statesmen, or 
commanders and men on the front line. The strategic control of massed armies was, 
therefore, significantly enhanced.(24) 
However, the telegraph's potential as a tactical tool was not fully realized. Innovation 
on the basic design allowed smaller, mule—pack field telegraphs which added a new 
dimension to army communications. Its use revolutionised logistical supply by 
effectively bringing the supply bases closer to the front.(25) But these more mobile field 
telegraphs were seen more as tools for enhancing executive commanders' 
communication, rather than field commanders' control over field units. Contemporary 
perception of the overall success of telegraphic technology was limited to its ability to 
make the battlefield closer to executive commanders. Technical gains in field 
telegraphic communication systems were not exploited to a point where its full value as 
a command tool could be realized.(26) 
After qualifying the strategic success of railroads and the telegraph it should not be 
assumed that their importance has in any way been reduced. In fact, the qualifications 
23. This was particularly the case at Chickamauga. The Confederate forces took over a week 
to organize the transportation of troops to the battlefield, so loosing valuable strategic 
advantage. The Union forces, however, had problems just supplying their forces. a Howard, 
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24.W.R. Plum, The Military Telegraph  (Vol.' & II) (New York, Arno Press, 1974) 
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made here stress the fact that as innovation occurred in their use and design, the latent 
technical potential of railroads and telegraph was not necessarily increased 
correspondingly. Many of the shortcomings in their use rested on the inability of 
institutions or individuals to adapt quickly to introduced changes. 
Designs did not have to be perfect on introduction for there to be advances in technical 
knowledge. In turn these technical advances could profoundly influence Civil War 
combat. The introduction of rifled small arms caused a number of tactical changes on 
the battlefield. Battle—lines stretched, armies formed for assaults further apart, the 
density of men in the battle zone reduced, and shock actions became decidedly 
subordinate to fire—fights.(27) 
As the range and firepower of rifles increased, new dimensions to warfare were 
consolidated. Shock tactics were devastated by frontal defensive flre.(28) Cavalry had 
their lances and sabres replaced by repeating carbines and revolvers. The weapons 
range, accuracy and rate—of—fire was further promoted. Weapons such as the Sharps 
breech—loading carbine, Spencer repeating rifle, and Gatling Gun proved desirable 
weapons in the new era of destructive capacity. They linked the power of technology 
change with the capacity to wage devastating warfare.(29) 
Other technical developments confirmed the importance of technological change by 
giving warring sides unknown advantages. Developments such as balloon technology, 
medicine, rockets, land torpedoes, stink shells, and others, presaged strategic 
dimensions of warfare that had not been remotely comprehended by Civil War 
generals. For some innovations the war would only be a stepping—stone in their long 
evolution. (30) 
The story of key wartime developments in rocket, stink shell, heavy artillery, weapons 
sights, grenades, and explosive ordnance is marked by their mixed success. All these 
weapons were to be the basis for experiment. For designs like rockets and heavy 
artillery, the wartime innovation by both sides was founded on pre—war research. 
Consequently, development tended to be restricted more to perfection of existing 
designs, without particular regard for the technical changes necessary to make them 
better able to meet strategic needs. 
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One technical development that never had its strategic potential fully attained in Civil 
War combat was the hollow shell. As a means of conveying chemical substances, this 
device produced a whole range of novel developments. The success of these shells, when 
deployed by the North as phosphorous anti—town shells or stink anti—personnel 
weapons, was not converted into wider deployment. The ultimate recognition of the 
stink shell's design integrity can only be acknowledged by noting that First World War 
gas shells differed little from the Civil War hollow shell design principles. 
The success of heavy artillery, grenades, and other wartime innovations may not 
necessarily be due to their designs. Often circumstances in the war permitted poor 
innovations to achieve close to their full potential. When compared to the First World 
War's steel and iron breech—loading artillery, the Civil War's basic wrought—iron 
muzzle—loading cannons were technically still in their infancy. Other weapons such as 
the hand—grenade, which was successfully used in the war, were still basically crude 
designs. The 6—pound "winged" Ketchum grenade was certainly cumbersome and 
lacked the design efficiency First World War trench warfare would encourage. Land 
torpedoes or land mines, although effective in the American conflict, were also to be 
refined in future wars. 
That a wide range of technical innovation did occur, is not disputed. There is no 
absolute reason why these new technologies should have produced strategic changes. 
Some technically advanced innovations had potential to change the conduct of war but 
were never to produce a significant impact (eg. the stink shells). Regardless of this, 
certain other innovations did produce significant reconsiderations of land tactics, even 
before they had been technically refined (eg. the BLR technology). 
Before tactics could change to match new technological capabilities, there had to be 
recognition by field commanders, that new dimensions had been added to land 
engagements. This is exemplified in a battle at Chickamauga in September 1863. 
Longstreet's confederate cavalry and men charged across open fields to assault Wilder's 
Lightning Cavalry Brigade. Armed with Spencer repeating rifles, Wilder's men were 
dismounted and under light cover of trees and ditches. Under the Spencer's fire, wave 
after wave of Longstreet's men "...appeared to melt or sink into the earth ".(31) On the 
third day of Gettysburg, the lesson was again repeated. Pickett's charge (2 July 1863) 
consisted of 15,000 men, yet only 150 reached Cemetery Ridge. Caught in the crossfire 
of rifled weapons from 300 metres onwards, they were annihilated. 
General Sherman's belief in the "science of war" may not only reflect his own 
perception of how warfare had changed but reflect the increased need for field 
31. Bruce, Lincoln & the Tools of War (1973:285) 
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commanders to identify the strategic advantage of those military innovations being 
encountered. 
8.2 	 The Impact of Innovation on Naval Warfare 
Civil War technological change made a profound contribution to naval strategy. As the 
most prominent example of a naval engagement, during a time when naval conflicts 
were scarce world—wide, the war stood as an example of how rapid industrialisation 
and technological advance could influence naval weaponry.(32) 
The basic naval strategy adopted by the North was so fundamental and well established, 
that innovations only arose from the need to meet strategic imperatives. The impact of 
innovations on tactics, however, may be discerned. The strategic master plan set for the 
Union's navy was: 
(i) the consolidation of the blockade, 1861-62 
(ii) gain control of the rivers, 1862-64 
(iii) offensive against coastal ports, 1862-65, and 
(iv) naval war of attrition, blockading the South and splitting the South down 
the Mississippi, 1862-65. 
Changes to the tactics used to achieve these aims arose from the introduction of steam 
propulsion, armour plating, turret mounted cannons, and large—calibre guns. These 
changes to technology quickly showed their dominance over older sail and wooden 
vessels in coastal engagements. 
During the American conflict steam power was extended beyond industry and applied 
to war; steam power and armour—plating on ships were combined to deadly effect. At 
the battle of Hampton Roads, these innovations were to establish a new era in naval 
warfare. The lessons learnt there, and repeated throughout the war, signalled the end 
of traditional sail—powered and wooden—constructed front—line fighting vessels. 
During the war, other innovations successfully secured their places as effective naval 
weapons. In particular, semi—submerged and submarine warfare _carried out by 
torpedo, and torpedo—related technology, established themselves as indispensable 
offensive and defensive tactics in contemporary naval conflicts. 
Naval innovations grew upon a sound base of technical expertise that was intentionally 
designed to perform critical functions. Although pre—war innovations and the early 
32. E.B. Potter & C.W. Nimitz (eds), Sea Power (New Jersey, 'Prentice—Hall, 1960:326) 
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wartime developments were often poorly designed, they did at least indicate, under 
combat conditions, the areas for more successful naval technical advancement.(33) 
As seen in chapter 3, ironclads of the Civil War were far from a revolutionary 
discovery. They were based on experiments in steam propulsion and the use of iron 
armour in warship construction that had been conducted in America and overseas since 
the early 1840s. Before the war, American naval engineering had also possessed a 
reputation for producing sound innovative designs in related areas. 
The Civil War was to be a testing and developmental stage in American naval warship 
design. During the war, ironclad designs confirmed the superiority of armoured 
warships over traditional unarmoured wooden warships. The war also served to test 
the ironclad's design features. Although John Ericsson had been accused of copying his 
design from the overseas designs of La Gloire and HMS Warrior, which pre-dated Civil 
War ironclads, the Americans were responsible for the first battle-testing of these 
innovations. 34) 
The ability of large-calibre weapons to effectively engage targets at longer ranges was 
also demonstrated. More explicit evidence was given on how an armour-plated vessels 
could withstand most forms of attack, whilst inflicting grievous damage to unarmoured 
vessels. This was even developed to a stage where ironclads could close with the enemy 
to point-blank range, and survive.(35) Ironclads were felt to be almost impervious to 
ramming, direct fire, or any other form of attack.(36) 
The example set at Hampton Roads, and repeated throughout the war, showed that 
ironclad technology included a number of innovations that proved the maritime 
supremacy of defence over offence. Most importantly, the superiority of an ironclad 
ram's ability to sink a wooden vessel was illustrated when the CSS Virginia used her 
new prow ram and sunk the USN Cumberland. To Civil War contemporaries this 
confirmed that while innovations threatened the wooden and sail principles of 
traditional naval design, modern warships had to adopt new technology to be effective 
strategic weapons in the future.(37) 
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As technology changed, it did not necessarily directly alter strategy. In fact, in the naval 
war, strategy often dictated the course of technical developments. The emphasis on 
inland waterways and coastal warfare increased the importance of shallow' draught 
ironclad designs. In turn, the use of ironclads mounting heavy-calibre smooth-bore 
cannons necessitated a re-evaluation of coastal forts, and both their construction and 
the types of heavy ordnance they mounted, became the subject of change during the 
war. 
American ironclad technology integrated many technical advances made in the course 
of the war. The incorporation of these innovations enhanced the specific operational 
and functional success of ironclad designs. 
Both sides quickly developed and introduced vessels that were purposely built on the 
principles of ironcladding, steam propulsion, and protected heavy calibre cannons.(38) 
Later combat experience demonstrated that large calibre cannons had little ability to 
pierce sloping, inch-thick iron plate with strong wooden backing. Experiments were 
also made in the North with ironclad hulls to protect against mines, armoured decks to 
protect against high trajectory ship-mounted mortars, and better stability to increase 
the seagoing performance of ironclad warships.(39) Attempts were also made to 
increase the speed and manoeuvrability of inshore or river vessels. 
An important influence on the successful utilization of ironclad technology was the 
mounting of large-calibre cannons on naval vessels. As ironclads reduced the effective 
power of small calibre cannons at sea, and as navies sought to engage land targets at 
long ranges, the importance of heavy ordnance increased. The pre-war Rodman and 
Dahlgren rifled smooth-bores provided the basis for Civil War innovation. These guns 
produced the central focus for the attempts to arm warships with a variety of calibres 
over 8 inches. 
Despite the larger calibres, the development of rams occurred because solid shot could 
not sink ironclads. The decline of masonry coastal fortifications and the introduction of 
low-profile forts with thick walls, protected by like designed large-calibre rifled smooth 
bores, was also instituted to improve coastal defence against new large-calibre sea-
borne naval cannons.(40) 
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Although large-calibre smooth-bores were successfully built using new casting 
techniques and better designs, little advance was made in breech-loading designs. Thus 
while American innovators were striving to build larger calibre smooth-bores that 
could fire heavier shot to crush and shatter iron plating, makers in Britain were proving 
the importance of high-velocity cannons.(41) In Britain, tests had shown that: 
Heavy shot and high velocity - in other words,heavy shot and heavy charges 
of powder - will smash through even six-inches of plates like glass.(42) 
Trials in Britain had demonstrated that increased muzzle velocity, plus breech-loading 
and rifling, could increase projectile velocity without the need to increase charges. This 
technical knowledge was soon adapted to self-contained ammunition in smaller-calibre 
cannons. (In fairness to contemporary American military officials, one must note that 
the British themselves adhered to muzzle-loaders until the 1880s, in defiance of the 
results from these trials.) Although possessing the breech-loading and rifling 
technology to create high-velocity large ordnance, the Americans adhered to designing 
larger muzzle-loaders that added shot weight and permitted increased powder loads. 
Adherence to the principles of muzzle-loading ordnance technology permitted episodes 
like the survival of CSS Tennessee and CSS Albemarle in confrontations with superior 
Northern fleets.(See also Appendix 25) History records the survival of ironclads that 
were hit by more than 50 heavy-calibre shells.(43) It is important to recall that it is 
doubtful whether rifled ordnance would have proved any superior to the large calibre 
smooth-bore Dahlgren cannons given the close range over which most Civil War 
ironclad engagements occurred.(44) 
The success of naval heavy ordnance was due mostly to its effectiveness in the war and 
not to its innovative technical merits. While tactics remained centred on ramming and 
close-quarter engagements, the role of existing weapons was not challenged. 
The story of torpedo technology followed a similar course. The torpedo cannot be said 
to have altered the course of any naval engagement or to have achieved the level of 
design integrity that their early innovations promised.(45) 
41. J Whitworth letter to the Editor of The Times 5 April 1862, in H. Brogan (cd), TiLe 
American Civil War: Extracts from The Times 1860-1865 (London, Times Books, 1975:69); 
& USM Journal, "Ordnance Versus Iron Plate" (1862:289-90) 
42. Trial of the 12-pounder Whitworth field gun and & 70-pounder Naval gun at 200 yards, 
USM Journal, "Ordnance Versus Iron Plate" (1862:289) 
43. R. McBride, Civil War Ironclads (New York, Chilton Books, 1962:30-31) 
44. D.C. Allard, "Naval Technology During the American Civil War", American Neptune  
(Vol.49,1989:116) 
45. M.F. Perry, Infernal Machines (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1985:196) 
192 
The torpedo's impact on Civil War naval operations can be discerned from the records 
of naval engagements. In effect, by denying free access to rivers and defended ports, 
torpedoes produced immeasurable (more supposed by the Northern commanders than 
historically apparent) restraints upon Northern tactical operations against the South. 
This permitted the South to create indecision in Union naval commanders' minds. In 
the Mississippi and James Rivers, at Charleston and numerous other Confederate 
coastal ports, torpedoes deployed by the South were able to reinforce its defensive 
capacities significantly, even though its forces were vastly inferior to the attacking 
Union forces.(46) 
Torpedoes certainly altered the mass fleet operations used to support combined 
operations against Confederate coastal bases. Single line formations became 
preferred.(47) These rudimentary torpedoes were deployed in submerged or semi-
submerged batteries that effectively deprived northern vessels access to narrow, shallow 
stretches of water. In no small way, torpedoes permitted the South to delay the Union 
navy's attempts to split the Confederacy down the Mississippi River and blockade 
coastal ports.(48) 
Design development of the torpedo never progressed at the speed early innovations 
indicated. In the South, shortages of resources and the immediate need for torpedoes, 
restricted production to a few designs with other more ingenious innovations mostly left 
on the drawing-board. In contrast, the Union production was limited more by moral 
concerns about the "civilised" nature of deploying torpedoes in warfare. Coupled with 
this were two other concerns. Fears were held by commanders that torpedoes would 
undermine ironclad technology if they became widely accepted as legitimate 
weapons.(49) The North also apparently felt torpedo technology was mainly for 
offensive use, rather than for use as a defensive weapon. The effect of torpedoes on 
ironclads has been well-documented but the successful offensive use of torpedoes is 
often under-rated. 
Development of offensive torpedo technology was centred on the use of torpedo-boats 
and submersible vessels. These developments must stand as one of the more successful 
innovation stories in the Civil War. 
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The development of the torpedo-boat centred on the South's semi-submersible David  
and Squib type vessel, and the North's Cushing type launch.(See Appendix 13 & 14)(50) 
The David class' success in operations around Charleston belied its humble beginnings. 
General Beauregard, commander of Charleston's defence wrote: 
I fear not to put on record now, that half a dozen of these 'torpedo rams', of 
small comparative cost, would keep this harbour clear of four times the 
number of enemy's iron clad gunboats.(51) 
The success of the David and Squib deeply affected the Northern commanders. Even 
the Northern Secretary of State, Frederick W Seward, was moved to issue a directive to 
maintain the safety of the fleet in this new "age of steam and torpedo ".(52) The 
Northern fleet commander, Rear Admiral John A Dahlgren, reported on the operations 
of the David that: 
Among the many inventions with which I have been familiar, I have seen 
none which acted so perfectly at first trial...The secrecy, rapidity of 
movement, control of direction, and precise explosion indicate, I think, the 
introduction of the torpedo element as a means of warfare. It can be ignored 
no longer.(53) 
Northern development of the torpedo was consolidated within a few years. Its most 
noted success occurred when it was used as an offensive weapon by Lieutenant 
Commander W B Cushing, who, using a steam launch with a spar torpedo, rammed 
and sank the CSS Albemarle on 27 October 1864.(54) Further advancement of the 
torpedo-boat followed this success. Within a few months the North had constructed the 
first purpose-built MTB (motor torpedo-boat), and by war's end had firmly fixed this 
technology into the ranks of the world's major navies.(See Appendix 15) 
Of significant note was the development attempts by both sides and, in particular, the 
desperation shown by the South, to create an effective submarine torpedo-delivery 
vehicle. Testing and development of this vehicle was to confront innovation problems 
that few would have attempted to resolve in peace time. Yet the vessel that was to go 
down in history as the first submarine craft to successfully sink an enemy's ship, was 
both a crude and inefficient design.(55) Nevertheless, the design refinements and 
50.W.B. Cushing (Commander USN), "The Destruction of the Albemarle" (Part III) of "The 
Career of the Confederate Ram Albemarle", The Century Magazine (Vol.36[3], July 
1888:432-438) 
51.Jones, The Civil War At Sea (Vol.III)(1962:53) 
52. Civil War Naval Chronology 1861-1865  (Part IV) (Washington D C, Office of Naval 
Operations, undated:39) 
53. Official Naval Records, "The Union & Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion" 
(Series I, Vol.15) (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 1902:13) 
54.G. Elliot, "Her Construction & Service" (Part I) of "The Career of the Confederate Ram 
Albemarle", The Century Magazine (Vol.36[3], July 1888:426) 
55.Jones, The Civil War At Sea (Vol.III) (1962:194); & Coggins, Arms & Equipment  
(1962:149-150) 
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experimentation in the North and the South, paved the way for not just the legacy of 
"success" left by the CSS  L Hunley, but for a revision of naval strategic planning. 
The success of the submarine served to confirm that navies could no longer command 
the coastal and inland rivers with the naval technology commonly deployed prior to the 
Civil War. Innovations could counter superior forces. Southern defenders came to 
consider the submarine and torpedo technology as a "legitimate mode of defence" that 
formed the most powerful "accessory to our limited means".(56) The torpedo especially 
became the centre for attempts by both sides to devise ingenious new naval 
weapons.(See Appendix 10 & 13) 
As torpedo technology became more refined and more reliable, it was able to be better 
deployed. By 1865 torpedoes had been successfully used submerged or semi-
submerged in water, buried on land as anti-personnel devices, and used as time bombs 
on land and at sea. 
Throughout the war, torpedoes were responsible for engendering much wider technical 
changes. Torpedoes may not have been refined into a totally reliable and efficient 
"modern" sea mine, but experimentation overcame many early shortcomings. 
To successfully pursue naval operations the North had to devise their own innovations 
to counter the deployment of torpedoes. Important innovations were made with fast 
light patrol-boats with rapid firing guns, intended primarily as fleet defences against 
torpedo-boats. Effective mine dredges and mine ploughs were devised to clear paths 
through submarine batteries (or mine fields in modern terminology).(57) On the 
vessels, iron hulls and thicker hull-side armour were introduced to protect ironclads 
from torpedo boat attack and from those deployed in the waterways. Other successful 
Northern attempts to counter night attack by torpedo weapons included electric lamps 
based on locomotive headlights, star shells, and rocket flares. 
Overall, the success of torpedoes during the war reflects the ability of innovators to 
design a weapon that had immediate uses.(58) In an haphazard manner they then 
upgraded and changed the weapon to suit new or necessary contingencies. 
As innovations improved the utility of existing technology, they served to confirm 
existing strategic operations. The development of shallow-draft Monitor class vessels 
56. Official Naval Records (Series I, Vol.26) (1914:190) 
57.For examples of these mine clearance devices Sec IBID:552-553; & Official Naval  
Records (Series I, Vol.15) (1902:14) 
58.See Perry, Infernal Machines (1985:28-29) 
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by the North and submarine torpedoes by the South, represent attempts to satisfy 
opposing strategic imperatives through different innovations.(59) 
The limitations on key innovations reflect the lack of importance strategic planners put 
on certain technical developments. If ironclads had been more seaworthy, both sides 
would have been faced with new strategic considerations. For the North, this possibility 
was neglected in favour of maintaining the existing numerical superiority of the 
blockading fleet, and producing more ironclads that could combat the threat posed by 
Confederate ironclads. For the South, there was little likelihood of development, given 
time constraints on design and the Confederacy's depleted resources. While iron-
plated vessels added a backbone to steam-driven line warships on the open sea, 
purpose-built ironclads remained primarily for shallow water deployment. 
Strategy was affected much less than battlefield tactics by the introduction of new 
technical developments. The importance of concentrating a fleet's firepower, whilst also 
enabling rams to be deployed, was realised by the Union navy. This created new naval 
formations. Defence in depth, massed firepower, mutual close support, and the 
avoidance of dangerously close manoeuvring saw formations go from the double 
indented line to experiments with double- and single-echelon lines. Finally, the single 
column was adopted. (See Appendix 25) 
The first great advantage of using single column naval formations was illustrated by 
tactics adopted by Admiral Farragut. He deployed ironclad vessels, supported by 
broadside vessels of the line, to attack coastal forts that defended East coast 
Confederate ports. This naval tactic was shown to offer strong mutual support and 
reduce the risk of obstacles in shallow waters and was to be used in the US Navy for 
many years to come. In fact, it was used when ironclads were added to the high-seas 
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The relationship between naval tactics and technology is one of reciprocity. As tactics 
changed to meet new circumstances technology evolved to fill new needs. Alternatively, 
as technical refinements and innovations were devised, ways of countering the opponent 
were often created. 
As tactics were refined and operations were successfully undertaken, strategy was 
consolidated. The North was able to employ its technological advances to assist with the 
blockade of the Confederacy, bombardment of coastal installations and those close to 
inland waterways, carry out amphibious operations, patrol and secure inland rivers, 
provide and maintain army communications, and capture forts and cities.(61) In 
response, the ingenuity of Confederate innovators, with their limited resources, 
enhanced the South's strategy of resisting the North's attempts to attain its strategic 
aims. 
On reflection, one can see that the achievements in the North's and the South's efforts to 
develop naval technology marked a new epoch in nineteenth century warfare. 
Measured by the overall impact naval technical changes made on the conduct of the 
Civil War, it must stand as one of the most persistent success stories of naval innovation 
to come from the preceding two centuries of naval conflict. 
8.3 	 Amphibious Operations and the Impact of 
Technological Change on Strategy 
As military technology and the materials available to wage war changed, military 
operations during the Civil War did not necessarily automatically alter. The impact of 
new technology on combat operations has been delineated in two key areas. These are 
the entrenchment of men on the battlefield, and amphibious operations. 
The hasty construction of field entrenchments and earthworks by Civil War soldiers has 
stood as one of the most important lessons for later wars.(62) The war is studied as an 
important phase in the evolution of entrenchment on the battlefield. In effect, the 
increasing use of rifled arms by the end of 1862, had influenced the infantry soldier to 
place himself in a dug out pit whenever he paused on the battlefield. The longer he 
stayed in position the greater depth, inter—linking of individual pits, and sophistication 
these earthworks attained.(63) 
The evolution of trench warfare became more consolidated after the actions of 
individual soldiers was augmented by the Corps of Engineer's skills, when deliberate 
entrenchment was conducted on a large scale. As the war of manoeuvre settled into a 
61.IBID:327 
62.Mahon, "Civil War Infantry Assault Tactics"(1961:66) 
63.Hagerman, The American Civil War (1988:236) 
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war of exhaustion,(64) the use of defensive field works by the Confederate forces, and in 
turn by the Union forces, became a necessary military skill. 
General W T Sherman attributed to the terrain and "intrenchments", the cause of high 
losses in his attacking forces in 1865.(65) Modern authors have also perceived the 
wartime evolution in trench warfare as the single most important reason for the war 
being a harbinger of modern warfare.(66) Trench warfare has also been held to 
represent the end to the war of manoeuvre and the introduction of a period of strategic 
manoeuvre or defensive positioning from 1864.(67) The responding changes 
tostrategies also instilled tactical and institutional revisions that were to cause a post-
war re—evaluation of military practices.(68) 
However, only an uncertain emphasis may be placed on the impact of entrenchments as 
a significant wartime innovation. The maintenance of the war of attrition can be seen as 
an important period in the evolution of warfare only if it is acknowledged that the 
generals were unable to use available military force to break the deadlock. In effect the 
strategy of the day supported defence, with the offensive technologies of the day only 
overcoming defensive positions with difficulty. 
In the case of amphibious operations a much greater emphasis can be placed on the use 
of new technology to support the breaking of the defensive strategies by supporting 
innovative offensive tactics. As an offensive operation conducted by the Union forces 
against the defensive Confederate coastal forts or river strongholds, amphibious 
warfare is the epitome of how technological changes impacted on the traditional 
conduct of military operations. 
The stress placed on land operations by the Union commanders influenced the 
performance of amphibious assaults and the allocation of sufficient resources to 
combined operations.(69) The concentration on the study of the history of land warfare 
has also biased modern historians' assessments of how technological changes impacted 
upon Civil War combat. 
64.A. Jones, Jomini & the Strategy of the American Civil War, A Reinterpretation", Military 
Affairs (Vol.34[4], December 1970:127) 
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(Vol.4) (New Jersey, Castle, reprint 1980:248) 
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Rowena Reed wrote in 1978 that: 
The planning of combined movements, their relation to Federal war aims, 
the effect of technological change on their design and execution, and the 
multiplicity of economic and political factors influencing the use of combined 
operations have not been previously examined. Nor has the development of 
combined tactics received enough attention.(70) 
Contemporaries of the Civil War did not overlook many of the lessons that could be 
derived from amphibious assaults on Confederate defensive positions. Viscount 
Wolseley noted that the assault on Charleston proved points that could only be tested 
under the combat conditions existing during the war.(71) 
From the end of 1862 the Confederate forces had no real capacity to defeat the Union 
blockade. But in their efforts to defend themselves against river and coastal assault 
they produced a fundamental consolidation of defensive technical knowledge.(72) In the 
construction of defensive forts the South united many technical advances. 
While recognizing the wartime importance of the most "complete blockade" in 
history,(73) Rear Admiral D D Porter (USN) still acknowledged the advances already 
made by the Confederacy in their capacity to construct defensive forts. Despite the lack 
of time and resources, the construction of low profile "dirt and sand bag" forts with 
rifled "foreign guns" provided what Porter believed was an even more formidable 
defence than the "old—fashioned" masonry constructions.(74) Coupled with the use of 
obstructions in the form of submarine batteries (mine fields), submerged obstacles, land 
mine fields and entanglements, attacking forces could not close to bring armed force to 
bear on the fortifications.(75) When placed together, the new form of defensive works 
were more formidable than had previously existed. The ability of offensive forces to 
meet the challenge posed by these supporting defensive technologies represents an 
important phase in the wartime deployment of new technologies to support strategic 
imperatives. 
The attack on Charleston had held low priority for Rear Admiral J A B Dahlgren 
because of its seemingly impregnable defences.(76) Yet amphibious operations were 
70.R. Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War  (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 
1978:ix) 
71."An English View", (Vol.149, July 1889:594) 
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75.Q.A. Gillmore (USArmy), "The Army Before Charleston in 1863", in Battles & Leaders 
(1980:71-72) 
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Defence of Charleston" in Battles & Leaders (1980:1-23); & for a profile of the Charleston 
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still considered as the most important means of threatening the inland railroads and 
communication links, and challenging the heart—land of the Eastern war theatre.(77) 
By mid-1864 it was obvious that the capture of Charleston and the more impregnable 
harbour defences were necessary if the strategy of blockade and the naval support of 
land operations was to be achieved. 
In 1863 limited progress had been made towards defeating the Charleston harbour 
defences. The slow firing, but well protected Monitor craft, were backed by faster firing 
broadside ships to effect the total destruction of Fort Sumter.(78) By January 1865, 
strategy for the assault of Confederate forts had evolved to a point where the seemingly 
impregnable Confederate Fort Fisher, fell to the combined efforts of a naval force 
headed by ironclads, and land forces lead by General Butler.(79) 
The North succeeded in this latter attack only because the commander, Admiral Porter, 
had learnt how to integrate ironclads into his fleet, and realized the importance of joint 
preparatory planning between naval and ground troops. The success at Fort Fisher 
highlighted how the Union forces could also plan, conduct, support, and aid troops in 
combined operations. Against an enemy force intent on defending the last remaining 
major port still open, the naval and land forces were still able to be victorious. 
The impact ironclads could produce on fortifications was central to the successful attack 
on Fort Fisher. Earlier in the war combat experiments had been conducted to assess the 
use of different ammunition against Confederate forts.(80) A combination of hollow 
explosive ammunition, explosive projectiles, and solid shot against forts had been shown 
to be most effective. 
The bringing to bear of sufficient naval force was not necessarily a lesson that would be 
easily learnt by Union commanders. With a total weight of metal at 14268 pounds and a 
combined broadside weight of 9288 pounds, in his attack on Mobile Bay Admiral 
Farragut felt convinced he had an attacking fleet of unparalleled might.(81) 
Nevertheless, a torpedo claimed the ironclad Tecumseh and more sailors than assault 
troops died in the subsequent attack on Fort Gains.(82) 
77. Beringer (et al), Why the South Lost (1986:199); & H. Hattaway & A. Jones, How the 
North Won (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1983:142-143) 
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Doubts as to the ironclads' ability to be deployed effectively against shore batteries (83) 
were overcome as innovations and techniques _improved the technologies general 
efficiency of existing technology. In an evolution of strategy, supported by new 
technologies, combined operations were improved. As an unconscious response to 
Confederate defences the North had to develop ways to meet their strategic goals. For 
the Confederate forces, the initial spur to defend their coast and rivers promoted the 
innovative use of available technical knowledge. 
Innovations in technology and technique permitted amphibious operations to succeed in 
meeting the corresponding changes being devised by the defensive forces. With the 
support of technological changes, combined operations consolidated a new strategic 
dimension in contemporary military annals. The establishing of these lessons under 
Civil War combat conditions, therefore, increased further the value of these lessons for 
future wars. 
83. Reed, Combined Operations (1978:297) 
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CHAPTER 9: THE IMPACT OF CIVIL WAR TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE ON THE WORLD ARENA 
For contemporary nations, the immediate consequences of Civil War military 
technological change were less than profound. While European armies disregarded 
certain combat tactics as unique to the war, they consistently failed to appreciate the 
success of those innovations involved. 
In spite of an initial reluctance to acknowledge the importance of American innovations, 
some technologies were nonetheless to exert a significant influence on the conduct of 
warfare. While few perceived the Civil War as having any special characteristics, some 
foreign military observers still managed to identify important changes that were 
affecting the conduct of warfare. Observers such as the Frenchman Vigo Roussillon, 
noted that the "great strides in weapons, military transport, signals and engineering 
devices" held a positive interest for European armies.(1) The Russian Ambassador to 
Washington, Baron de Stoeckl, wrote that the battle at Hampton Roads: 
marks an epoch in naval history...shows beyond a reasonable doubt the 
superiority of armour—plated ships over wooden ones. (2) 
Such insights could not be passed over as unique observations from men with great 
vision or some fortuitous predictions made by chance. Such penetrating observations 
were repeatedly made by many observers of the Civil War conflict.(3) 
How then was it that no clear message of the Civil War's importance, particularly as an 
indicator of the power of modern technological developments, was conveyed directly to 
the major world powers? 
Having studied the technological innovations of the Civil War and examined their 
impact on arms and battlefield strategies, we must now consider their impact on the 
armies and navies of other nations. 
1. J. Luvaas, The Military Legacy of the Civil War (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
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9.1 	 The Legacy of Military Technological Change 
Two lessons should be immediately apparent from the technical advances than occurred 
during the American Civil War. Firstly, the North's massive industrial base permitted 
it to design and produce weapons that gave it an unchallenged strategic advantage over 
the South. The second lesson may, however, seem to contradict this, for the South's 
ability to conduct its own defence was also greatly enhanced by the successful 
deployment of some crude, but nonetheless ingenious, weapons. Taken together, these 
two lessons illustrate that technical changes were not only becoming a vital process in 
the conduct of war, but that the resultant technological developments were affecting the 
means of conducting armed conflict. 
Contemporary students of the Civil War never fully appreciated the process of • 
technological change. When we look at their acceptance of how technical innovations 
could affect warfare, we get a mixed response. Differences lay in the perception of how 
industrialization could alter not only the means of producing weapons but the range of 
weapons available to those participating in martial conflict. For Europeans the 
methods of conducting war had been established in the writings of Napoleon, 
Wellington, Frederick the Great, Jomini, and Clausewitz.(4) Consequentially, these 
writings dictated the type of weapons deployed in European campaigns. 
While the American Civil War emerged as the testing ground of new technology and 
highlighted a new approach to warfare, for the European military leaders, it was 
generally viewed as just adding a new dimension to existing strategies. It was not widely 
regarded as a divergence from accepted past military strategies. 
As has been already found, the use of rail represents an important lesson enforced by 
Civil War experiences. The precedents, problems, and potential for railroads were 
established in the war and set the example "the rest of the world had simply to follow, 
adapt or perfect." (5) It was immediately apparent that rail increased mobility by 
reducing the size of supply columns.(6) Europeans realised that this would enable them 
to range over greater distances, go further from their supply depots, and, given the size 
of Western Europe, rapidly deploy and support soldiers from a home base. 
4. R.A. Leonard, A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War (London Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
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The lessons contained in the Civil War, however, should not be overstated. Rail had 
been used as a military tool in Europe prior to 1861.(7) The strategic significance of rail 
was acknowledged by the Prussians when during 1864, they established a railways 
section in their General Staff. In 1866, the Field Railway Section (which was modelled 
on the US Construction Corps) was added to the Prussian army.(8) In practice the 
railway played a vital strategic role in the Prussian wars against the Austrians during 
1866, and then against the French in 1870. 
The use of ironclads in the Civil War also represents an example of how the value of 
technical knowledge could be confirmed, then through subsequent use have its military 
utility enhanced by technical refinements. Ironclad vessels had been launched by the 
English and French from 1859 onwards. Throughout the Civil War both these nations 
participated in a race to build more and better ironclad warships. But American 
purpose-built ironclads with turret mounted cannon and steam propulsion, produced 
weapon systems that offered new potential to European nations. The proof of ironclads' 
superiority over wooden vessels and the speed with which the United States built such a 
formidable fleet, accelerated the pace of other world navies development of ironclad 
technology. 
The lessons learnt from the deployment of ironclad technology were, however, not 
always clear. Hampton Roads in particular showed the power of an ironclad ram 
against wooden vessels. The conflict between the Monitor and Virginia was much less 
decisive. In this conflict no significant lessons were learnt about how to improve 
ironclad vessels offensive capabilities. This was the case throughout the war, with no 
significant indications being made on how to decisively improve the architecture of the 
vessels, or to promote the use of different artillery types.(9) 
The means of countering ironclads in coastal or river systems were also quickly 
appreciated. As ironclads were developed the ancillary need to possess torpedoes, 
torpedo-boats, patrol-boats, and boats capable of deploying rapid firing weapons, to 
destroy small attacking vessels was also realised. 
By 1870 torpedoes, torpedo-boats, monitors, and sea-going ironclads could be found in 
Sweden, France, Britain, Spain, the Russian western and far eastern navies, Chile, Peru, 
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Aix. See Pratt, The Rise of Rail-Power (1915:9-10) 
8. J. Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815-1940 (Chicago, 
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and elsewhere.(10) Despite this, the lessons of the Civil War were quickly suppressed. 
From 1866 till 1874 the US Congress failed to sanction any new naval construction.(11) 
The reduced emphasis on naval forces in the rest of the world also meant failure to 
expand on the new naval technology started by the Civil War.(12) Although Britain, 
France, and some other European nations undertook to armour warships and 
experiment with new cannons, important design innovations progressed slowly. 
Many weaknesses of early ironclads were not to be overcome until the 1880s. The use of 
muzzle—loading rifled cannons, the lack of open—sea stability due to the low Monitor 
style freeboards, and poor engine designs remained.(13) Many Monitor designs, as laid 
out by John Ericsson and later improved by Ericsson and other designers, were to 
remain in naval front—line service till after the First World War.(14) Other naval 
designs such as torpedo—boats and patrol—boats were refined as cheap alternatives to 
building larger vessels. The submarine, however, had to wait until the 1880s and 1890s 
before its design included modern propulsion systems and satisfactory underwater 
capabilities.(15) 
Naval technology had an impact on the world's navies, confirming basic developments 
already experimented with by some nations. However, the stagnation in naval 
development for almost two decades after the Civil War brought to a standstill the 
development of innovations made in the war.(16) 
Like the development of the ironclads and the railway, the telegraph had its potential 
more fully exploited after the Civil War. The electric telegraph and its mobile field 
model added a new strategic dimension to the use of large armies. It added new 
potential for the command and control of large armies over widely spread fronts. 
Coupled with rail, the telegraph became an accepted tool necessary for American 
commanders to efficiently co—ordinate troops. 
The telegraph's use in the Civil War served to confirm how it could be used on a large 
scale. The fact that European nations already had the rudimentary technology, but 
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used the electric telegraph as a more developed military tool only after 1862, can be 
credited to the American Civil War. The war showed how innovations had expanded its 
battlefield utility and made it a more effective controller of front-line operations. 
In small arms technology, it is less easy to identify the extent to which Civil War 
innovations affected other nations. Developments occurred across such diverse areas 
and with such a varying degrees of success, that their importance to other nations is 
difficult to estimate. 
By 1866 most European armies were experimenting with alternatives to rifled muskets. 
Since the early 1850s, Prussia had experimented with the Dreyse needle gun which was 
the forerunner of the bolt-action rifle. By 1862 the design was refined to a 0.47 calibre 
needle gun that was to equip all Prussian infantrymen.(17) By 1866 the French had also 
introduced a 0.434 calibre Chassepot bolt-action rifle.(18) (See Appendix 23) Austrians 
were also introducing the bolt-action Snider Rifle by the mid-1860s. All these rifle 
designs were converted or designed to take centre-fire metallic cartridges. However, in 
1863 none of the designs could match the efficiency or firepower of the American 
Sharps or Spencer rifles. Nor had the designs overcome the problem of machining a 
breech assembly that would prevent gas leakage. This was compounded by their better 
quality nitre which produced greater pressure on firing. 
By the end of the American Civil War, Britain still relied on the 1853 Enfield percussion 
rifle as its major infantry weapon. It was essentially the US Springfield, made from 
machinery and mills imported from America in the mid-1850s. By 1870 Britain 
adopted the breech-loading, rimfire, single-shot rifle based on the same design. This 
was in fact a copy of the system the Americans had adopted, when in 1868, they 
converted their Springfield rifles to fire rimflre metallic cartridges.(19) Britain, like 
America, stayed with a reliable, conservatively modified rifle, that cost little to convert 
from existing rifled musket stocks. 
As with the ironclads, the small-arms technological changes were not developed after 
the Civil War. However, isolated examples of continued innovation did occur. In the 
area of rim-fire and centre-fire metallic cartridges, the Civil War established their 
superiority, and rifles, revolvers, and machine-gun designs were refined to better use 
these ammunition developments. European cavalry still spurned the use of breech-
loaders and revolvers, for the sabre and lance. While machine-guns were still being 
deployed as artillery pieces. Despite such limitations, American technological 
innovations in all these areas still influenced European armies. 
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Technology transfer from America to the world was quickly achieved through 
individual innovators relocating in Europe. Just as Ericsson was to take the Monitor 
design to Sweden and South America,(20) so Benjamin Hotchkiss took his knowledge 
and innovations to France. Here he became responsible for establishing a whole new 
generation of weapons innovations. Colt, Smith & Wesson, and Winchester firearms 
companies, extended their weapons designs and foreign sales to the European arms 
market. 
As the post-war American market was saturated with wartime weapons, the numerous 
wartime arms manufacturers had to look overseas to find new markets. As arms were 
sold in Europe, so the means to produce these arms were relocated to the market 
centres. Prior to 1861, only Great Britain had imported American small-arms 
machine-tools and milling techniques. By 1870, however, Belgium, Spain, Turkey, 
Denmark, and Egypt had followed suit.(21) 
Regardless of the advantage in firepower or design that the American rifles and pistols 
held, European nations ignored them when re-arming their infantry. Through the 
Europeans' nationalistic honour or through their failure to appreciate their tactical 
role, American weapons did not gain wide adoption in the leading European armies. 
Design features were used, or innovators from America were employed, but the 
weapons themselves remained largely overlooked. 
Of all the small arms to create an impact on the international arena, the machine-gun 
stands out. The Gatling gun's greatest impact was to occur outside the confines of the 
Civil War. The success of the Gaffing was dependent on post-war improvements in its 
rate of fire, metallic ammunition, alternative calibre sizes, and later the perfection of its 
cooling and magazine feed.(22) It was adopted widely by such nations as Great Britain, 
Russia, France, and Turkey. It was to be used extensively on land and at sea. 
In comparison to the French Mitrailleuse, the Gatling was more reliable and quickly 
able to enforce its tactical role as a defensive weapon. The success of Russian Gatling 
Guns used against the Turks, and the success of the British weapons when used in their 
colonial wars, laid the foundation for further machine-gun design work. Designs such 
as the Gardiner, Nordenfeldt, and Maxim guns, evolved rapidly. These designs in turn 
created a degree of mechanical efficiency in machine-guns that was to provide perhaps 
the single greatest impact on land conflict after the turn of the century.(23) 
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A number of other Civil War military technological innovations were to affect the 
armies and navies of the world. In 1864 Britain sent a commission to investigate a 
number of areas that interested the British War Lords.(24) The final Gallway and 
Alderson Report of 1864 listed a number of innovations, that were a strong indication of 
the technologies that were to affect other nations' contemporary military development. 
The key areas of examination included: (a) the system of rifling used; (b) breech-
loading and polygonal oval boring; (c) lead-coated projectiles; (d) composition of field 
batteries; (e) rifled guns available to fire round shot; (1) how to strengthen cast guns; (g) 
the operation of balloons; (h) the value of explosive bullets or "small arm rifle shells"; 
(i) the use of steam traction for military transport; (j) success of union repeating guns or 
other multi-barrelled rifled weapons used in the field; (k) the problem of confusion on 
calibres and the damage done to supply; (1) the merit of small arms used and contrived 
(range, accuracy, rate of fire, and so on).(25) 
It is worthy of note that the British War Lords were interested in the impact 
technologies had on the war. The Report represents the extent to which the British, at 
least, used the Civil War as a reference point in their assessment of how military 
innovations were able to perform. 
The pool of technical knowledge created by experiments with grenades, defensive 
positions, weapon sights, hollow artillery shells carrying chemical mixtures, flare guns, 
trench mortars, sea mortars, rail guns, new explosive ordnance, and so on, all 
contributed to industrialised nations' ability to further build new military innovations. 
Unfortunately, much Civil War technical innovation was lost, either because it could not 
establish its vital tactical role or because post-war stagnation in arms development 
stifled interest. The US model Sharps and Spencer rifles, for instance, were more 
effective weapons than the Dreyse. The Dreyse had a weak firing-pin, inferior 
ammunition, and a bolt configuration that did not completely stop gases from escaping. 
Nevertheless, it was still considered a marvellous weapon when it devastated Austrian 
massed line-in-depth formations in 1866.(26) In the Russian-Turkish War, the use of 
Winchesters, Gatling guns, and land mines harkened back to the Civil War. With the 
war's removal from Europe, the reliance on siege warfare, and the pre-occupation of 
Europeans with Prussia's military presence, the impact of such insights were much 
reduced. 
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The impact of Civil War military technological development may be linked to a number 
of important influences. Seemingly the European nations were all too willing to accept 
the lessons of the war in a haphazard fashion. Existing military needs determined the 
rate of technical development. Unfortunately, priorities were established by weighing 
the economic cost of innovations against immediate military threats. Thus, naval 
technology was accepted quickly but evolved slowly.(27) Land warfare innovations 
were accepted slowly and developed, for the most part, only spasmodically. 
Safe technology that built upon known technical developments or could be introduced 
without disrupting the configuration of existing military institutions was most likely to 
find early acceptance. But innovations and the new pool of knowledge created by 
recently deployed or designed Civil War weapons, apparently influenced future 
international 	 military 	 technical 	 knowledge. 
9.2 	 The Civil War as a Testing Ground for 
Subsequent Wars 
Liddell-Hart wrote: 
... when the analyst passed from the American Civil War to the Wars 
in Europe which followed on its heels he is likely to be impressed above 
all by the sharpness of its contrasts.[sic](28) 
In Europe, battles were again to be conducted on open meadows with disciplined 
soldiers, artillery in close-fire support, and cavalry with sabres and lances. They fought 
to secure the offensive initiative. 
Did, then, any of the Civil War's innovations contribute to subsequent wars? 
To European military experts the strategic lessons of the Civil War had little 
importance. They saw the American war as a battle between semi-regular forces of the 
North and virtual guerilla forces of the South.(29) For Helmuth Von Moltke, the Chief 
of the Prussian General Staff, studying the "movements of armed mobs" (30) was 
dismissed as uninformative. Moltke's views reflected the general opinion held in the 
world's leading armies, that the American forces were not only unprofessional but were 
also led by part-time generals who constantly made flagrant mistakes and tactical 
27. Allard, "Naval Technology" (1989:122) 
28. B.H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach (London, Faber & Faber, 1967:154) 
29. Liddell-Hart, Strategy (1967:142) 
30. M. Earle (ed), Makers of Modem Strategy (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1973:166) 
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miscalculations.(31) The men they led were seen as undisciplined, poorly dressed, 
lacking in co—ordination when in attack, and too eager to take cover when under 
fire.(32) 
European armies could not accept the abandonment of traditional line and column 
tactics. They were too ready to blame poor leadership, lack of discipline, and the 
American terrain for these tactical anomalies. The success of General Lee's 
Napoleonic—style battles of 1861 and early 1862 was viewed with more interest.(33) The 
strategy of attrition and attempts at Southern annihilation by General Grant and 
General Sherman in 1864 and 1865 were seen as avoiding brief Napoleonic—style 
climactic battles. This defied the Continental tactics of Jomini, Clausewitz, and others, 
in which troops should be concentrated in a swift strike against an enemy's weakest 
point.(34) 
Equally incomprehensible to European analysts of the Civil War was the relegation of 
cavalry to mobile infantry. Cavalrymen were deployed as guerilla units or in skirmish 
lines in front of armies, but were not used as shock troops.(35) The concept of using 
mounted troops solely for interdiction and reconnaissance was not to be found in 
European books on tactics. It was not until 1870 at Rezonville, Sedan, when the 
Chasseurs d'Afrique were destroyed by Prussian small—arms and artillery fire, that 
Civil War lessons on the futility of using cavalry to attack prepared troops armed with 
modern weapons were rediscovered.(36) 
Although the Civil War had confirmed the argument of Clausewitz that defence was the 
stronger form of war,(37) Europeans often overlooked this singularly important 
strategic lesson. More astounding was the ability of contemporary armies to ignore 
even the most significant tactical lessons that resulted from technological changes. This 
ignorance of the war's true strategic legacy is forwarded by many modern authors as 
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the greatest reason why the war never has attained a clear place in the evolution to 
modern warfare.(38) 
Many important nineteenth century tactical developments became features of the Civil 
War. The use of cover and movement in attack was necessary due to the longer range 
and greater accuracy of small arms and artillery. Also, small-arms developments 
allowed men to load and fire from the prone position.(39) Cavalry armed with breech-
loading rifles and revolvers were a far more flexible tactical tool, with improved 
offensive and defensive uses. The improvements in the accuracy and range of artillery 
permitted not only more effective fire support for troops but also precipitated 
improvements in defensive positions.(40) As engineering of entrenched defensive 
positions improved, a shadow was forever cast over the fast mobile shock tactics 
common to mid-nineteenth century Europe. Increasingly, it was the commanders 
capacity to supply and keep a massed army in the field, that became the decisive 
indicator of the types of strategy employed.(41) General Longstreet wrote at the end of 
the Civil War that the: 
...time had come when it was imperative that the staff of generals and 
the strategy and tactics of war should take the place of muscle against 
muscle. (42) 
He reflected the vision that European Generals felt had remained unchanged. 
Longstreet desired a return to an "art of war" that had been forgotten, not the strategy 
of exhaustion, that dominated Civil War generalship.(43) 
The European armies' tactics, and particularly the Prussians' offensive strategy,(44) 
were concentrated under offensive tactics that preserved not only the army's integrity of 
purpose but also its fluidity of movement. Assessed on this basis, the American tactics 
were negative and strategic objectives were not effectively consolidated. 
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The major European powers were not prepared to concede that American battlefield 
tactics of open-order swarms or flexible linear battalion or company formations were 
acceptable. The British from Wellington until Lord Kitchener in 1880 maintained two-
deep linear formations.(45) The French did not change until the 1870s when the 
Chassepot rifle was widely used, and their defeat at Sedan forced changes to attacking 
in columns. The Prussian, Von Moltke, although a visionary, still directed massed 
troops at decisive points. His tactical system was reliant on the sub-unit formation 
patterned on Napoleonic principles.(46) Not until the Chassepot devastated Prussian 
ranks - in 1870 at St. Privat, the Prussian Guards Corps lost 8,000 in 20 minutes - did 
experimentation with new formations occur. 
Strategically, the general course of military operations in the North and South was 
viewed by other nations against a backdrop of "enormous tactical blunders." (47) These 
blunders often occurred because technical developments had altered tactical situations. 
Generals of both sides often failed to realise how new technology had altered battlefield 
tactics.(48) Innovations also provided a two-edged sword to commanders. Rail offered 
new mobility, but Civil War commanders tended to cling to rail while advancing, so 
removing flexibility and bold manoeuvres from campaigns.(49) The telegraph, while 
improving communications, also provided an unprecedented opportunity for political 
authorities to interfere in the implementation of strategy. 
Without a strong American General Staff Corps or similar organisation (the US War 
Board of the General Staff from 1861 to 1863 had little real strategic control and was 
mostly an informal institution),(50) the European armies, with their strong central 
military organisations, saw both the Northern and Southern strategies as unco-
ordinated.(51) Control of resource allocation and swift deployment of troops were seen 
as having no structure. General Meigs, a strong critic of fellow Northern generals, 
admitted that no single man was "the author of all the plans of campaign finally 
accepted."(52) The Europeans felt justified in believing they had no lessons to learn 
from the bodies organizing Civil War strategy. 
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Reluctance to learn from organisational arrangements in the North still did not limit the 
lessons observers learnt from the use or misuse of technical innovations. 
Captain Justus Scheibert, of the Prussian Army, noted the use of rifled artillery on 
traditional masonry and earthworks.(53) He wrote of the decline of old defensive 
structures and noted the power of defence. The power of entrenchments to negate 
superior numbers and weapons was also examined.(54) The Duke of Cambridge 
believed that the spade and axe had ushered in a new age of defence. He believed the 
improvements in small arms and artillery would increasingly make defensive 
entrenchments a permanent feature of wars.(55) On land "lavish examples of the 
problems and possibilities which rail transport provided to strategists" (56) were 
illustrated by the Civil War. ,Rail as a means of supply, and reinforcement, and as a 
strategic objective itself, was shown to European observers. 
In the air, balloons were watched by many nations with interest. Interest in balloons for 
military purposes was revived in Britain, France and Prussia. One observer, Graf von 
Zeppelin, was himself to become famous for his promotion of airship technology. 
The influence of small—arms technology on military tactics was recorded by a number 
of observers, none of whom was more influential in his home country than G F R 
Henderson. His writings, including such works as, Stonewall Jackson and the American  
Civil War (1898), the Campaign of Fredericksburg Nov—Dec 1862: A Tactical Study for 
Officers and numerous essays,(57) were widely read by military cadets in Britain 
around the turn of the century.(58) Nevertheless, it is difficult to discern any significant 
impact having been made by Civil War tactical lessons on European military 
doctrine.(59) 
Other observers, such as Viscount Wolseley, noted that tactical changes were caused by 
technology changes at sea. Wolseley believed it was important to note how the strategy 
of the Northern navy and army was made in consideration of each other. In fact, he 
credited combined operations, amphibious landings, increased coastal defence, and the 
use of ironclads and patrol—boats in inland areas to support land warfare, with having 
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added a new strategic dimension to military strategic journals.(60) At the same time, 
Wolseley continually confirmed how technical developments reinforced the basic naval 
strategy of blockade. 
Fundamentally, the world's navies observed how Northern superior numbers and 
technical innovations were able to deny command of the sea to the South. The tactical 
use of the navy to blockade the South, control rivers, and support army operations, 
served to provide the conditions where their strategy could succeed.(61) 
In naval matters, observers and the writings of contemporary American naval 
commanders found a more immediate audience. The use of single—column deployment 
of line warships, adoption of armour and armament to facilitate close—quarter gun 
duels, and the use of defensive technologies such as torpedoes and their delivery 
vehicles, were widely noted. However, just as technological innovations inspired similar 
developments the world over and then stagnated, so tactical developments also 
stagnated.(62) 
Developments had not removed or changed the strategic imperatives of the world's 
leading maritime nations. Tactics were affected by technical developments that 
occurred in the Civil War or by later innovations, but few major nations were engaged 
in wars involving control of the seas. While the technical character of naval wars 
changed rapidly, its strategic impact was stifled. Not until the 1880s, and more fully in 
the next century,(63) were the modern weapons of naval warfare able to exert their 
influence upon a nation's grand strategy. 
Essentially, the Civil War provided an influential combat testing ground for modern 
naval technology. The impact of certain technological changes were established, but 
advances were limited to the immediate new strategic considerations of the war.(64) 
For instance little was derived by way of using ironclad vessels in the open seas against 
enemy forces. 
The study of Civil War technology change lent weight to other nations' knowledge of 
certain tactics. The impact of new technology and aspects of how it could be deployed 
were observed. At sea, as on land, there does not appear to have been a concerted 
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attempt by any leading nation to adopt Civil War tactics directly. The drawn-out 
conflict was blamed on the failure of generals to achieve a quick and decisive victory. 
Technical innovations did not apparently alter this situation; and, therefore, it was 
thought the contribution of these new technologies should be considered only with 
regard to their ability to assist existing European strategies. 
Many other features of the Civil War were to be translated into action around the 
world. Technological advances and tactical changes were reinforced in wars such as the 
Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the Chile-Peru conflict, and British battles against the 
Zulus, the Ashantees along the Gold Coast, and the Boers in South Africa. 
In the Russo-Turkish conflict, for instance, the siege of Constantinople illustrated the 
power of Turkish defensive tactics. In battle, Turks used repeating Winchesters, 
Gatling guns, and land mines to hold off Russians who also deployed the Gatling gun 
(renamed the "General Gorloff"). In the Chile-Peru conflict, the power of ironclads in 
joint operations and repeating small arms in land conflicts was highlighted. Against the 
Ashantees, the British took balloons and a telegraph signals section. Against the Zulus, 
one Gatling gun was able to cut down 473 Zulus in a 500-yard arc when they charged a 
British defensive position.(65) 
Numerous stories exist of how Civil War innovations had affected conflicts around the 
world. As railroads spread across the globe, their military capabilities became a major 
consideration. From 1864 to 1876 the Gatling gun was adopted by Russia, Turkey, 
Tunis, Morocco, Japan, and European nations. Its extensive use, modification, and 
suitability for use on land or sea, presented enormous firepower to even the most 
ancient armies. 
The Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 have been 
regarded as more akin than the Civil War to the total wars of the twentieth century. 
They deployed modern weapons of mass destruction and necessitated a massive 
commitment of the State to the war. This total war concept has been used to distinguish 
between the limited wars of more traditional eras. Here limited interests, limited 
objectives, and the restricted time and geographic space of conflict involved less 
sustained strategic operations.(66) Although definitions vary in detail, and despite the 
fact that neither expression is really satisfactorily defined, the Civil War is often not 
included with the Wars of 1866 and 1870 as forerunners of total wars. 
However, there are significant features of the Civil War that indicate it had aspects of 
total commitment. There was, for example, a commitment of industrial capacity and 
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the exploitation of innovations in steam technology, electric telegraph, and weapon 
systems. None of these factors had uniformly occurred in previous 'limited wars'. 
It could be suggested that the European wars of 1866 and 1870 were accepted as more 
like total wars because the legacy of the Civil War was unrecognized in Europe, and 
that today's analysts have mostly failed to highlight the war's important differences 
from limited wars.(67) The impact of Civil War technology was often limited by 
European nationalistic views. Interested in an expansion of military forces from their 
own indigenous industries, major European military powers were mostly pre—occupied 
with the possibilities of their own technologies.(68) Designers had to very closely 
monitor national politics and convince the network of advisers and committees of their 
particular weapon's merit.(69) 
Paradoxically, despite many innovations not being fully utilized in the Civil War, the 
war produced men with a new outlook on military technical knowledge. Regardless of 
innovation's impact in America and overseas, technologists were building on the 
increased body of military technical knowledge to devise new weapons. Indeed, some of 
the world's most famous military inventors were to build upon Civil War innovations. 
The American Civil War's legacy was to spur noted American military innovators such 
as Samuel Colt, Sir Hiram Maxim, Dr Richard Jordan Gatling, William Gardner, 
Benjamin Berkeley Hotchkiss, Colonel Isaac N Lewis, John Browning, Major Thomas 
Rodman, John Ericsson, Christian Sharps, Francis D Lee, James P Lee, Erskin Allins, 
and many others. 
Many great companies were built on the legacy of Civil War innovations. Some, like 
Winchester, Remington, Smith and Wesson, Ruger, Du Pont, and Colt, owe their 
longevity to the impetus produced by the Civil War. Rail, telegraph, foundry, chemical, 
and textile companies could also attribute much of their post—war success to specialist 
work done in their fields during the war. 
The combined impact of knowledge, innovators, and corporate sponsorship took 
American arms into the world market after 1865.(70) Contradicting this trend the 
Americans dismantled their military organisation after 1865, and virtually curtailed the 
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production of new military technology. To Europe, this reinforced the belief that the 
lessons of the Civil War were transitory. European military doctrine was left largely 
unimpressed by the immediate impact of the Civil War.(71) All the war seemed to 
provide, was a study piece for the use of specific technical innovations in war and a 
limited insight into interesting tactical formations. 
In effect, the war was to provide the basis for future innovations but its significance as 
the first industrialised war or total war, can be argued only in retrospect. The link 
between technical and tactical innovations and the strategic implications of this type of 
war, were not to be consciously learnt by the nineteenth century world.(72) 
As time passed after the Civil War, there slowly grew an appreciation of certain 
technologies, and with these came the gradual adaptation of tactics that built new 
strategies of warfare. Into these new strategies, future technical innovations evolved 
that were to shape the wars of the twentieth century. 
The inability of concentrated force to easily dislodge the enemy from their defensive 
positions, was placed in the strategic spotlight. Combined operations and trench 
warfare provided the focus for those technological changes that could directly 
circumvent the reliance just upon the strategy of massed frontal assault. The ensuing 
lessons may not have been consciously absorbed by Civil War commanders, or 
contemporary European strategists, but today they represent technological and 
strategic legacies that are impossible to ignore. 
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CHAPTER 10: THE CIVIL WAR INNOVATION PROCESS 
A cursory analysis of the Civil War innovation process would seem to reveal the absence 
of any formal structure. The official procurement process in both the North and South 
were dominated by salesmen, overworked Ordnance Department officers, the absence 
of any statement on overall military needs, and little capacity to filter the best weapons 
or ideas from the myriad of lesser options. Nevertheless by wars end improvements to 
military weapons can be identified. Improvements over the length of the Civil War saw 
the development, procurement, manufacture, adoption, and deployment of small arms 
change dramatically from that in existence at the beginning of the war.(1) During the 
same period naval technology had also made notable advances. 
Substantial development work had also occurred in various fields of endeavour such as: 
(i) telegraphy - the Beardslee magno-electric telegraph machine and field 
telegraphic systems; 
(ii) ballistics and ordnance - fuses, sights, ammunition loads, substitute nitre, 
trajectory and artillery shell penetration of fixed, solid targets, and 
explosives; 
(iii) engineering - naval steam propulsion, ironclad ship construction, railway 
hardware, bridge construction, road construction, and trench-work; 
(iv) medicine - sanitation, diet, and surgery; and 
(v) navigation - hydrography and cartography. 
Is it possible to conclude that the many successful innovations that occurred during the 
Civil War were just isolated advances, not linked by any formal process that 
encouraged technical improvement? 
Stressing the holistic evaluation of technological change, no one technology can be 
studied in isolation from the context of the overall environment within which 
technological change occurred. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the general 
conduct of innovative effort during the Civil War before an insight into the phases of 
1. C.L. Davis, Arming The Union (Port Washington, Kennikat Press, 1973:178) 
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development may be assessed for technical advances. The study of the innovation 
process is not meant to suggest that wartime Americans (particularly in the North), 
consciously set up an innovation process, or deliberately organized changes to 
technology through a systematic process of development. This thesis has already 
argued against such a conclusion being possible by identifying the inability of Civil War 
contemporaries to realize the potential of advanced designs, the struggle by successful 
innovations to be deployed properly on the battlefield, and the incapacity of military 
organisations to adequately administer military technological changes. 
The question is whether a Civil War innovation process can be delineated and its impact 
on technological change assessed. 
10.1 	 A Model of the Civil War Innovation Process? 
The conduct of innovative activity in the Civil War relied heavily upon the efforts of 
individual innovators who conducted their design work independent of any outside 
control. Throughout the early years of the war these individuals were responsible for 
concentrating scientific and technical endeavour. These artisans, independent 
inventors, craftsmen, and military or marine engineers, produced the innovations that 
changed existing military technology.(2) 
Initially in their backyard barns, and increasingly as the war progressed in company—
paid positions, innovators drew upon existing technical knowledge to produce their own 
military devices. Regardless of the industrial might of the North, the increased role of 
central government or big companies like Winchester or Du Pont, it was the skill of 
individual innovators that converted practical know—how into applied research efforts. 
These effort then formed the basis for industry to produce better and more 
commercially viable, weapons.(3) 
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In a crude way, individual efforts at innovation were linked together and formed into an 
enormous body of new knowledge on military technology. It was this technical 
knowledge that helped form the basis for an innovation process. Discernible phases in 
innovative endeavour seem to have evolved during the war. In their various attempts to 
produce military innovations, craftsmen consolidated past advances. In so doing they 
also created innovations that were to win endorsement and provide the focus for 
sponsored technological development. The consolidation of industrial and physical 
resources within the whole process, provided the basis for more co—ordinated 
development on individual design types. Knowledge became concentrated in research, 
development, and experimentation. In turn, these efforts served to foster other 
innovative endeavours. Either directly or indirectly, this pooled knowledge began to 
spur wider development. As technical knowledge improved, specific development 
phases became more distinct. 
It is perhaps time to revisit the Linear Model and Cyclic Model outlined in Chapter 1. 
The comparison between the Linear Model and Cyclic Model will provide the 
framework within which the Civil War innovation process may be identified. This basis 
can then be expanded to provide a yardstick by which to measure the war's overall 
contribution to military technological change. 
The Linear Model suggests a clear progression to an innovation from the initial demand 
or pure research spur. The Cyclic Model is far less clear in its progression from any 
one phase to an innovation. While the Linear Model suggests intervention or direction 
from a controlling authority, the Cyclic Model is far more interactive. The cyclic 
process acknowledges that the innovation process may be made up of a number of 
distinct phases. These may collectively end with the production of a new technological 
entity or idea, but these phases do not necessarily progress through a logical continuum 
with a set beginning or finishing point.(4) 
4. H.G. Gelber, "Technical Innovation & Arms Control", World Politics (Vol.26[41, July 
1974:510) 
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While the general phases of the cyclic process have the ability to establish wider areas 
for analysis, they fail to specifically acknowledge other important functions. This is in 
particular contrast with the Linear Model which places more emphasis upon 




The Civil War Innovation Process 
Figure 5 represents an acknowledgement that the Civil War innovation process was not 
a simple linear process. The phases of development were not controlled for every 
innovation, nor did development necessarily progress through each distinct phase. 
The original spur to innovate in the Civil War was generally left to the company or the 
innovator. Government or the military played a reactive, rather than pro—active role in 
technological innovation.(5) Classically innovations were built upon known technology. 
This promoted acceptance by officials controlling (or at least influencing) the 
procurement process. Officials only had on real form of control and this was to issue 
government contracts that encouraged the production of weapons it was not 
manufacturing. Hence all the Union forces breech—loaders being made under contract 
from private providers, for instance. The issuing of contracts was far less likely to be 
swayed by any minor technological advances over previous designs. The ability of the 
5. Davis, Arming The Union (1973:12) 
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manufacturing firm to supply the arms on time and at a desired level of reliability was 
of primary importance.(6) 
After the first battle of Bull Run in 1861 the Union forces had to face the reality of a 
protracted armed conflict. This spurred the need to acquire more weapons. Not just 
weapons that came for the stockpiles of Europe, but more advanced weapons that could 
be produced by local industry. Between 1862 to 1863 the procurement process is 
marked by the competition amongst innovations to receive government production 
contracts. The spur to innovation was increasingly marked by the determination to 
improve on technology that had gained some degree of acceptance in the initial years of 
the Civil War. Applied research concentrated on improving the design reliability, its 
durability in the combat environment, or to make the hardware easier to mass produce. 
By late 1863 to 1865 the more reliable suppliers with established experience were 
favoured with contracts for the production of weapons.(7) 
The complexity of the unsystematic procurement process meant innovation had great 
difficulty even securing official endorsement. The applied and experimentation phases 
to the development of an innovation were, therefore, critical. To build on established 
designs improved the likelihood of official acceptance, but also guaranteed fewer 
technical problems the more inventive designs may encounter. 
The lack of an effective testing phase in the procurement system consolidated the 
applied research efforts that sought only to improve known technology. The technology 
that had already established a military contract formed the guide for further innovative 
efforts. Thus it was that established demands, not new pure research discoveries, that 
seems to be the basis for the majority of Civil War military innovations. With the 
process of military technological change based more on meeting perceived needs, pure 
scientific work created only a limited basis for devising new technical products through 




Interaction between the Civil War innovation process and the environment served only 
to enforce the individual phases highlighted in the pragmatic model above. As seen in 
chapter six (on the administration of technological changes), government policy shaped 
how innovation was undertaken, but it lacked the policies necessary to competently 
intervene and encourage the better innovations. Without specifically intending to do so, 
innovation was shaped by policies involving patents, sponsorship of research and 
development, and the absence of formal testing programmes. This is why the 
experimental development phase is depicted separately from the applied research phase. 
It acknowledges that, as research work continued over time, an increased refinement of 
known technology also occurred. As innovations were designed to conform to the 
perceived expectations of military officials a distinct experimental development phase 
eventuated. 
Despite the vast array of minor technical developments being accumulated, they only 
replaced old technology slowly.(8) This does not deny that the refinement of known, or 
new technical knowledge, still produced distinct advances. Nevertheless innovators that 
were keen to produce a commercial design were wary of being too inventive. If any 
innovation was to return back to the research and development phases the promoter 
would not only have to undertake re—design at their own expense, but also fight to 
regain access to the procurement process. 
The Gatling Gun is a good example of how a sound innovation did not attain its full 
potential during the Civil War due to the initial barriers in entering the procurement 
process. Despite the fact that the Gatling Gun received limited deployment during the 
initial phases of the war it was not to overcome it inhibiting design faults until 1865.(9) 
This situation arose from the fact that the organization of money, manufacturing and 
technical problems were left to Dr. Richard Gatling to resolve without any direct input 
from the US Ordnance Department. After subsequent modifications and design 
8. A. Zvorikine, "The History of Technology as a Science & As a Branch of Learning: A 
Soviet View", Technology & Culture (Vol.2[1], Winter 1961:2) 
9. D. A. Armstrong, Bullets & Bureaucrats (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1982:35) 
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variations it was three years before Gatling once again secured the support of the 
Washington bureaucracy to have his weapon tested, and later adopted in limited 
numbers.(10) 
However reliable or advanced an innovation may be, there was no guarantee it would 
receive testing or adoption by the US Ordnance Department. The Spencer Repeating 
Rifle is a good example of how an very innovative design was derived from proven 
technical know—how (the Sharps BLR). In addition to his innovation skills the weapons 
designer, Christopher Spencer, was also an accomplished machinist and salesman. 
Nonetheless, despite starting to market the weapon to Government in 1862, it was not 
until May 1864 that an open—end contract was awarded to deliver all the Spencer 
Carbines they could make until September 1, 1865.(11) This government contract only 
resulted after the removal of the Chief of Ordnance, Brigadier—General James Ripley, 
and support received from soldiers already using sizable quantities of the arm in 
combat. 
Civil War innovators worked at more general levels of applied research because of the 
problem of having to devise new inventions or developments while still ensuring the end 
product could be sold. This eventually promoted the shift of innovative effort from 
individual innovators, to those sponsored by larger commercial organizations. 
Companies could maintain greater entrepreneurial pressure on the military 
procurement system. They also ensured that the more effort could be spent by 
innovators or technicians on experimentation or refinement of crude designs. Lone 
innovators could not continue to bear the on—going expense of refining or developing 
designs. Nor could smaller entrepreneurs hope to meet government contracts at the 
volume and deadlines demanded. 
It was not uncommon for wartime innovators to sink most of their money into 
producing a working model. Their ability to refine designs further, often depended on 
10. IBID:34 & 36 
11. Davis, Arming The Union (1973:93) 
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government support. Without proper assessment during the testing phase, good designs 
did not have their faults overcome by government financial assistance. Hence weapons 
such as the Monitor class vessel and the Henry repeating rifle performed dramatically 
well in the field and were adopted, despite design faults that could have been overcome 
with further pre—manufacture work. Other designs such as the US Army Gatling Gun 
and the CS Army Williams Rapid—Fire Cannon had design flaws that stopped them 
from being widely adopted. Yet with some design work on specific identifiable 
problems, both armies could have gained valuable weapons. 
Military agencies never recognized how the testing of weapons could be used to refine 
useful technical innovations.(12) The testing of innovations was a haphazard exercise 
that rarely identified a weapon's overall design integrity. Instead testing was used as a 
negative process, indicating problems not potential. This failure to use testing as a 
means to refine weapons with technical promise, indicates wider problems with the 
creation and introduction of new technologies.(13) 
The failure in the war's testing phase severely hampered the introduction of better 
innovations, causing a disjointed advancement in innovative effort. The breakdown at 
this stage of innovative effort also promoted a greater concentration on research and 
development as a means to refine existing knowledge. As the full potential of arms such 
as the Gatling, Monitor, torpedo, and even breech—loading artillery systems, was never 
fully realised, the designers limited themselves to innovations that could gain easy 
commercial acceptance. 
Throughout the unsystematic innovation process innovations improved upon the 
previous designs and produced a consistent incremental advance in technology. As 
arms problems were resolved in steps, each subsequent advance progressed from a basis 
of growing technical improvement.(14) The final cumulative result was for Civil War to 
produce an innovation process that lacked any formal direction by outside agencies that 
12.IBID:151 
13.Armstrong, Bullets & Bureaucrats (1982:36) 
14.Davis, Arming The Union (1973:iii) 
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could enforce systematic progression upon a single innovation, but encouraged overall 
improvement to existing technology.(15) 
10.2 	 Incremental Changes to Military Technology 
The course of the Civil War was not influenced by profound technological changes that 
derived from radical alternatives to existing technical knowledge. Yet the overall scale 
of technical innovation on Civil War military technology has been clouded by focussing 
on a few innovations that were supposed to have produced more obvious strategic and 
technical 'breakthroughs'. There has continually been a failure to recognize how 
innovations that improved existing technical designs produced an overall impact on 
technological change. These low—risk designs relied on successive innovations to 
incorporate their advances. The amazing collection of new designs that incorporated 
these advancements, prevented the end innovation from being readily identified. 
The introduction of new technical knowledge in the Civil War had mixed successes. If it 
added to the performance of existing technology, an innovation generally had a much 
better chance of being adopted. For instance ironcladding, BLR cannon designs, and 
improvements to the telegraph such as the Beardslee or field mobile 'mule' packs. 
However, if a design made a radical shift away from established technical knowledge, 
any design weaknesses could limit its successful adoption. If the design also challenged 
existing technology, the perceived costs of introducing the weapon were considered even 
more prohibitive. This can be seen with the Gatling Gun, repeating rifles, or high 
velocity BLR cannons for naval vessels. 
The need for weapons, and industry's desire for quick returns, promoted innovations 
with short time lags before introduction. Hence a concentration of production resources 
on the manufacturing of established technology, with the search for breakthroughs or 
undertaking research in high—risk experiments, becoming much less desirable. 
15. This was particularly the case with military or government organizations. 
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Understanding the above factors in relation to the American Civil War confirms the 
important distinction between radical technological change and conservative 
technological change. Radical technological change is more likely to derive from pure 
research efforts, or breakthroughs in research effort. The resulting technological 
entities usually produce rapid acceleration or changes in developmental directions. 
Conservative technological change, on the other hand, is more likely to consist of 
improvements on existing technical knowledge. This results from an innovator's wish to 
increase the acceptance of the end product. As has been identified as occurring in the 
Civil War, the emphasis upon applied research efforts reflects an awareness of the need 
to create harmony with established technology, and to ensure that innovations do not 
conflict with the traditional biases of those organizations established to manage the 
technology. 
An increase in the control exerted by Civil War governments on the management of 
military technology procurement improved the ability of innovators to specialize 
technical effort on certain technologies. The introduction of radical, new technology 
could not be planned, but with the concentration of technical effort, the risk of 
conducting more advanced research could be reduced. The over—reliance on applied 
research work, the unwillingness of innovators to conduct experimentation on designs 
with no certainty of final adoption, and the lack of a consolidated testing phase, all 
reflect an innovation environment where uncertainty in demand still dominated the 
innovation process. 
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Figure 6 (16) 
RISK 
INNOVATION 
The above figure is a matrix representation of the barriers to innovation. This is a 
simple representation of the positive relationship between the degree of innovation and 
the increase in risk. 
Technological change that fell into the lower left area would show a low risk and a low 
innovation content. This reflects an important distinction between conservative and 
radical innovations. Conservative innovations being more preferable because of the 
fewer risks involved in achieving acceptance. More radical innovations based on 
uncertain technological discoveries, or pure research efforts, have more apparent risk 
involved for the innovator, and such a technological change would fall into the upper 
right hand area of the matrix. 
Study of the phases in a Civil War innovation process reveal a number of reasons as to 
why, in this new industrial era, the Civil War only promoted low risk technological 
changes that were based around existing technical knowledge. 
Firstly, for a commercially orientated innovator the risk of creating a dynamic, totally 
revolutionary technical entity required a great deal of pure research, applied effort, and 
resources. None of this work was done with any guarantee of military demand, or an 
accepted measure for assessment. As the natural conservatism of government, industry, 
16. R. Landau, The Innovation Milieu", in S.B. Lundstedt & E.W. Colglazier (eds), 
Managing Innovation: The Social Dimension of Creativity, Invention & Technology  (New 
York, Pergamon Press, 1982:57) 
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and particularly the military, was entrenched in the system, there was a reluctance to 
produce more radical technological changes for formal testing. 
Secondly, by adhering to known technology with a proven record or by improving on 
specifically accepted technological designs, innovators were able to produce innovations 
that were more likely to take time between development and utilization. The need to 
refine innovations after achieving some form of testing, would relegate novel designs 
back to the beginning of the process. 
Thirdly, as there existed no formal co—ordinating agency or systematic testing phase, 
the standard of excellence in innovation was uncertain. This often restricted the 
promotion of good designs, further limiting the 'pool' of available technical knowledge 
and tightening the cyclic promotion of future innovations. 
The informal adoption, trial, and contract systems, negated any efforts made by 
government to intervene to enhance an innovation at any stage of the innovation 
process. In particular, there existed a clear lack of comprehension as to how official 
measures could shorten the period between development of a basic (needed) design and 
its use by the military. 
For the fourth point it may be argued that, had authorities recognized the potential of 
good innovations at point of initial conception (applied research phase of the Civil War 
innovation process model), refinement of technical knowledge could have occurred 
more quickly. This awareness may also have permitted earlier acceptance and 
therefore greater research effort on the generative technical knowledge. Had there been 
broad based testing and development in a design area, it is plausible to suggest that less 
lags would have occurred between the commitment of manufacturing resources and 
final utilization of the technology. 
The fifth reason why conservative changes to military technology may have occurred, 
resulted from the Civil War innovation effort being faced with trying to control all the 
developments being spurred by each new technological change. Defensive tactics meant 
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that at sea, emphasis was placed on developing increased firepower, rams, and effective 
armour-plating. On land, the use of trenches promoted development of guns with 
longer ranges, which in turn necessitated better-designed defensive positions. In 
industry, better and larger arms requirements, promoted larger hydraulic and 
machine-tool equipment. This necessitated greater steam power, better electrical 
systems, and improved organization.(17) Science, despite failing to limit the parameters 
of applied research through effective pure research, also contributed to the production 
of military technology.(18) 
What evolved was a process of cyclic influences that stimulated an unprecedented 
linkage between industrialisation and military innovation. Yet, as the study of the Civil 
War innovation process has illustrated, the absence of clear direction promoted the 
focussing of research onto known technological entities. 
The process of innovation in the Civil War was for the most part unco-ordinated, with 
little direct government policy support. A study of Civil War innovations, their 
environment, and then the pragmatic models of examination used here, all indicates a 
moderate increase in technical knowledge. As innovations improved the viability of 
certain technical fields, design work gradually became more co-ordinated on specific 
endeavours. 
Because the introduction of innovations was not systematically controlled by 
government, some modern analysts have condemned the Civil War for being 
unscientific. Evidence is not hard to find for the contention that the war was pre-
modern in both its application of scientific knowledge, and the subsequent exploitation 
innovations derived from pure research work. 
To establish the modernity of the war it is simply not a worthwhile exercise to just 
identify radical breakthroughs or emphasise pure research. Through incremental 
17.W.H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force & Society Since AD  
1000 (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1983:241) 
18.G.I. Rochlin (cd), Readings from Scientific American  (San Francisco, W.H. Freeman, 
1974:2) 
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stages, Civil War military technology did change, resulting in the creation of new 
dimensions to warfare that surpassed all previous experiences. 
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE SUMMARY 
Despite the almost imperceptible nature of the technological change, innovations 
fundamentally altered the means available to wage war. The study of the innovation 
process illustrates that the myriad of alterations, improvements, and specific 
developments in military technology contributed to the expanding pool of technical 
knowledge. Despite innovations not always being successful or their full potential being 
realised, they did influence the technical knowledge available for later innovators to 
draw from. 
During the Civil War new technical skills and knowledge were increasingly required by 
the military to wage war. Not only did armies have to include civilian personnel in their 
ranks to operate technology, military officers and soldiers had to adopt new skills so as 
to exploit improved military tools. The relationship between government and rail 
companies especially reflected the first real co—operation by the State with a large 
company that had grown out of the Industrial Revolution. The fate of military effort on 
the battlefield necessitated a continuous relationship between the public and private rail 
interests throughout the Civil War.(19) 
The deployment of the rapid firing gun stands testimony to the progress some military 
minds made in dealing with new technology. In 1861 J D Mills sought to sell his Union 
Repeating Gun (Ager Gun) to the North. Not only were his efforts blocked by a 
reluctant Ordnance Department, field officers that tested the weapon lacked both the 
technical skills to even assess the merits of the weapon, and the comparative knowledge 
necessary to assess how the weapon could "fit" with existing military doctrine.(20) By 
1865, however, Union naval officers were encouraging the design and deployment of a 
Gatling Gun with a 1—Inch bore. Senior naval officers had recognized the weapon had 
19.M. Pearton, The Knowledgeable State (London, Burnett Books, 1982:77) 
20.Armstrong, Bullets & Bureaucrats (1982:18-21) 
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improved with the use of brass cartridges, but more importantly it could be fitted on a 
specially designed mounting aboard their vessels and used to repel torpedo boats. 
The imperceptible advance of military technology was couple with an increase in the 
population's general appreciation of technical innovation. While repeating weapons, 
iron clad vessels, the telegraph, and railroads may not have been well understood as 
technological entities, they produced visible contributions to the war effort. As key 
technologies did succeed in gaining military deployment they confirmed the value of 
technical change in the minds of both government and the general public. 
Innovative endeavours began to concentrate on utilizing proven and accepted 
technology as the basis for further commercial products. In so doing weapons 
technology moved into an era marked by breech—loading ordnance, vastly improved 
ammunition, iron cladding, steam power, aerial observation, and better strategic and 
tactical communications. Together, these endorsed technical innovations or techniques, 
altered the characteristics of warfare. They introduced fundamental concepts alongside 
the technical realities that were to produce the basis for modern industrialized wars of 
the twentieth century.(21) 
The legacy of Civil War technical innovation is such that it can, in retrospect, be 
discerned as an important transition point between previously traditional wars and the 
more modern wars of the twentieth century. 
21. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (1983:260-261) 
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CONCLUSION 
To understand military technological change properly it is necessary firstly to place any 
study into a wider historical context. Only in this context is it possible to trace the series 
of changes to technical knowledge, and assess the future importance of the end 
technology. The impact of a technology, at a given point in time and place, can then be 
fully appreciated by studying it as a function within a specific environment: being 
influenced by, and in turn influencing, society. 
During the Civil War it seems that neither the immediate impact of a technology, nor 
the advancement in technical knowledge, represent appropriate indicators of an 
innovations' ultimate importance. A technology like the Rodmans/Dahlgren MLR 
cannon produced an immediate impact on Civil War conflict, but held significantly less 
value for future technical developments. Other innovations such as the BLR small—
arms produced seemingly unimportant, incremental improvements to technology, but 
eventually they consolidated to produce more reliable technological entities such as the 
Spencer and Henry repeating rifles. Minor technical changes were also responsible for 
gradually reducing the barriers of acceptance certain technologies faced, or 
permanently altering the military utility of a technology. 
This thesis has supported a more holistic method for understanding military 
technological change. By firstly identifying key military innovations, it was then 
possible to examine the impact non—technical factors had on the adoption and further 
development of a technology. After progressing through these stages it then became 
feasible to conduct an assessment on how these technologies added to existing technical 
knowledge and the military's strategic operations. 
A more balanced assessment of an innovation necessitates the consideration of 
environmental factors. It is the study of non—technical factors that often provide clues 
as to why some innovations were not widely deployed. The significance of these 
constraints, their impact on innovation, and their influence on how history has come to 
perceive Civil War lessons has not been given enough weight. Too often the emphasis is 
only placed upon those weapons that went into production. Such an approach is likely 
to overlook the contribution pre—war technical developments made to technologies that 
were first placed into production during the war. Concentration on weapons that went 
into production can also lead to a lack of emphasis being placed on successful wartime 
designs that were not widely produced due to non—technical barriers. 
A study of the Civil War confirms that the introduction of technically advanced 
weapons into war, does not determine the immediate importance of that technology. 
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The Monitor is one technology that is held to be a landmark in military history. Yet its 
technical legacy can be attributed more to the deliberate incorporation of existing 
technical advances into one design, rather than a breakthrough in technical knowledge. 
This contrasts with the Gatling Gun, which produce a totally unique technology by 
incorporating many novel technical ideas together. Nevertheless, it was not deployed to 
any great effect during the Civil War. 
The importance of innovations in railroads, ironclad warships, telegraphic 
communications, and balloon technology, do not appear as great when considered in the 
context of overall Civil War innovative effort. Rather than trying to acclaim all these 
technological changes as radical improvements, which they mostly were not, their 
importance as examples of core technologies needs to be stressed. It was the 
incremental improvements, made by innovations upon them, that made these core 
technologies more effective military tools. 
Many technological changes confirmed the importance of on-going technical 
developments in areas that were still to be fully appreciated by Civil War 
contemporaries. To realize the future technical value of some designs not widely 
adopted in the war, one only has to examine the post-war impact of the lever action 
repeating rifles, revolver technology, and field-telegraph communication systems. 
Other important Civil War technical developments had to await future wars before 
their true merit could be realized. The importance of the torpedo and of related 
technology, the value of rapid-fire field guns (the machine-gun), BLR cannons, and 
development of hollow artillery projectiles that could carry chemical substances, were 
not effectively established until after the Civil War. 
To appreciate the wartime advancement in military technology fully, one must 
simultaneously study the use of innovations in arms, entrenchment, and tactics, at 
Petersburg in 1864. The dimensions and ferocity of the Petersburg conflict can be held 
as a clear precursor to the First World War.(1) One of the problems with assessing the 
modern nature of the Civil War may, however, reside with analysts looking to the First 
World War as a comparative modern war. This is done, apparently, because it 
illustrates the importance of scientific endeavour, and the systematic introduction of 
technology in a total war. But one may seriously question the basis for such an 
argument. With the exception of air warfare, strategists and tacticians were still 
utilizing weapons with known technological dimensions. They were using these 
weapons over ranges, and in manners, that were well established in military annals.(2) 
1. K. Macksey, Technology in War (London, Arms & Armour Press, 1986:28) 
2. S. Zuckerman, Scientists & War (London, Scientific Book Club, 1966:113) 
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Regardless of parallels the Petersburg campaign had with the First World War, history 
has not been overly considerate of the overall technical legacy left by the Civil War. 
Many important advances in technology were overlooked by contemporaries of the war. 
While the lessons, that could have been learnt by European armies from the impact of 
new technology on the conduct of Civil War, had to be re—learnt over the next fifty 
years. 
It would be misleading, however, if we were to limit the legacy of the Civil War because 
we continue to measure the war's modern proportions, by seeking to identify a few 
innovations that may fit the mould of radical technological change. It is not sufficient to 
apply the modern war title simply because there were produced a few innovations that 
derived from scientific research and had never before been identified in military 
history. 
Admittedly science set the scope of novel technological changes in the Civil War. The 
new era of science had utilized pure research to establish a basis of theoretical 
knowledge that technologists built their practical innovations from. However, with 
military technological change playing no significant role in redirecting pure research 
work, scientific endeavour mostly drew upon knowledge already in existence prior to 
the Civil War. 
Through the use of applied research efforts, innovators drew from the past designs and 
from existing research efforts to advance military technological understanding. This 
serves to make the Civil War an unreliable example of a scientific war that was brought 
on by a new era of military hardware derived from pure research.(3) With the 
prevalence of barriers and delays in acceptance, those new technologies that were 
introduced contributed little of substance to the advancement of theoretical science. 
This ultimately served to stifle rapid technical advances and increase reliance solely 
upon applied research efforts. 
As the application of scientific knowledge and the systematic exploitation of innovations 
is held to be a feature of twentieth century wars, the Civil War is therefore believed to 
be pre—modern. This failure of innovation to be systematically introduced, has caused 
some modern analysts to deprecate the war as being unscientific. 
This thesis has stressed the importance of acknowledging that the process of innovation 
in the Civil War was mostly unco—ordinated, with little direct government policy 
support. The bulk of the technological changes, impacting on the conduct of the Civil 
3. G.I. Pokrovsky, Science & Technology in Contemporary War (London, Atlantic Books, 
1959:3) 
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War, were conducted by individual innovators using applied research to make only 
modest additions to existing fields of technical knowledge. 
Technology change that did occur mostly progressed through a series of cautious 
innovations, building on established technical knowledge. The study of innovations, 
their environment, and then the pragmatic models of examination used here, all reflect 
a gradual increase in technical knowledge. Only after two years of war did the 
concentration of innovative effort on key areas of design, and the increasing desire to fill 
specific needs, directly promote the co—ordinated development of certain technological 
advances. 
It is evident that the ability to design and produce a superior technological entity, was 
not enough. Institutional barriers to innovation played a significant role in determining 
the success of a technology. Certain important innovations were never able to achieve 
their full potential because military institutions were unable to discern those 
technologies that would be most appropriate to their needs. 
The Civil War confirms the basic contradiction between the progress of military 
technical knowledge, and the need to prove certain technologies' combat potential. On 
the one hand, there exist lags in nurturing innovations by military organizations, and on 
the other hand, the failure, by these same institutions, to integrate the best designs into 
their strategic considerations. The resolution of this fundamental contradiction was to 
be addressed in the modern wars of the twentieth century.(4) It is in the Civil War that 
the first attempt was made in the industrial age to co—ordinate the innovation process 
towards set ends. Therefore, a study of military technological change produces more 
illuminating lessons for the subsequent wars than for the preceding conflicts. 
Perhaps the most important finding that can be made, from a study of military 
technological change in the Civil War, is that innovations seem to have drawn from 
existing technical knowledge and produced low—risk, incremental design advancements. 
The study of military technological change as an environmental function confirms that 
the adoption of new technology was affected by the ability of military organizations, and 
the civil bureaucracy, to recognize its potential and sustain its use. Conservative 
innovations, that had only a limited capacity to challenge established organizational 
values and the technical expertise of field commanders, were more likely to be accepted. 
The Civil War can undoubtedly be seen as a harbinger of technological change and, in 
retrospect, may be seen as the transition point between traditional wars of the 
nineteenth century and modern wars of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the era of 
4. A point originally set out by John Ellis' study on The Social History of the Machine Gun 
(London, Cresset, 1975:177) 
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modern war did not dawn with the ending of the war. Civil War technological 
advances, whether adopted or not, produced a legacy of technical know—how that was 
to irrevocably alter armed conflict after 1861. 
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011101 CIRBIIIS 
Carbines Parchased By US Ordnance Bureau 1111-1165 
Caliber Total lumber Parckased 
Total Cost SUS 	1165 
f Total 	No. °floods Purchased 
Total Cost Of Rounds SUS 1865 
Date Of Carbines Patent 
Date Of Carbines Official idoption - . 
Ballard 1.44/0.54 1,509 35,140 3,527,150 51,945 5 lov.11E1 1862 Ball 0.14/0.50 1,102 25,381 See Spencer See 	Spencer 1164 Kay 1865 Burnside 1.54 55,567 1,412,620 11,819,210 541,490 25 Mar.1165 1861 Gvyn 1 Caspbell or 0.50 9,342 119,838 6,300,000 132,107 21 Oct. 1062 1863 Cosmopolitan Gallager 0.51 22,728 508,412 1,294,123 211,893 17 	Jul.1160 1862 Gibbs 0.52 1,052 21,995 - 8 Jan.1856 1863 Hall 0.52/0.64 3,520 64,762 - - 31 Jul. 	1144 1861 Joslyn-Percosslon 0.54 860 212,568 515,416 12,935 28 Aug.1155 1111/18631 -Carbine 0.54 11,261 I Oct.1111 1864 81865 Lindner 0.57 192 19,195 110,100 2,262 - - Maynard 0.50 10,002 189,319 2,151,000 12,207 6 Dec.1159 1861 Merrill 0.54 14,495 374,804 5,519,750 115,779 20 Jul.1158 1111-1862 Pallier 0.41/0.50 1,001 - 20,918 See Spencer See Spencer 1163 1865 i Benry 1 henry Regiagton 0.46 20,000 436,752 4,257,000 68,600 15 Nov.1864 1164/1865 Sharps 0.52 10,517 2,213,192 16,316,508 347,410 1848/52 	164 1851 Skarps 1 1,001,000 lank ins 27,402 1862/63 	164 1862 Snith 0.50 30,062 745,645 13,161,500 377,569 5 Ing.1156 	i 23 Jun.1157 1862-63 Spencer 0.52 94,196 2,393,633 58,238,924 1,119,277 6 Mar.1110 	i 20 Jul.1862 1862-1863 Starr 0.54 25,603 516,773 6,1(0,000 140,761 14 Sep.1858 1861 Varner 0.50 4,001 79,310 1,128,000 27,472 23 Sep.1864 Mar. 	1865 lesson 0.44 151 3,491 254,000 3,666 1864 1165 
°TIBBS 
French Carbines 0.61 200 4800 
Foreign Carbines Various 10051 66193 From Stock 
Musketoons 0.54, 511 5815 From Stock 1 Original 1112 0.64 	1 0.54 	lall's Patent (1848 	to 0.69 Paper Round 1852 
■ - Converted) . 
AppErnd i,c  
RIFLES & MUSKETS PURCHASED 
BY THE US ORDNANCE BUREAU 
1861-1865 
Rifles II Muskets 
Purchased 









SPRINGFIELD RIFLE-MUSKET' 0.58 670,617 13,089,855 
LINDSAY DOUBLE SHOT MUSKET 0.56 1,000 25,250 
BALLARD RIFLE 0.54 35 ..- 1,262 
COLT REVOLVIN6 RIFLE 0.44/0.56 4,612 204,487 
GREENE RIFLE 0.54 900‘ 33,266 
HENRY RIFLE 0.44 1,731 63,953' 
MERRILL RIFLE 0.54 583 23,880 
SHARPS RIFLE 0.52 9,141 330,629 
SPENCER RIFLE 0.52/0.56 12,471 467,390 
HALL RIFLE 0.52 1,575 23,704 
HARPER FERRY RIFLE 0.54/0.58 -22,793 414,316 
RIFLES 0.69 CALIBER 0.69 1,832 20,076 
AMERICAN SMOOTH-BORE MUSKETS 0.69 2,181 21,825 
Foreign Rifles 
ENFIELD LONG It 0.577 428,292 
SHORT RIFLES 8,034 7,869,175 
BOKER RIFLE 0.71 162,533 2,267,834 
BOKER (WITH SWORD BAYONET) 0.70 25,000 139,254 
FRENCH RIFLES 0.71 44,250 757,416 
BELGIUM RIFLES 0.69/0.71 57,467 811,109 
AUSTRIAN RIFLES 0.72 226,294 2,640,704 
PRUSSIAN RIFLES 0.69-0.71 59,918 590,485 
JAGER RIFLES 0.54 29,850 260,785 
SUHL RIFLES 0.71 1,673 26,056 
TOWER RIFLES 0.71 4182 18,819 
6ARIBALDI 0.69/0.71 5,995 35,970 
PRUSSIAN SMOOTH-BORE MUSKETS 0.69-0.71 81,652 554,849 
FOREIGN SMOOTH-BORE MUSKETS Various 29,201 234,345 
RIFLES OF VARIOUS KINDS Various 641 15,256 
.. 
TOTAL 1,894,453 30,941,950 
-
I Not including the 800,000 manufactured in Federal areouries 
PERFORMANCE OF CIVIL WAR SHOULDER .FIRE ARMS 
TYPE OF WEAPON 
-r 
CALIBRE (Inches) 
(1) TYPE OF ACTION 
(2) 50 YARD ACCURACY (Inches) 
.., 
MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE (Yrds) 
M1855 SPRINGFIELD RIFLE-MUSKET 0.581 RML 5.25 300 
M1863 SPRINGFIELD 0.58 RML 5.25 350-400 
M1842 RIFLED MUSKET 0.694 RML 7.25 200 
MI819 HALL FLINTLOCK RIFLE 0.535 RBL 7.25 80-130 
M1863 NEW MODEL SHARPS RIFLE 0.52 RBL . 5.25 350-400 
LONG ENFIELD RIFLED MUSKET 0.577 RML 3.75 450 
AUSTRIAN RIFLE 0.546 RML 6 250 
M1842 TOWER PERCUSSION MUSKET 0.725 SML 8.5 BO 
BELGIUM PERCUSSION MUSKET 0.68 SML 13 50 
FRENCH TIGE RIFLE 0.79 RBL 8.5 120 
WHITWORTH 0.452 HEX-ML 1-2 1000-1200 
SPENCER 0.56 1 RBI 600 
(1)RML:Rifled Muzzle Loader, RBI.: Rifled Breech Loader, SML:Ssooth Bore Muzzle Loader, & Hez-MLBliezegontl Muzzle Loader (2)Accuracy 2 Grouping of five shots (See NRAA, Civil War Small Ares 1960126) 
Apr, 	1..x 6 
REVOLVERS & PISTOLS PURCHASED 
BY THE US ORDNANCE BUREAU 
1861-1865 
w- 
Revolvers & Pistols 
Purchased 
By US Ordnance 
Bureau 1861-1865 







ALLEN & WHEELOCK 0.44 536 9,130 
ADAMS 0.44 415 7,526 
BEALS 0.36/0.44 2,814 38,315 
COLT ARMY 0.44 129,730 2,296,112 
COLT NAVY 0.37 17,010 466,068 
JOSLYN 0.44 1,100 24,793 
PERRIN 0.44 200 4,000 
PETTINSILL 0.44 2,001 40,287 
LEFAUCHEAUX ARMY 0.43 52 
LEFAUCHEAUX NAVY - 0.35 11,781 167,489 
REMINGTON ARMY 0.44 125,314 1,631,629 
REMINGTON NAVY 0.36 4,901 59,838 
RAFAEL 0.41 978 16,181 
SAVAGE NAVY 0.36 11,284 221,355 
STARR 0.36/0.44 47,952 737,793 
ROGER & SPENCER 0.44 5,000 60,739 
WHITNEY NAVY 0.36 11,214 139,690 
FOREIGN PISTOLS Various 100 1,000 
HORSE PISTOLS Various 200 1,400 
SIGNAL PISTOLS 348 1,935 
COLT POCKET 0.31 17,010 
SMITH & WESSON 0.22/0.32 
SMITH & WESSON 'VOLCANIC 
REPEATING PISTOL' 0.31/0.38 
LA MAT (French) 0.44 & 0.65 
_ 
TOTAL . , 389,940 5,925,280 
Akp p rid lac 6B 
REVOLVERS & PISTOLS IN SERVICE WITH THE CONFEDERATE ARMY 1861-1865 . 
Revolvers & Pistols In Service With The Confederate Any 1861-1865 
1 Caliber 
M1807 VIRGINIA 0.70 PALMETTO M1842 0.54 RAPPAHANNOCK FORGE FLINTLOCK 0.65 HOCK ENGLISH FLINTLOCK (0.65?) COLT ARMY 0.44 REMINGTON ARMY 0.44 WHITNEY 0.36 ENGLISH KERR 0.44 ENGLISH DEANE 0.44 ENGLISH TRANTER 0.36 FRENCH LA MAT 0.42 & 0.50 FRENCH PIN FIRE 0.45 M1851 COLT NAVY 0.36 DIMICK 'COLT' 0.36 SMITH & WESSON 0.32 M1842 RICHMOND 0.54 SHANK & McLANAHAN 0.36 CUFER CONFEDERATE REVOLVER 0.36 LEECH & RIGDON 0.36 IRIGDON & ANSLEY 0.36 COLUMBUS FIRE-ARMS 0.36 SAMUEL SUTHERLAND 0.45 TUCKER & SHERROD 0.44 DANCE t PARK 0.44 dANCE & PARK NAVAL i 0.36 
Union Railroad Battery, Petersburg 
From A Photograph. 
century . Magaz.ine, (Vol. XXXIV (3) 
1889:774) 
Ap p rid ix 7 
LJ 
pilothouse blower intakes 	El 	turret 
0 	smokestacks 
Coggins (1962:135) 
Iron, 2 in. x 8 in., laid vertically 
Iron, 2 in. x 8 in., laid horizontally 
Oak, 4 in. thick, laid vertically 
Pine, 8 in. thick, laid horizontally 
Pine, 12 in. thick, 
laid vertically 
11/4 in. bolt 
Coggins (1962:134) 
Appel-id 1.3c. 8 
USS MONITOR AND DETAILS OF ARMOURED SHIELD 
Hull: 
Turret: 
length- 172 feet; beam- 41 feet 6 inches; draft- 11 feet; 
freeboard- 1 foot 
20 feet (inside diameter); height- 9 feet; thickness- 8 
inches (8 layers of one inch wrought-iron plates bolted 
together); revolved on central spindle small steam engine; 
turret top- heavy iron grating, with sliding hatches: 
Armament: 	two 11-inch smoothbores firing solid shot weighing 180- 
pounds. 
Engine: 	single, horizontal, driving one four-bladed propeller nine 
feet in diameter; speed- five knots; two return tube 
boilers, forced draft by blowers; two rectangular 
smokestacks six feet high; two blower pipes, four and a half 
feet high (stacks and blower intake pipes taken apart and 
laid flat when cleared for action). 
A ppertaix 9 
A SECTION THROUGH THE 1-.15$ MQNTTOR SHOWING ITS TURRET AND 11-INCH DAHLGREN GUNS (I. Hogg, Artillery 118). 
Hogg & Batchelor, (1974:118) 
App 	1 0 
TORPEDOES 
Rebel Frame Torpedo 
Obstruction torpedo 
Barnes, (1869:plate 4.1) 
Frame Torpedo & Land 
Obstruction Torpedo 
(Cast iron shell with 
percussion detonator) 
Barnes, (1869:plate 4.4) 
Obstruction Torpedo 
(Percussion/presure forces 
spring to contact points 
to meet & detonate cast iron 
shell. Timber housing, cast 
iron shoe embedded into seasbed) 
Barnes, (1869:plate 4.3) 
-Singer Torpedo 
(Air in top of frame, powder in bottom, 
cast iron sled, trigger, firer connection 
to side of spar) 
Floating Boyant Keg Torpedo 
(100 lb powder chemical or 
percussion fuse) 
Brooke Boyant Torpedo 
(Chemica) sensitive fuse, cast iron 
frame, wooden spar and mud anchors) 
Keg Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 6.1) 
Brooke Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 6.3) 
Singer Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 6.2) 
CSN Electrically Fired Torpedo 
(Fired by an observor - Used successfull 
at Richmond 1865) 
Mobile Floating Mine 
(Tin cylinder 16.5 inches long 
& 11.5 inches in diameter. Lines 
were attahed to floating wood & 
exploded on contact with the lines) 
"Devil Circumventor" 
(Set into ground & fired by electrical 
wire or lanyard & pin) . 
(Called "Turtle" and used in 100 lb 
powder load at Richmond & Charleston) 
Devil Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 7.1) 
Electric Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 9.1) 
Mobile Floating Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 7.4) 
Hydrogen Gas Torpedo 
(Exploded by jet of Hydrogen 
gas shot into small mass of 
spongy platinum so becoming 
incandescent & igniting) 
Drift Mine 
Clockwork Torpedo 
(Time bomb) Coal Torpedo 
(Air hole, solid cast iron shell, 
powder filled) 
Hydrogen Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 8.1) 
Drift Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 8.2) 
Coal Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 8.5) 
Clockwork Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 8.4) 
CSN Ram Torpedo 
(Chemical sensitive fuse) 
CSN Ram Torpedo 
(Percussion fuses) 
David Spar Torpedo 
Chemical Ram Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 9.1) 
Percussion Ram Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 9.2) 
David Spar Torpedo in Barnes, (1869:plate 9.4) 
Apra e rid 1_2c 1 1 
Chemical Sensitive Fuse 
& Cross Section 
Ground Rise 
&. Cross Section 
Composition Metal Percussion 
Primer & Cross Section 
Barnes, (1869:plate 5.3) 
Barnes, (1869:plate 5.4) 
Barnes, (1869:plate 5.5) 
Apprtdic 1 2 
FUSES - CROSSECTIONS 
Bormann Time 
Hackley, (1960:31) 
Confederate Land Mine 
Hackley, (1960:32) 
US Hotchkiss Percussion 
Hackley, (1960:33) 
US James Percussion 
Hackley, (1960:34) 
US Schenkl Combination 
Hackley, (1960:40) 
US Sawyer Percussion 
Hackley, (1960:39) 
US Parrott Percussion 
First Type 
Hackley, (1960:37) 
US Parrott Percussion 
Second Type 
Hackley, (1960:38) 
US Water Captime 
Hackley, (1960:44) 
US Tice Concussion 
Hackley, (1960:42) 
US Schenkl Percussion 
Hackley, (1960:41) 
Mortar Time Fuse 
Hackley, (1960:36) 
US Ketcham Grenade 
Hackley, (1960:35) 
L  	 
Time Fuse 
Hackley, (1960:43) 
Apperidi,c 1 3 
David in McBride, (1962:108-109) 
Squib in Civil War Naval Chronology 1861 - 1865 (Parts IV, 
Undated:38) 
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ARTILLERY AND PROJECTILES  Appericl. il-3K 1 6 
Napoleon 12-Inch Field Gun (M1849) 
Downey, (1952:19 & 551) 
Apr) erica ix 1 7 
MS OF SIEFLIn AND FUSES 
. Confederate siege and field rifie projectiles: (1) 24-pdr, weight 573 lbs.; (2) 12-pdr, weight 29 lb.., 
copper cup; (3) I2-pdr., weight 28 lb..; (4) 12.pdr„ weight 213 lbs., plate missing; (5) 12-pdr., weight 32 lb.., 
plate missing; (6) 9-pdr, weight 23 lbs., copper ring missing; (7) 9-pdr., weight 25 lbs, copper ring missing; 
(8) 9-pdr., weight 233 lbs, copper ring missing; (9) 9-pdr., weight 26 lbs., copper ring, wooden fuze plug; (10) 
9-p,dr., weight 26 lbs, wrought iron cup, wooden fuze plug; (11) 18-pdr., weight 24 lbs. (defective); (12) 12- 
pdr., weight 40.5 lbs., solid wrought iron; (13) Weight 6.4 lbs.•
' 
 (14) Weight 5.7 lbs.; (15) 3:ndr, weight 10 
lbs.; (16) 3-pdr., weight 6.8 lbs.; (17) 3.pdr, weight 9 lbs.; (18) 3-pdr., weight 7 lbs.; (19) 3-pdr., weig,lat 10 
lb..; (20) 3.pdr, weight 8 lbs. Classification: Class 1, Reed, wrought-iron cup (10, 19, 20)•, copper ring 
(2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15. 16, 1 7 , 15); Class 2, copper cup (1, 3, 4, 5); Class 3, copper "ratchet sabot"; Class 5, solid 
wrought iron (12); Class 6, Whitworth (13, 14); Class 9, Hotchkiss (11). (From H. L. Abbott's "Siege Ar-
tillery in the Campaigns against Richmond." Other Canisdr_cale artillery projectiles are 1.1...^ own in Fig.. 6.) 
(Lewis. 1959:14, 15, 19 & 17) 
TYPES OF SHELLS AND FLISL:S 
Confederate siege and field rifle projectiles: (1) 9-pdr., weight 28 lbs.; (2) 9-pdr, weight 245 lbs, 
sabot missing; (3) 9-pdr., weight 25 lbs., sabot missing; (4) 9-pdr., weight 24.5 lbs., sabot missing; (5) 6-pdr., 
weight 143 lbs.; (6) 6-pdr, weight 17.7 lbs., wrought-iron cup; (7) 6-pdr„ weight 19.5 lbs.; (8) 6-pdr., weight 
143 lbs.; (9) 4-pdr., weight 115 lbs.; (10) 4 - pdr., weight 11.5 lbs, sabot missing; (11) 4-pdr., weight 93 lbs.; 
(12) 3-pdr., weight 8 lbs.; (13) 3-pdr., weight S lbs, lead fuze plug; (14) 3.pdr., weight 8 lbs., sabot missing; 
(15) 3-pdr., weight 13.3 lbs.; (16) 3-pdr., weight 12.1 lbs.; (17) 3.pdr., weight 9.5 lbs.; (19) 3-pdr., weight 
12-3 lbs.; (19) 3-pdr., weight 10 lbs.; (20) 3-pdr., weight 10 lbs.; (21) 3.pdr., weight 9.3 lbs.; (22) Weight 1.1 
lbs., ring missing; (23) Weight 3 lbs. Classification: Class 1, Reed wrought-iron cup (6, 7, 12), copper ring 
(1,.5,_22); Class 2, copper Cu; (Z3 1 : Cl-air 3, copper "ratchet sabot" (2, 3); Class 4, lead sabot (9, 9, 10, 13, 
14); Class 6, Whitworth (15, 1f., 17); Class 7, Armstrong, lead•coated (18), shunt (19, 20); Class 9, Hotch-
kiss (11, 21); Class 10, Schenkl (4). (Abbott's "Siege Artillery in the Campaigns against Richmond.") 
TYPE OF S1EELJ—S AND FUSES 
U. S. siege sod field rifle projectiles, 185.4: (1) 11-pdr, weight 32.5 lb,.; (2) 11-pdr, weigbt 31 
Ib3.; (3) 11-pdr, weight 23 lbs.; (4) 9-pdr„ weight 25 lbs.; (5) 9-pdr.; (6) 9-pdr., weight 24 lbs.; (7) 6-pdr., 
weight 13.2 lbs.; (8) 6-pdr., weight 19 lbs.; (9) 6-pdr- weigb.t.16.5 Lbs.; (10) 3-pdr, weight 16 lba-; (Il) 3- 
pdr., weight 7.8 lbs.; (12) 3-pdr„ weight 9.2 lbs.; (13; 3-pdr„ weight 9 lbs.; (1-1) 3-pdr„ weight 92 ltu. Clas• 
si6cation: Parrott, brass ring (4, 5, 9, 14); Schenk!, papier-mache sabot (6, 10, 11, 12); Hotchkiss, compressed 
load band (8, 13); Dyer, lead sabot (2, 3); Sawyer, lead sabot and lead-coated (7); Absterdam, lead sabot sod 
bands (I). (From H. L. Abbott's "Siege Artillery in the Campaigns against Richmond.") See Figure 7 also. 
TYPES OF SHELLS AND RISES 
U. S. siege seri field rifle projectiles, 1864: (1) 32-pdr, weight 95 lbs.; (2) 32-pdr.: (3) 32-pdr, 
weight 81 lbs.; (4) 32-pdr, weight 92 lbs.; (5) 24-pdr. Sawyer, weight 41 lbs.•. (6) 11-pdr, weight 26 lbs. 
Classification: Parrott, brass ring (1, 2, 3, 4); Schenk!, papier.miche sabot (6): Sawyer, flanged sod lead-
coated (5); Abaterdarn, lead sabot (1),, (Abbott's "Siege Artillery in the Campaigns against Richmond.") 
Apipericli_x 1 8 
CIVIL Ill SEIGE AND CHUM ARTILLERY 
, 
Stip and Garrison Artillery 
, 
Caliber Bore lio.) 
Leagth Of Tube (in.) 
Veight Of Tube (lb.) 
leight of ProJectile (lb.) 
!eight of Charge (lb.) 
Range (Yards at 5 Degree Ilevat) 
4.5 Inch 	(MLR) 4.50 133.00 3450 33.00 3.50 2171 
30-Pounder Parrott 	(MLR) 4.20 136.00 4200 29.00 3.75 2210 
24-Pounder Gun 	(SB) 5.82 124.00 5790 24.00 6.00 1910 
18-Pounder Gun 	(SB) 5.30 123.25 4680 18.50 4.50 1592 
12-Pounder 	Gun 	(SB) 4.62 116.00 3120 12.30 4.00 1134 
8-11ch Howitzer 	(51) 8.00 61.50 2614 50.50 4.00 1241 
Old Models 
Old 42-Pounder Rifle 640 ? - - 14.00 1.00 1650 
Old 	32-Pounder 	Rifle 6.40 ? - - 64.00 6.00 1650 
Old 	24-Pounder 	Rifle 5.82 ? - _ 41.00 5.00 1670 
30-Pounder 	Parrott Rifle 4.20 96.80 3550 30.00 3.50 1670 
10-Inch Snot!) Bore 10.00 120.00 12000 128.00 20.00 1740 
8-Inch Smooth Bore 8.00 95.00 6000 68.00 10.00 1740 
e 
CIVIL VIII SEA COAST ARTILLERY 
Sea Coast Raillery Caliber Bore (in.) 
Length Of Tube (in.) 
. 	
Weight Of Tube (lb.) 
Weight of Projectile (ib.) 
Weight Of Charge (lb.) 
0 Range 	'Ilevation (Degrees) 
32-Pounder Gun 	(SD) 6.40 125.2 7280 32.60 1 1122 5.11 
42-Pounder Gun 	(SE) 7.00 129 8465 42.70 10.5 1955 5.00 
I-Inch Columbiad 	(SB) 1.00 124 9240 65.00 11 1113 5.00 I 10-Inch Colunbiad (SB) 11.00 126 15400 121.00 11 1114 5.00 
15-Inch Colutbiad (SB) 15.00 112 50000 c.1350 48 5730 5.00 
20-Inch Ragan (513) 21.00 190 117000 1080.00 108 6161 - 	21.35 
100-Pounder Parrott 6.40 151 9700 70-110 10 2370 5.00 
200-Pounder Parrott 1.00 159 16300 132-175 16 2800 5.08 
300-Pounder Parrott 11.00 113 26500 230-250 25 2500 	I 10.00 
10-Pounder Vilitmorth 	(MLR) 5.00 118 8582 88.00 10 13665 1 10.00 
70-Pounder Armstrong (BLR) 6.40 110 6903 79.80 10 2183 1 5.90 
8-Inch Blakely (NLR) 8.00 156 17000 211.00 20 2000 5.01 (Bore) 150-Ponder Armstrong (MLR) 8.50 120 15737 150.00 20 2200 	1 5.81 
12.75-Inch Blakely (NLR) 12.75 192 54080 701.00 50 5000 15.01 
CIVIL VU SMOTR IDRE ARTILLERY 
Ssooth Bore Artillery Caliber lore (1n.) 
I 	Length I 	Of Tube I 	(in.) I 
!eight Of Carriage (lb.) 
'eight 	of Robe (lb.) 
leig1t of Projectile (lb.) 
leight of Charge (lb.) 
Range (lards at 5 Degree Ilevat.1 
Total Gun Veight (lb.) 
6-Pounder M1141-1844 3.67 60.00 900 884 6.10 1.25 1523 - 
12-Pounder 141141-1144 4.62 78.00 1175 1757 12.30 2.50 1663 - 
12-Pounder lovitzer K1141-1844 4.62 53.00 110 788 1.90 1.00 1072 3214 
12-Pounder Mountain Howitzer 4.62 33.00 157 220 1.90 1.00 900 507-970 
24-Pounder Spritzer M1141-1144 5.12 65 1121 1318 18.40 2.00 1322 4036 
32-Pounder loritzer K1841-1144 6.40 75.00 1175 1920 25.60 2.50 1504 1575 
12-Ponder lapoleon K1857 4.62 66.00 1121 1227 12.30 2.50 1119 or 31E5 1610 (Caisson 
_ o, , 	I I 3111) 
CIVIL Vu RAUL 1RTILLBRI 
Naval artillery Caliber Bore (ill.) 
c Length Of Bore (in.) 
!tight Of Total Gun (lb.) 
Type Of Projectile 
.. !eight of Projectile (lb.) 
!eight 	of Charge (lb.) 
t Range (Yards at 5 Degree Kent.) I 
S000th Bores I I I 15-Inch 14.50 130.00 42000 330-352 I 	Shell 35 1700 
11-Inch 11.15 132.00 15700 135.50 I 	Shell 15 1712 
10-Inch 9.15 120.00 12000 101.50 I 	Shell 12.5 1710 
9-Inch 1.15 107.00 9200 70.00 Shell 10 1710 
8-Inch/64-Poonder 7.85 95.00 6000 52.70 Shell 7 1657 
32-Pounder Bovitzer 6.25 69.00 3000 32.10 Shot i 4 1469 
• 26.00 Shell ' 	4 ' 	1460 
24-Pounder Coehorn lov. 5.80 58.00 13000 17.50 Shell 2 1270 
12-Pounder Coehorn lov. 4.60 55.00 760 8.50 Shell 1 1085 
Rifled Guns 
150-Pounder Parrott 8.00 136.00 16500 152.18 Shell 16 2000 
100-Pounder Parrott 6.40 130.00 9700 70-110 Shot 8 10 2000 70-108 Shell 10 	I 2001 
60-Pounder Parrott 5.30 105.00 5310 55.08 (Shot) 6 	I 2100 






EARLY ROCKETS  Apr) ems:11..2c 1 9 
iion;sztlt ,47745.7 
C . 
Hale War Rocket 
New type, two rotation orfices 
at centre of gravity shell. 
Hale War Rocket 
Introduced c. 1855 Rotation 
orf ice in head. 
(a) bore and vent 
(b) recess in base of head 
(c) tangential vents-3 
(d) head solid in the centre 
Congreve War Rocket 
Guidance by stick attached at rear. 
Congreve War Rocket Launcher 
(Loaded) 
4 	
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1...4141 . 1 It. %VII., .14.• 	 1.•444 ■%. 	 ■ •••laia 41 III II. 1”..i...14 v. iglu. 
I.y 	 11, ■■ 1"1 ..•ro,s• al. ill -twit a tetant4t, 
1143 	 call I... 1.,••••”4 , 1 	 rit•11,11 ., t/rr 	 .114..att14• 	 it- a•1I•. 
I14.• 	ral 1.I. 	 •:.i.1 WO V. laid, 
tr ;44 l4.• 	 ...OA "poll 	 111441rat, 	 l' 	  
'slave 	 ao ■ .44•• ■ •Ita44i4•al 	 tat44•••..sol.-laillially 	 .4•1 11•111. 
%VIII,. I to, I.3/. 1••1 	...1.11.4•1 ,4 10 thy 	 ia 
ol,o111•1'. 1 :11-•“•1,41111 il..• 141 , u1.44•111, 	 a 	11,...111 3,1i411 
814•• 	 .• ■ 	1.4,1 al441 ■ 14•• :16141441,11 01 III.• 
I.!. 	 1••••Ia1lic 
St II, I al••• ■ •Ia $14. ," 	 r. 	 1Iv• 	 fa 114, 
-"oh .t •II:ti..- 114:I 	II4•• 	 c.ljv 1, ca.: ht• 
••: ■ -ily la: 	  14.410 44t le .■ ■ 14•• 	 Or 
..1 ■ •• ■ 1 II.- I. 	 I,. 	 1 1 ,0101, po-o loot 
.4• ■ f..rt 
	 ,16 
17Y.T1 
ti • .G;;.;„..' 
3:1..3 I 
•• 	Nos ...mt.., 3. 
LI-41W. 
;.• 
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..11.• •• ■ 	 ..• •, 	• 	 141 	11,. 	 I• ■ • 	• 	:. 
.1. 
e. 	 ..1 .11 II.. 	1.,•• ■ 	1...11. 
;•••••• .1... 	12.4.1m,••• LI I. I•s ..re 	..1 	••;••••••s, 
•	 ■ 1 II, 	I. . I. 
1..•Itt II. 	•,- 	 ,s,•1 
_ 
4, ••• al. Id.ILI-4 Ill. 




1 	• 1 	1 	.1 I . " •1. 	11•• 	• ••••.,••• 
.l., I I 	s.“I. 
.1. 
11,....".• 	I I 	1••• 1.. 
II. 
I It , 	• 1 . .•..,.•.•01 . 	;. 
..... 	.1. .11.I 	11,1,0 	.•.11. 	1 • I . . 	I ••I 11 ■ ••11 . ...111. ■ .11..11 	.10..1.411 
61, 	L.... !1...: 	. ... ; . 	 111 ,.•L•• 	f o 	 
• .1.• 	..... 
s.•.• 	 ile•• 	. • 3. 	 II s• 
	
I 	 1.• 1/1• 	11 	 1 1.1 6.1:• • 31 111.• 1.1. ..... •gi 1 .11 
..•••. g.1 	 ••/.. 	 ••.. 1. 	 .1.;. ■ .1.•• 	 It •: - 11 
..1 	 1 • .., 	 c.11. 1.1 Ile, 
1 	 .1. 	 • 	Ity. II Ow I., ...I, II., 
• 1 	- 	1 	1 • 	..• 	11.••11 . • 	 111. •1.1...131111.111y 111 1 it, 1.1 
No. 3.1.1.1.1..! 
4'II I/IS'Ir 0111 EU II. Sill•)::•41:11. 
. . JoIy 	1%6'2. 
C. .1/. 	'Ell 
I. -  
IR. • • •• ■ •.I 	si 	1 
S. 	 1 	1 I, 	.... 	 otI, 	...1.11....o...1 	11 11.4 	•4 
I• 	I 1. .11, ....mt., 0,1 I ..... 
II,, 1..t, II. 	 -O." 1111..01, 
J. 	 r 
'malt 
Doe :W. 1864 • 
.11111N F. A t•rus:n v. 
Win, 27..1857 
.1/”. / • ISE; 
•.•_,, 
-4 
	 1 	 I 
No. 45,11111 	  Ilterbother 20. 14111. 
This um. belongs to 11••• 	provi.l.11 wok it 111arati00 0f gar. 
trtdres, which are ant 	oileatly 1, 1 10 11••• eh:onto, toy the mos entent 
of ti.. guard levee. The reciproe:  ' 	l•reerlopi•••••• 	ntlar11.-.1 to a 
•errated rod tousl ing hack into 111.• •11..k. rovii ..realion holding a 
an rtridge and moving 	• forwar•I 	 of 111.• 10001 . 11. A 
ur 	 lorioe• Ihe forward cartridge op iu 
Ism. with Ell.. ehalnhet ni omit op, .. • .. e 	the -Aid hleecti. 
• CLA0.1.-The eon-shill:Loon of the cortri.le. rah•lt.1 rod fl, with the 
bresch•picce C, sut..tatitially in the manner awl for the purl..., herein 
shown and dereettwd. 
• Also. the combination of the sprint: edit ridg.e.lifiet I, will, 111.• 
breech•piece• C, nod rntrhet.rod (3, •ob.uolitottly in the snatinur nod 
for [ht. plietto, heroin shown :•1111 .10,116,1, 
Sliding Breech Loading Bolt Action 
.1. 11. 4111:1:N 
No. 1,...4::11 	  Nose:allot, I. 1 ,37. 
Ii i ho 11.11.r.,•• ■ ••••••t. 	hortel .%. •• 	 1.•••1. :•• t• ..... 
10:0110 	 elso 	'11. 	t. 1, It tiler, ••• 	••le 110, 1i, 101 1110 
01 160,0 .,1_0. T111 •00,1116 0 100101 . 11. 0 06.0u ,, lei 
g.0.•I 1 	 •1.101 . .. 	 phott.•••• S. :1,1 .1,...,1 , [h. • •••••• r ••f •111- 
1.11,tree 
 
01 , 51 II. t. to. it 	i•••• a I ••• 	ord ...1 a Ia.- , 11$1.1•.e 
•• •• •t al 	 •• • ••1 	hoi:•••• V. The oho, •I I.11t•••• "owl-1W, 
Nt .16 it Ittli or boo tosa 1. 	which 	tool000lose.l. :51$.! roul 
i•ro.1•••••••, •••• ■ •• .1, •,111•11, 	 ne• 1••••it ..... 
- 0011 .1. 160 ••••;•rot i.e...••••••r e. 	the 
:••••1 r• 	n:.•:•• ■ ••• 	the •11..11.1, • r, 	ii 	••.1...1• II.. 	1.11•Ireer 
■ •••••■■ ••••1•••• 	I he 	• .1. 11051 	hO •1 	 1•1•••• 5. :old 	phone,. 
111.1) . 1.• •Iro 	s. 1...• 
'• • to ...1:•r• 1 The er••••••• 	or to. 	pot -.1-1$1.•••••••:ssiot: 1.8 
• ••• ■ •••••••••.• 	oho •.:5•1 01 16 0 10.1g 01110•00101.1, • . 	 ilte 
..• 1 . ....1..10.0.011, 	 •••• 	III; 	 I .1. 1 1. 0 1 rl...10 	 .11.111 1 1., 10 000 1 1 
..... 	 pc.••••••1 
r•,.••••••• ■ •1. 	l'he 	■ •••••• ■ •1••olo, 	1:. •..... 	0055 oh , 
••" 1 ••I: 1•1••••e.t 
o lour 01 111 0  10.0.0.1 016016. 
1..i 	•. :•5••1 •olo 	••,...tone 	t 	10. 	  
•-• 51,, ea too, lot. el.  
'1111: 	11. I•I/ 1: r.rit. 
1.1 rcla 	P.C.:. 
No. tt 1.7110 	  
I! ‘,..-•11••• orrautreol••••• of Ow co na.•1•• ■ er IS. 	%pro,: ., 
and ill , Ilo...1.1.••er 1. I 	 w III $1 • ■ •••1 ol -1 	 I•ler 	•••$ 
60111. 111111 1 .0 90001 lo Ille 	 •••••• ■•••le., tool .0 	•• 
III 1,..1.1me 	ote I.. ol 	410111..• -.041 .0:11e. III 11,14,1:-/ 0114 
1111:N.1 A :II l2; 11% JUNIN:N. 
No. 51.11117 	 J000nry 	81..1111. 
Gl...11.1 	 l'Io• noothola 	nr 	N.1,4+ 	1.. r•tol es- 
t oholar proj..e. 	 o 	:1 cylosolo.al 1.11..1 calla 1.1e of 
lorno.ol os the 	looser.' 	 . all .11Instalillally 125 a12s1 1.0 
1.0 rpo.... 10 . /..ill P0.1 foril,. 
	
ol the ssaiol 	 laarr..I. 
orej,1 ion .1 of Ilk.• loe.,111.1ev.• tool 1. swift,: valeta I:. the wIlol.• 
I.- mos:ea zoo/ op.4,11ing 	t:th 	Hy 	forth. 
JOSL l'A'. Jon.", .1366. 
	1 
011.,:t2 	  
Ith 
	 alma. a ry I. 112117. No. 
S•••••11.1. '111.• 6,0011..111 li,,,,Slill, II... 	r 	 of 
or It: 	 
I, II, 	 th:11 	the 	 of lb.. 
r.•I I.. 10 , ...,1, 	 1..• 	,,,,, 	loot 
II ,ota 	..0•-vosti . .Il1: 	 311.1.1e.or11.41. 
Thin!. II/ ..... 1.2.2,10 as Ss ills 	loss , 11.• carryalls, TsssI s anti IOW 
I. Is , 	St 1- 	 - ,vist,sl, 	 and lostlaing 
.1.11stss 	Itn•Is sstirs . 	  I- 11., ....the ...I. I.• ■ 	the (root .41.1 ..r 
II. , 	nonl str the 	 so• 
Folo$ It. II .o ..... 	I 	 I 	 ....el. or  
iot• 	 th.• 	,1110 	 3041 rola 1 .■ 	 Jr..' 
st 	I. 	s, s,s•••• ■ ••-. •• ■ • •.sintsalnitt 	ive - for Ii "titan,: nod 
.I.•tes  	11••• 	r.I 	 tIo• 	Issiosisis, 
.sonIsnr.si .... •• ■ 	sn.nslls-rartyitss, 	:tha 
I. .1 ill, 11... ititl, ..I • 	•• ■ •1 .••ll .41 ill Ili.• 	to) of 
.2.1 5•••ro•,..1•••1 	1•••••••-..4 eor 	lo• ■ •••••.1.11.o, of Ike s.Stisl 
woos., .nIssstants:sll, a • sttnl l'ssr soorsts•••••. 
SSI.. In 	 :•Ctdis, lit.-sarns, 1, 	loer.in .1...wr2t...I. the 
.....S•itm ..... t. i I. II. , tstIoa 	e• 1...11 	 i•lio,r ill the 
ot 	-:“. ■ •• 	 for rev,. rioZ 
• rot:.  	 •sit ass.ta 	•ts. 
• •a•t 
i■• • ■ •• 4111i. 1..1.•11.• •• 	1 •,•,• . ,11 lit•• 	/.1 111.• 1.114•11 . 1. 1.stI1 
.1., floor 	tol 	 ..... :61.1.• 	 lio.10.0:11 .124: 
sol••• •I 	 I 	 .11:1 meter 	:I. So 
Moo 	••• •I.I.• I. , I. 	:10.1 ..... of his , rhar..• 
Sn• 	. ost 	.t 	ts 1.• 	ron•lis ally 	I ..... Ilsn 
.0.11 4, •11.1.1••••••••i 	t1• . ..le 11.•• 11,•.11.• •11...Illl 3414 II..1.1.4V1,1••11 
• ti a nd - ••1 
. I. . 	I'll. 1.•:.,1:1 , $1" Jot. I. 
.t. 11 . 11ANSEPO/T. 
, In a la ...,It•ItossailIC 	 rival...tow...ion 
the to 	orrylo,, ...I :slot II... ...DO. 	1.2211221ot Y 5010,1, 
e 	 oper, 	;mil ....11oint.V0 from thr 
.i.00 si am! •••1 
Sliding Longitudinally Forward 
Breech Sliding Backward (Longitudinally 
Operated By Hand) 
	  - - 	) 
7;)1 
t4    
X! 
111 II. %V .■ 
N o. 1.19.lo 1 .................. 	....... 	 1. 1 ••••70. 
...1•„ • ,. 	 ..„.$ 	.. . 	.••••...1...1 225212 
12..1 	:1•••• ■ •• 	.11 .... Iowa  	it 	II. , •• ■ ••:ol ■ • 
1.....•••18.1... 	1.1.1.5.1•••1 	 %. 
II' ts lo - o •••• ■••■■ .1.• ■ •••I :Intl eq., al.,: as.  	ansl 51 , -s•risIsntl. 
TIn• Issonstont .  sina Ile al,stass I S. Inas islnol %Visit Oho in ts• 
	 s, I. :•12.1 I •.8. a'. 	• ..... qnsisnm 	Is I Ito 	
Is. pr... 
.81441 	II.•• •1.•1 I .. 	11••• • s• - 3.1. so"I. , 1;w...est •.• 11I. 	18.• so• 
.11,11 esso•Itlost - trtl noel .pera I log a- ss 	 St Stall 
TlooI 	....1 .1 Issslt 41. ,s 	 Ste no op, 	 
toot .I••• to 	•I•••Il 	olio, .... 	11..• 
I•• ■ • nss, , t to., 41$•• ■ •••• I 	•1•••11, 	e. 1.2112 a. 	•18.... 
and stn....SI...I 
1 , ..... III. 	 ltItts1 I . ea 	 la ills II. , 1.1•••• ■ •1.• 
pstnenII, Es• •••• lit t1 	 1 1 11 , 1 111. - . ' 	1 '11 • 
....II:: I II , • : ..... 	 ••• 1• :I • a 21:1,.• 	 111.• 	 ..1 
ti..• do 	.• 	I... a. 
2.10. .1 	 fo...1 it 	e.. ..... sd•••I o 	•35•• ■■ 1..11 
.s1......1•• ■ ••.$1411. 3 • 	to :oot •I. 
II. II. tt'l:.%1' 
No. 	 In. 1 ,33. 
1'1. t m.-1.'le•t. .olobiiiintto• 	m i th lo•131 , ,Ily .tt .iig• 
iiir 	Islarpoo• 	ell,rtio= 111, 	w 
th, 	 coehing. 	.111 , haio 	• I%) tswa1.- ol 
II. Ili, pinI, , •Isele al, :13..1 h•vor 	■•. all op,ram.:P.h.1.1. 1 6311y 
	
i.• 	1.• io 	 or *imply i•ot• 
111.•i.linioloi, Ili .• 
..... 	 ilo• promo,: -lid , .1. %viol. the lo,ter It. and 
ille 	..... :t plo I. al...As 	 I to ilo•• 1,v , r, 
Ili a .1oI 1,, ill tit, ....do or liol. 	Wirlo..1 	 111.11 ■Io• 	I 
s, ill drat,: 	h si,. hallow,' ...... .110 , far to 
allots' Ill , 	pill h. or H. 	 St 	lialooler 
• 	Ili, cap, 	..... vi• th.• 
11, 3.1.0 laviot lo,t. 	1 , %••■• 	 •••■ 
II. B. 111.:+4 	 JAL2114 1. 
1:tit!IpSi 
NO.I 1.191 	  !Ilse rel. 21. 1.144. 
11,...11• NO. 1.129— 
01,1.1.-11 , 1. 'rho itmvald , 	rl 	h.•s, 	arrot,•.1 	it 
broo:1110 "V to al." :tznitt-1 111 , ..0.1  
1 he 01. 111. 4. of II , 1113,1.1 . ..4111. :81, 11 	il 	11,01 ot 	r•.:1 r of 111.• 
harr,I. nod carried att - : 8■ • Ir... 	 for :11,• 	..... 
.111o.taittially 114 ••• ■ 1111111. 
1. 111 ,..11,103,101. with 111, tooval.1 , 
tint 	11•••■•iiii ii 11,•• 	 th.• vied, of 	ho 
eartrillz...oltaitilier, lor 	i''''i"''''''' Girth. 
Third. 	 1,1 . 11.01. 	 11,111 ,, 	I 	as •••5 
Lim 	porpo”..1.•irrit...1, 
1"0,111. TIo• .11111111, 1•1••,1. 111iiit. 41 ,1,11,, 	 (..1111. Jr II, 
Fiji', 	 .... 	1,1,, I lo• 1,,r1,111, for the tot, 
110.11 of elartienz the toin form aid 3. 111.• 4 . 111. 11•111..: ... 	. 0 ,11,. 
.1. /1.1./. 
T5r. 	 ''''• • 1.-...- .• —  — . • • 	. 	. 	. 
' ...T•14 .5 	: :: "7. '.,c-7.-:-•+; 
7/,,,',.\ 
1-----' 




.t 1.111111' 	%I.T- 
No. a3.•421- 	 I-h i.  
rio• 	• 	 or tit , rai-k bar 	ti■•• 
Pf•••••••■• V, or 	11011,11..111. 3,1 111•Oilipelli1,1 ti,, i n. 
II. ii..• 	 10 lb, owt;:a7.11., 	711“1 l la , 111._ ■•• 
h•e,r I:. and 	5.. nin•rate tog,•ther and m ith 
S• • • . ..11.1. T11, Co1“1111131100 	11..• 	 .1'1. V. :Oa II 	;WI 
I, II. :ma flo• rack liar 1. . nod .1,, pp:, .1 to a 
oia,:a,itt , It. ao.I 	 h•ver 	•nt•-tantiaii 
and ,o a. in oporor 
Thii 	 of II.,' rim I •pritv., I. ,siii1.4, , t , •■• 
11,, us' 	xt 	(1,11. 	 lo olto1,1Ie 	 111,, 
TIo• eolL1,1111. :011 Of Ili , 111:11f:1 ,11 . ,111 . , 
or al rarloto•o S, Su it, 	ovio, ta 	toloolar 	 11. ,11,1 Iv' 
Lever Action Breech Loading 
(Evolution of Winchester Design) 
' Swinging on Longitudinal Pin  
App 	1_24c 21 





ettobt r It.. 
(Relnmed Doonsam, 
Cum.—First. In combination with the hollow ne.--ch.pin, th , 
spring-catch In, on the breech yin, nod 11.• 0.1011, a rranzed or t,:trai 
or rtrn.rtre, or both, Poloitan daily A. and for the piorpa.t•r• .4 ler: 
Second. In combination with the carrier•block L. and Ow •ntio, 
catch In, placed on Lo.lp of the bmretapin L. stn.,' 	rt! , :i.• 
of sant carrier•block, near the rear end, us. ehown at d. , dz. 4, 0. to 
stnIte the cartridze forward or the centre, and 	ritairir 	forward 
end of the cartritIce, while the rear end I. 11 ,1.1 down hy 	,1•11,.• 
catch. trippinc It over and freeing it from thq spring, and ..jt...1ing it 
the gun.sublitantially a, described. 	 lab 
Swinging & Tilting Bolt 
(Sliding Backward & Downward) 
4 1, i•••• •1 .1. 
 
tons■RIO. 
   
X A".1X0 	 ft.  1866 11 
p • '7;4- _ 
No. 115,01 .. Mny 22, 
  
TIM cartridge it transferred to the barrel from the macacine tube 
beneath by a earrier hinek, operated by t.lie trittger•coard lever. Car• 
triAlZrs Are to Oar rmtexcine through i   in be 
frame, (vreievied by eater,) and correppondinit channel in the carrier. 
t.lt.tim.—rorminc an opening throng!, the train, feint iVr1 l• LO the 
carrier block Out) 111;w:aZill., , and in combination therewith, no OM , 
tile 1111g:1.11W may be charred through the carrier block from one 
if the arra, klibetan tinily in the manner herein drscribed. 
Breech S1i ri - Backward 
(Operated By Lever ) 
0. F.14 7.A .0 ESTER 	 Jer 
• 	 , 








   
   
(1. 
so. 37.,..41.1 	
S.ritle"11.er I. Ivii4t. 
1011.11 	it,.. tile r 1■1•1,1,10 , ..... 1 . - nntinal
■ 
I 10• 10:1 1$0., in,orit,011. .0 113i 	
i„. 	,„ 
enn,hinali•ni with the rarrier 	 1..1.1 
	I. ;Ind 1,1 I 1,•1 	
an,' 
or ill' 	411ms- , nr•fili.A. 
St '.1 The 4 .01iiion3 100 of I li•• .101i S
. . I, •-r• II. ', id Carrir/d11...1. 







	Apr, ericl ix 22 
Volcano Repeating Rifle 
Model 1851 Sharps 
MODUL 2851 
	
PlOOCI 2855 Wt11-4 CONANT SEAL 
Spencer Crossectional View 
Of Mechanism (1865 Spencer 
Catalogue)  
BREECH BLOCK 
BARREL 	, Itwcetvest. 	E7ECTOR. 	/1.--HAmNIEFC 
., .LOCKING SuiRFACE 
mAGAZINE 'TUBE 
	 I*/ 
FiNGER LEvER Fiver 	SPRING 
BREECH ASSEMBLY PIVOT 	TRIGGER. 
FINGER LEVER. 
B UT T E T OE K 




Tuteuted May 14. 1861. 
• .111.• MOW .00.•■■••••• O....a,. • 
invtator 
Sibert Magazine Fed Fire Arm 
Fuller & Steuart, (1944:206, plate 20) 
Winchester Model 1865 
• 	  nitsimourinvpmmimainnwmpoornitanutnnwouniziamms 
Peabody Crossectional View with 
Operation Open 
(Patent No. 35947 issued, 
July 22, 1862) 
Scientific American (Vol.1214), January 21, 1865) 
Henry Magazine Fed Repeating Rifle 
(Patent No. 30446 issued 
October 16, 1860) 
41P-10114,1 - 
.A.F.F.4mricli_x 23 
French Chassepot (311ustrated London 
News, March 1867) 
Appr&di 2'. 
Gatling Gun Model 1864 
(Hogg & Batchelor 1974:113) 
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POWS Or C0111510m Or THE DirrrFror 
VCSSELS LIFOn NIL F.A•I Original Chart Of the Battle of Mobile Bay. Featuring the ramming of CSS Te_n4APAee 
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c? 	. 0 LITTLE . ITELIC.A.V. 1514111 
• • 
' 
ENii In n•tista or Olor. ii. I rum the laLl` 51.11Iii 1 ■ 111111% 
r i ti 	M 01111.1: 	IIUII T. 
	
= 4. i 31.p. 	1.y.14ve and 	449 4. 01.01 	n...1 It ...attar, ....nay 
4•40 	114•14.• 	rent• a•d of 1.4. 34.., 
ir=
▪ 
2 ..• 	y 	■ A• 
• *at 
 
S. 4. • 	 at ..4 
▪ •.• 	41.•1• 	 1•••••• ••■••• •■••••,.. •es,..■•••• 1 1.., 
aye,. 1. 	 
1.J A.•••.•• 	dna. 	...a...4, non 	anis t• 	 an. alminatice• 
on..1 	ate. ••• 	5.• •••• ■ 1.•■• ...ty•■••. 
• p•as 	■••••I 6/1 01 0, ea. 	 •-•.• 44. 	aaaaa 	fee 
••••■•• ••I fio 
= • 1 •I 	.41••• 	••■ •.• 1.1• alc..ga ••• ..... 	1, II.. tint 
son/ 
prris 	 .4.... 1.. 	a 	 ••• ■A 
Irel•4us .0.• 1, 1-.11arnli 	 G. I . 	g•tt t . 
I=..Z 	I;1•Ita 	 for, I ....v/1 •  
ENTRANCE OF 
- - 
REAR ADMIRAL FARRAG UT 
-_-_-.  
NOVI LE LI AY. 
Appendix 25 
